With judges garbed in flowing robes and court procedings ensconced in arcane ritual, the judiciary is arguably one of the Western world's last vestiges of the medieval era (along with both academia and the Catholic Church). Even so, courts have become a pillar of modern democratic governance, largely because of their widely respected role as administrators of justice, mediators of intragovernmental conflicts, and arbitrators of constitutional controversies. Indeed, though unelected and largely unaccountable to the public, the judiciary is an oddly undemocratic champion of democracy.
In the conventional understanding of their role in democratic societies, judges attain legitimacy from the fact that they are relatively immune to political pressures and are removed from the spectacle of political intrigue. In a system where interests reign—where interests compete against interests—judges are the dispassionate arbiters of the common good. Maintaining a healthy distance from politics gives judges the independence and autonomy they need to weigh in on controversial issues. As US Founding Father John Adams wrote in his Thoughts on Government (1776), judges “should be always men of learning and experience in the laws, of exemplary morals, great patience, calmness, coolness, and attention. Their minds should not be distracted with jarring interests; they should not be dependent upon any man, or body of men.” As such, good judges keep a low profile: They let legislators take the limelight and leave the bully pulpit to the president. Or do they?
In Judicial Power and Strategic Communication in Mexico, Jeffrey Staton challenges the conventional view of the modern judiciary and illustrates how constitutional courts deliberately seek to legitimate and gain popular support for their decisions. Staton examines when and why judges “go public,” and the choices they make in an effort to maximize judicial power and independence. He uses formal, game-theoretic modeling to describe the circumstances that constitutional courts face in a political context where the media may or may not pay attention to court decisions, and where erroneous reporting could jeopardize the legitimacy of the judiciary when it does. The author argues that courts are likely to be strategic about their public communications and media relations, sometimes opting for a more proactive approach and other times prefering “strategic deference” to other branches of government.
To test this argument, Staton turns to the case of Mexico. As in other emerging democracies, particularly in Latin America, Mexico's federal judiciary was historically dominated by other branches of government, especially the country's all-powerful presidency. For more than 70 years, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) had a virtual monopoly on all elected offices, and as the party's de facto leader the president had tremendous power vis-à-vis the judiciary. Moreover, restrictions on the tenure of judges and, more importantly, on judicial review weakened the power of Mexico's Supreme Court for much of the twentieth century. However, by the 1990s, the electoral and political reforms that accompanied Mexico's protracted process of democratization brought new opportunities for the judiciary to assert itself. In particular, a major federal judicial reform in 1994 under President Ernesto Zedillo (1994–2000) brought structural, administrative, and jurisdictional changes that expanded the Supreme Court's power of judicial review and its role in arbitrating intragovernmental disputes.
Yet Staton points out that this kind of de jure authority is not sufficient to ensure judicial power. Rather, “judicial power emerges out of strategic interactions between courts and political officials [and][p]ublic support for courts and the pressure constitutents can place on their representatives for failing to respect the rule of law is essential to judicial power” (p. 51). To illustrate this point, he draws on extensive field research and a rich data set generated from decisions by Mexico's Supreme Court. Relying on interviews, court documents, and exhaustive news analysis, Staton describes in rich detail the Court's aggressive public communications strategy in the wake of the 1994 reforms. Notably, public relations offices, press releases, and media interviews became central to this strategy, and worked not only to increase media coverage of court activities but also to educate journalists on how to interpret judicial decisions.
Staton tests his hypothesis through rigorous analysis of an original data set of more than a thousand Supreme Court decisions in cases dealing with constitutional controversies, unconstitutional actions, and special injunction requests (juicios de amparo). The author makes three key findings: 1) The court was more likely to challenge public policies when there was greater public attention to and understanding of a case; 2) the media were more likely to cover cases in response to public outreach by the court (i.e., issue a press release); and 3) the court was more likely to promote certain cases when it perceived the media as not paying attention and there was a need to increase public awareness. Staton also finds that when authorities occasionally defied the court, it refrained from confrontation and opted instead for strategic deference.
The author's detailed attention to the Mexican case allows him to delve deeply into the nuances of court strategy and decision making, and he addresses critical cases that shaped Mexico's democratic transition, such as the Supreme Court's decision regarding a controversial “bad bank” program set up during the Zedillo administration. At the same time, he makes a much broader contribution to the comparative study of the judiciary through both cross-national analysis and frequent references to the experiences of various other countries, including Argentina, Austria, Germany, Israel, Pakistan, Russia, the United States, and Venezuela. Staton's goal is not merely to develop a country study of the emergence of an independent judiciary in Mexico's new democracy, but to present a theory of why courts “go public” in both emerging and established democracies around the world. In this regard, the book makes a timely contribution in a period when courts have been prominent subjects of political pressure and manuevering, whether looking to Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf's purge of his country's Supreme Court in 2007 or the Obama administration's ongoing battles with the Roberts Court.
With analytical rigor and strong empirical grounding, Staton effectively demonstrates the circumstances under which the judiciary is likely to be concerned about and seek popular support. What is less clear from his analysis is the calculus of elected officials in responding to courts' efforts to influence and draw support from public opinion. Interbranch relations are a multiplayer game, and some consideration of the strategic perspective and possible advantages of courts' opposing players would be useful. For example, how might opposing branches of government seek to undermine the power of a court to effectively make public appeals, and when are these efforts more or less likely to be successful? Also, is there a difference in the relative ability of the executive or legislative powers to respond to court attempts to sway public opinion?
Fortunately, Staton's findings provide a basis to develop more sophisticated models of interbranch relations that take into consideration such questions. Meanwhile, he convincingly illustrates that the public relations strategies of judges are a factor that can influence the development of checks and balances and the rule of law in democratic systems of government.
