Harry Frankfurt has written a very accessible text addressing an extremely important contemporary problem. It provides a good critique of loose arguments about the evils of economic inequality you might find in the popular press. It provides a provocative critique of a widely accepted tenet of economics—the declining marginal utility of money. Ultimately, however, the text ignores the literature on inequality and egalitarianism for the sake of making its argument clear and simple.
Frankfurt calls “egalitarians” out for misplacing the focus of their moral arguments. Economic inequality, he argues, “is not in itself objectionable” (5). Rather, “our basic focus should be on reducing both poverty and excessive affluence” (5). Frankfurt proposes “the doctrine of sufficiency … that what is morally important with regard to money is that everyone should have enough” as the appropriate alternative to economic egalitarianism (which he defines as “the doctrine that it is desirable for everyone to have the same amounts of income and of wealth”) (6–7). Frankfurt believes this confusion not only muddles debates but also “distracts people from considering their own personal circumstances and needs” and “encourages them to aim, misguidedly, at a level of affluence measured by a calculation in which … the specific features of their own lives play no part” (10–11). Thus, a pursuit of egalitarianism diverts the individual from trying to discover “what he truly desires or needs, and what will actually satisfy him,” and focuses attention on his position in relation to others (11). This results in “alienation” as it “leads him to focus his attention upon desires and needs that are not most authentically his own” and ultimately to “moral disorientation and shallowness” (12, 13).
In the strongest and most thought-provoking part of the book, Frankfurt refutes what he considers to be the strongest moral argument for greater economic equality, namely, Abba Lerner's diminishing marginal utility argument that “an equal distribution of money maximizes aggregate utility” (17). Lerner's analysis fails to account for inflationary effects that would result from redistribution, as while the poor would increase marginal utility “members of an intermediate class”—below the rich but still above the formerly poor—“will be unable to maintain their accustomed level of consumption in the face of higher prices,” which “would offset the gain by the formerly poor” (19–20). Second, Lerner's theory is based on two assumptions that Frankfurt argues are false: “(a) for each individual, the utility of money invariably diminishes at the margin; and (b) with respect to money, or the things it can buy, the utility functions of all individuals are the same” (18). Frankfurt argues (a) is false because some goods have a “warming up period”—people can derive more utility after sustained consumption than at first (23). Other goods may have utility thresholds so that “an incremental or marginal dollar may have conspicuously greater utility than dollars that do not enable a threshold to be crossed” (27). Frankfurt gives an example of a ten-person society with conditions of scarcity where a person would need five units of healthcare to survive and there are only forty total. It would be less rational (and “morally grotesque”) to distribute units equally as everyone would die since they would not reach the threshold needed for enough healthcare (35). Frankfurt dismisses assumption (b) because “the utility functions for money of different individuals are not even approximately alike” (20).
Ultimately, the text utilizes an overly narrow definition of egalitarianism. Rather than engaging with egalitarian ideas, Frankfurt resolves the questions that literature raises by recourse to a theoretical construct that erases them. By defining egalitarianism as “the doctrine that it is desirable for everyone to have the same amounts of income and of wealth” (6–7), Frankfurt excludes virtually the whole scholarship on egalitarianism as figures like John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, and Amartya Sen would not qualify as egalitarians.
The second part of the book aims to “recover one way in which economic equality may indeed be of some moral significance,” by which Frankfurt refers to the “moral importance of respect, and hence of impartiality, rather than any supposedly prior or preemptive moral importance of equality” (xi, 82). This part becomes more a wholesale refutation of the premise that “egalitarianism, of whatever variety, is an ideal of any intrinsic moral importance” rather than a defense of the moral importance of respect (65). Frankfurt provides two problematic lines of argumentation to support his contention that morality demands sufficiency and not any version of egalitarianism.
First, Frankfurt argues that sufficiency has intrinsic moral importance because it is based on respect and partiality, while equality lacks intrinsic morality. His explanation hinges on a differentiation between respect and equality: equality “is merely a matter of each person having the same as others” while respect means “dealing with him exclusively on the basis of those aspects of his particular character or circumstances that are actually relevant to the issue at hand” (77–78). I found this characterization of egalitarianism befuddling. For example, Dworkin's resource auction famously distinguishes equal treatment from treatment as equals, with treatment as equals requiring that persons are not treated equally, but rather treated in accordance with their rights, legitimate claims, and desert (Taking Rights Seriously, 1977). The application of Frankfurt's critique to Sen's capability approach would be even more problematic as Sen's whole point is to take better account of the differences among people, as the conversion of primary goods into the capability to do various things that a person may value can vary enormously with differing inborn characteristics. Sen's equality of capabilities is just one example of how egalitarians have advanced theories that embrace aspects of a person's particular character or circumstances that are relevant to the issue at hand.
Frankfurt's second and related argument is that sufficiency is intrinsically morally valuable while egalitarianism of whatever variety is derivative. By this he means that equality of welfare, equality of resources, equality of capabilities, is not morally required as even if a lack of welfare or resources would lead to deprivations that would be immoral, this would be because of the deprivations (i.e., the poverty or lack of sufficiency) not because of the lack of an equality of welfare, resources, or capabilities. What is moral ought to depend only on one's own situation rather than some external comparison to others. Frankfurt's own definition of sufficiency, however, would not divorce the moral criteria from comparisons to others. According to him, “To say that a person has enough money means—more or less—that he is content, or that it is reasonable for him to be content, with having no more money than he actually has” (48). Whether it is reasonable to be content will (as T. H. Marshall reminded us in Citizenship and Social Class, 1949) depend upon the relative availability of resources and the level of development of his environment, so sufficiency in 2016 will entail a different bundle of resources than it would have in 1816. Furthermore, Dworkin's, Rawls's, and Sen's projects (to provide just a few examples) aim to give us a sophisticated way to figure out what is the level of resources with which it is reasonable for a person in a liberal democracy to be content.
In the end, the chief virtue of Frankfurt's text, its brevity and freedom from the vast literature on egalitarianisms, becomes its chief albatross as it stubbornly refuses to address any of the strongest arguments and concerns egalitarianism offers.
