In a meeting in Moscow some years ago, the former Soviet Union's principal Americanologist, Georgi Arbatov, complained to me quite seriously, “We study your system, and we still do not know how it works.” Probably one reason for Arbatov's expressed puzzlement had to do with the role played in the American governmental system by the United States Senate, of which, at the time of our conversation, I was a member.

There is no doubt that the Senate is a peculiar institution in our democracy (and part of the justification for our saying, if we are careful, that in our system the people rule “in some way”). The Senate is not a majoritarian body, of course—with two senators from each state, large or small (so that less than 17% of the nation's present population can elect a majority of the Senate) and with internal rules that allow a minority of senators to block action by a Senate majority.

There is no wonder that the Senate is something of a puzzlement. According to the authors of this excellent book, the Senate emerged from the Constitutional Convention, itself, as a “clumsy hybrid,” a “committee's version of a horse” (p. 206)—that is, a kind of camel. And it was altered some, too, later on.

The unique value of this book by Daniel Wirls and Stephen Wirls is found in its combined discussions of three aspects of the “invention” of the Senate. The book begins with an interesting exposition of pre-Convention liberal-republican theory and practice. It then examines the crucial decisions made at the Convention about the Senate, decisions which are shown to have been more than the mere result of an often-called “political deal,” but involved matters of substance, too. Finally, the book traces the later institutionalization of the Senate, from the ratification period through the early years of Congress.

American Founders such as James Madison wanted the Senate to be an equal, positive legislative actor with the House of Representatives, a liberal separation-of-powers check on the House and the executive, and a small, independent, selectively appointed republican bastion of thoroughly “national” prudence and wisdom. But the Convention decided also to make the Senate an embodiment of federalism and the rights of state governments (two senators from each state, originally elected by state legislatures). In operation, the Senate became more internally individualistic, while power in the House became more hierarchically organized. And the Senate became increasingly interest- and constituent-oriented, especially after a constitutional amendment that provided for the popular election of senators.

Congressional scholars, including the authors of this book, have been focusing more and more on the fact that the U.S. Congress is composed of two chambers and that the two are very different—in formation, representation, and operation. And all that is to the good, if we Americans are to understand better than Russian Georgi Arbatov how our system actually works.

The Invention of the United States Senate arose from a vacation-time friendly argument between the authors. One pronounced the Senate an “undemocratic constitutional atavism,” while the other, defending bicameralism in general, heralded the Senate as “essential to moderate and free government” (p. ix).

The argument was never resolved. Maybe the two political scientists were both right. But you and I are fortunate that to bolster his own side of the argument, each of the authors soon plunged into some serious research about the United States Senate, and then both finally pooled the results of their efforts to produce this highly scholarly but also highly engaging work.