The new history of archaeology: setting the scene

A brief survey of the evolution of archaeological historiography is essential to appreciate current trends in the discipline. In fact, from its beginnings to the 1970s, the history of archaeology was written from an ‘internalist’ point of view primarily focused on the story of those pioneers, discoveries and scientific techniques that had contributed to the establishment of modern archaeology. This approach was first adopted in the second half of the 19th century, when archaeology became a scientific discipline and, by extension, the first histories of archaeology appeared. As often happens in the process of constitution of a new science, the first function assigned to the history of archaeology was that of reinforcing the new discipline by demonstrating its progress. Former archaeologists saw history as a means ‘to establish the discipline, identify its knowledge claims and lineages of authority, and then confirm to its members its accredited domains and norms of inquiry’ (Schlanger and Nordbladh Reference Schlanger, Nordbladh, Schlanger and Nordbladh2008, 1). In this setting, it is not surprising that the historical sections (les historiques, in French literature) which prefaced their textbooks constituted the primary form of disciplinary history for many years. The objective of these introductory chapters was to establish contemporary scientific methods, ideas and concepts by displaying their evolution. Not surprisingly, these histories adopted an internalist perspective that fulfilled the justificatory needs of the nascent discipline. The history of archaeology was therein conceived as the inexorable journey from ‘fairy tales’ (Boule Reference Boule1923, 1) and ‘legends’ (Cartailhac Reference Cartailhac1889, 2) to the ‘present advanced condition’ (Falconer Reference Falconer and Murchinson1864, 570) of archaeological knowledge. The popularity of internalism was also related to the fact that, written by professional scientists, the history of archaeology reproduced the positivism and the empiricism dominant among archaeologists during the second half of the 19th century.

This way of writing the history of archaeology remained unchallenged during the greater part of the 20th century. While instances of internalist studies can be found in German, French and American historiographies, Glyn Daniel's works are the best example of this ‘intellectual history’ of archaeology. Daniel suggested that the history of archaeology was

He claimed that the main contributor to the progress of archaeological knowledge was the development of modern scientific techniques, such as geological stratigraphy and radiocarbon dating. While he was aware of the influence of social context in the practice of archaeology, Daniel only appealed to contextual factors to explain the ‘perversions’ of archaeological knowledge, i.e. the use of archaeological evidence to reinforce totalitarian regimes (Daniel Reference Daniel1981a, 150–51), the creation of archaeological forgeries (Daniel Reference Daniel and Daniel1981b, 11) and the utilization of archaeological evidence for promoting personal interests.

The form, the meaning and the status of the history of archaeology thus shifted at the end of the 1970s, when a positivist approach to doing archaeology was increasingly replaced by a more relativistic one. This shift was initially related to the impact of postmodernism in the social sciences. In archaeology, postmodernism encouraged major changes in the conceptualization of archaeological explanations. To begin with, postprocessual archaeologies (neo-Marxism, critical theory, gender archaeology) shared an unrelenting antipathy towards the positivist paradigm prevalent in the discipline during the greater part of the twentieth century. In short, postprocessualists claimed that archaeological interpretations were not value-neutral. Because of this interest in the ‘sociopolitics of the past’, the history of archaeology began to play a major role in disciplinary debates. In fact, in a context still dominated by later processualism, historical studies were an effective way to demonstrate the sociopolitical dimensions of archaeological practice. After all, even the most fervent supporters of processualism could accept that archaeology had served to justify totalitarian regimes (Losemann Reference Losemann1977; Schnapp Reference Schnapp1977), that political and economic circumstances had conditioned the emergence of scientific archaeology in some Western countries (Klindt-Jensen Reference Klindt-Jensen1975; Kristiansen Reference Kristiansen and Daniel1981), and that 19th-century archaeologists had promoted negative stereotypes of aboriginal peoples (Trigger Reference Trigger1980; Murray and White Reference Murray and White1981). Furthermore, postprocessual archaeologists saw historical studies as an adequate means to expose the relativism intrinsic to archaeological explanations. The history of archaeology was a powerful tool to demonstrate that the value of scientific theories changes constantly and, consequently, that there is no reason to assume that modern science provides definitive truths about the past.

In this setting, most studies of the history of archaeology published since the 1980s have been oriented toward the analysis of those political frameworks in which archaeological remains had been more clearly used in the service of ‘non-scientific’ interests: nationalism and colonialism/imperialism. The popularity of these topics parallels recent debates on colonialism and nationalism in other social sciences. In the case of colonialism, the impact of the first intellectual critiques of imperialism (e.g. Asad Reference Asad1973; Said Reference Said1978) provoked the emergence of ‘postcolonial studies’, a multidisciplinary field which sought to analyse the cultural, political, economic and social effects provoked by colonial processes. In the case of nationalism, the 1980s saw publications by Anthony D. Smith (Reference Smith1983; Reference Smith1986), Ernest Gellner (Reference Gellner1983) and Eric Hobsbawm (Reference Hobsbawm1990; Hobsbawn and Ranger Reference Hobsbawm and Ranger1983) that revitalized discussions of the different facets of nationalist ideology. In the 1990s, this academic interest was fuelled by an increase in the number of ethic/national conflicts related to the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent restructuring of the Soviet Union's political space. In archaeological historiography, interest in the role played by nationalism and imperialism in the constitution of scientific archaeology was first formulated in Bruce Trigger's works (Reference Trigger1980; Reference Trigger1984; Reference Trigger1989). Under the influence of Trigger's pioneering essays, most of the ‘new’ history of archaeology has consisted in demonstrating how archeological discourses have supported nationalistic programmes (see, for instance, Silberman Reference Silberman1989; Kohl and Fawcett Reference Kohl and Fawcett1995; Díaz-Andreu and Champion Reference Díaz-Andreu and Champion1996; Atkison et al. Reference Atkinson, Banks and O'Sullivan1996; Meskell Reference Meskell1998; Kohl Reference Kohl1998; Sommer Reference Sommer2000; Härke Reference Härke2000; Galaty and Watkinson Reference Galaty and Watkinson2004; Eickhoff Reference Eickhoff2005; Halle Reference Halle2005; Kohl et al. Reference Kohl, Kozelsky and Ben-Yehuda2007) and how archaeologists have played a crucial role in legitimating imperial and colonial powers (e.g. Robertshaw Reference Robertshaw1990; Lyons and Papadopolus Reference Lyons and Papadopolus2002; Chadha Reference Chadha2002; Schlanger Reference Schlanger2003; Horning Reference Horning2006; Díaz-Andreu Reference Díaz-Andreu2007a). In fact, the amount of scholarship devoted to these topics in the last three decades has been so remarkable that it is no longer possible to offer an exhaustive list of relevant studies (for accredited bibliographical accounts see Trigger Reference Trigger1994; Reference Trigger2006; Kohl Reference Kohl1998; Shepherd Reference Shepherd2002; Díaz-Andreu Reference Díaz-Andreu2007a). Interest in the social context of archaeology has not been limited to the analysis of nationalism and colonialism. In fact, in the context of the aforementioned ‘historicization’ of archaeological science, the last years have witnessed a formidable increase in publications, including national histories of archaeology (e.g. Patterson Reference Patterson1986; Reference Patterson1995; Coye Reference Coye1997; Kehoe Reference Kehoe1998; Kehoe and Emmerichs Reference Kehoe and Emmerichs1999; Hurel Reference Hurel2007; O'Connor Reference O'Connor2007; Richard Reference Richard2008), gender studies (e.g. Hager Reference Hager1997; Díaz-Andreu and Sørensen Reference Díaz-Andreu and Sørensen1998), critical appraisals of methodology (e.g. Christenson Reference Christeson1989; Moro Abadía Reference Moro Abadía2007; Schlanger and Nordbladh Reference Schlanger, Nordbladh, Schlanger and Nordbladh2008), encyclopedias and biographical studies (e.g. Murray Reference Murray1999; Reference Murray2001; Kaeser Reference Kaeser, Schlanger and Nordbladh2008; Coye Reference Coye2006) and critical studies in the transmission of archaeological knowledge (e.g. Schnapp Reference Schnapp1993; Rowley-Conwy Reference Rowley-Conwy2007).

In short, in the last several years the history of archaeology has become a respected field in the context of archaeological studies. Thanks to the efforts of many historians, archaeologists have come to appreciate the importance of historical studies for archaeology. This recognition is certainly related to the adoption of an external approach concerned with the economic, political and social conditions that have influenced the production of archaeological knowledge. On the one hand, externalism has become an essential component of the new history of archaeology's programme, a hallmark for a generation of scholars eager to demonstrate the importance of historical studies. On the other hand, externalism has served to introduce a healthy dose of reflexivity among archaeologists by reminding them that their science, like any other intellectual activity, is sociohistorically constituted.

Beyond externalism: exploring new directions in the history of archaeology

While externalism has produced many disciplinary benefits, there are a number of reasons to explore other approaches to the social constitution of archaeological science. In the first place, externalism has oriented research in productive but restricted ways. As I have noted in the previous section, much of the recent historiography has focused on the influence of imperialism, colonialism and nationalism in the development of archaeology. This ‘nationalism–colonialism-centeredness’ is not without effects. To begin with, after so many papers and books, research on these topics runs the risk of being perceived as repetitive. Further, the focus on these subjects has prevented historians from examining other ways in which archaeology is socially constituted.

In the second place, renowned historians and sociologists of science have argued ‘not just that the externalist/internalist theories are inadequate but that the very categories we have traditionally used to construct the relevant boundaries are analytically flawed’ (Shapin Reference Shapin1992, 334). These theorists have pointed out a number of epistemological problems associated with most externalist approaches. To begin with, they have put into question the externalist assumption that it is possible to differentiate between an ‘inside’ and an ‘outside’ in the history of science and, consequently, that ‘science’ can be distinguished from the ‘social’ world. According to authors such as Shapin, Barnes and Latour, studies in the history of science have shown the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of defining clear boundaries between science and the society in which this activity is practised. A second group of critiques refers to the fact that externalist historians take for granted the existence of an ‘outside’ of scientific research that is often equated to the ‘social’, the ‘political’ and the ‘economic’ context. This identification between the ‘external’ and the ‘social’ has also been considered untenable by most historians and sociologists. They have argued that science is a ‘social’, ‘political’ and ‘economic’ world like any other and, consequently, that there is no reason to consider ‘society’ as that which goes on outside ‘science’ (Shapin Reference Shapin1992, 349–50). Finally, sociologists and historians have also criticized externalism's tendency to fail on ‘essentialism’ and ‘social determinism’, i.e. to explain all scientific development by appealing to one or two sorts of social influence.

Archaeologists are not unfamiliar with this sociological literature. Inspired by the works of Bourdieu, Latour, Bloor, Pickering and others, they have explored some of the ways in which archaeology is socially constituted. This scholarship includes the analysis of social practices at the level of fieldwork and write-up (Hodder Reference Hodder1999; Reference Hodder2000; Chadwick Reference Chadwick2003; Yarrow Reference Yarrow2003; Hutson Reference Hutson2006), social conventions in the construction of knowledge about the past (Moser Reference Moser1998; Reference Moser and Hodder2001), agency and actor-network theory (Dobres and Robb Reference Dobres and Robb2000; Johnson Reference Johnson and Thomas2000; Dornan Reference Dornan2002; Whitridge Reference Whitridge2004; Yarrow Reference Yarrow, Knappett and Malafouris2008; Dolwick Reference Dolwick2009) and symmetrical approaches seeking to overcome the dichotomies involved in opposing people to things and science to society (Olsen Reference Olsen2007; Shanks Reference Shanks2007; Webmoor Reference Webmoor2007; Witmore Reference Whitmore2007). While these examinations have promoted new views on the relationship between archaeology and society, their impact in historical studies has been restricted to a small number of papers (Van Reybrouck Reference Van Reybrouck2002; Schlanger Reference Schlanger2002; Díaz-Andreu Reference Díaz-Andreu2007a). For this reason, I discuss in this section how historians of archaeology can use the history and the sociology of science as a source of inspiration to expand the horizons of archaeological historiography.

Defining the boundaries between ‘archaeology’ and ‘society’ If ‘science’ is influenced by the ‘social context’ in which it emerges, it follows that ‘scientific research’ and ‘social context’ must be separate entities. In other words, the discourse of social influences tends to portray science as a world apart. This idea has been criticized by many historians and sociologists of science since the late 1960s (e.g. Kuhn Reference Kuhn and Kuhn1977; Barnes Reference Barnes1974; Johnston 1977; Latour and Woolgar Reference Latour and Woolgar1979; Shapin Reference Shapin1982; Callon and Law Reference Callon and Law1989; Chamber and Turnbull Reference Chamber and Turnbull1989, 161; Schuster Reference Schuster, Olby, Cantor, Christie and Hodge1990; Shapin Reference Shapin1992; Barnes Reference Barnes, Machamer and Wolters2005; Galison Reference Galison2008, 112). In the first place, given the pervasiveness of the internal/external dichotomy, sociologists have considered it of some importance to explain its success. In this setting, it has been suggested that this distinction has been used by scientists themselves to legitimate their discipline. In fact, ‘the assumptions underlying the internal/external dichotomy have played an important role in maintaining the public image of the scientific institution as an autonomous producer of scientific knowledge’ (Johnston 1977, 198). The credibility of scientists depends, up to a point, on their ability to produce knowledge dissociated from the interest of any particular social group. For this reason, scientists have tended to be sympathetic to those ideas (such as the external/internal dichotomy) which reinforce their claims of political neutrality and freedom from ‘external’ control. Other authors have linked the popularity of the aforementioned dichotomy to the fact that, in the modern world, scientists have become differentiated into clearly defined scientific subcultures in which their members are the main audience for, and judges of, each other's work (Kuhn Reference Kuhn and Kuhn1977, 119; Barnes Reference Barnes1974, 121). As a result of this process, the practitioners of modern science have a relative autonomy from the social and cultural environment in which they develop their work (Kuhn Reference Kuhn and Kuhn1977, 119; Shapin Reference Shapin1982, 164–65; Bourdieu Reference Bourdieu1975, 95; Bourdieu Reference Bourdieu2001, 57). This autonomy generates the perception of a seemingly self-evident distinction between external and internal factors in scientific research.

Sociological arguments notwithstanding, historians have argued that, as one goes back into the history of science, the boundaries between science and society become nebulous, and ‘internal/external distinctions become more and more difficult to employ on the basis of actor's own definitions’ (Barnes Reference Barnes1974, 121; see also Shapin Reference Shapin1982, 168). Therefore the modern ‘boundary-speech’ (Shapin and Schaffer Reference Shapin and Schaffer1985, 342) that permits the identification of ‘science’ as a particular segment of culture is anachronistic when examining past knowledge. This anachronism is particularly evident, for instance, in the history of prehistoric archaeology. Today, practitioners of this science are instructed in sophisticated methods and theories, including individual technical specialities, particular scientific vocabularies and specific norms of investigation. As a result, they constitute a group that is certainly not homogeneous but, up to a point, is identifiable by the members of other disciplines and the general public. Nevertheless, when one examines the early developments of this science in the second half of the 19th century, ‘prehistoric archaeology’, as well as most modern academic disciplines, becomes less and less recognizable on the basis of our modern categories. At that time, the scientific study of humans’ origins emerged at the crossroads of disciplines like geology, palaeontology and anthropology. This situation had a number of theoretical, methodological and practical consequences. First, ‘prehistoric archaeologists’ took several of these disciplines as reference to construct their own science. They considered that, in order to solve the question of the origins of humankind, ‘the principal, if not the only safe method, is that by which all true advances in [natural] sciences have been effected . . . I mean the diligent observation and collections of facts from which in due time some general laws may be induced’ (Evans Reference Evans1870, 9). The various titles given to the study of humans’ origins between 1860 and 1900 reflect the multidisciplinary character of the new field: ‘human palaeontology’ (Hamy Reference Hamy1870, 1), ‘palaeoethnology’ (Dupont Reference Dupont1872, 30; Mortillet Reference Mortillet1883, 1), ‘prehistoric archaeology’ (Cartailhac Reference Cartailhac1889, 27) and ‘prehistoric anthropology’ (Capitan Reference Capitan1899, 1). Second, ‘prehistoric archaeologists’ adopted the methodologies of more established sciences. They borrowed, for instance, the principles of stratigraphy from geology and the idea of ‘type fossil’ (fossil directeur) from palaeontology. In this setting, one can wonder whether it is accurate to talk about ‘prehistoric archaeologists’ at the end of the 19th century. In fact, most of the scholars who validated the first discoveries concerning human evolution were geologists (Joseph Prestwich, Hugh Falconer, Charles Lyell), palaeontologists (Édouard Lartet, Marcellin Boule), anthropologists (Armand de Quatrefages) and antiquarians (John Evans). As these examples illustrate, when one moves back in time, it is problematic to consider ‘prehistoric archaeology’ as a clearly demarcated scientific area and ‘prehistoric archaeologists’ as a group of scientists trained in a specific domain different from other branches of knowledge, like geology or palaeontology.

Moreover, historians of science have pointed out that, in the early development of a new scientific field, the concepts, ideas and methods employed in solving problems are often informed by forms of discourse today considered non-scientific, such as prevailing philosophical and religious traditions (Kuhn Reference Kuhn1962, 3; Reference Kuhn and Kuhn1977, 118; Russell Reference Russell1984, 777; Porter Reference Porter, Olby, Cantor, Christie and Hodge1990, 39–40). Since the 1960s, the work of Frances Yates (Reference Yates1964) on the Hermetic tradition, Allen Debus (Reference Debus1987) on chemistry and alchemy, and Alexandre Koyré (Reference Koyré1961) on the philosophical background of Copernicus and Kepler have demonstrated that ‘religion’, ‘magic’ and ‘philosophy’ were essential components of the cultural antecedents of modern science. These studies have led to an increasing awareness that, when analysing the early developments of contemporary Western scientific cultures, to distinguish the ‘scientific’ component of past beliefs from what we are accustomed to label as ‘superstitions’ and ‘fallacies’ is meaningless (Kuhn Reference Kuhn1962, 3; Shapin Reference Shapin1982, 168). Historians of prehistoric archaeology are certainly aware of the influence of theological, religious and amateur visions in scientific practice. For instance, a significant number of the major actors involved in the constitution of French prehistoric archaeology at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th were clerics or were people who had strong religious commitments, including Jean Bouyssonie, Hugo Obermaier, Henri Breuil and Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. As several scholars have pointed out (e.g. Vialet and Hurel Reference Vialet and Hurel2004; Defrance-Jublot Reference Defrance-Jublot2005; Coye Reference Coye2006; Hurel Reference Hurel2007), this fact had important implications both for the interpretation of archaeological evidence and for the institutionalization of French prehistory. For example, the creation of the Institut de paléontologie humaine in 1910 was marked by intense disputes between materialists and ecclesiastics. The fact that two of the first three chairs of this prestigious institution were offered to clerics (Breuil and Obermaier) provoked a reaction from those who supported a strict separation between science and religion (Hurel Reference Hurel2007). The dispute between anticlericalists and ecclesiastics also emerged in the interpretation of prehistoric remains. For instance, the delay in the recognition of Palaeolithic art in France between 1880 and 1900 was, up to a point, related to Gabriel de Mortillet's anticlericalism. De Mortillet was convinced that the paintings of Altamira were a plot by the Spanish clergy to discredit prehistoric archaeology and, consequently, he rejected the discovery (Moro Abadía and González Morales Reference Moro Abadía and Morales2004, 326). Mortillet's authority over French prehistory significantly influenced the rejection of parietal art in that country before 1900. As these examples illustrate, modern intellectual canons of rationality (such as the opposition between ‘science’ and ‘religion’) can be irrelevant or anachronistic when describing the origins of prehistoric archaeology.

A third critique often addressed to the clear-cut demarcation between science and its surrounding culture is that the distinction depends on a subjective definition of ‘external’ and ‘internal’ factors in the history of science. Alexandre Koyré and Paul Forman's interpretations of the role of philosophical influence in scientific change illustrate this point. Koyré (Reference Koyré1966) suggested that the main factor explaining the ‘Scientific Revolution’ was the replacement of an Aristotelian paradigm (pervasive until the 15th century) with a Platonic one (developed during the 16th to 17th centuries). In other words, Koyré related the emergence of the revolution mentioned above to a philosophical change. The interesting point here is that he regarded this shift as ‘internal’, since he considered that philosophical influences operated within science itself (Barnes Reference Barnes1974, 110). This interpretation contrasts with that proposed by Paul Forman (Reference Forman1971) to explain the development of the quantum theory in the intellectual milieu of the Weimar Republic. Forman argued that the acausality characteristic of the new mechanic was the consequence of the philosophical context prevalent in Germany in the 1920s. In contrast to Koyré's viewpoint, Forman described philosophy as ‘playing an important role as an external influence’ (Barnes Reference Barnes1974, 110). These examples demonstrate how the same kind of factor – namely philosophical influences – can be catalogued as ‘external’ or ‘internal’ depending on the historian's viewpoint. The history of archaeology also illustrates difficulties in considering certain ideas and concepts in terms of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’. For instance, as several authors have pointed out, the idea of ‘progress’ shaped the constitution of disciplines such as anthropology and prehistoric archaeology (Bowler Reference Bowler1989; Trigger Reference Trigger2006, 101–2). This category influenced the unilinear evolutionism adopted by anthropologists during the second half of the 19th century (Kuper Reference Kuper1988; Bowler Reference Bowler1989), the former classifications and typologies of archaeological artefacts (Owen Reference Owen2006) and the first chronologies concerning prehistoric art (Moro Abadía Reference Moro Abadía2006b). The main question is whether ‘progress’ should be considered ‘internal’ or ‘external’ to prehistoric archaeology. In fact, while the concept of ‘progress’ has its origins in Enlightenment philosophy, it was a taken-for-granted assumption of archaeologists and anthropologist in the late 19th century and the beginning of the 20th. This postulate is difficult to analyse in terms of the externalist/internalist dichotomy. As happens with many other categories, ‘progress’ cannot be easily labelled ‘internal’ or ‘external’ because it is both a metanarrative that has structured the perception of Western societies since the 19th century and a way to approach material culture intrinsic to archaeological science.

Is ‘the social’ ‘internal’ or ‘external’ to archaeology? Historians and sociologists have argued that a pervasive trait of externalist studies is the identification between ‘the social’ and ‘the context’ of science (Latour and Woolgar Reference Latour and Woolgar1979; Shapin Reference Shapin1982; Reference Shapin1992, 349). This equation implicitly assumes that ‘the social’ is external to scientific knowledge (Latour and Woolgar Reference Latour and Woolgar1979, 23). Such an assumption has been considered unjustifiable because ‘there is as much “society” within the scientific community, and scientific workplaces, as there is outside them’ (Shapin Reference Shapin1992, 349; see also Latour Reference Latour1999; Reference Latour2005). In fact, most of the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) developed since the 1970s has been based on the idea that ‘it is possible to recast social factors as an integral part of routine scientific procedure. As a result, the “social factors” in question no longer appear extraneous to science’ (Latour and Woolgar Reference Latour and Woolgar1979, 22; see also Latour Reference Latour1987; Reference Latour1999; Reference Latour2005; Law Reference Law2004). In other words, sociologists and historians of science have suggested that all knowledge is socially constituted and, therefore, it should be treated as material for sociological investigation (Bourdieu Reference Bourdieu1975, 91; Bloor Reference Bloor1976, 1). For this reason, using anthropological and sociological techniques, they have examined the social foundations of science. To cite just a few examples, historians and sociologists have analysed the way in which scientists organized themselves in networks and groups (Knorr-Cetina Reference Knorr-Cetina1999; Law and Hassard Reference Law and Hassard1999; Latour Reference Latour2005; Frickel and Moore Reference Frickel and Moore2006), access to and the impact of funding in scientific research (Roy Reference Roy1985; Wang Reference Wang1995), the social dimensions of technology (Bijker et al. Reference Bijker, Hughes and Pinch1987; Kline Reference Kline1995) and the social scope of experiments (Shapin and Schaffer Reference Shapin and Schaffer1985; Gooding et al. Reference Gooding, Pinch and Schaffer1989). This scholarship has had a limited impact in the field of the history of archaeology, wherein ‘social factors’ are still mainly considered ‘external’ forces. This identification between ‘the social’ and ‘the context’ has led to a paucity of work concerning the sociology of science. While it has become common to explore the ‘social milieux’ (nationalism, colonialism, imperialism) in which archaeology has been practised, ‘there are still too few studies of the institutional structures of the discipline, of the impact of funding on archaeological theory and practice, of how archaeology has defined itself as a field, and of other sociological aspects of the production of archaeological knowledge’ (Trigger Reference Trigger and Murray2001, 638–39). This lack of interest is surprising for two reasons: archaeologists have become more and more interested in sociological approaches (see the works cited at the beginning of this section), and the few attempts that have been made to study the history of archaeology from a sociological perspective have been successful (e.g. Gero Reference Gero1985; Croissant Reference Croissant and Nash2000; Díaz-Andreu Reference Díaz-Andreu2007b; Kaeser Reference Kaeser, Schlanger and Nordbladh2008).

Moreover, it has been argued that the tendency to consider ‘social factors’ as ‘external’ to scientific knowledge engenders an asymmetry that David van Reybrouck (Reference Van Reybrouck2002, 160) summarizes as follows: ‘“Good” science is explained by rationality, “bad” science by sociology’. In fact, sociopolitical factors have had a bad reputation (or are soundly ignored) among scientists. This prejudice is the result of the history of science and, in particular, of the long-running belief in scientists’ neutrality. As Robert K. Merton pointed out in the 1940s, the normative structure of science has been traditionally defined by a number of ideals (universalism, communism, disinterestedness, organized scepticism) that (a) have reinforced the belief in scientists’ fair-mindedness, and (b) have stigmatized possible economic and political motivations as ‘anti-scientific’ (Merton Reference Merton and Merton1973). In other words, ‘social factors’ have been considered incompatible with scientific values, and therefore they have been placed ‘outside’ scientific research (Latour and Woolgar Reference Latour and Woolgar1979, 21). In the case of the history of science, the stigmatization of ‘social factors’ has encouraged asymmetrical explanations: while the ‘progress’ of science has often been explained by appealing to technical, theoretical and cognitive advances, the ‘mistakes’ in the history of science has usually been attributed to ‘social’ influences. Even though this asymmetry has been criticized since the 1970s (Bloor Reference Bloor1976; Latour and Woolgar Reference Latour and Woolgar1979; Russell Reference Russell1984), there remains a tendency to assume a ‘close relationship between archaeology's progress and that of technology’ (Bahn Reference Bahn1996, x). Similarly, the inclination to consider the ‘social context’ in pejorative terms is illustrated by the current popularity of words such as ‘use’, ‘abuse’ and ‘manipulation’ when talking about ‘social influences’ of archaeology.

Is archaeology necessarily linked to nationalism and colonialism? Since the 1980s, historical studies have provided substantial evidence of the influence of nationalism, colonialism and imperialism on the interpretation of archaeological data. Without denying the evident value of these studies, they raise fundamental issues worthy of historiographical analysis. To begin with, it has been argued that archaeology is essentially a nationalist and colonialist discipline. For instance, many authors have talked about ‘near universality of a relationship between nationalist politics and the practice of archaeology’ (Kohl and Fawcett Reference Kohl and Fawcett1995, 4). While there is little doubt that archaeological agendas have been conditioned by nationalistic goals, the existence of a necessary link between these phenomena has been called into question by several authors. First, some historians have suggested that the role of archaeology in the creation of national myths has often been overestimated. For instance, Alain Schnapp has discussed the relationship between archaeology and nationalism in France. Schnapp proposes that archaeology has traditionally been considered a ‘dominated discipline’ in that country and, therefore, it has not played a central role in constituting the French nation (Schnapp Reference Schnapp, Díaz-Andreu and Champion1996, 54). Similarly, and without denying that archaeological remains have been employed to justify the British Empire, Timothy Champion has argued that the late involvement of the British state in archaeological matters, illustrated by the lack of a unified state archaeological service, had as a consequence an increasing professionalism and scientific neutrality within the discipline (Champion Reference Champion, Díaz-Andreu and Champion1996, 129). Further, some authors have questioned the idea that archaeology is essentially a nationalistic discipline (Hamilakis and Yalouri Reference Hamilakis and Yalouri1999; Silberman Reference Silberman1999; Kaeser Reference Kaeser2002, 171). It is argued that ‘nationalistic archaeology has varied in content, importance, and its relation to the political process. The production of archaeological knowledge has only been regulated in detail for nationalistic purposes by a relatively small number of regimes’ (Trigger Reference Trigger, Kohl and Fawcett1995, 270). These historians have documented a number of cases in which nationalism did not play a major role in the constitution of archaeological knowledge (see Trigger Reference Trigger1984; Reference Trigger, Kohl and Fawcett1995). In so doing, they have put into question the privileged position of this ideology as the main sociopolitical framework that utilizes the cultural capital of archaeology (Silberman Reference Silberman1999). These critiques regarding the ‘nationalistic nature’ of archaeology parallel those addressed to current literature on colonialism and archaeology. For instance, there is a widespread tendency to consider the history of archaeology in Africa in colonialist/imperialist terms. While it is clear that archaeology has played an integral role in legitimating Western imperialism in Africa, colonialism is not the only factor to explain the history of archaeology in that continent. Indeed, archaeology in Africa has also served to legitimate nationalistic claims, pan-Africanism and the interests of certain indigenous groups (see Shepherd Reference Shepherd2002).

The ‘nationalist/colonialist-centredness’ that has oriented much scholarship in recent decades has effectively prevented archaeologists from examining other processes that have shaped the history of their discipline, especially those that seem to contradict the privileged place of nationalism and colonialism in current research. The example of internationalism can illustrate this point. As many historians have demonstrated, internationalism played an important role in several periods in the history of science (e.g. Schroeder-Gudehus Reference Schroeder-Gudehus1978; Crawford Reference Crawford1992; Crawford et al. Reference Crawford, Shinn and Soerlin1993; Skolnikoff Reference Skolnikoff1993). While the term is ambiguous, it generally refers to (a) a component of scientists’ ideology that stresses the political neutrality of science and (b) the international dimension of scientific research. In these two senses (as an ideology and as a specific form of organization), internationalism is essential for understanding the history of most scientific disciplines in the second half of the 19th century, including prehistoric archaeology. At that time, scholars interested in human origins organized international congresses (such as the Congrès international d'anthropologie et d'archéologie préhistoriques, founded in 1865), took part in worldwide exhibitions (such as the Expositions universelles held in Paris in 1867, 1878 and 1889; see Müller-Scheessel Reference Müller-Scheessel2001) and travelled from one country to another to validate scientific discoveries (such as Boucher de Perthes's discoveries in Abbeville). Furthermore, they established the new discipline on the basis of principles and methods that could be applied universally to the analysis of archaeological data. While internationalism played an important role in the institutionalization of prehistoric archaeology, historians of archaeology have paid little attention to this phenomenon (see, however, Rasmussen Reference Rasmussen1995; Kaeser Reference Kaeser2002; Díaz-Andreu Reference Díaz-Andreu2007b). I suggest that this reticence is related to the popularity of nationalism and colonialism, two ideologies seemingly opposed to internationalism. Indeed, the current focus on nationalism and colonialism makes it difficult to imagine that archaeologists could also cooperate internationally in the name of science. In practice, however, nationalism/colonialism and internationalism are not necessarily opposed. For instance, in the second half of the 19th century, international competition and collaboration were not seen solely as a way to encourage scientific development, but also as a means ‘to compare and evaluate the contribution of different nations to the progress of science in terms of preeminence and inferiority’ (Schroeder-Gudehus Reference Schroeder-Gudehus1978, 49). In other words, internationalism, defined as a peaceful competition between different nations, also served to promote national pride and to create scientific heroes.