This book is an updated version of Entessar's Kurdish Ethnonationalism, published in 1992 by Lynne Rienner Publishers. It is an updated and not a revised version because the text of Kurdish Ethnonationalism is reprinted intact. (The author provides an update of four pages to Chapter 2, three pages to Chapter 3, six pages to Chapter 4, four pages to Chapter 5, and one page to Chapter 6.) The appending of eighteen pages to the version under review is not adequate to cover the significant political and historical developments that have occurred since the publication of the original text in 1992, especially the consequences of the 1991 and 2003 U.S. invasions of Iraq. Among these consequences are the “unimaginable” strengthening of Kurdish nationalist movements in Iraq, Turkey, Syria, and Iran, countries where 98 percent of an estimated 30 million Kurds live (p. 100). Kurds achieved near independence in Iraq by 2010 and demanded “democratic autonomy” (demokratik özerklik) in Turkey.
Since readers of this journal are now well informed about the major outlines of Kurdish history, especially in Iraq and Turkey, I shall offer just a few comments on Entessar's treatment of the Kurds in Iran (Chapter 2), Iraq (Chapter 3), and Turkey (Chapter 4). Entessar believes that the prospects for Kurdish autonomy in Iran are bleak. He attributes this to several factors. Chief among them is that the Kurds of Iran, unlike the Kurds of Iraq and Turkey, participate more fully in the Iranian oikumene (or “Iran-Shrar”) and identify with many aspects of Iran's culture. This is the view of many historians of Iran, and up until the last two or three decades it seems to have held true. It would be interesting to learn whether Entessar would have found this view as valid after 1979, however, had he probed this postulate more deeply. Will the religious brotherhood proffered by the Islamic Republic be able to circumscribe Kurdish nationalism as well as the secular nationalism of the Pahlavis? Can Iran's ideological Islamist oikumene more effectively constrain Kurdish nationalism than the nationalism of the Iraqi state, the ethnic nationalism of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in northern Iraq, or the republican, secular, but religiously oriented nationalism of the Justice and Development Party (AKP)? Will the Islamic Republic be able to constrain Kurdish nationalist movements in Iran when Kurdish nationalist movements have achieved such success in Iraq and Turkey during the last two or three decades? Or will the oft-repeated paradigm of Iranian exceptionalism as far as Kurdish nationalism is concerned fail or at least be severely diminished? In this reviewer's opinion it has been and will continue to be diminished.
Entessar recognizes the “unimaginable” gains that Kurds have achieved in Iraq during the last three decades and especially since 2003. In spite of this, he thinks that it will be difficult for them to achieve independence and recommends the pursuit of full and equal rights through constitutional guarantees. The major reason for his skepticism lies in the “festering problems of corruption, cronyism, and the general lack of transparency (p. 103)” afflicting the Kurdish polity in Iraq. This reviewer is of the opinion that the potential for surmounting these deficiencies, even short of independence, is greater than implied by Entessar. For one thing, the threat of attack by Iraqi Arabs will require full cooperation and readiness between the two leading Kurdish groupings, the KDP and PUK. For another thing, the emergence of the political party Goran (Change) in opposition to the very corruption and cronyism mentioned by Entessar and its securing of twenty-five seats in the KRG parliament in the July 2009 parliamentary elections augur positively for more transparency in the KRG. Goran achieved its victory despite the great power wielded by the KDP and PUK and despite U.S. support for the latter groups. Finally, if the Kurds of Iraq (KRG) are threatened by the Iraqi Arabs, they will rely on the Kurds of Turkey—“all 20 million of us,” as Osman Baydemir, the Kurdish nationalist mayor of Diyarbakir (Amed) in southeast Turkey, likes to say. Such a development will not be much affected by issues of corruption, cronyism, and transparency.
In regard to Turkey, Entessar's book is good up to 1992, but again the updated six pages are not adequate to elucidate the recent historical changes taking place. These include the substantial increase during the past two years in communal clashes between Kurds and Turks in the large urban centers of western Turkey, where large numbers of Kurds settled as a result of the ethnic-cleansing practices of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) during their civil war with the Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK). Another dramatic development during the past three years has been the revelations associated with the Ergenekon conspiracy, according to which active and retired TAF officers, members of the judiciary, education establishments, and the media, among others, sought to overthrow the AKP government and to diminish the growing influence of Fethullah Gülen's religious organization by creating chaos throughout the country, even if this meant cooperating with the PKK. Entessar concludes his update of the Kurds in Turkey by stating: “The Islamic parties [AKP] will have a more difficult task of changing Turkey's policies and legal restrictions that may benefit the Kurds than the secular parties will have because of their inherent mistrust by the Kemalist establishment” (p. 148). But the AKP has already transformed official policy toward the Kurds, albeit minimally and in a co-optive fashion, more than any Kemalist party has ever done—in the process diminishing the power of the TAF and other elements of the Kemalist establishment, as evidenced by the 14 September 2010 referendum.
The unexpected strong showing of the Kurdish nationalist Democratic Society Party in the 29 March 2009 local elections, as well as the revelations of the Ergenekon crimes, impelled the AKP, with the agreement of the TAF, to launch its Kurdish Initiative (Kürt Açılımı) promising more cultural and linguistic rights (but no decentralization or autonomy of any kind) to the Kurds. But the initiative soon sputtered due to opposition from the military, judiciary, media, and oppositional political parties, as well as growing popular Turkish nationalism against PKK attacks. In the run up to the 14 September constitutional-change referendum, however, the persistent demands from Kurdish political parties and Kurdish politicians for democratic autonomy, including the right to education in Kurdish, demonstrated the great impact of the autonomy achieved by Iraq's Kurds on mobilizing Kurds in Turkey as well as Iran and Syria.
Entessar's books, both the 1992 and 2009 versions, make important contributions to the study of Kurdish politics in the context of regional politics and international geopolitics during the last three decades. Given the complexity of the task, he deserves accolades for his trailblazing work. In particular, much of his analysis of the interface between Iran's policies toward its own Kurds and the Kurdish questions in Iraq and Turkey during the 1980s and 1990s still stands. It is also impressive that he manages to accomplish this complicated task in just 229 pages including footnotes. The length of the book helps make it a welcome text for the burgeoning number of undergraduate and graduate students who want to study the history and politics of the Kurds.
