Current debates about Japan's political economy revolve around revisiting and refining the “miracle” thesis associated with the country's postwar development. The books by Gregory J. Kasza and Leonard J. Schoppa are excellent contributions that advance this conversation. They are thoughtful, well researched, and creative studies. They complement one another well. In fact, the two ought to be read together.
Kasza's study examines the historical development of Japan's welfare state. His is a story of optimism. Kasza contends that when patterns of Japanese social welfare reform are scrutinized against a comparative backdrop, the evidence strongly suggests that Japan has by and large been a leader, not a laggard, in social policy innovation. At worst, he claims, Japan's performance has been average in some social policies when ranked among other advanced industrial countries. As the title suggests, One World of Welfare argues that the Japanese welfare state has converged with the West. Japan has transformed. Schoppa's book, on the other hand, offers a much less sanguine view. He explicitly links together economic and social policies. Japan's postwar social contract, he argues, was based on a mutually reinforcing dynamic between economic productivity and social protection. Like Kasza, Schoppa underscores how Japan's postwar miracle was rooted in growth with equity. However, the pressures of globalization and continued modernization have forced Japanese policymakers to adapt, which, according to Schoppa, they have failed to do. He sees change in Japan, but not transformation. Race for the Exits offers an explanation as to why.
Kasza's book focuses on a range of social policies, specifically health, pensions, and unemployment insurance. The first two are considered the cornerstones of the welfare state, requiring the largest outlays. Protection for the unemployed has become increasingly critical, given the precariousness of today's labor markets. Kasza demonstrates how the Japanese government first institutionalized social insurance schemes during the 1930s or during World War II. His point is threefold. First, Japan learned from Western examples, notably from Germany's social insurance model. Second, the origins of Japan's welfare state predate its postwar economic growth. And third, early reforms entailed policy-institutional legacies that subsequently allowed the state to layer on new social policies and expand existing ones in tandem with economic growth. Kasza finds that welfare state deepening in Japan was productive, belying the assertion that growth and equity are antithetical. He also finds that this pattern is not dissimilar to experiences in Western industrial societies (Chapters 2 and 3). Indeed, Japan had converged. Its social policies are similar to those found in Anglo-European welfare states. Meanwhile, differences, he argues, are exaggerated. He debunks the notion that Japan epitomizes the archetypal Asian welfare “society” model, showing how differences among welfare regimes within Asia are far more significant than those found among Japan and its counterparts in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (Chapters 4 and 5).
Schoppa's study begins with an exposition of “convoy capitalism,” a system of mutually constitutive and mutually beneficial relations between productive and protected sectors of society. The Japanese state, he points out, was at the center of this arrangement. Schoppa focuses his empirical analysis on two key interconnected constituents: firms and women. Despite a strong state presence in Japan's postwar industrialization, the firm was always at the core of productivity. Firms were the vehicles for wealth creation and stable (lifetime) employment. Women were at the core of the family, which in postwar Japan was the principal institution for social protection. In Chapters 3 and 4, Schoppa describes how convoy capitalism worked, though he is careful to stress that its success was realized in a particular socioeconomic context. Convoy capitalism began to unravel during the 1980s and 1990s, coinciding with the decades when Japan's growth slowed significantly. Rising wages and input costs, inefficient infrastructure, fiscal deficit, government debt, and fertility decline were among the pressures that came to bear on the Japanese economy (Chapter 4). The author suggests that we should have expected the state to steer public policy in ways that dealt with such pressures. But it failed to do so. He demonstrates how economic and social policy reforms were (and continue to be) incomplete, were off target, and have failed to adapt (Chapters 5 to 7).
It is interesting to note that the two studies reach divergent conclusions about developments in Japan. For Kasza, policymakers made good on their commitment to promote socioeconomic equity, while ensuring that this did not come at the expense of economic productivity. Schoppa, on the other hand, contends that the Japanese government failed to adapt the postwar productivity-protection compact to new socioeconomic realities. Why different conclusions? Their divergent takes reflect different focal points and theoretical questions.
Kasza's book provides some insight into why Japan's welfare state converged with the Anglo-European (minus the United States) standard. This is the focus of Chapter 7, wherein Kasza argues that the international diffusion of social policy problems and solutions and the formation of a transnational epistemic community of social policy thinkers fed into the Japanese policymaking process. While he shows interesting parallels across space and time, he is less specific about the precise causal mechanisms that facilitated the transmission of ideas. But this criticism is relatively minor considering that he is more interested in answering “what” than “why” questions. The comparative backdrop explored throughout the book positions Japan among a global range of cases. Kasza's theoretical contribution, therefore, rests in his argument that Gosta Esping-Andersen's “three worlds” typology—still the conceptual standard-bearer in comparative welfare state research—is problematic. Kasza demonstrates empirically how convergence among welfare states in rich democracies blunts Esping-Andersen's conceptual distinctions. Moreover, Kasza's demonstration of how welfare deepening in Japan occurred in the absence of a strong “left” weakens the conventional power resources approach, which argues that welfare state development is both correlated with, and caused by, union density and the strength of social democratic parties. Due to its broad and comparative scope, One World of Welfare demands a rethinking of extant categories in the welfare state canon.
Race for the Exits is primarily concerned about “why” questions. Why has the Japanese government failed to adapt to pressing socioeconomic conditions? Schoppa draws on Albert O. Hirschman's theory of exit and voice to animate his argument. He contends that those constituents affected by economic globalization and Japan's modernization—firms and women—have opted for quiet exit strategies. More specifically, he argues that they have chosen “limited” and “uncoordinated” exits, which have confused social policymakers and disincentivized them from engaging emerging policy problems head-on. As he explains, limited exit “made it difficult for government officials to grasp the significance of the problem, diagnose causes, and formulate a response” (p. 15). Had they chosen to “fight” and express their voice politically, or alternatively, had they chosen to exit fully and rapidly, Schoppa reasons, then policymakers in Japan would have looked for and received clearer signals from within society and, in turn, devised more effective policies. He demonstrates this by contrasting the government's “partial and incomplete reforms” (p. 194) caused by limited exit strategies shared among firms and women (Chapters 5 to 7) with what he sees to be more decisive policy processes in the areas of financial liberalization and long-term care insurance for the elderly (Chapter 8).
The two books ask different questions and, as such, arrive at different conclusions. Kasza, for instance, is primarily concerned with outcomes, while Schoppa's main focus is on the policy process. Theirs entail different interpretations of policy events and outcomes, even if they are examining similar empirical evidence.
For Kasza, government subsidies for weak industrial sectors are a good thing, as they ensure productivity and protection for otherwise vulnerable Japanese citizens; for him it is, after all, about outcomes. Schoppa sees these subsidies as an inherent pathology of the bygone era of convoy capitalism; for him they are obstacles to policy reform. Kasza understands social care for children and the elderly as normative social goods and the continued deepening of Japan's welfare state. Schoppa sees social care as a normative good, to be sure, but he also understands it as a way to encourage sounder economic policymaking, particularly in activating labor markets. For Kasza, the legacies of early policy decisions are good, as they lay the foundation for Japan's deepened welfare state. Yet for Schoppa, such legacies are in part to blame for misguided public policymaking in Japan over the past two decades or so.
The treatment of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in the two studies is interesting, in part because it opens their respective arguments to some critique. Kasza credits LDP leadership (among other variables) for having deepened Japan's welfare state. LDP decisions were no doubt wise ones. Yet if we are to accept Kasza's empirical argument about welfare state convergence globally, then we are left to wonder whether the range of choices for the LDP was ever very wide. If international diffusion compelled convergence among rich democracies, why would we expect anything less than what the LDP apparently chose to deliver? Schoppa's take on the LDP is much more critical than Kasza's. He laments how the absence of a coordinated voice from the bottom up necessitated top-down, bureaucratic policymaking. This style of policymaking, which featured the LDP at the center, contributed to late, reactive, incomplete, and by and large failed reform efforts. Yet, it remains unclear why Schoppa believes that voice strategies in the political arena would have made the ruling LDP any more effective at reform, especially considering the conventional wisdom, which posits that contested pluralism tends to obfuscate problem definition and solutions in policymaking. Limited exit is clearly not optimal in times of crisis, as Schoppa ably demonstrates, yet it is not clear to me, with the exception of the case of financial liberalization during the 1990s, how voice would necessarily be better.
That questions remain is hardly surprising. But what is not in doubt is that these two books, separately and together, contribute much to the understanding of Japanese political economy in comparative perspective.
