The argument of this book is that Hobbes's widely asserted break with the Scholastic natural law tradition, as exemplified in St. Thomas Aquinas, is open to serious question. The importance of Cooper's analysis is that he “seeks to draw out the essential continuities and discontinuities of ideas in the natural law tradition, with particular attention to those of Aquinas and Hobbes” (14). In this Cooper has made an admirable contribution to understanding better what Hobbes intended, but also to the debates in modern legal and moral philosophy.
That there was a break of sorts is true, but Hobbes retained more features of the old natural law than his critics, both then and now, thought. Hobbes retained the idea that there is a rational foundation for civil order accessible to human reason which is realized in the vision of civil law as the natural law put into practice. In this respect, there is considerable continuity in thought from Aquinas to Hobbes, who also retained a conception of the good. Hobbes's conception, as Cooper shows, is “thin” not “thick,” a major reason traditionalists in his time and later rejected him. In practical terms, this means that not all the moral precepts sought by traditionalists to be put into law—translating moral duties into legal obligations—would find support in Hobbes. Another way to put it is that the precepts of natural law, for Hobbes, are the necessary background conditions for making laws properly so called, but beyond securing life itself through recognition and accommodation among individuals, a great deal must be determined in varying ways according to varying conditions. The Reformed tradition, given the increasing disunity of Christendom, fostered the desire to define minimal rather than maximal doctrinal commitments. Hobbes thus can be seen as arguing, in full awareness of the evolving religious situation, within the tradition of natural law theorizing, not seeking a radical rejection of that tradition, but rather adjusting its continuing relevance to radically altered historical conditions.
Cooper reviews classical natural law theory in Aquinas in conjunction with the “new natural law theorists” such as John Finnis, scholars whose arguments are designed to respond to the alternative legal theories of legal positivists and such scholars as H. L. A. Hart, in part by respecting the modern emphasis on rights. One sees in the debate between the “old” and the “new” natural law theorists (how true to Aquinas are the new theorists?) a version of the debate in the seventeenth century. What is common despite conflict among these voices is a conviction that there are certain human goods which are known to human reason and rational conduct consists in pursuing these goods. Such arguments reveal something of the long debate still underway between Catholicism and liberal Protestantism.
There follows a substantial and excellent examination of Hobbes's work, and of commentaries on it, leading Cooper to conclude: “The basicality of the good of life seems not only to fit the texts but to provide the key to understanding a whole range of Hobbesian doctrines” (132). The reader will find that Cooper preserves most of the familiar reading of Hobbes but alters how we understand the intent of what he is saying. He illuminates convincingly that what Hobbes claimed to be doing was really what he was doing; he was not concealing his intentions. He was not a secret atheist or a proto-existentialist. Importantly, Cooper's Hobbes offers a natural law foundation for what we have come to know as the liberal tradition. This has contemporary significance for us since Hobbes is often blamed in the “liberalism has failed” literature as a principal source of the liberal tradition's decline. Such arguments depend on the alternative conventional view of Hobbes that Cooper shows to be inadequate. He concludes: “The truth of Hobbes's natural law theory rests not on proto-Humean doctrines of the fact-value dichotomy, the autonomy of civil science, reason's enslavement to the passions, or skepticism about natural theology… . The truth of Hobbesian natural law stands or falls upon whether Hobbes is warranted in modifying the broadly scholastic notion of natural law to embrace a thin theory of the good” (265).
Cooper is right—this is the real issue. Cooper avoids declaring victory in the argument. He recognizes that the heart of the matter is a tension deeply embedded within the Western tradition at least since the Reformation. The rise of literacy, the increasing sense of individuals that they are indeed individual, forces us to recognize that the nature and requirements of political and moral authority had to be re-examined. To demand too much agreement is the threat to peaceful and stable order.
The book has the considerable virtue that Cooper mounts a fine defense of the real intent of Hobbes, who understood profoundly the changes wrought by the Reformation, while showing full and fair awareness of the alternative responses to Hobbes. The debates are of course about how to read Hobbes, but even more they are evidence of our unending quest for self-understanding which is a crowning achievement of the philosophic tradition from ancient to modern times, before and after Hobbes, debates which exemplify the ordeal of individual self-awareness, the life of selves among other selves. Every student of Hobbes's thought, and of the liberal tradition, will profit from reading this book.
