Tore T. Petersen, who teaches American diplomatic history at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology and previously published two captivating accounts, The Middle East between the Great Powers: Anglo-American Conflict and Cooperation, 1952–57 and The Decline of the Anglo-American Middle East, 1961–1969, continues his investigations into past American–British policy initiatives. His latest contribution focuses on Southwest Asia and covers a critical period between 1968 and 1973 when Washington and London courted Tehran and Riyadh to serve as their surrogates in the Persian Gulf and Arabian peninsula. His fascinating narrative identifies the Gulf as an “Anglo-American lake,” in which the United States and the United Kingdom competed with each other to preserve and protect respective interests regardless of the desires of local actors.
In a substantial introduction, Petersen evaluates Richard Nixon's attempt to use the Arabian peninsula as a building block in his “global structure of peace” (p. 2), against the claims of several historians—profusely quoted in these pages—who have argued that “America had no real policy in the Middle East” (p. 3) to accomplish such a grandiose goal. Naturally, in the context of the early 1970s, Nixon was chiefly preoccupied with Vietnam. He was not particularly eager to alter his predecessor's policy preferences, with the exception of a bold new twist to empower Iran and Saudi Arabia to fill the security vacuum created by the 1971 British withdrawal from East of Suez. Although London conceded a potential American role after it announced a carefully orchestrated military departures from the Lower Gulf in 1968, Petersen documents the Machiavellianism of the Edward Heath government as it honed a well-established proclivity to divide and rule. “The British did not bother to inform or consult the United States of the impending 1970 coup in Oman” (p. 5), for example, and felt quite at ease to let their American partners discover for themselves how Saudi Arabia “slumbered in its traditional lethargy” (p. 9). They were equally guarded about Tehran, notwithstanding Henry Kissinger's fawning over the shah, “that rarest of leaders, an unconditional ally, and one whose understanding of the world situation enhanced” (p. 7) U.S. interests. In the event, Petersen asserts that the Nixon doctrine, which stated that the United States “would honor its treaty obligations and provide nuclear cover to its allies and economic and military assistance in lieu of American troops” (p. 6), required “regional policemen” to do Washington's bidding during the Cold War notwithstanding various British stratagems.
The introduction closes with the astonishing claim that “Nixon and Kissinger not only engineered oil price increases . . . to support . . . defense spending, but also to reduce economic growth in Japan and Western Europe by siphoning off surplus to the oil producers” (p. 11) and thus enhance American power. Needless to say, such calculations further weakened the so-called special relationship between the United States and Britain, both of which, for entirely different reasons, saw the Gulf region as a strategic asset from where the flow of oil could, should, and would not be interrupted. In a hefty prologue that follows this introduction, Petersen provides a detailed discussion of the many steps taken by the two Western powers to move beyond earlier colonial confrontations toward putative political cooperation. However, one wonders whether the offers made by several Gulf rulers to finance a continued British military presence were taken seriously. Apparently, these requests “were brutally and gratuitously shot down” by one of Her Majesty's representatives who retorted, “that he was not ‘sort of a white slaver for Arab shaiks’” (p. 27). This is ironic because British and American soldiers did eventually become mercenaries for Gulf rulers. In any case, Petersen sets out to demonstrate that oil was not all that important in the Anglo-American equation as long as it was available at reasonable prices. More valuable was the region's role within the global framework, as Washington devised pillars and London enjoyed unilateralism.
Within the area itself, other dynamics emerged, manifested by the shah's determined focus on Bahrain and the three UAE islands of Abu Musa, the Greater Tunb, and the Little Tunb. According to Petersen, the shah told his British and American allies in 1971 that he intended to invade and occupy the islands, a position that received little opposition. On the American side, Nixon, Kissinger, Joseph Sisco, and Richard Murphy all concluded that what really mattered was cooperation between Iran and Saudi Arabia, because that was the source of stability and therefore trumped any concerns expressed by Lower Gulf rulers. Moreover, Petersen reports that high-ranking Western officials did not think much of local Gulf potentates, with Kissinger opining that Sultan Qaboos was “not a particularly strong leader and ha[d] done little to bring the various parts of [Oman] together” (p. 60). In effect, Petersen demonstrates that Britain and the United States actually negotiated Iran's occupation of the UAE islands throughout 1971, although it was widely acknowledged that Iranian claims to the islands were without foundation.
To be sure, the American strategy to have allies—not mere clients—in the Gulf necessitated sycophantic praise of the shah as well as a steady flow of arms sales. Western policy dictated that the shah be “aggrandized” and, in time, manipulated as a counterbalance to Arab oil producers. Even if Nixon and especially Kissinger loathed King Faysal bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Al Saʿud, it was pragmatic not to be excessively critical of the forthcoming 1973 oil embargo because Riyadh should appear “to be completely untied to the United States and in common front with Arab states.” For Sisco, who calmed jittery oilmen a few months before the 1973 war and embargo, Washington's judgment was “that the Saudis want to stick with us, and any action they might take against us would be done reluctantly” (p. 114).
The book closes with a chapter on Oman that illustrates how British imperialism made its transition to modernity and further highlights differences between London and Washington. Although Petersen gives credit to the manipulation skills of American policymakers regarding the Arabian peninsula, he forcefully illustrates that the “British had no serious intention of giving up their core area” of influence, which protected long-term British interests.
In the end, Petersen does not believe that Nixon's much vaunted global structure for peace succeeded, because “a pattern of an Anglo–American grand strategy emerge[d] in the area, tolerating no outside powers or hostile local powers to challenge Western hegemony in the region” (p. 133). Nixon and Kissinger may well have engineered the rise in oil prices between 1969 and 1972, perhaps to enable their Saudi and Iranian “allies” to purchase military hardware even if Britain had other priorities. To be sure, both countries wanted the shah to serve as guardian of the Gulf, but what chiefly concerned London was its own ability to retain power by pursuing independent policies, which prompted the Crown to help create the United Arab Emirates and ensure that Qaboos became sultan of Oman in 1970. Successive American and British governments evolved into premier arms merchants that neglected indigenous problems, opting for short-term gains over long-term stability and security. Petersen identifies this tendency as a hallmark of the Nixon–Kissinger foreign policy team that ultimately produced the 9/11 blowback.
This incredibly detailed book, with extensive citations from both British and American government archives, will delight students of international relations eager to understand ossified mind-sets. Petersen is eminently convincing that American and British merchants can transform clients into allies but will fail to make them act against their own intrinsic safety.
