The Arab Spring revolutions in 2011 led to an upsurge in Islamist or “jihadist” state-formation projects, the most infamous of which was the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). While a number of books have been written about the origins and rise of ISIS, there has been little scholarly focus on the Islamist proto-state as such. And while there is abundant literature on civil war, relatively little has been said about the link between civil wars and state formation.

Aisha Ahmad’s study seeks to fill both of these gaps by conducting a comparative case study of two Islamist proto-states that were formed during civil wars: the Taliban in Afghanistan (formed 1994–96) and the Islamic Court Union in Somalia (formed in 2005–6). The puzzle that she seeks to explain is the following: Why did the Islamists succeed in creating order when groups based on tribal, clan, or ethnic identities failed? The answer, Ahmad argues, lies in the nexus of business and Islamist interests that has emerged in contemporary civil wars. Simply put, for Ahmad the local business elites helped the Islamists come to power because the Islamists were in the best position to protect their business interests. Behind the sudden and unexpected rise of an Islamist proto-state—which may take on mythical characteristics—she argues that there is in fact a hidden, economic logic.

Diving deeper into the author’s argument, there are two mechanisms that explain the sudden rise of an Islamist proto-state: “the long-term Islamicization of the business class and the short-term strategic support for Islamists from the business elite” (p. xxiii). Over time, business elites adopt an Islamist identity because it increases trust and is good for their bottom line. Then, the business elites start buying protection services from the Islamists, because the Islamists can offer better protection services at a lower price than their competitors can. While the first dynamic lays the foundation for business–Islamist interaction, the second contributes directly to a sudden rise in Islamist power. The two dynamics reinforce each other, and together they explain not only why Islamist proto-states emerge but also the timing and place of their emergence.

Jihad & Co. will undoubtedly have broad appeal among area experts, political scientists, and policymakers. First, the book presents two empirically rich and highly detailed case studies on Islamist groups in Afghanistan and Somalia, which are welcome contributions to the area studies literature. Second, it presents a new hypothesis on the rise of Islamist power in volatile areas, which will be of interest to scholars of civil war and state formation. Third, the book taps into ongoing political debates on how the international community should deal with contemporary Islamist proto-states.

The main strength of the book is that it is based on unique empirical material, gathered through the author’s lengthy fieldwork in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kenya, and Somalia. Ahmad has used a “mixed-methods approach that included interviews, survey questionnaires, and participant and nonparticipant observations” (p. 204). Her research methods are exemplary; in fact, the methodological appendix is in itself a field manual for conducting research in security-challenged areas. Another strength of the book is the originality of the author’s approach. Existing studies of militant Islamists and why they rise to power tend to emphasize ideology and external support as the main explanatory variables. To my knowledge, Ahmad is the first to do a systematic analysis of the connections between militant Islamism and local business elites. Her analysis does not distinguish between legal and illegal businesses, because as she pragmatically puts it, “it makes little sense to talk of illegality in lawless societies” (p. xxiii). A nugget worth adding here is that she found “no clear evidence that involvement in criminality made businesspeople any more or less inclined to support Islamists over other factions” (p. xxiii).

This core assumption about the nature of business in conflict areas sets her book apart from much of the terrorism studies literature, which tends to talk about the existence of a “crime–terror nexus” rather than a business–Islamist one (e.g., see Steven Hutchinson and Pat O’Malley, “A Crime-Terror Nexus? Thinking on Some of the Links between Terrorism and Criminality, Studies in Conflict Terrorism, 30[12], 2007). Regarding the old debate on whether criminals and terrorists are distinct or overlapping groups, Ahmad posits that “business and jihadist interests are highly distinct” (p. 6)—thus aligning with the classical position of Alex P. Schmid (“Links Between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorist Crimes,” Transnational Organized Crime 2[4], 1996), rather than with the dominant view in contemporary terrorism studies. But the picture is not clear-cut. Ahmad acknowledges that the borders between the two actors can be blurred, for example, in the case of Mokhtar Belmokhtar, an Al Qaida leader in Mali who was also big in the cigarette trafficking business, and who therefore earned the nickname “Mr. Marlboro” (p. 176).

On a theoretical level, the book lies at the intersection between international relations and comparative politics, and is a pioneering attempt at bridging the gap between the literatures on civil war and state formation. If there is anything to criticize in this otherwise excellent study, I would suggest that it does not quite fully succeed in its theoretical ambitions. According to the author, the book’s general contribution is that it provides a “theoretical framework to help explain the rise of modern jihadist-created polities across the world” (p. 13). To achieve this, Ahmad develops a hypothesis from the Afghanistan and Somalia cases and then validates it externally by including three additional “mini-case studies” of contemporary jihadist proto-states (ISIS, Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan). The result is not entirely convincing. While the mini case studies show that business–Islamist relationships are present in contemporary conflicts, they do not go deeply enough to validate the more fascinating parts of the author’s hypothesis—namely, that there is a two-stage dynamic at play that helps explain how militant Islamists suddenly and unexpectedly rise to power.

Having said that, Ahmad’s work taps right into current political debates about how to deal with jihadist proto-states. Such “states” are seen as highly unwanted, due to their ultraviolent behavior, disregard for international law, and support of international terrorism. The billion-dollar campaign against ISIS is the latest in a series of international military interventions designed to defeat jihadist proto-states. Despite the enormous amount of resources spent on fighting such entities, surprisingly little is known about them. It is also not clear-cut what it would take to defeat them, or prevent them from reemerging somewhere else.

Jihad & Co. is one of the first to provide research-based knowledge about the dynamics of Islamist proto-state emergence. It should therefore be required reading for all professionals dealing with issues of state security and foreign policy. Just be warned that the book contains no magical solutions or quick fixes to the security challenges posed by such states. It does, however, provide unique insights into the factors leading to their emergence in the first place. This book is bound to be a classic within the emerging theoretical field of state formation in civil wars.