Philosophical interest in emotion and imagination has created a deluge of publications in recent years. Morton’s new book connects these two subject areas in new and original ways. His central aim is to demonstrate how emotion and imagination play a central role in our lives, especially our moral lives. The centrality of emotion and imagination reveals itself in provocative ways. For example, not only does he think all emotions involve the imagination but mice, apparently, can prepare for trouble (i.e., cats) by imagining potential avenues of escape. Although counter-intuitive, Morton’s key idea is that basic emotions, such as fear and anger, require imaginative processes just like contemplative moral emotions, such as remorse, guilt, or shame. Imagining requires taking another’s point of view or perspective but also requires understanding how this perspective influences our own emotions and subsequent actions. In short, Morton weaves together an intricate portrait of how our moral emotions are influenced by the imaginative process and its psychological impact.
The book is broken into four parts with each section consisting of short chapters. Some chapters merely explore an idea or concept while others are more summative of his thesis. The addition of a dizzying array of thought experiments and examples—which often fail to produce a consistent narrative—makes reading a very disjointed experience. However, Morton’s work, generally speaking, is important and can be summed up as follows.
First, emotions play a role in how and what we imagine. Fear, as Morton points out, often takes the form of imagining possibilities of danger. Fear, such as boogeymen under the bed or tripping while holding one’s newborn granddaughter, creates imaginative ways of coping that allows us to adjust our behaviour and take preventative steps, in some cases, literally. At other times, fear takes the form of inner imaginative narratives in how, say, someone will respond to our arguments or questions. But emotions aren’t static; they can put pressure on our thoughts, desires, and perceptions. Each emotion, says Morton, has a specific kind of pressure it puts on other mental states, while some mental states (moods) put pressure on our emotions.
Second, the pressure exerted by emotions on our beliefs and desires lies at the heart of our moral lives. Pressure is built up, so to speak, through imagining the minds of others. Unlike other philosophers writing on the subject, Morton does not make concrete distinctions between empathy and sympathy but instead shows how sticky their connections can be, which makes imagining the minds of others difficult business. As Morton correctly demonstrates, we often don’t acknowledge or recognize the limits of our imagination; it’s too hard, we imagine inaccurately, or we just don’t want to. Most importantly, the accuracy with which we imagine another person’s mind is framed by emotional pressures that bend the act of imagination itself.
Third, building on existing psychological research, emotions such as contempt, disgust, and disappointment are often central to moral decisions. Our moral emotions, says Morton, are built out of other points of view. He calls these “memotions”. Memotions are derived by taking the other person’s point of view (love, trust, respect, awe, admiration, or fear), acknowledging the attitude another person has towards an act (praise or fury), and then combining these points of view in imagination. This combination of emotions generates cognitive pressures on beliefs, desires, inclinations and intentions from which our moral judgements derive but can also lead to changes in other emotions. This leads to emotional learning. Moral emotions allow one to learn from another’s point of view, which may be retracted, nullified, or blocked, and alter moral judgments.
Finally, once we get our heads around the idea that others might have different attitudes than our own, we can use this emotional learning to prevent smugness or come to grips with remorse or regret. We don’t need rules; at least they shouldn’t be at the heart of our moral decisions. For Morton, imagination and empathy are riskier attitudes; these attitudes are especially important when ‘the official rules are blind or unjust or crush individuals in the cogs of their approximations’ (173). A little more imaginative thought may produce different alternatives and better moral outcomes.
But it’s unclear why Morton dismisses rules so easily. Don’t trust someone who doesn’t laugh, says Morton, because his moral judgments come from rules and they will not be able to hold two different points of view in mind. But why should we think this? Surely it’s an exaggeration; some rules provide clear moral guidance regardless if one can hold two views at the same time. Doing what is right often requires us to fight, quarantine, or overcome our emotions. It’s easy to imagine someone having to overcome her racist or prejudicial views in order save the life of someone she would, under non-moral circumstances, despise or feel disgust for. Perhaps, when one’s memotions are inappropriate, moral rules will come to bear and show the individual the error in her ways. Moral rules are, generally speaking, engendered via social narratives and dialogues as children and are not so easy to escape.
Morton is right that we often don’t acknowledge or recognize the limits of one’s imagination. It is also reasonable to assume that individuals from one’s own culture will be easier to understand than those from different cultures. But most of the time we don’t need to imagine. Even Morton acknowledges “in everyday interaction with others our purposes and roles are usually clear, so that we have a good idea why people are doing what they do, what their medium-scale aims are” (88). In this sense, imagination may be unnecessary. Morton over-determines the extent to which one imagines in the moral context. It’s unclear why emotional imagination must be central to morality. Stepping into the shoes of another person is not necessary for moral judgments any more than music is necessary to dance. Moral judgments are often based on social narratives and contexts that make it unnecessary to imaginatively determine what is right or wrong.
However, Morton’s analysis of emotion and imagination provides one of the most nuanced and subtle books on moral psychology today. For this, it should be applauded, even if he overextends the role imagination plays in our moral lives.
