In Orgies of Feeling, Elisabeth Anker probes melodramatic depictions of political events in the media and in political discourse in the United States after World War II. What do these depictions tell Americans about their beliefs and expectations for themselves and their country? How do these depictions affect power relations? These questions are important for understanding politics, but Orgies of Feeling shows that their answers have crucial implications for political theory as well. In politics, Anker argues, melodramatic discourse often succeeds at legitimizing the state's antidemocratic and violent displays of power; but when it fails to do this, melodrama opens a space where “projects of true democracy and equality across borders” can emerge (256). In political theory, how we view—and use—melodrama can land us in different sides of a divide on the use of narrative patterns in political thought. Here, I believe, lies the book's real provocation. l first want to offer an overview of the rich and beautifully written core of the book.
Orgies of Feeling reframes two commonplaces. The first is that there was much pathos in the political discourse responding to 9/11, and leading to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The pathos, however, did not come from a generic appeal to emotion; rather, it came embedded in a particular, and distinctively modern, type of storyline. This political discourse tells a story of good and evil, political polar opposites personified in characters who represent the virtuous nation and its vicious enemies, and such discourse is often accompanied by heart-wrenching music and special effects. The victim is virtuous because of her suffering, and the suffering, in turn, underscores her innocence. So, in this narrative, the nation becomes a damsel in distress: being an injured and endangered innocent gives the victim moral authority, which in turn justifies any action promising to save the victim-cum-nation from danger. The narrative can then move forward, allowing the hero (which in this case is the nation turned into a powerful state) to rescue the victim and to restore her innocence. In sum: “The story of 9/11 was a melodrama” (3).
In Anker's view, melodramatic political discourse is particularly useful in building the nation and generating legitimacy. This narrative form is so embedded in US culture, moreover, that it does not need to be designed or prescribed. As chapter 1 shows, as soon as the first plane crashed into the World Trade Center, melodrama was the genre the media overwhelmingly used to tell the story; and thus, only a few hours after the attacks, it became the main frame for understanding the events of September 11. Later, however, it was the government that consciously used melodramatic discourse and speeches to legitimize the “War on Terror,” and to distract attention from the undesirable consequences of the war effort, particularly the growth and reorganization of the state apparatus and the concentration of power in the White House. Melodrama justified the growth of the administration and the security state.
This view of the “War on Terror” is the second commonplace that Anker introduces and reframes. Most commentators have said that the buildup of the American state was legitimized by the media as a relinquishing of freedom in exchange for a gain in security. Anker, by contrast, argues that the growth in state power and the excesses of the Bush administration (particularly the buildup to the war in Iraq) was legitimized by a search for freedom. In her view, the melodramatic storyline that legitimized state actions succeeded not because it promised future security in exchange for a lost freedom, but because it promised future freedom after heroic retaliation for freedom's loss. The promised freedom is individual sovereignty; a form of freedom that requires full individuality, mastery of circumstances, and control of the external world. In Anker's view, freedom as individual sovereignty is the core ideal of the American version of liberal individualism. This ideal eventually engenders violent state power. It pervades American society's imagination, particularly in an era when such an ideal becomes harder and harder to attain. Thus “the melodramatic story of 9/11 reveals a desperate and violent attempt to pursue freedom as the morally righteous reclamation of sovereignty in a volatile, disempowering and non-sovereign era” (14).
For Anker, melodrama succeeds as political discourse when it convinces Americans that they can attain this freedom as individual sovereignty through the state. Yet the ideal of an individual who exercises sovereign control of herself and her environment is a chimera. Individual freedom always depends on wider collective forces, and unsolvable conflicts in the structure of society and the economy, both at home and abroad. So freedom as sovereignty is impossible, even though Americans think it is not. This lack—or cognitive dissonance—is compensated for by melodrama which resolves contradictions on the stage and in political discourse as magical solutions to individual problems. It suggests that structural problems can be resolved by virtuous and heroic individual action. In the political discourse of 9/11, the nation that symbolizes each individual is avenged, but the wars in Central and Southwest Asia do not solve the problems of powerlessness and economic injustice for individuals in the US. Melodrama is a form of ideological legitimization which, as Weber, Foucault, and Habermas would agree, steps in to help individuals make sense of their world, despite the inabilities of capitalism and liberal politics to resolve contradictions in the economic and political structure of society. Ideological legitimization conveyed in political discourse and the media is intended to patch up structural cracks—the dam of the state always precariously containing the flows of capitalism. The mechanism to achieve this effect is “Orgies of Feeling.”
In Anker's view, these “orgies”—Nietzsche's depiction of a communal reveling in heightened feeling—best explain melodramatic depictions of national suffering. The excesses of grief and sorrow in which media viewers soaked after 9/11 managed to overshadow the more mundane effects of the unfulfilled promises of freedom in politics and everyday life predating the attacks. Yet even if the “orgies” deaden the pain, heightened feeling does not erase the longing for what is in fact impossible. The core theoretical chapters of the book thus trace a straight path from Nietzsche's orgies of feeling to Freud's defense mechanism of identification. Both orgies of feeling and identification with the state are potent drugs with short periods of effectiveness and terrible side effects. As Nietzsche warns, these drugs make “the sick sicker.” For Anker, the promise of emancipation presents the real problem for individuals, given the structural incapacity of the state to fulfill its promises. The sovereign freedom that individuals seek requires a view of historical development and teleology for which neither politics nor theory can vouch. Yet our dominant view of freedom remains tied to this promise.
In chapter 6,“Left Melodrama,” Anker shows that melodrama is not a narrative mode over which conservatives have sole ownership. The Left also yearns for sovereign freedom and clarity of purpose, which is shown in the melodramatic narrative of The Communist Manifesto. Hence, for Anker, melodrama presents itself as an ideological placebo that undermines democracy in both the Right and the Left. Melodrama makes us sicker.
However, the last chapter presents an unexpected twist. It suddenly turns to seeking out melodrama's emancipatory possibilities. Such melodramas as women's weepies involve a necessary failure. In so doing, they “refract” the ideology of freedom as individual sovereignty, showing up its impossible aspirations for what they are, and redirecting the expected trajectory towards new possibilities. Refraction can “open different paths for envisioning new practices of freedom that are nonsovereign, collective and radically participatory” (230).
This reversal might seem unconvincing. For until the last chapter, Orgies of Feeling reads like a satire, ridiculing the political follies that result from, and the false ideology that generates, political melodrama. The central image in this satire of political melodrama is President Bush swaggering across the aircraft carrier to proclaim his “mission accomplished.” Political melodrama, the satire suggests, usually ends in grotesque farce. However, Anker's reversal is not a retreat. By ending with a discussion of the critical potential of another kind of melodrama, Anker avoids triumphantly proposing a replacement for melodrama tout court: a move that would have turned her own book into a “left melodrama”! The last chapter, by discussing emancipatory features of another kind of melodrama, puts into practice the book's teaching that melodrama should not lead political discourse. It thus makes an opening for the book's real provocation: the book questions an unstated but prevalent view in political theory that equates lowbrow media discourse with popular power and critical potential. Anker's unaffected prose and low-key ending restores dignity to those who want to reject the manipulative ideology that, as she so powerfully shows, is what political melodrama really is. Anker's book, then, defends the views that popular discourse can be intelligent, and that popular culture and popular politics do not require either displays of violent power, or contortions of pain, to seek freedom.
