Open Skies tells the story of negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union (and their NATO and Warsaw Pact allies) to establish cooperative aerial surveillance of one another’s territory during the final years of the Cold War. Agreeing to allow reciprocal, regular overflights of military developments, deployments, and facilities was a bold mutual concession designed to avert crises through transparency and to test and build confidence in one another’s peaceful intentions. The book presents a Lazarus narrative: The idea was launched by Dwight Eisenhower and his advisors in 1955, shot down by U.S. bureaucratic interests and Soviet opposition, and successfully resurrected by the George H.W. Bush administration in 1989 (the treaty was signed in March 1992 after the Soviet Union had broken up). And, ultimately, it is an insider account: Peter Jones, a former Canadian foreign service officer, and now a professor of international affairs, was personally involved in the Open Skies negotiations and draws heavily on his own recollections, notes, collection of unpublished documents, interviews with former colleagues, and previous research. This makes Open Skies clearly the most comprehensive account of this diplomatic episode, but it also carries significant tradeoffs for scholarly work in security studies.
The book raises at least four major themes of broad and significant interest for political scientists, and provides useful insights and suggestive anecdotes on each. First, it explores the politics of information openness in cooperation among adversaries, identifying several strategic, domestic, technical, and perceptual obstacles in the early stages of trust-building. Leaders pushing for a transparency regime had little to no support from public opinion (p. 24), an unwillingness to hear or inability to understand their opponents’ sincerity in initial negotiating positions (pp. 50, 56), and a process focused on political and strategic objectives that marginalized flight operators and other technical experts until the final stages of negotiation and implementation (pp. 38–39, 138–140, 150). Second, it investigates the intersection of great power relations and intra-bloc politics, emphasizing the importance of middle-power agency for establishing multilateral cooperation. Especially Canada and Hungary, both independently and together, played key roles in setting the agenda and pushing momentum by hosting two multilateral conferences in Ottawa and Budapest and executing the first test flight (pp. 18–22, 31–32, 43, 48–50, 52, 57). Third, it traces the complete lifecycle of negotiations, with overlapping phases. Pre-negotiations between the blocs were few and unproductive (pp. 32, 34, 50, 56), working conversations continued between formal rounds (pp. 81–83, 92), the parties repeatedly punted a number of difficult questions to be negotiated after the treaty was formally signed (pp. 7, 26, 134, 147), and operational flights began years before the treaty entered into force (p. 149). Finally, Open Skies says a great deal about presidents, their advisors (including scholars), and the process of foreign policymaking. High-level political leadership was essential since the proposals had no bureaucratic constituency (pp. 19, 35, 49), but leaders were also constrained by opposition from military, intelligence, and diplomatic agencies whose participation was essential to implement the agreement (pp. 3, 6, 20, 49, 68).
However, the book treats these issues largely in isolation from existing research (except on Open Skies itself), so scholars of foreign policy may need to do additional work to plug Open Skies into major debates in the field. For instance, the role of signaling, information, and concessions in conflict resolution has preoccupied works such as Charles Kupchan, How Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace, 2010; Dan Reiter, How Wars End, 2009; William Long and Peter Brecke, War and Reconciliation: Reason and Emotion in Conflict Resolution, 2002, and notably Andrew Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations, 2005, which focuses on the U.S.-Soviet relationship. To the extent that Open Skies is a policy memoir by a scholar-practitioner, for an applied audience of diplomats and decision-makers, this is not a problem. And the book as it stands offers valuable source material for researchers and a successful narrative history of an important international accord. Jones is clearly optimistic that the Open Skies negotiating experiences “hold considerable lessons for those who would embark upon the negotiation of any ambitious Confidence-building Measure (CBM) in many different contexts in today’s world” (p. 1). For others, the extent to which Open Skies serves as a case study that confirms or rebuts existing arguments, constitutes an outlier or a representative sample, and yields generalizable lessons may be less clear.
The fine-grained discussion of Open Skies itself is admirably transparent. Jones meticulously clarifies in endnotes which of his assertions are based on personal memory as opposed to documents or others’ analysis, and he methodically cross-references his recollections by interviewing other participants (some of whom were colleagues, and others of whom are anonymous) and citing these to confirm his account (e.g.: p. 203 fn. 5). However, to judge by the endnotes, the author and his interviewees seem always to concur, which is surprising in a book about bureaucratic infighting, mistrust among allies, and protracted negotiation. Whether on the motives for bureaucratic opposition to Open Skies in the United States or the USSR, or on the impact of smaller allies’ diplomacy on U.S. and Soviet negotiating behavior and the prospects for multilateral cooperation, this apparent unanimity should offer fertile ground for future research. The author helpfully draws on a number of unpublished documents in his possession, from his own notes and correspondence to copies of Open Skies Conference Secretariat papers, as well as newspapers and published Canadian, American, and NATO documents, moving beyond the realm of oral history or memoir. As declassification opens up new swaths of the George H.W. Bush Presidential Library (and Canadian and European archives), scholars will hopefully find complementary material with which to challenge, enhance, and complicate Jones’ analysis (Jones does cite [p.182 fn. 54] one Bush Library document online—a National Security Directive). As the author notes, “historians… are divided as to Eisenhower’s motives” (p. 9) regarding Open Skies in 1955—Bush administration policy is likely similarly complex.
Relatedly, given the book’s subtitle, Transparency, Confidence-Building, and the End of the Cold War, does Open Skies push scholars to rethink the Cold War, particularly its final years, and subsequent U.S.-Russian relations in the context of a changing Europe? What role did Open Skies play in these developments, what did it ultimately accomplish, and does it offer any hope for overcoming the resurgence of U.S.-Russian antagonism and mistrust? Getting the treaty on the table, let alone formally agreed upon and implemented, was a major achievement for middle powers, national leaders, and negotiators. But Open Skies was undermined from inception, its implementation resisted by allies and agencies alike, its initial motivation made partly obsolete by geopolitical and technological revolutions, and as the author admits, it has recently been “languishing” in a “low period” of “malaise” (pp. 158, 163, 172). Multiple periods of Soviet-American détente in the 1960s and 1970s seem not to have involved a revival of Open Skies-type confidence building (the book treats the Eisenhower years briefly in Chapter One, then devotes Chapters Two through Seven to the Bush administration), and the Cold War ultimately ended through unilateral collapse rather than trust and rapprochement.
Ultimately, the promise of Open Skies for confidence-building remains alluring but uncertain, which offers intriguing questions for international security research and policy. On the one hand, Jones’s Open Skies offers encouragement for leaders trying to transcend regional conflicts. Even failed attempts, such as by Eisenhower in 1955, may be valuable for agenda-setting: despite sitting on ice for a generation or more, they can swiftly be revived as coherent and inspiring templates for action. And executive determination and the dogged diplomacy of external allies can sometimes overcome both bureaucratic opposition and popular indifference to such initiatives. Should leaders simply go for it, though? What are the scope conditions within which the Open Skies lessons hold? Failed overtures might worsen mistrust, help hardliners oust moderates, and contribute to popular disillusionment, deterring future cooperative efforts. And successes may depend as much on the cooperative predispositions of individual leaders (such as Mikhail Gorbachev) as on any mutually constructed confidence. Third party involvement could multiply veto points, create counterproductive linkages, and scuttle cooperation in some instances—witness Greek and Turkish positions on the inclusion of Cyprus in the Open Skies regime. To build on Jones’s work, to help sort out cause from contingency, and to sharpen and contextualize policy recommendations, future research might analyze the Open Skies saga in comparative perspective.
