The Rise of Nuclear Fear is an extensively revised and updated version of Spencer Weart's widely read and successful 1988 book Nuclear Fear: A History of Images. In his preface, Weart asserts that there are three major differences between this reworked edition and the original text, namely that it has been updated to include developments of the last twenty years; that it is more concise; and that it incorporates advances in understanding from the broad range of fields, from historical scholarship to neuropsychiatry, on which his analysis relies. Despite these differences, Weart's central thesis, ‘that images buried within our minds have larger consequences in history than has commonly been thought’, remains unchanged (p. viii).
The structure of the book largely follows that of the 1988 version, with seventeen of the opening nineteen chapters retaining their original titles and position in the text. The final section of the book features four largely new chapters that focus on developments in the last twenty years. In a post-Fukushima world, where nuclear fear is purportedly once again on the rise, and as an increasing number of commentators begin to see nuclear energy as having an important role in a low-carbon future, Weart's updated assessment of nuclear imagery and its persistence in the post-Cold War period is as timely as his original 1988 publication.
The Rise of Nuclear Fear introduces a wide array of case studies from mid-1950s ‘Atoms for Peace’ visions of a White City utopia, to sci-fi movies such as Godzilla, explicitly influenced by radioactive contamination and the threat of the hydrogen bomb. Weart utilizes these examples to deftly highlight the wide range of nuclear technologies and the shifting position of nuclear energy in twentieth-century societies. Further, the author links the emergence and prevalence of nuclear fear, especially in America, to the combination of the real potential of nuclear energy and deep-rooted human fears of dirt, disgust, power and hell.
Although the book begins with a convincing assessment of how pre-nuclear narratives, such as those of masters and monsters prevalent in Gothic literature, influenced subsequent radioactive and nuclear imagery, it is on the post-war period that Weart's historical narrative focuses. Given that during the 1950s many definitive nuclear texts were published and that in this period the Cold War nuclear state emerged, it is unsurprising that Weart's treatment of this decade is rich in historical insight and analysis. Throughout, Weart uses a wide range of primary sources, including US Congress records; anti-nuclear literature; newspaper coverage; and a plethora of long-forgotten nuclear-influenced films, television programmes and novels.
In a review of the original 1988 Nuclear Fear, appearing in this journal, historian of science Paul K. Hoch raised concerns about a lack of symmetrical treatment of the anti-nuclear and pro-nuclear proponents. Although The Rise of Nuclear Fear by no means gives equal space to pro- and anti-nuclear actors, giving much more critical coverage to those with an anti-nuclear position, it does provide limited coverage of pro-nuclear positions, most insightfully through Weart's analysis of how fears of nuclear experts themselves were transmitted into both nuclear regulation and public narratives. Further, in this latest incarnation, Weart closes with a personal note, where he reflects on his own politics and opinions on the role nuclear energy must play today, in a society he sees as threatened by the consequences of unabated carbon emissions.
Ultimately, in the 1988 review, Hoch was left unconvinced by Weart's inability to coherently link nuclear imagery to nuclear reality. Such a reading fails to truly grasp the depth of Weart's argument in both versions of the book; for me The Rise of Nuclear Fear clearly demonstrates the limitations of believing in a true impermeable boundary between imagery and actual events. For Weart shows not only the complex influence a diverse range of imagery had in shaping public perceptions of nuclear technologies, but also how experts, politicians and scientists were themselves influenced by these public narratives.
Although containing insight into Soviet, British, Japanese and German nuclear imagery, The Rise of Nuclear Fear is unashamedly American in its focus. Whilst such a treatment is not problematic per se, it does weaken Weart's assertion, drawing on psychological, anthropological and psychiatric literature, that nuclear fear, much like other human fears, is part of our biology. For if nuclear fear is almost programmed into human nature, how can one account for the divergent nuclear paths that different nations have taken?
Despite these misgivings, which could be addressed by more in-depth study of scholarship on nuclear imagery in non-US contexts, I find Weart's central placement of psychology and risk perception throughout the narrative compelling. If historians of science and technology are to better understand the complex influence that imagery and popular culture have had on both geopolitics and technological development, especially in the twentieth century, then more will need to embrace such interdisciplinary approaches. It is for this reason that this book should appeal to a broad range of readers. Whether you have a specific interest in nuclear issues and the Cold War or not, Weart shows that imagery and its most common outlets – television, film and the print media – are not merely reactive instruments simply reflecting expert knowledge, but rather imagery and associated public perception are active components in the development of contested technologies and scientific practice in society.
