In Spanish, ‘propaganda’ signifies either a commercial advertisement or subversively manipulated information within politics or warfare (p. 257). Through the case of Colombia's still-simmering armed conflict, Guerrilla Marketing shows us how the two meanings of propaganda – advertising and sly political messaging – have become inextricably entwined in the practice of contemporary warfare. Alexander L. Fattal's utterly engrossing and sharply written study is an ethnography of this weaponisation of marketing – or ‘brand warfare’, as he calls it.
In 2006, Colombia's military approached the Bogotá-based advertising firm Lowe/SSP3, asking it to develop a marketing campaign aimed at convincing individual guerrillas from the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, FARC) to desert the group and begin their transition into civilian life through the government's Programa de Atención Humanitaria al Desmovilizado (Programme for Humanitarian Attention for the Demobilised, PAHD). Lowe/SSP3 accepted the contract, which only paid a fraction of its going rate, with one condition: rather than a single campaign or a one-off stunt, the firm wanted to build the PAHD and, by extension the Colombian military, into a ‘brand’. So, while Lowe/SSP3's campaign sought to strip the FARC of its fighters and debilitate the insurgency, the commercials were also aimed at portraying the military as a legion of noble humanitarian warriors trying to ‘save’ the guerrillas and, crucially, reunite them with their families.
The book, for instance, opens by describing one commercial that shows the army putting up posters in various rural villages. Printed on the posters are old, blown-up photos belonging to the families of still-active guerrillas: a mother embracing her baby, a chubby toddler, an overly posed pre-teen. In the video, a mother's voice-over repeats the same text printed on the posters: ‘Before being a guerrilla, you are my child, so come home. I will always be waiting for you at Christmastime.’ (p. x) The fact that most of Lowe/SSP3's campaigns were strategically timed for Christmas was deliberate and a product of the marketing firm's diligent research with demobilised rebels. The firm's ‘creatives’ learned the holidays are difficult emotional times for guerrillas, most of whom have not seen their families in years. The commercial illustrates how the strategic mechanism at the core of Lowe/SSP3's brand warfare was not so much politics or ideology as it was affect; not only the affective disposition of the guerrillas, but also that of its other target audience: national and international publics.
Guerrilla Marketing is a path-breaking exploration of what's at stake in this confluence of marketing and counter-insurgency. For starters, the clever composition of the book's structure is indicative of Fattal's creativity as a writer and researcher. Besides a substantive introduction and conclusion, the book's four core chapters provide multiple ethnographic portraits of how brand warfare became an integral part of the armed conflict. Interspersed between all of these – in addition to a forward-looking epilogue – are excerpts of life-history interviews that Fattal conducted with demobilised rebels. These testimonies – the longest is maybe ten pages – are accompanied by a drawing from the pen of Lucas Ospina, a Colombian artist. The chapters strike a perfect balance of show-and-tell; vivid ethnographic detail is mixed with incisive analysis that is informed by theory and prior scholarly literature, but never overpowered by it.
Chapter 1 is a genealogy of brand warfare, which Fattal convincingly dates back to the 1970s, a decade that saw not only the proliferation of guerrilla groups and the intensification of counter-insurgency, but also the nascent consolidation of mass media, marketing and branding in Colombia. In this chapter, he credits the media-savvy rebels of the Movimiento 19 de Abril (19 April Movement, M-19), a mostly urban-based guerrilla movement, as the pioneers of brand warfare, beginning with the media spectacle they created by stealing Simón Bolívar's sword from a Bogotá museum in 1974. Fattal also discusses another, more infamous master of brand warfare: Pablo Escobar.
Chapter 2 details some of Lowe/SSP3's award-winning campaigns for the PAHD. The most famous involved the army setting up a gigantic Christmas tree in the jungle that would light up when activated by motion sensors. According to Fattal, the main achievement of these instantly viral campaigns (disseminated via YouTube, TED Talks and the like) was not a flood of demobilisations – a brutal, US-backed military offensive was the main catalyst for that. No, Lowe/SSP3's real achievement was recasting counter-insurgency as a form of loving – even familial – humanitarian care. Chapter 3 stays on the topic of ‘humanitarian counter-insurgency’ through a strikingly up-close ethnography of a military intelligence unit's attempt to demobilise a prominent guerrilla leader. In this chapter, Fattal reveals the mediatised, ‘humanitarian’ demobilisation campaign's true aim: wringing actionable intelligence from the combatants it successfully lures out of the rebel ranks.
Chapter 4 looks at what happens after guerrillas demobilise, documenting their struggles and their maladjustments to city life. The pitch by the PAHD and its marketers for the rebels’ demobilisation and their ‘reintegration’ into society is all about bootstrap, neoliberal entrepreneurialism (the PAHD gives ex-guerrillas seed money for microenterprises). But Fattal discovers a much darker reality. Most demobilised rebels enter a deep spiral of debt, social atomisation and alienation; so much so, in fact, that many end up ‘remobilising’ by turning to the various criminal enterprises run by their former arch-enemies: drug-trafficking paramilitaries.
Although it comes late in the book, it is in the final chapter that the book's inclusion of ‘Capitalism’ in the subtitle begins to make more sense. It's also here that Fattal's argument about branding as an emergent ‘mode of governance’ gets more fleshed out. We see, for instance, how the PAHD's production of atomised, neoliberal subjectivities completes the political work of counter-insurgency and how it dovetails with the crushing structural realities of mass urban poverty and a burgeoning surplus population. My one critique – and it is a minor one – is that earlier sections of the book could have tied in more evenly the ways in which capitalism matters to Fattal's story: perhaps through more discussion of the political economy of the media industry in Colombia; or by accounting for the way the shifting conjunctures of the country's capitalist development are reflected in the evolution (and his periodisation) of brand warfare.
In any case, what impresses me the most about this book is Fattal's evident skill as an ethnographer. First, there is the sheer multi-sitedness of his project: a glitzy marketing office, a military intelligence bunker, peace talks in Havana, and city slums – not to mention stopovers in Sweden, Denmark and various battlefront zones of Colombia. And yet, this juxtaposition of geographies never feels forced, neither methodologically nor narratively. Second, despite these scattered sites, Fattal gained an incredible degree of access. His (strictly observational) immersion in Lowe/SSP3 and, especially, the military intelligence unit are something to behold. He handled these two deeply fraught situations with admirable reflexivity and ethical poise. Finally, Fattal is a gifted cultural critic. He has a knack for deconstructing media and marketing with cutting analysis without it ever seeming too rebuscado (overwrought). Thanks to his prowess on the page and in the field, Guerrilla Marketing is a fascinating deep dive into the Colombian conflict's image-world.
