Analytic panpsychism and the combination/decombination problem

Panpsychism in contemporary analytic philosophy comes in two varieties: micropsychism, the view that microphysical entities are conscious and the most fundamental, from which the other entities of the universe derive; and cosmopsychism, the view that the cosmos as a whole is conscious, and the fundamental entity from which all other entities derive.Footnote ⁷ Critics of panpsychism have objected that micropsychism faces a ‘hard’ problem of its own – the combination problem of explaining how the consciousness of microentities combines to form the consciousness of macroentities (such as humans).Footnote ⁸ Such a combination, critics contend, seems impossible. While various aspects of the combination problem have been identified in contemporary discussions,Footnote ⁹ it is the subject combination problem that is considered the really ‘hard’ problem (e.g. Coleman Reference Coleman2014; Siddharth Reference Siddharth2024). As Galen Strawson, an influential contemporary panpsychist, notes, subjects seem to be ontological unities that are ‘fundamentally unified, utterly indivisible as the particular concrete phenomenon it is, simply in being, indeed, a total experiential field’ (Strawson Reference Strawson2009, 377–8). It seems inconceivable how such a strong ontological unity could be broken down into or understood as a composite of other ontologically unified individuals.Footnote ¹⁰ Subjects, as William James (Reference James1890) noted, seem to be the ‘most absolute breaches in nature’ (p. 226).

Another way in which this intuition manifests is that it does not seem conceivable that a subject’s experience can be shared with or accessed by another subject. Even if two distinct subjects could experience exactly identical qualitative content, it would not be the case that they both share the same token quality, but rather an instance of two subjects experiencing different tokens of the same type of qualitative content. This ontological privacy Footnote ¹¹ of subjects raises the question of whether it is possible for a human subject to derive from the combination of microsubjects if qualitative content cannot be shared.

The problem of subject combination carries over to cosmopsychism and the notion of subject decombination as well. Cosmopsychists face the challenge of explaining how human (and other macro-level) consciousness derives from cosmic consciousness; specifically, of explaining how it is even possible for human subjects to derive from the cosmic subject. Let us take S_c to be the cosmic subject that ought to decompose into further subjects S_1, S_2…. S_n. Each subject is endowed with ontological unity and privacy. Given this, one is faced with the following question: How is it possible for the qualitative content of S_c to be experienced by S_1, S_2…. S_n, when S_c as well as S_1, S_2…. S_n are each ontologically private (i.e. do not share content) and phenomenal (i.e. each feels some way while experiencing their content)? (Miller Reference Miller2018). This question has come to be known as the decombination problem. Others who prefer to articulate this in less mereological terms call it the individuation problem or the derivation problem.Footnote ¹²

The cosmopsychist views that have emerged in response to the decombination problem can be classified into two types. First is priority cosmopsychism, the view that the conscious cosmos is ontologically prior to all other entities and individuals (including other subjects), from which the latter derive.Footnote ¹³ The second and less popular version is existence cosmopsychism, the view that the cosmos, considered as a whole, is conscious and the only token individual that exists,Footnote ¹⁴ which entails that entities other than the cosmos are not real individuals but merely aspects of the only individual. This may not be the place to get into a detailed evaluation of these views,Footnote ¹⁵ except to note that it is an open question as to which cosmopsychist ontology is the most successful in responding to the decombination problem.

Three further points about the combination/decombination problems are worth noting: The issue at hand is not just an explanation of the mechanisms that underlie the combination/de-combination of subjects; rather, it is the question of whether such combination/decombination is possible in the first place.Footnote ¹⁶ As we shall see later, it is precisely in this regard that some views fall short. Second, the unity-privacy intuitions that underlie the problem are based on how human subjects seem to us; as Siddharth (Reference Siddharth2024) notes, there really are no arguments for these intuitions. Nevertheless, that this is how human subjects seem to be is something that almost everyone agrees on; even those who go on to propose accounts of subject combination/decombination do not deny this but only contend that the seeming is not an accurate indication of how subjects really are. Given that human subjects are the only ones we have direct epistemic access to, our intuitions that are based on how human subjects seem to be ought to hold primacy over other possibilities we may entertain. This is not to say that the unity-privacy intuitions cannot be rejected, but that the onus is on those who reject them to show how subjects that violate these intuitions are possible.

Third, the issue at hand is not to explain how or why subjects of experience are strong ontological unities in the first place – the combination/decombination problems arise only because this ontological unity seems to be a fact that we cannot get around. The question rather is, if one were to accept the ontological unity of subjects, how is it possible that subjects combine/decombine? Hence, a solution to the problem is not expected to explain the unity of subjects, but only whether (and how) such unified entities can combine/decombine.

The monadic jīva as Brahman’s inseparable aṁśa

Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedāntins contend that Brahman, the essence of which is consciousness, is the only substance; the plurality of entities, sentient and non-sentient, are real qualities of this single substance. In Adhikaraṇasārāvalī, Veṅkaṭanātha characterises Brahman’s svarūpa (intrinsic nature) as that of being self-luminous and illuminating everything else; the material cause of the universe yet distinct from the sentient and non-sentient entities; the indwelling self (antarātmā) of everything; and of infinite bliss (ānandamaya). In addition to these essential characteristics, Brahman is also described as the ādhāra (the ontological ground) of the universe and as ubhayaliṅga, or having the dual characteristics of possessing all the desirable attributes and being devoid of any undesirable characteristics (Chari Reference Chari2008, 31–49). As noted earlier, Brahman is equated with Īśvara (the lord) and, as the union of two divine persons, Nārāyaṇa and Śrī. This forms the basis of Viśiṣṭādvaita’s Vaishnava theology, often interpreted as a form of panentheism.Footnote ¹⁷

Like other Vedāntins, Viśiṣṭādvaitins consider the Upaniṣads, the Vedānta Sūtra and the Bhagavad Gītā as foundational texts that serve as valid means of knowledge. An early version of the one-many question facing the Vedāntins is posed in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad (6.3.4), where Uddālaka asks what it is that, when known, everything else is known. He goes on to identify this as Brahman – the essence of the cosmos, which is also the self in each of us (Olivelle Reference Olivelle1998, 253). The jīva (individual self) is further characterised as an aṁśa of Brahman in the Aṁśādhikaraṇa of the Vedānta Sūtra (Raǹgācharya, Varadarāja Aiyangār Reference Raǹgācharya and Varadarāja Aiyangār1965, 143). Both these passages are accorded great importance by Rāmānuja and Veṅkaṭanātha as they seek to accommodate the ambiguity of different Upaniṣads on whether the jīva is identical to or distinct from Brahman (Chari Reference Chari2008, 196–201).

The term aṁśa is often understood (and translated) as ‘part’ or ‘fragment’,Footnote ¹⁸ which can be misleading. Different Vedāntic schools interpret the aṁśa-aṁśin relation in various ways; for Rāmānuja, an aṁśa is ‘an essential attribute (viśeṣaṇa) of a qualified substance’ (Chari Reference Chari2008, 200). Interpreting it this way allows Viśiṣṭādvaitins to make sense of the seemingly contradictory passages in the scriptures: what makes Brahman and jīva distinct is that the former is a substance, and the latter an attribute of the former. What makes them non-distinct is that the substance and attribute are integrally related and inseparable, or apṛthak-siddha (Chari Reference Chari1998, 43). The inseparability of the universe and Brahman is also described as analogous to the necessary relation that exists between the body and the soul; just as the body of a human being could not exist separate from the soul – for the Viśiṣṭādvaitins, this is true by definitionFootnote ¹⁹ – neither can the universe exist separate from Brahman (Chari Reference Chari1988, 272).Footnote ²⁰

As noted earlier, Viśiṣṭādvaitins are also committed to the view that Brahman is ubhayaliṅga – it has the dual characteristic of being endowed with all positive qualities and devoid of any negative qualities and imperfections. For example, in his commentary on the Ubhayaliṅgādhikaraṇa of the Vedānta Sūtra, Rāmānuja says:

How, though, is it possible for Brahman to be devoid of imperfections and negative characteristics while the jīva that possesses these imperfections is an inseparable aṁśa of Brahman, of whom Brahman is the inner controller? How must the aṁśa-aṁśin relation between jīva and Brahman be for this to be the case?

A similar problem arises in another instance. A pūrvapakṣin (a hypothetical opponent) raises the following question: if every jīva is an aṁśa of Brahman, why do they not all share experiences? Will one jīva’s experiences not be experienced by another jīva as well? In response, Rāmānuja and Veṅkaṭanātha contend that the jīva is aṇu (monadic or atomic) and not vibhu (all-pervading). Rāmānuja says:Footnote ²¹

This gives rise to a problem: If jīvas are all Brahman’s inseparable aṁśa and Brahman their inner controller, how can each jīva be aṇu or monadic? An atomic/monadic entity is usually understood to be an ontological individual – a unity. How can such an entity be a mere aṁśa of another entity (which also is an ontological unity)?

Rāmānuja’s response to such concerns has been to appeal to the scriptures and foreground the body–soul metaphor, to establish his view that the jīva is an inseparable attribute and that Brahman is devoid of imperfections and negative characteristics. Contemporary exegetes of Viśiṣṭādvaita (Bartley Reference Bartley2002; Carman Reference Carman1974; Lipner Reference Lipner1986; Ruparell Reference Ruparell2005) also understand Rāmānuja and others as justifying the inseparability yet distinctness of the universe and Brahman on the basis of scriptures, without delving into the more fundamental question of how Brahman and jīva ought to be for this to be possible in the first place. Given this, such exegeses do not really answer the question raised here but merely restate the problem.

This limitation is best elucidated by Lipner’s (Reference Lipner1986) articulation of the issue. He presents Rāmānuja as propounding a polarity theology that balances pairs of views that are in tension: transcendence and immanence of Brahman in the universe; parthood and participation of Brahman in the universe; the distinctness and inseparability of Brahman and the universe; and the derivativeness of the selves and their substantiality. According to Lipner, Rāmānuja’s metaphor of Brahman ensouling the universe helps him achieve this balance. Rāmānuja also employs the technique of perspectival shift in his discourse – from the perspective of Brahman, the universe, including individual selves, is all merely its attributes; however, from the perspective of the individual self itself, it is a substantial entity. This way, ‘the microcosmic tier of the self-body model counterbalances the macrocosmic, resulting in the dynamic equilibrium of the whole’ (Lipner Reference Lipner1986, 137).

The issue here is that Lipner merely describes how Rāmānuja balances the opposing poles in his discourse and how one ought to understand him, without touching upon whether and how such a polarised reality is possible in the first place. This perhaps serves Lipner’s aim of giving an account of how Rāmānuja interprets scriptural authority and worldly experience to defend his theology, but in doing so, Lipner does not articulate or broach the metaphysical question that is of concern to us.

Carman (Reference Carman1974) too notes how the soul–body metaphor is central to Rāmānuja’s theology, and that the universe understood as the body of Brahman is for Rāmānuja ‘not the conclusion of a rational argument, but a fundamental fact vouched for by Scripture. It is thus because of this fact that finite selves constitute the body of Brahman that we can say that these souls or selves are modes of Brahman’ (Carman Reference Carman1974, 127). Carman then summarises Rāmānuja’s four-pronged response to the problem of the one and the many: a) Though all entities inhere in Brahman, they maintain their distinctive nature, like how the threads woven into a cloth maintain their distinctness. b) Given the soul–body-like relation between Brahman and the universe, the imperfections of the universe do not touch Brahman. c) It is due to karma that an entity suffers, not merely because it has a body. Though Brahman has a body, Brahman does not suffer because karma is not attributable to Brahman, as attested by the scriptures. d) The universe, understood as the body of Brahman, is only to show that the latter is the lord of the former and is in control of it.

These arguments of Rāmānuja can be understood as offering an affirmative response to the following general question: Can there be some entity X such that it is an attribute of Brahman, such that it is distinct from Brahman and yet inseparable from it, and such that X’s deficiencies do not attach to Brahman? However, our concern here is not just this general question, but the more specific question of whether a monadic jīva can be the attribute of Brahman. In response to each of the four arguments, the following questions could be asked: a) How is it possible for a monadic self that is distinct from Brahman to inhere in Brahman? b) and c) What is it about the universe, which is the body of Brahman, on account of which it is both distinct yet inseparable from Brahman, such that its imperfections and karma do not carry over to the substrate? d) While Brahman may be its lord, how can a monadic self be merely Brahman’s attribute?Footnote ²²

In summary, even if one accepts the Viśiṣṭādvaitins’ interpretation of the scriptures – that Brahman and the universe are inseparable yet distinct, that the individual self is monadic and that the negative attributes of individual selves do not attach to Brahman – one still has to provide an account of how Brahman and individual selves (and the relation between them) must be for this to be possible. This question becomes significant given the conception of the jīva as monadic, which is in tension with its conception as an attribute of Brahman. Contemporary exegetical works seem to have clarified the Viśiṣṭādvaita position without broaching this specific question.

The emergent one-many problem

Contemporary cosmopsychists face the decombination problem on account of the ontological unity and privacy of subjects; given these, it seems incomprehensible how human subjects could derive from the cosmic subject. Typically, panpsychists (including cosmopsychists) propose and defend their views as a solution to the hard problem of consciousness, and as an alternative to physicalism and dualism. In this context, the question of combination/decombination of subjects poses an explanatory gap similar to the one faced by physicalists – or so critics hold. Thus, the issue of the unity-privacy of subjects is at the centre of what needs to be addressed; a failure to address the problem that arises from these intuitions might render the very existence of a cosmic consciousness unacceptable.

The Viśiṣṭādvaitins, on the other hand, are faced with a slightly different challenge. As noted in the previous section, one of their primary aims is to reconcile the seemingly contradictory passages in the scriptures. For Viśiṣṭādvaitins, unlike contemporary cosmopsychists, the existence of a cosmic consciousness (Brahman) is not in question – at least in their disputes with other Vedāntins. That the jīva is an aṁśa is also scripturally given; their task then is only to explicate the relation between the aṁśa and aṁśin. Thus, their focus is not so much on the unity-privacy of subjects as on fulfilling the other conditions set out in the scriptures.

A contemporary Viśiṣṭādvaitin-cosmopsychist, though, is faced with both sets of problems, and will have to explicate the relation between the individual self/subject and Brahman in a manner such that:

1. A. Every subject that exists is ontologically unified and private.

2. B. The individual self is an inseparable attribute of Brahman.

3. C. The individual self is a distinct ‘individual’ of sorts and the bearer of undesirable properties and experiences.

A and C are similar in that they point to the ontological unity-individuality-monadicity of selves. B, on the other hand, points to the inseparability of the self and Brahman. How can Viśiṣṭādvaitins reconcile these two seemingly opposing posits? Addressing this requires us to delve deeper into the Viśiṣṭādvaita metaphysics of relations.

Causation

In Indian philosophical debates, a distinction is drawn between two kinds of causes: upādānakāraṇa, or the material cause, and nimittakāraṇa, or the efficient cause. The material cause refers to the stuff that makes up an entity. For example, the material cause of a clay statue is clay. The efficient cause of an effect includes the agent and the entities that bring the effect into being. The efficient cause of a clay statue includes, among other things, the make of the clay statue. Consider another example of a loaf of bread. The material cause of the loaf is flour (which is baked), while the efficient cause(s) include the oven and the processes that occurred in it, the baker, and so on.

The various views of causation are usually classified into two types. First is asatkāryavāda, the proponents of which (such as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika) contend that the cause and effect are not the same, and that the effect is not something that is pre-existent in the cause. On the other hand, the proponents of satkāryavāda, such as the Sāṅkhya school, contend that effect is already pre-existent in the cause, and hence is not something ‘new’. The Viśiṣṭādvaitins, who adopt a modified form of satkāryavāda, contend that the effect is neither distinct from the cause nor does it already exist in the cause (in a latent state); rather, the effect is the result of a pariṇāma (transformation) of the attributes of the cause, while the substrate of the cause remains unchanged (Chari Reference Chari1988, 53). That is, while the stuff that constitutes both the cause and the effect is the same, the attributes of the stuff undergo transformation, which leads to the same substrate having modified attributes, resulting in the effect. In the earlier example, while clay is the material cause of both a lump of clay and the clay statue, the attributes of the lump of clay (shape, texture, etc.) transform in a manner such that the lump transforms into a clay statue.

Within this framework, one could ask three further questions about the relation between the cause and the effect:

• • Individuation: Are the cause and effect the same token concrete individual-substance?

• • Continuity of stuff: Are the material cause and effect of the same kind of ‘stuff’?

• • Homogeneity of stuff: Is the material cause itself constituted of one kind of stuff, i.e. homogeneous?

In the example of the clay pot, the same lump of clay (considered here as one token individual) is transformed into the clay pot, and hence the cause and effect are the same individual. The stuff that constitutes the lump of clay and the clay pot is continuous, for there is no new stuff that emerges in the causal process. And the stuff itself – clay – is homogeneous.

We can ask these questions about the Viśiṣṭādvaitins’ claim that Brahman is the upādānakāraṇa of the universe too: Are Brahman and the universe together one substance? Are the two constituted by the same kind of stuff? And is Brahman itself homogeneous, stuffwise? From the literature, it seems to me that Viśiṣṭādvaitins accept the first two – that Brahman and the universe are ultimately the same individual-substance, and that there is continuity of stuff between them when the universe is manifested from Brahman.Footnote ²⁵ However, it is not clear whether they hold that the material cause – Brahman – itself is homogeneous in terms of the stuff it is constituted by. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to examine these issues in detail, I think it is possible to interpret the Viśiṣṭādvaitins as accepting the third as well. I shall in this paper assume that they do,Footnote ²⁶ which in turn shall inform my interpretation of their view as a form of existence cosmopsychism. Before that, though, it would be useful to clarify certain metaphysical issues related to subjectivity.

Ontological unity reconsidered

Before that, it would be useful to draw further distinctions between aspects of a subject-having-experience. First, one can discern and pick out the ontological aspect of pure subjectivity – the bare minimum a subject has to be, understood merely as the metaphysical locus of subjective experience irrespective of the kind of qualitative content that is being experienced, a subject qua subject. When I consider a subject in terms of this aspect of pure subjectivity, I shall refer to it as subject₁. The concept of illumination consciousness employed by some Vedāntic schools captures the same aspect of reality that I here refer to as subject_1.Footnote ²⁸

In the example described at the beginning of this section, in addition to the pure subjectivity of the subject-having-experience, there are various experiential qualities that are experienced by the pure subject. These experiential qualities are spread across modalities; some ‘parts’ of it are intentional – they have a subject–object structure such that the content is directed at an ‘object’ (typically experienced as distinct from the experiencer) and is experienced as ‘for-me’, the subject. The various qualitative ‘parts’ are experienced in a unified manner – they are all aspects or ‘parts’ of a single phenomenal field and are also experienced as such by the subject.

While this is how most human subjects-having-experience are, one can also conceive of scenarios where the qualitative content is not intentional, such that they do not have a subject–object structure. Nevertheless, a subject-having-experience experiencing such content is not merely a pure subject, for it experiences some qualitative content. However, unlike in the aforementioned example, they do not experience content with subject–object structure. To reiterate, it seems to me that most human subjects-having-experience are not of this kind, for most human experiential content has a subject–object structure; the purpose here is only to carve out the conceptual possibility of a subject that experiences content without subject–object structure. It is a further question whether such possibilities obtain in reality.

The ontological unity – the fundamental singleness – of subjects is not on account of their having qualitative content simpliciter or qualitative content of a particular kind (phenomenally unified and/or intentional content); rather, it is on account of the content being experienced by a subject₁ – a single metaphysical locus of experience. In the earlier example, the experience is experienced as unified – all the content is experienced as part of the same phenomenal field. However, even if they were not and there were qualities that were not experienced in a unified manner, the subject-having-experience would still be characterised by ontological unity and privacy – it would still be the case that the subject can be understood only as a single entity, and none of its token experiential content would be available to be experienced by any other subject. It is on account of its pure subjectivity or subject₁-ness that a subject-having-experience is an ontological unity.

We can thus distinguish between the ontological and phenomenological unity of a subject-having-experience. Phenomenological unity is a matter of how the qualities experienced are structured with respect to each other. In the previous example, the laptop I see, the students I hear, etc., are structured such that they are experienced as aspects or ‘parts’ of a unified experiential field (in some cases, phenomenological unity may also include the feeling of being a unified subject). However, this is not the same as being an ontological unity. Phenomenological unity (or phenomenology of any kind) entails that it is for an ontologically unified subject₁, but the reverse need not be true. It is conceivable that an ontologically unified subject₁ experiences qualitative contents that are not phenomenally unified with each other. That is, it is possible that different ‘parts’ of a subject’s phenomenal field are not experienced by the subject as being parts of the same phenomenal field. That the qualitative unity of the content does not explain or exhaust the ontological unity of a subject is acknowledged in contemporary debates, especially those about the combination problem.Footnote ²⁹

Now, it may be asked what explains the metaphysical unity of a subject₁. While this is an important question, I shall put it aside for the purpose of this paper. As noted earlier too, the one-many problem that I am considering pertains to the question of how it is possible for a subject that is an ontological unity to be understood as a ‘part’ of or deriving from another subject. This question is premised on the acceptance of a subject as an ontological unity; a solution to the problem must explain either how such a derivation is possible or show that subjects are not really unities. Doing this is not the same as explaining how the subject is a unity in the first place.

In what follows, I shall develop and outline my interpretation of the Viśiṣṭādvaita view as a form of existence cosmopsychism, which I contend can adequately respond to the one-many problem.

Priority cosmopsychism

There are broadly two sets of priority cosmopsychist views that draw from Indian traditions: those drawing from the neo-Vedāntins Swami Vivekananda and Sri Aurobindo (Swami Medhananda Reference Medhananda2022a, Reference Medhananda2022b, Reference Medhananda2024); and those based on Pratyabhijñā Śaivism (Biernacki Reference Biernacki2024; Gillett Reference Gillett2025). While these views differ from each other in many ways, they are similar in terms of their inadequacy as a response to the decombination problem. They both put forth explanatory mechanisms for how and why the cosmic consciousness (which they identify with the divine, or a personal god Śiva) manifests as the universe of sentient and non-sentient entities; however, they fail to show that the metaphysics they propound – wherein there are finite subjects embedded or grounded in the cosmic subject – is possible in the first place. As noted earlier, the real challenge posed by the decombination problem is in showing how it is possible for ontologically unified and private subjects to be grounded in (or be a mere aspect of) another unified and private subject, and not just the question of the underlying mechanisms.

Consider Swami Medhananda’s (Reference Medhananda2022b, Reference Medhananda2024) account of Sri Aurobindo’s opaque cosmopsychism. He expounds a mechanism of ‘self-limitation’ and ‘exclusive concentration’ by which the cosmic consciousness individuates into limited finite subjects, the experiences of which are not available to be experienced by – opaque to – the cosmic subject (Medhananda Reference Medhananda2024). However, while the opacity of finite selves might help us save the ontological privacy of finite selves, there is also the question of their ontological unity – if subjects are ontological unities, is it at all possible for subjects (considered as subject₁) to be grounded in another subject irrespective of whether the experiences of the former are opaque or transparent to the latter? Swami Medhananda’s account does not address this. To do so, it needs to be shown how human subjects are not really ontological unities (and hence not subject₁) – in which case the view becomes similar to VEC – or how ontological unities can be grounded in other unities.

Here, it might be pertinent to discuss the views of Itay Shani (Reference Shani2015, Reference Shani2022), which are in many ways similar to Swami Medhananda’s opaque cosmopsychism (though not motivated specifically by any Indian philosophical tradition). Shani (2022) contends that the combination problem arises on account of having to accept the following two theses: a) Constitution: microsubjects literally constitute the macrosubject. b) Inclusion: microsubjects that constitute the macrosubject continue to exist as subjects within the macrosubject. He further contends that cosmopsychists need not be committed to these theses and argues for a view that gives up constitution wherein macrosubjects (and their experiences) do not constitute the cosmic subject. Instead, the cosmic subject is a pure, aperspectival subject from which macrosubjects non-constitutionally derive their sentience and develop their perspectives and experiential contents through an a posteriori mechanism. Shani (2022) explains the derivation of macrosubjects from the cosmos in terms of partial grounding, wherein the qualitative content of lesser subjects need not be available to be experienced by the cosmic subject, though the former derive their sentience/pure subjectivity from the latter, holding that there is nothing incoherent about this idea:

This passage is revealing, especially where Shani says that his view is possible from an epistemic point of view. The (de)combination problem is not a question of epistemology, but one of metaphysics. The objection is not that there cannot be a scenario wherein lesser selves experience content C which the cosmic subject does not know, but that there cannot be such C which is not also experienced by the cosmic subject, as a matter of metaphysical fact, irrespective of whether the cosmic subject knows it or not. The analogies Shani draws to block holes and blind spots within human experiences are also revealing. If there is a region of my experience C that I am not consciously aware of, it only means that C is not wired into certain cognitive mechanisms, not that C is not experienced by the subject-that-I-am as a matter of metaphysical fact.

Furthermore, it is not clear what the derivation of subjectivity/sentience – or, as Shani (2022) says, ‘entrusting them with its essence of sentience and subjectivity’ (p. 19) – entails. In claiming that lesser selves derive their ontic subjectivity from the cosmic subject without the latter experiencing the former’s content, it seems like Shani wants to preserve the ontological privacy of lesser selves but not their ontological unity, their fundamental singleness. How can the cosmic subject ‘share’ its ontic subjectivity/subject₁-ness with lesser subjects without also experiencing everything that the latter experience, though? If this is possible, in what sense is the lesser subject’s subjectivity derived from the cosmic subject? Given that we have no positive conception of a subject that has ontic privacy but not unity, such a move only seems to beg the question against those who think individuation/decombination of subjects is incoherent.

A way out for Shani (2022) and Swami Medhananda (Reference Medhananda2022b, Reference Medhananda2024) is to modify their views and claim that each lesser self is not an ontological unity, but only a phenomenological unity – a collection of qualitative contents that are phenomenologically unified, such that they are not available for unification with any other content experienced by the same subject₁ experiencing them. Such a modified view, of course, is similar to VEC, wherein lesser selves are not subject₁-s distinct from the cosmic consciousness, but only regions of phenomenological unity experienced by the only subject₁ there is.

Biernacki (Reference Biernacki2024) and Gillett (Reference Gillett2025) interpret Pratyabhijñā Śaivism as a form of cosmopsychism, wherein the personal god Śiva, of the nature of non-dual consciousness, is the ultimate ground of all reality, and the universe of sentient and non-sentient entities is the product of the creative freedom of Śiva. The human self is identical to Śiva, and our failure to recognise this is the impediment to our liberation. They contend that plurality (of the universe) can be embedded in a single consciousness, similar to how our own experiences often contain plurality and contradictions – for example, we might feel a strong desire to eat more food even as we think that we have already over-eaten. None of these, though, explain whether it is possible for a plurality of limited selves, where each self is a subject₁, to be grounded in a cosmic self (Śiva). Gillett (Reference Gillett2025) and Biernacki (Reference Biernacki2024) do not explicitly address this question but simply seem to assume that it is possible.

One can, however, construct a possible response from their perspective. Biernacki (Reference Biernacki2024) distinguishes between two aspects of consciousness – the illumination (prakāśa) aspect and the intentional-awareness aspect (vimarśa). She then describes how objects and selves manifest from non-dual Śiva when Śiva gets associated with māyā, or the cosmic illusion. One could possibly understand the view as Śiva being the only source of illumination consciousness, and all other objects and limited selves are but arrangements of the phenomenal field of Śiva. This would then mean that what we take to be limited human selves are but sophisticated arrangements of the phenomenal qualities of Śiva, and not themselves independent sources of illumination consciousness (i.e. not independent subject₁). That Biernacki and Gillett’s explicate the Śaiva view by drawing an analogy to human experiences containing plurality and diversity within themselves supports such an interpretation of their views. Notwithstanding whether this is a correct interpretation of Pratyabhijñā, such a view would be similar to VEC.Footnote ³¹

The priority cosmopsychist views offered by analytic philosophers also fall short for similar reasons, in that they all fail to reconcile the ontological unity and privacy of macrosubjects with the requirement that they are somehow dependent on or grounded in the cosmic subject; in attempting to this reconciliation, they are either forced to make some kind of brute posit or accept some explanatory gaps (or incoherent concept) or the other. A recent example: Goff (Reference Goff2024) is required to posit strong emergence to explain how macrosubjects come into existence from the cosmic subject, which in turn requires brute, fundamental laws.Footnote ³² VEC, on the other hand, places no such demands, for it does away with the plurality of subect₁-s, while accounting for human selves as phenomenological monads.

Idealism/existence-cosmopsychism

Finally, consider the classical Advaita-inspired views of Albahari (Reference Albahari and Seager2019a, Reference Albahari2019b, Reference Albahari2022) and Hejjaji et al (Reference Hejjaji, Sadasivan and Padmakumar2023).Footnote ³³ According to the classical Advaitins (and Albahari and Hejjaji et al.), everything other than a qualityless, non-dual Brahman is real only when considered from our limited perspectives; ultimately, they are the product of a cosmic illusion. This includes limited human subjects, their experiences, the physical world, and even the cosmic illusion itself to which the classical Advaitins ascribe an indeterminate ontological status (which they term anirvacanīya). As critics of classical Advaita point out, this is rather difficult to understand. For example, Rāmānuja in Śrībhāṣya contends that the Advaitin’s rejection of the limited individual self and its knowledge is akin to a man cutting a tree ‘cutting down everything other than the ground, which includes cutting down himself and the act of cutting down itself’ (Lakshmithathachar Reference Lakshmithathachar and Mishra2015, 70). As some contemporary critics of the Advaita-inspired views note (Vaidya Reference Vaidya2025; Vaidya and Siddharth Reference Vaidya and Siddharth2025), the contention of such views that the empirical world (of physical objects and individual selves) is not ultimately real renders them unsuitable as a solution to the hard problem of consciousness, for it seems to eliminate the very explanandum of the hard problem. Furthermore, such views will have to be ultimately based on a certain interpretation of scriptures or the testimony of certain mystics, which themselves are contentious and amenable to alternate interpretations. On the other hand, VEC allows for the reality of human experiences and the physical world, and while Viśiṣṭādvaitins often allude to the authority of scriptures in their support, the view defended here does not really require any trans-rational sources of justification.

The view that is closest to VEC is Kastrup’s (Reference Kastrup2018) idealism, which can be understood as an instance of existence-cosmopsychism. Kastrup, like VEC, contends that there is a single subject₁, the phenomenal field of which constitutes the universe. Regions of this phenomenal field ‘disassociate’ to form closed loops of unified qualities, which he calls alters and relative subjects. Unlike the Advaitic view, these disassociated qualities are not ultimately illusory, but as real as the cosmic subject – they are the real qualities of the latter. To the extent that both Kastrup and VEC posit only one subject₁ and accept human experiences as ultimately real, they are similar, and do not face the hard problem of having to explain how limited subject₁-s can be grounded in a cosmic subject_1. Kastrup, unlike VEC, is not committed to a metaphysics where the substrate and its attribute belong to distinct ontological categories.Footnote ^34, Footnote ³⁵