(…) whereas those responsible for such interference, including their proxies within and outside their own territory, can be state or non-state actors, and are frequently assisted in their foreign interference by political accomplices in the Member States who derive political and economic advantages from favouring foreign strategies; whereas foreign actors’ use of domestic proxies and cooperation with domestic allies blurs the line between foreign and domestic interference (…)
(INGE Report on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation, 8 February 2022, A9-0022/2022, E.)
I. Introduction
The editors of this special issue highlight that EU anti-corruption law rests on four pillars: “first, the definition of criminal offenses and the rate of investigation, prosecution and sanctions of these offences; second, integrity rules at the national and local levels, including regulations on immunity; third, the establishment, powers and structure of anti-corruption authorities and other administrative bodies; fourth, provisions on transparency, publicity and lobbying.”Footnote 1 Building on this fourth pillar, this article examines how the European Union conceptualises the relationship between anti-corruption and lobbying regulation, with a particular focus on the regulation of foreign influence. Rather than addressing corruption primarily as an individual criminal offence, it analyses it from an institutional perspective, building on relevant literature on political corruption in constitutional law and political theory.Footnote 2
The article develops this analysis through three comparisons. First, it examines the EU’s approach to lobbying and corruption targeting the EU Member States vs the EU institutions. The Commission’s Rule of Law Reports, which have been released annually since 2020, mention lobbying regulation in the context of anti-corruption.Footnote 3 However, like the Rule of Law Reports in general (and, before them, the European Commission’s Anti-Corruption ReportFootnote 4 ), this assessment only concerns lobbying regulation within the EU Member States and not at the supranational level.Footnote 5 Second, the article compares the European Union’s treatment of foreign vs “standard” lobbying. Usually, jurisdictions that have adopted specific rules on foreign lobbyingFootnote 6 regulate it more stringently than standard lobbying,Footnote 7 and this is also what the European Union envisages. Third, the article compares the European Union’s approach to lobbying by public vs private actors. For instance, both the Interinstitutional Agreement on a Mandatory Transparency Register (IIAMTR)Footnote 8 and the proposal for a directive on third-country interest representation contain a diplomatic exception, thereby excluding some forms of (foreign) public lobbying.Footnote 9
Several lobbying and corruption scandals involving foreign entities have emerged at the EU level in recent years, including Russiagate, Chinagate and the Huawei scandal, i.e., “a slew of ‘gates’ that challenge the legitimacy of EU decision-making and the ethics of its politicians and staff.”Footnote 10 Among these affairs, the 2022 Qatargate scandal particularly stands out because of its magnitude and the ambiguity of the EU’s institutional response.Footnote 11 The article hence focuses primarily on Qatargate (which also involved Morocco and Mauritania) and the European Union’s response to it. Accordingly, it centres on the European Parliament as a lobbying and corruption target, as opposed to other EU institutions or officialsFootnote 12 involved in this affair. Relevant developments in other jurisdictionsFootnote 13 are beyond the scope of this contribution, which does not offer a comparative assessment of foreign lobbying regulation.Footnote 14
The article first clarifies the main concepts employed (II.). Next, it examines whether the European Union’s response to Qatargate constitutes a coherent framework or instead entrenches problematic double standards (III.). It concludes by emphasising the limits of the EU’s predominantly transparency-based response to Qatargate (IV.). While the transparency paradigm is in line with the approach adopted by the IIAMTR, it is overly restrictive, risks singling out third-country lobbying, and may ultimately prove ineffective given the relative ease with which transparency requirements can be circumvented.
II. Conceptual clarifications
To analyse the European Union’s approach to corruption and lobbying regulation, it is first necessary to clarify the meaning of these concepts, which are often fuzzy.Footnote 15 This section begins by examining the concept of (anti-)corruption (1.), before turning to the notion of lobbying, which this contribution uses interchangeably with the concept of interest representation (2.).
1. Corruption
One challenge when attempting to define corruption is that the EU anti-corruption framework operates through catalogues of offences rather than a general definition of the concept. This is illustrated by the recently adopted directive on combatting corruption.Footnote 16 The Commission’s proposal states that “corruption is an endemic phenomenon that takes multiple shapes and forms across all facets of society, for example bribery, embezzlement,Footnote 17 trading in influence, trading of information, abuse of functions and illicit enrichment.” The proposal recalls that during the UNCAC negotiations, States “reached consensus on certain manifestations of corruption while leaving each State free to go beyond the minimum standards set forth in UNCAC.”Footnote 18 As a matter of fact, international instruments like UNCAC (to which the EU is a party) avoid a comprehensive concept of corruption and, instead, mention specific offences that fall under this label.
Both the EU institutions and legal scholars (including EU law scholars) usually associate corruption with criminal offences,Footnote 19 i.e., with individual corruption (e.g., by defining corruption as “abuse of power for private gain”Footnote 20 [emphasis added]). Such a criminal law approach draws a relatively clear boundary between lawful and unlawful conduct by defining what constitutes a criminal offence. Corruption, conceptualised from a criminal law perspective, is necessarily illegal, and those who commit acts of corruption can be prosecuted (which is what happened in the aftermath of Qatargate). For instance, the directive on combatting corruption states that its purpose is “to tackle corruption by means of criminal law, allowing for better cross-border cooperation between competent authorities.”Footnote 21
The problem with this perspective, however, is that it risks missing systemic problems. This is what political theorists like Dennis Thompson, but also legal scholars like Lawrence Lessig call institutional corruption, as opposed to individual – “criminal law” – corruption.Footnote 22 Institutional corruption captures distortions of an institution’s mandate which, from a legal perspective, can be chiefly found in constitutional law. The systemic dimension of corruption is reflected in the fact that this offence has no clearly identifiable victim,Footnote 23 at least not in an individualised sense: its victim is the public as a whole, i.e., the public interest.Footnote 24 As the directive on combatting corruption explicitly highlights,Footnote 25 corruption is problematic from the perspective of the Union’s fundamental principles and values, which include democracy,Footnote 26 equality, the rule of law,Footnote 27 and fundamental rights.Footnote 28 Addressing systemic issues requires taking measures that go beyond mere criminal law instruments, which are mostly repressive and constitute the ultima ratio. Such measures also need to include other branches of the law, such as constitutional and administrative law, and resorting to other instruments than strictly legal ones, such as soft law.Footnote 29
The European Union’s neglect of these systemic problems is implicitly acknowledged by EU law scholars. Korkea-aho for instance writes that the EU is not “under attack from third-country governments” as it often claims to be: rather, “[t]he attack is internal” in the sense that “the EU has neither adequately addressed its responsibility to establish clear and unambiguous rules, nor effectively exercised its ethical authority.”Footnote 30 This failure to tackle broader systemic issues is partly due to the features of the EU constitutional framework: as Mitsilegas observes, “[t]he limits of EU anti-corruption law can be traced at the limits of and controversy regarding the extent of EU competence in the field of corruption in particular, and in the field of criminal law more generally.”Footnote 31
Several corruption scholars have interpreted Qatargate not only as a case of individual wrongdoing, but also as an instance of institutional corruptionFootnote 32 (see also below, III.). Importantly, institutional corruption may overlap with lobbying when the latter distorts the functioning or independence of a given institution.
2. Lobbying
a. Lobbying in general
Independently of a specific legal definition, lobbying can be defined as the attempt by natural or legal persons who lack legal authority in the law-making process, except for citizens acting on their own behalf, to influence the law-making activity of those holding such authorityFootnote 33 (regarding the EU’s legal definition of lobbying, see below, 2.b.).
The IIAMTR defines lobbying (or interest representation, to stick to the IIAMTR’s terminology) as a range of activities in which interest representativesFootnote 34 engage “with the objective of influencing the formulation or implementation of policy or legislation, or the decision-making processes” of EU institutions.Footnote 35 The definition of “interest representation activities” contained in the proposal for a directive on third-country lobbying is essentially the same,Footnote 36 even if the proposed directive obviously does not have the same coverage. The proposed directive’s broad definition of interest representation has been widely criticised due to its potential chilling effect on the activities of civil society organisations (CSOs); in general, foreign interference laws are often criticised from this perspective.Footnote 37
Is lobbying necessarily legal? Academics usually consider that it is “conceptually different from corruption.”Footnote 38 Yet, lobbying may overlap with both individual and institutional corruption (on these concepts, see 1. above).
Besides other affairs, including Qatargate, the cash-for-amendments scandal of 2011 provides a telling illustration of the potential overlap between lobbying and individual corruption.Footnote 39 Moreover, the Code of Conduct appended to the IIAMTR states that registrants shall “not obtain or try to obtain information or decisions dishonestly or by use of undue pressure, improper behaviour or offensive language,”Footnote 40 and the Code of Conduct applicable to MEPs requires that MEPs “act solely in the public interest and refrain from obtaining or seeking to obtain any direct or indirect benefit or other reward,” and provides that they shall “not solicit, accept or receive any direct or indirect benefit or other reward, including in cash or in kind, in exchange for specific behaviour in the scope of the Member’s parliamentary work, and shall consciously seek to avoid any situation which might imply bribery, corruption, or undue influence.”Footnote 41 The proposal for a directive on third-country interest representation also confirms that this directive and the directive on combatting corruption are complementary.Footnote 42 Empirical research likewise suggests the existence of a nexus between an “anti-corruption agenda and the adoption of lobby registers,”Footnote 43 the latter being tools that “allow citizens to monitor and hold accountable elected politicians.”Footnote 44 Scholars emphasise the need for more research on the link between lobbying and individual corruption.Footnote 45
What about the link between lobbying and institutional corruption? Lobbying is often considered lawful; scholars tend to distinguish it conceptually from practices that fall under the criminal law of bribery,Footnote 46 though we have seen that the two can overlap. Outside the criminal law realm, the boundaries of legality become even fuzzier.Footnote 47 This is where institutional corruption comes into play: from a legal (constitutional) perspective, and outside the criminal law of bribery, lobbying becomes problematic if it threatens the (constitutional) mandate of the institution at which it is directed.Footnote 48 This especially applies to lobbying practices that build on structural, institutional dependencies. Such practices fall under what Lessig refers to as “dependence corruption,” which is a subcategory of institutional corruption.Footnote 49 Both (individual or institutional) corruption and lobbying thrive on exchange relationships generating mutual benefits.Footnote 50 In the case of lobbying, this exchange is often grounded in the epistemic dimension of lobbying,Footnote 51 but also in other resources that lobbyists provide.Footnote 52 In the European Union, institutions like the European Parliament can be captured by special interests, which distorts the EU lawmaking process and prevents legislation in the public interest, i.e., in the interest of the European peoples.
Qatargate is a case of individual corruption because it is a “money-for-influence scandal,”Footnote 53 the main protagonists of which “were accused of accepting political bribes and cash from the Qatari government in exchange for political favours,” while the payments were “allegedly funnelled to MEPs through fake non-governmental organisations.”Footnote 54 However, the affair also revealed deeper systemic problems that are inherent in EU lobbying regulation and in the European Parliament’s institutional framework, and that constitute institutional corruption.Footnote 55 Indeed, the Qatargate files uncovered the existence of various institutional weaknesses, such as insufficient transparency about foreign interest representation, weak monitoring and enforcement mechanisms of lobbying regulation, and a lack of institutional independence and deliberative integrity.Footnote 56 These deficiencies resulted in an institutional environment in which the alleged scheme was able to operate undetected for several years.Footnote 57
b. “Standard” (domestic) vs foreign (third-country) lobbying
One distinction that is implicit in the proposal for a directive on third-country interest representation is that between “standard” (domestic) and foreign (third-country) lobbying; as its name suggests, the proposal focuses on the latter.
“Standard” (domestic) lobbying is conducted by natural or legal persons who represent domestic interests, i.e., interests connected to the jurisdiction of the lawmakers who are being lobbied. Examples of domestic interests include those of domestic businesses, workers, and farmers; interests relating to the domestic healthcare, education, or social security system; and the interests of particular regions, professional groups, and any other groups within that jurisdiction. The term “standard” reflects the fact that the academic literature and debates about lobbying generally focus on lobbying conducted on behalf of “domestic” interests, which is treated as the archetypical case of lobbying, while lobbying on behalf of foreign interests is usually treated as a distinct and less common phenomenon. In the context of the European Union, “domestic” interests may be either supranational or national, i.e., connected to the EU legal order or to the legal orders of the EU Member States. Moreover, these interests may be public or private in nature (i.e., they may belong to a public entity, like a specific EU Member State, or to a private one, like a trade association; on the distinction between private vs public lobbying, see below, 2.c.).
By contrast, foreign lobbying is conducted on behalf of foreign interests,Footnote 58 i.e., interests connected to a jurisdiction other than that of the lawmakers who are being lobbied. Examples include the interests of foreign governments, NGOs, investors, businesses and trade associations. Of course, the boundary between domestic and foreign interests can be fluid. For instance, the interests of – and defended by – a foreign environmental NGO are likely to overlap with those for which a local environmental association stands. Similarly, the interests of foreign businesses may intersect with those of domestic ones. Moreover, the notion of foreign interests does not indicate whether these interests are public (for example those of a third country) or private (for example those of a foreign company). The distinction between public and private interests can be fuzzy as well (on this topic, see below, 2.c.): for instance, it is often in the interest of a State to promote economic interests and, by doing so, its own economic prosperity.
The IIAMTR exempts a number of activities from its scope,Footnote 59 such as “activities carried out by (…) public authorities of third countries, including their diplomatic missions and embassies, except where such authorities are represented by legal entities, offices or networks without diplomatic status or are represented by an intermediary” (emphasis added).Footnote 60 This diplomatic exceptionFootnote 61 (which applies not only to third countries, but also to the EU Member States, see 2.c. below) is also common in domestic regulation.Footnote 62 Yet, foreign governments’ attempt to influence other States can be problematic from the perspective of these States’ sovereignty and constitutional framework.Footnote 63 Thus, historically, foreign lobbying (and corruption) has long been a source of concern. A well-known historical example is the snuff box gifted to Benjamin Franklin by the French king;Footnote 64 a more recent one is the luxury jet offered by Qatar to the Trump administration in May 2025.Footnote 65
While the IIAMTR contains a diplomatic exception, it does cover lobbying by foreign private actors. Moreover, it also applies to lobbying on behalf of “public authorities of third countries” if the latter are “represented by legal entities, offices or networks without diplomatic status or (…) by an intermediary” (Article 4(2(d) IIAMTR).Footnote 66 However, the transparency register “does not clearly reveal foreign influence as it does not provide results by reference to the principal (the source of the influence) and, being optional, does not include requirements or strong incentives for foreign lobbyists to register.”Footnote 67 A study commissioned by the European Parliament’s Special Committee on Foreign Interference (INGE 2) hence recommends “[c]learer presentation of data on foreign influence” and “[s]tronger requirements or incentives for foreign interest lobbyists to register.”Footnote 68
In the context of foreign lobbying, it is also important to mention the related notions of foreign interference and foreign influence. According to the aforementioned study, foreign interference refers to “illegitimate interference in the politics and democracy of the EU and its Member States by foreign powers”;Footnote 69 the term “foreign power” designates “foreign (i.e., non-EU) states, governments and political parties, as well as entities associated with them,”Footnote 70 and can hence include both public and private entities. This definition raises certain difficulties: it contains a circular element (since the concept of “interference” is not defined) and, relatedly, does not explicitly identify the relevant normative benchmark to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate influence, though several passages of the study suggest that transparency constitutes an important benchmark.Footnote 71 Another relevant benchmark appears to be coercion.Footnote 72 The study also refers to “abuse of the lobbying system, corruption, espionage, cyber-attacks; and manipulative influence on public engagement or views, for example through online disinformation and manipulation campaigns.”Footnote 73 This list of illegitimate activities illustrates the possibility of overlaps between lobbying and corruption.
By contrast, foreign influence is defined as “all activity by foreign powers which has the aim or effect or influencing EU politics and democracy”Footnote 74 and is generally regarded as “a normal and legitimate aspect of international relations and diplomacy”Footnote 75 (and, accordingly, as a concept that “only encompasses non-criminal activities”Footnote 76 ). This definition also appears circular, as it does not define the notion of influence and the normative criterion to distinguish between legitimate (or normal) vs illegitimate (or abnormal) activities. Once again, transparency seems to be treated as an important criterion to distinguish between foreign influence vs interference.Footnote 77 The aforementioned study explicitly links foreign influence to lobbying, describing the former as a term that encompasses “diplomacy, lobbying and public communications.”Footnote 78 While of course, foreign influence is a phenomenon that long predates Qatargate, “the attention given to it heightened following the Qatargate scandal.”Footnote 79 In general, the study observes that “foreign powers increasingly contract PR agencies, law firms and other entities to advocate on their behalf in foreign capitals and fund CSOs to do the same (‘foreign interest lobbying’).”Footnote 80
c. Private vs public lobbying
Another distinction underlying the proposal for a directive on third-country interest representation concerns public vs private lobbying, i.e., lobbying conducted on behalf of public vs private interests. In both cases, these interests lack legal authority in the respective lawmaking process, in line with the generic definition of lobbying provided above (2.a.).
Both lobbying regulation and lobbying scholarship usually focus on lobbying by private entities as the archetypical form of lobbyingFootnote 81 (e.g., lobbying by private companies, but also NGOs, foundations, trade unions, etc.). The Huawei scandal, for instance, involved a Chinese company rather than the Chinese State itself (at least not directly).Footnote 82 By contrast, public lobbying (i.e., lobbying by public entities) is often treated as a more specific phenomenon, as it frequently raises questions related to specific legal concepts or particular areas of the law (e.g., the separation of powers, federalism, or international law).
As we have seen, the IIAMTR contains a diplomatic exception for third countries (which is one form of public lobbying) but covers “foreign agents and principals” as long as they are not “foreign governments acting on their own account”Footnote 83 (above, 2.b.). In addition, the IIAMTR also excludes lobbying activities carried out by “public authorities of Member States, including their permanent representations and embassies, at national and subnational level.”Footnote 84 This exclusion hence concerns another form of public lobbying besides foreign public lobbying, namely lobbying conducted by the EU Member States themselves. Other forms of public lobbying are also exempted, such as lobbying by “associations and networks of public authorities at Union, national or subnational level” or by “intergovernmental organisations.”Footnote 85 As scholars point out, the reasons for excluding this type of lobbying from the scope of the IIAMTR “remain unclear.”Footnote 86 Just as foreign public lobbying may raise concerns from the perspective of constitutional law and institutional independence, similar issues may also arise in connection to lobbying by domestic public actors.
The proposal for a directive on third-country interest representation explicitly targets public (i.e., third-country) lobbying. The notion of third-country entity used in the proposal includes not only “the central government and public authorities at all other levels of a third country,”Footnote 87 but also any “public or private entity whose actions can be attributed to [them], taking into account all relevant circumstances.”Footnote 88 Accordingly, it also covers some forms of foreign private lobbying. However, the proposed directive only applies to lobbying services provided to such third-country entities,Footnote 89 and not to “activities carried out directly” by a third country and “that are connected with the exercise of official authority, including activities related to the exercise of diplomatic or consular relations between States or international organisations”Footnote 90 (this is, once again, the diplomatic exception). Nor does it apply to “activities supporting or aligned with the interests of a third country but without any link to that third country.”Footnote 91
d. Supranational vs national lobbying
Finally, the proposal for a directive on third-country interest representation implicitly distinguishes between different targets and levels of lobbying, namely lobbying directed at the EU institutions (supranational lobbying) and lobbying conducted within the EU Member States (national lobbying). Indeed, the proposed directive only addresses the latter (for further details about the proposal, see III.4. below). Similarly, the proposed directive on combatting corruption (see III.3. below) focuses on corruption within the EU Member States. By contrast, the proposal for a directive on third-country interest representation does not regulate lobbying targeting the EU institutions, which is instead covered by the IIAMTR (at least as far as the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council are concerned). Lobbying at EU level hence falls under a separate regulatory framework.
Like other distinctions highlighted in this article, the distinction between supranational vs national lobbying is not always watertight in practice. More generally, some private entities, such as multinational corporations (MNCs), cut across several of the distinctions analysed in this article: the activities of MNCs – e.g., big tech companies – raise questions about the boundary between domestic vs foreign interests (above, b.), private vs public forms of influence (above, c.), and supranational vs national lobbying.Footnote 92
III. The EU’s response to Qatargate
Is Qatargate a corruption scandal, a lobbying scandal, or both? Most commentators describe it as a case of (individual) corruption.Footnote 93 Korkea-aho argues that it is not lobbying,Footnote 94 while De Capitani refers to it as involving both “lobbying and corruption.”Footnote 95 If one adopts a broader definition of corruption, Qatargate is not just a scandal involving violations of the criminal law of bribery (i.e., individual corruption): it is also a lobbying scandal that uncovers elements of systemic corruption (i.e., institutional corruption)Footnote 96 due to the way in which lobbying is currently regulated (see II.1. above). It hence also needs to be analysed through that lens.
This section examines the EU’s regulatory response to Qatargate and proceeds chronologically. It begins with the work conducted by the two Special Committees on Foreign Interference, i.e., INGE (1.) and its successor, INGE 2; the Qatargate scandal occurred in December 2022, as INGE 2 was preparing its report (2.), and was followed by proposals for a directive on combatting corruption, which was adopted in April 2026 (3.) and for a directive on third-country interest representation (4.), and by the signature of the agreement establishing an interinstitutional body for ethical standards (5.). As the concluding section explains, these various initiatives reveal problematic double standards between standard vs foreign, private vs public, and supranational vs national lobbying and corruption (IV.).
1. The special committee on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation (INGE)
INGE was created by decision of the European Parliament of 18 June 2020Footnote 97 and published its report on 8 February 2022, several months before Qatargate.Footnote 98 The report provides interesting insights into the Committee’s conceptualisation of foreign lobbying and corruption. It explicitly frames “foreign interference” as “a serious violation of the universal values and principles on which the Union is founded, such as human dignity, freedom, equality, solidarity, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, democracy and the rule of law”Footnote 99 (on the concept of foreign interference, see above, II.2.b.). This framing acknowledges the systemic threats arising from foreign interference. What is not sufficiently clearly articulated is the extent to which foreign interference creates specific threats calling for a distinct regime from the one applicable to standard (domestic) practices (even if the report mentions threats to “EU security and sovereignty”Footnote 100 and uses very direct language, referring to “malicious and authoritarian foreign state and non-state actors, such as Russia, China and others”Footnote 101 ). The report itself acknowledges that foreign inference can be conducted by both “state or non-state actors,” and that “foreign actors’ use of domestic proxies and cooperation with domestic allies blurs the line between foreign and domestic interference.”Footnote 102
Foreign influence is defined very broadly and encompasses a wide range of practices.Footnote 103 One of the report’s central concerns is foreign lobbying targeting the EU institutions, especially by “countries such as China and Russia, but also Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Turkey,” which have “invested heavily” in these practices.Footnote 104 The report highlights the “serious lack of legally binding rules and enforcement of the EU’s lobbying register, which makes it practically impossible to track lobbying coming from outside the EU,” but also the absence of mechanisms aimed at “monitoring lobbying efforts in Member States that influence legislation and foreign policy through the European Council.”Footnote 105 It also expresses concern “about the many gaps and loopholes in current legislation and policies at EU and national level intended to detect, prevent and counter foreign interference.”Footnote 106 These remarks reveal two distinct regulatory concerns. First, the report emphasises regulatory gaps at EU level and “calls (…) for the EU institutions to reform the Transparency Register, including by introducing more stringent transparency rules, mapping foreign funding for EU-related lobbying, and ensuring an entry which allows for the identification of funding from foreign governments.”Footnote 107 Second, it also focuses on lobbying directed at the EU Member States, which it urges “to consider the establishment of a foreign influence registration scheme and the creation of a government-managed register of declared activities undertaken for, or on behalf of, a foreign state, following the good practice of other like-minded democracies.”Footnote 108
INGE’s recommendations illustrate the EU’s transparency-based approach to foreign influence, while leaving open an important question: do the risks identified by INGE stem primarily from foreign influence as such, or are they rooted in structural weaknesses in the regulation of lobbying within the EU (be it standard or foreign, private or public, and supranational or national lobbying) that go beyond the dimension of transparency?
2. INGE 2 and Qatargate
INGE 2 was established by decision of the European Parliament of 10 March 2022, only one month after the publication of the INGE Report (above, 1.), to continue the work of INGE.Footnote 109 Qatargate happened in December 2022, a few months before INGE 2 produced its final report.Footnote 110 As the European Parliament later acknowledged, the scandal revealed structural weaknesses in the EU’s transparency framework: “the NGOs at the center of the Qatargate scandal were not registered, yet had unhindered access to the European Parliament.”Footnote 111
The European Parliament’s resolution of 15 December 2022 reacting to Qatargate offers further insights into the Parliament’s conceptualisation of foreign lobbying and corruption.Footnote 112 It highlights the significant damage that the scandal does to “European democracy” and the importance of “ensur[ing] that democratic processes are not captured by private and external interests.” It further distinguishes between legitimate lobbying (i.e., “the ability of interest group representatives to influence decision-making in Parliament by way of arguments”) and illegitimate practices (i.e., “inappropriate means of influencing, bribery and other criminal offences”), and condemns “Qatar’s alleged attempts to influence Members, former Members and staff of the European Parliament through acts of corruption, which constitute serious foreign interference in the EU’s democratic processes.” By linking corruption and foreign interference, the resolution suggests that foreign lobbying becomes problematic primarily when it crosses the threshold of criminal conduct. At the same time, it acknowledges structural weaknesses in the EU lobbying framework. However, the proposed measures are cautious and remain within the transparency paradigm: the report considers that “the EU transparency register should be strengthened by increasing the budget and the number of staff”, and “that its scope should be expanded to include representatives of non-EU countries.”
In response to Qatargate, the President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola, announced a 14-point reform plan in January 2023.Footnote 113 Several of these measures were incorporated into the European Parliament’s Rules of Procedure in September 2023.Footnote 114 The reforms include more stringent disclosure obligations for MEPs, who must declare their meetings with interest groups, including with third-country representatives. However, these measures leave the basic EU regulatory framework unchanged. In particular, under the IIAMTR, registration remains optional.
Commentators have expressed scepticism about the limited scope of these reforms. Alemanno qualifies the EU’s response to Qatargate as “modest, essentially short-termist and aimed at deflecting attention away from its most damaging effects.”Footnote 115 Moreover, “none of the 14 proposals appear able to structurally address the EU ethics rules’ original sin, that of having their enforcement entrusted to the political – as opposed to legal – authority of the institution’s President.”Footnote 116 In short, according to Alemanno, this is “a missed opportunity for the Union’s democratic life.”Footnote 117
The EU’s approach also raises questions concerning potential double standards. As a report by the CEU Democracy Institute observes, “numerous shortcomings of the EU ethics and integrity framework” revealed by Qatargate are “relevant also in the context of conflicts of interests between the EU institutions and domestic actors.”Footnote 118 Yet, the European Parliament has largely framed the problem in terms of foreign interference and transparency rather than as a broader issue of lobbying regulation and institutional integrity.
These double standards are also reflected in the subsequent work of INGE 2. In February 2023, the European Parliament expanded its mandate and amended its name to include “the strengthening of integrity, transparency and accountability in the European Parliament.”Footnote 119 INGE 2 published its report on 26 April 2023.Footnote 120 The report explicitly refers to Qatargate and emphasises the need for “effective measures by Parliament and the other EU institutions to close the loopholes for foreign interference, as well as to increase transparency and accountability in order to protect the integrity of the institutions.”Footnote 121 It reiterates the importance of “trust in Parliament’s integrity and the rule of law” and of “ensur[ing] that democratic processes are not captured by private and external interests.”Footnote 122
On the one hand, the report acknowledges structural weaknesses in the EU’s existing, transparency-based regulatory framework. It refers to the previous INGE report’s emphasis on “a serious lack of legally binding rules regarding lobbying and enforcement of the EU’s lobbying register,” and to the fact that it is “practically impossible to track lobbying coming from outside the EU.”Footnote 123 It also highlights the potential link between lobbying and corruption when mentioning “the capture of elites by foreign interests, facilitated by the non-restriction of ‘revolving doors’ between the EU institutions and autocratic countries with a high risk of harmful interference against the democratic interests of the Union.”Footnote 124 It further recognises the existence of a continuum between foreign lobbying and interference, as the former “may open the door” to the latter.Footnote 125
On the other hand, however, instead of adopting a broader institutional perspective, INGE 2 focuses on the need for a “criminalisation of foreign interference” to “target and stigmatise this malign behavior.”Footnote 126 Like the European Parliament’s resolution, it “[d]enounces in the strongest terms the alleged attempts by foreign countries, including Qatar and Morocco to influence Members, former Members and staff of the European Parliament through acts of corruption, which constitute serious foreign interference in the EU’s democratic processes.”Footnote 127 In terms of concrete measures, the Committee “underlines the need to step up efforts to enhance the transparency and integrity of the EU institutions, and to combat corruption, manipulation, influence and interference campaigns; reiterates its call for updated transparency rules and ethics, mapping foreign funding for EU-related lobbying, including funding for non-profit organisations and proper regulation and monitoring of friendship groups.”Footnote 128 The report suggests either “that a specific foreign influence section be inserted in the EU Transparency Register or that a foreign influence register be established.”Footnote 129
In short, INGE 2 primarily focuses on foreign interference and on improving transparency in this context, rather than on addressing more fundamental and pervasive gaps in the EU’s transparency-based regulatory framework.Footnote 130 By treating foreign influence as a specific and distinct problem, it risks overlooking the fact that the institutional vulnerabilities revealed by Qatargate also exist in the context of standard lobbying.
3. The proposal for a directive on combatting corruption
In May 2023, the Commission published its proposal for a directive on combatting corruption.Footnote 131 This directive, which was adopted in April 2026, sheds light on the European Union’s conceptualisation of anti-corruption.Footnote 132
The proposed directive is part of the Commission’s 2023 Anti-Corruption Package and was mainly developed by DG HOME under Commissioner Ylva Johansson. It frames corruption as a cross-border threat to the rule of law, democratic processes and the functioning of the internal market, while emphasising the need to modernise and harmonise Member States’ criminal laws in the light of international anti-corruption obligations.
The directive is based on Articles 82(1)(d) and 83(1)–(2) TFEU, which allow the Union to “establish minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions in the areas of particularly serious crime with a cross-border dimension,” including corruption (Article 83(1) TFEU). It is thereby situated in the area of judicial cooperation in criminal matters (Article 82(1)(d) TFEU) and focuses on the harmonisation of Member States’ criminal laws (Article 83(2) TFEU).
The Commission’s proposal establishes a link between corruption and foreign interests by highlighting that corruption “acts as an enabler for (…) hostile foreign interference,”Footnote 133 and by stating that “[c]orruption for the benefit of a third country has a particularly detrimental impact on democratic institutions and political life of the Member States and the Union” (though without elaborating on this point). While the proposal states that “Member States should (…) provide for an aggravating circumstance to cover such situations,”Footnote 134 no such aggravating circumstance is prescribed by the final text of the directive. The Commission’s proposal acknowledges the broader, systemic effects of corruption, noting that it “is highly damaging to society, to our democracies, to the economy and to individuals” and that it “undermines the institutions on which we depend, diluting their credibility as well as their ability to deliver public policies and quality public services.”Footnote 135 These remarks overlap with the concept of institutional corruption (above, II.1.): corruption can divert an institution from its mandate and hence have broader, systemic implications. As Recital 5 of the directive points out, “[w]hereas corruption is first and foremost a crime and specific corruption offences and corruption-related offences are defined in national and international law, failings in integrity, undisclosed conflicts of interests or serious breaches of integrity rules can result in corruption offences if left unaddressed.”Footnote 136 Accordingly, as the directive makes clear, corruption needs to be tackled through an integrated approach as well as preventive – and not just repressive – measures, including by regulating lobbying and safeguarding institutional independence.Footnote 137
To summarise, while the directive is formally grounded in EU criminal law competences and focuses on harmonising the laws of the EU Member States, it also acknowledges the systemic and institutional dimensions of corruption.
4. The proposal for a directive on third-country interest representation
In December 2023, the Commission published its proposal for a directive on third-country interest representation, which is part of the Defence of Democracy Package.Footnote 138 The proposal aims to address concerns about foreign influence in the European Union by increasing transparency requirements for entities that lobby on behalf of third countries in the EU Member States.Footnote 139
The proposal was drafted in response to growing concerns about foreign interference in democratic processes within the EU. It was mainly developed by DG JUST under Commissioner Didier Reynders and forms part of the EU’s broader strategy to protect democratic processes against covert foreign interference. The proposal generated significant debate among CSOs, the European Economic and Social Committee, UN Special rapporteurs, and several EU Member States. Critics argued that it risked chilling legitimate foreign interest representation activities and shrinking civic space.
In its explanatory memorandum, the Commission emphasises that its proposal must be distinguished from other “foreign agent” laws and that “it does not negatively label the activities of specific entities, including CSOs, nor does it seek to limit civic space.”Footnote 140 It also highlights its complementary with the proposed directive on combatting corruption (above, III.3.), arguing that making third-country lobbying more transparent “is equally expected to make a positive contribution to the prevention and detection of corruption.”Footnote 141 The proposed directive thus reflects a transparency-based approach, its primary goal being to establish “harmonised transparency requirements applicable across the internal market.”Footnote 142
The proposal underlines the importance of democratic accountability by noting that it “enables citizens and other interested stakeholders to exercise their democratic rights and responsibilities, including their ability to exercise democratic scrutiny in full knowledge of whose interest [sic] are being served by the interest representation activities to which they, or their elected representatives, may be exposed.”Footnote 143 However, it does not clearly state why these considerations are especially important in relation to third-country lobbying. Foreign influence is treated as a distinct problem, even though similar concerns may arise in the context of standard lobbying.
The proposal relies on transparency as a regulatory tool, but whether it can truly fulfil its purpose is unclear, especially considering the risk of circumvention. Moreover, this purely transparency-oriented approach does not take other important pillars of lobbying regulation into account, such as equality of access and institutional integrity.Footnote 144 It also risks stigmatising third-country lobbying, even though third countries may have legitimate interests to defend. The proposal reflects the EU’s tendency to frame integrity risks as external threats rather than as structural weaknesses that need to be addressed by the Union’s existing regulatory framework. As Korkea-aho observes, “the EU often perceives itself to be under attack rather than as being an active agent capable of promoting ethical conduct.”Footnote 145
5. The agreement establishing an interinstitutional ethics body
Another important development following Qatargate was the signature of the interinstitutional agreement establishing an interinstitutional ethics body in May 2024.Footnote 146 The mandate of this body is to “contribute to promoting a common culture of ethics and transparency among the Parties, in particular by developing common minimum standards and by fostering the exchange of best practices on the matter.”Footnote 147
While discussions about establishing an EU ethics body started well before Qatargate,Footnote 148 the European Parliament’s resolution of 15 December reacting to the affair urged the Commission to establish such a body “as soon as possible.”Footnote 149 The Commission presented its proposal on 8 June 2023.Footnote 150 In a resolution of 12 July 2023, the Parliament stated that this proposal was “unsatisfactory and not ambitious enough, falling short of a genuine, independent ethics body as envisaged in Parliament’s resolution of 16 September 2021.”Footnote 151 Paradoxically, “the body has not started its work yet, due to an opposition from the European Parliament, which faces new allegations regarding potential conflict of interests and corruption in the ‘Huawei bribery scandal’.”Footnote 152
Commentators have expressed scepticism about the new interinstitutional ethics body by pointing out its lack of investigativeFootnote 153 and sanctioning powers,Footnote 154 and the fact that it is “prohibited from deciding on individual cases.”Footnote 155 Despite hopeful comments about its “potential to profoundly alter both the quality of the ethical standards and their enforcement on the participating institutions’ members,” they conclude that “in the absence of accountability mechanisms that may be prompted by third parties – such as civil society organisations –, the new Body risks becoming yet another inter-institutional construct whose operation is left to the good will of the participating institutions”.Footnote 156 The ethics body could hence become “yet another fig leaf,” despite the importance of creating a dedicated authority to support the European Parliament’s institutional integrity.Footnote 157
IV. Conclusion: coherent approach or double standards?
So far, the European Union’s response to Qatargate has mainly consisted in minor adjustments to the European Parliament’s Rules of Procedure, in plans to limit foreign interference, in proposals for a directive on combatting corruption (which was adopted in April 2026) and a directive on third-country interest representation, and in an agreement establishing an interinstitutional ethics body (above, III.). The assessment of these measures has been mixed at best: “the EU has so far shown little ambition in examining solutions that would go beyond its usual preference for transparency tools and soft law.”Footnote 158 Moreover, its “proposals remain on the surface of the problem and fail to tackle the systemic causes behind the scandal.”Footnote 159 More fundamentally, and as this concluding section argues, the EU’s approach creates double standards between “standard” (domestic) vs foreign, private vs public, and supranational vs national lobbying/corruption. The limitations of these three distinctions become particularly apparent in relation to MNCs, whose activities frequently transcend the domestic vs foreign, private vs public, and supranational vs national dichotomies on which the EU’s regulatory framework relies.
First, regarding the regulatory distinction between “standard” (domestic) vs foreign lobbying/corruption, it is typically grounded “in the concern that decisions regarding the direction of one’s nation should be driven by those who will ultimately be affected by those decisions: citizens and residents.”Footnote 160 In the context of foreign lobbying legislation, the protection of State sovereignty is a central preoccupation, while their domestic equivalent focuses on the prevention of corruption.Footnote 161 Yet, as Dolan points out, foreign and standard corruption share the same traits: “[n]either variety can succeed without individual lapses in integrity among the decision-makers it targets.”Footnote 162 Even if one reaches the conclusion that such a distinction is warranted from a normative perspective, it is not clear that it can be enforced, and it risks creating problematic loopholes and, therefore, risks of circumvention.Footnote 163 As Hogic points out, “anti-corruption policies must start at home,”Footnote 164 and the same can be said about lobbying regulation.
Second, while lobbying/corruption can be conducted by both public and private persons and entities,Footnote 165 the EU regulatory framework often treats them as distinct phenomena. One illustration of this approach is the diplomatic exception contained in both the IIAMTR and the proposal for a directive on third-country interest representation. Yet, giving too much importance to such a distinction risks creating problematic loopholes, considering the fluidity of the public vs private distinction and the difficulty of “understand[ing] the role that non-state actors have in acting as agents of the corrupting state.”Footnote 166
Third and finally, the EU regulatory framework tends to draw a line between the supranational and the national level, as exemplified not only by the IIAMTR (which focuses on the EU institutions) and the proposal for a directive on third-country interest representation (which focuses on the EU Member States), but also by the directive on combatting corruption (which aims at harmonising the criminal laws of the EU Member States). While this two-tiered approach is partly due to the EU’s limited competences, it remains that supranational and national lobbying/corruption are entangled. For instance, lobbying in the EU Member States can affect EU lawmaking processes in various ways, e.g., via the Council, but also via MEPs and other EU officials,Footnote 167 and vice versa. Similarly, “[t]he effectiveness of the EU anti-corruption framework depends also on the domestic rules on the fight against corruption”Footnote 168 and vice versa.
Another issue is credibility. Many commentators criticise the fact that the Commission’s annual Rule of Law Report “excludes the EU institutions themselves from the monitoring exercises.”Footnote 169 Yet, “[t]he institutions must be held – at the very least – to the same Article 2 TEU standards as they demand from the Member States” if they want to avoid the charge of endorsing double standards.Footnote 170 Korkea-aho highlights the discrepancy between the EU’s own regulation of lobbying through the IIAMTR and what it asks from its Member States in relation to the regulation of third-country lobbying.Footnote 171 Similarly, as Grogan and Grabowska-Moroz note, at the level of the EU institutions, “anti-corruption reform has been piecemeal and fragmented within a complex system.”Footnote 172
To conclude, the EU should place greater emphasis on the systemic, institutional dimensions of lobbying and corruption and adopt a truly integrated regulatory approach to these phenomena. In particular, the regulation of (foreign) lobbying should extend beyond transparency and incorporate all three of the OECD’s pillars of lobbying regulation: transparency, equality of access, and integrity.Footnote 173 The EU should also strive for greater coherence to avoid any double standards: if a given conduct threatens EU values, including democracy, equality and the rule of law,Footnote 174 then this conduct needs to be addressed regardless of the origin or nature of the actor who engages in it.Footnote 175 Indeed, as Dolan rightly emphasises, “[t]he full focus of policymakers’ attention should be on preventing these shared lapses in integrity standards that are the weak points in institutions.”Footnote 176
Acknowledgments
I am grateful to Nedim Hogic and Franco Peirone for their invitation to contribute to this special issue and to participate in the workshop on the Institutionalisation of EU Anti-Corruption Law at the University of Oslo on 19 September 2025. I thank them and the other workshop participants for helpful comments and discussions. I am also grateful to the participants in the panel on “Lobbying for and against the EU” at the Annual Conference of the International Society of Public Law (ICON-S), held at University College Dublin’s Sutherland School of Law on 29 June 2026, for their interest. Last but not least, I would like to thank Garance Müller-Serex for her research assistance. Any remaining errors are mine.
Competing interests
The author declares no conflict of interest.
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