This is a really outstanding book, full of important arguments that very much repay serious thought. Part of what I want to do here is to approach some of the issues Sergio discusses from a somewhat different angle than he does. And since it would be pretty boring just to keep agreeing with everything, I will raise some questions that I hope will be addressed in this discussion.
Let’s start with the fact that desires, which according to Sergio are “appearances of the good,” have a role in the explanation of actions. Exactly what sort of explanation is given when one cites the agent’s desire to do something in explaining her action? There is a difference between teleological and non-teleological explanations. Following Scott Sehon, we can say that a teleological explanation is one where essential use is made of the “in order to” locution, i.e., one where it is claimed that what is being explained happens in order to bring about some state or event. Non-teleological explanations are ones where this is not so, where either the “in order to” locution is not used or, if it is used, can be eliminated without loss to the explanation. Teleological explanations, understood in this way, can be of two importantly different sorts. They can be genuinely purposive or merely functional.
Consider a large rock that is sitting at a strategic point beside a long, curved driveway. Saying this rock is there “in order to” keep cars from going into the ditch that runs alongside the driveway gives a teleological explanation of the rock’s location. But this doesn’t yet tell us whether we are citing the purpose of the rock or its function. It could be either. Obviously this rock could have keeping cars out of that ditch as its purpose only if someone, perhaps the owner of the driveway, has this purpose for it. It can’t have this purpose “on its own,” no matter how well it keeps people from driving into that ditch. It could have this function though, if we understand “function” as referring merely to the role of this rock in the system of traffic flow up and down that driveway. The function of the rock, in that system, might be to keep people out of that ditch (without that rock, at that place, lots more people might inadvertently drive into that ditch). The term “function” refers to the causal role of something in some system. There is therefore nothing “intentional” about the function of something, in the sense in which philosophers use this term. A thing’s function is merely its causal role in some system. A thing’s purpose, though, since it depends on what some agent has in mind for it, is “intentional” (that is, a purpose always involves intentionality).
There is another sense of “function,” also not intentional, as when it is said that the function of the colour of a flower is to attract a certain sort of insect (which then spreads the pollen), or that the function of the heart is to pump blood. Such functions are a result (roughly) of the evolutionary history of the ancestors of the thing that has the function.Footnote 1 Functions in either the causal-role or evolutionary senses can be discovered but they are not assigned. Even non-sentient things such as rocks can have causal roles in traffic patterns and flower petals can have evolutionary functions. An alien from outer space, even if she utterly rejected the thought that the flora or fauna on this backward planet showed any intentionality, could still discover either sort of function if she watched the traffic pattern in the driveway or stayed around long enough to find out the evolutionary history of the organism.
So the function of a thing, in either sense, is different from the purpose someone might give something, perhaps even the very thing with the function. If, in order to brighten up the room, I specifically put yellow flowers in the vase (rather than some other colour), then the purpose of that colour is to brighten up the room. But its evolutionary function, in the flowers, is still to attract (say) honeybees. The ancestors of these yellow flowers reproduced more successfully than did flowers of other colours because yellow attracted more honeybees, which resulted in a higher reproductive success for that species of flower. So here the evolutionary function of the yellow colour in those flowers, namely to attract honeybees, is different from its purpose (the one I gave it) of brightening up the room. Similarly, someone might place a large rock by her driveway in order to keep cars out of the ditch. That would then be the rock’s purpose, even if in fact cars went into the ditch all the time anyway, i.e., even if it did not actually function to keep them out.
All this is relevant to Sergio’s argument in the following way. At the heart of Sergio’s book is an account of desire, what he calls the scholastic view that a desire is an appearance of the good, and when we explain someone’s action by reference to her desire, that is, by reference to what she wanted, we are in essence explaining what she did by citing the purpose of her action. Talk of the agent’s desire, in the context of explaining her action, is a shorthand way of referring to the purpose or goal or point of what she did (p. 26). So such explanations are teleological explanations of the (genuinely) purposive sort. And Sergio’s book is partly at least a contribution toward understanding such teleological explanations.
One might think that, given the diversity of human life and the different situations in which we find ourselves, a human action could have virtually anything at all as a purpose. In one way that is right, of course, since it is up to us to decide what purposes we will pursue. But in another very important way, this is not right. When we are trying to explain someone’s action we cannot just assign anything at all to it as a purpose. For one thing, as I said, the purpose of an action is not just what it achieves. In fact it might not achieve its purpose at all. The purpose of an action is what the agent intended it to achieve or wanted it to achieve. So to understand the purpose of an action we must understand it as the agent understood it. That is why explanations in terms of the agent’s purpose are inherently intentional. But in addition to this, it is not obvious that we can think of agents as just pursuing absolutely anything at all. Since the agent can choose what aims or goals to pursue, it is reasonable to think that if we want to understand what she was doing, we must also figure out what she saw in the action that led her to perform it; what she thought counted in its favour given the available actions she thought were open to her. And it is plausible to think that these two things are connected; that is, that the actual purpose of the action can be understood only by reference to what the agent thought counted in favour of it. In order to figure out what the purpose of some action was it is not directly relevant to look at what the action actually achieved, since it could have misfired. We need to look at what the agent wanted it to achieve. But beyond that, it is plausible that the only way to figure out what that purpose is we need to be able to figure out what the agent thought recommended the action, what she thought made it worth doing. Agents are rational beings. They can choose purposes to pursue. And that seems to entail that in order to understand them we must figure out what it was about the action in question that recommended it to them.
So there are, or at least seem to be, two distinct constraints on the possible content of any desire cited to explain someone’s action. First, an intentionality constraint says that since this desire is a way of referring to the purpose or goal or point of the action, the content we give it must conform to the way the agent herself understood what her purpose was. And second, an evaluative constraint says that since the agent was choosing this action with this purpose over other possible ones, the content of this desire must be such as to allow us to see what she thought was to be said in favour of achieving this purpose in this way.
This second constraint is, if I understand Sergio, at lease very close to what he is calling the “scholastic view” of desire, the view that “we desire only what we conceive to be good.” But I don’t think this is quite the same as the scholastic view. Sergio seems to think there is an “if-and-only-if” here (or at least an “only”). And it is not obvious that this follows from the explanatory points just made. If what I called the evaluative constraint is a constraint on explaining actions, then why would it apply to desires on which we do not act – cravings and urges, for instance, that remain “idle”? (See pp. 202-3.) Your craving to drink a can of paint, for example, if it is never acted on and so never referred to in the (correct) explanation of any of your actions, would not be subject to a constraint on action explanations that required us to figure out what good the agent saw in what she was doing. So if such a craving is somehow conceiving drinking paint to be good, as the scholastic view says, it can’t be for the reason just explained.
There is a connected point. The evaluative constraint says that to understand someone we must see what she saw in the action we are trying to explain; why, so to speak, it appeared to her “in a favourable light.” But this doesn’t mean seeing what is good about the action. It means seeing what the agent found attractive. So why couldn’t the character of the agent choosing the purpose to be pursued with the action in question be such that she would be attracted to neutral or weird or even evil things? The second constraint is a constraint because we are trying to understand what the agent was doing. That means we must take into account what the agent herself is like. Presumably a person with a strange or even evil character might perfectly intelligibly choose to pursue strange or even evil purposes. Sergio describes a desire as “an appearance of the good,” but appearances are always appearances to someone and hence always depend in part on the person to whom they are appearances. And Sergio will, if I understand him, agree that some strange things may “appear good” to strange people. But why stop at that point? Why couldn’t some people be “strange” enough that they were attracted by things that appeared to them not to be good?
Consider someone who has some defect of character; is cowardly, let’s say. That means in part presumably that a certain sort of action, not attending a meeting at which she is likely to be called on to make a public statement, for instance, will be attractive to her. But saying that this “is attractive” to her doesn’t seem to be quite the same as saying that it “appears good” to her. Couldn’t she perfectly well realize that the action that is attractive to her is “the cowardly thing to do;” even be ashamed that she is attracted to such a cowardly action? As I understand him, Sergio wants to say that these would be reflective judgments, countering so to speak the good appearance of the action. And the same will hold for other character defects and the sorts of actions that seem attractive to someone with one of these defects, defects and actions even worse than cowardice. So it looks as if the scholastic view will involve saying that the even genuinely rotten things that are attractive to genuinely rotten people will “appear good” to those people. It rules out automatically the possibility that character defects manifest themselves in making those who have one of these defects attracted to something that appears bad to her in some way. Even bad people, according to this view, are pursuing the good. It is just that some bad things appear good to them. They don’t, in fact on this account can’t, pursue things that appear bad or even just neutral.
One might think that this is where Sergio’s claim that the good is the formal end of practical reasoning comes in. The thought is that insofar as one is pursuing some goal, and hence figuring out how to achieve that goal, one is thinking of that goal as in some respect good. But I am not sure this solves the problem. True enough, agents are at least to some extent rational, not just in the sense that they can adopt effective means to the ends they have but also in the sense that they can adopt better over worse ends. This means that all goals are subject to rational criticism, just as means are. Ends, as well as means, can be better or worse. It follows that agents can be understood, to the extent that they are rational, by trying to understand them as choosing the best goals possible. That is what I called the evaluative constraint. I think it is what some philosophers call the principle of charity. Since understanding agents in terms of their desires is understanding them in terms of their purposes and since they can choose purposes they think better over ones they think worse, the evaluative constraint — the principle of charity — applies to our explanations of their actions in terms of their desires. To put all this slightly differently, to say that goals or purposes are open to rational criticism is to say that “the good is the formal end of practical reason.” And since we understand actions in terms of the purposes they are aimed at achieving, we can understand actions insofar as we see what led the agent to choose that action, with that purpose, over the other actions she thought were open to her. This is to understand people as deliberators, so to speak, and as following the standards of deliberation.
But so far as I can see, none of this is quite the same thing as saying that desires just are appearances of the good or that we aim at only what we conceive to be good, i.e., asserting the scholastic view. This is because people are not completely rational, either in choosing means to ends or in choosing which ends to pursue. The evaluative constraint, that is the principle of charity, takes account of that by saying in effect that we should try to understand people as being as rational as possible. And to the extent we can’t understand the rationality of their goals and their means to those goals, we can‘t understand them in this way. We need to add some extra explanatory element to account for their irrationality. But the scholastic view seems to go beyond this, as I understand it, by ruling out one sort of irrationality, namely desiring what appears bad (or, I suppose, neutral or less good?).
The evaluative constraint on understanding agents really is just the idea that practical reason is the search for “the good” (or the better?), plus the thought that we are (largely or mostly) rational. It yields the conclusion that we should understand agents largely as attempting to get what seems to them good and eschewing what seems to them bad. But of course people are not always rational and all kinds of irrationality are possible — we are talking about human beings here. So the question I want to ask is why that couldn’t include the form of irrationality that would be involved in seeking something that appeared bad. The scholastic view says not merely that all our ends are subject to rational criticism, i.e., that they should be aiming at “the good,” and (so) that to the extent that we are rational beings we can understand our ends insofar as they seem to us to do this. It says that they all do aim at (what appears to us to be) good. That is, it says that whatever mistakes we make, aiming at what we conceive to be bad (or even neutral or less good?) is not one of them. But why not? According to Davidson, “[A] man may all his life have a yen, say, to drink a can of paint, without ever, even at the moment he yields, believing it would be worth doing.”Footnote 2
As I understand Sergio, he would agree that this man did not, or might not, believe drinking that paint was worth doing but still say that it “appeared good” to him. But I am not really sure what this comes to. “Appearance of the good” is a visual metaphor and needs to be such if it is not the same as believing the thing to be good. And of course the visual metaphor carries with it a “perspective” metaphor as well, since according to Sergio things can appear good from one perspective but not another. But this is all pretty dark. What is a “perspective” in his sense, for instance, when calling this “an appearance” is metaphorical? And if to desire something is for that thing to appear good to you, then what is it for something to appear bad to you? And what is it for something to appear neutral, neither good nor bad? It is unclear to me what is the actual meaning of “appearing good” if it has so little cognitive content that something can “appear good” to someone who never believes it good. So I think there is a general issue here. Desires are appearances of the good, according to Sergio. And, he says, “Concluding that something is good is, according to the scholastic view, to pursue it, or at least to form the intention to pursue it” (p. 237). But are such all-out conclusions also perspectival? And what exactly is the relation between these appearances of the good and all-out judgments that some action is good; that is, beliefs about what is good or what one ought to do or what would be best to do? For instance, could I fully believe that some action was the best thing I could do in the circumstances, for instance, and then act on that belief without the action appearing good to me (i.e., without desiring to perform it)? In the sense of “desire” Sergio seems to be using, where a desire would seem to be simply the aim or goal of the action in question, it is not clear that this makes sense. That is because in this sense of “desire” it seems to just follow from the fact that something was the purpose of my action that I wanted that thing. But doesn’t it have to make sense if we are to distinguish my belief that something is good from its “appearing” good to me?
Since I am running low on time (and space), let me briefly raise one other question, though one I think is connected to this latter one. I said a moment ago that the evaluative constraint on understanding agents really is just the idea that practical reason is the search for “the good,” plus the thought that we are (largely or often) rational. I have been questioning the scholastic view that desire is just appearance of the good by focusing on that second point. But the first point also raises puzzles. The claim is that there is a strong and important analogy between truth as the formal end of theoretical reasoning and “the good” as the formal end of practical reasoning. But there would seem to be some very important disanalogies as well. It is not clear that it even makes sense to say that there are multiple “truths.” If some sentence is true then its negation is false. But there certainly seem to be multiple “good”s and “bad”s. It might be bad for the US to immediately pull out of Iraq and equally bad not to. Similarly, it might be good if I give some of my money to A, but equally good if I don’t give it to A but give it to B instead, and even equally good if I give it to neither A nor B but just keep it myself. Then too, if some (declarative) sentence is not true, then it is false. But an end can fail to be good without its being bad. It might be neither. All this I think raises questions about talking of someone’s “conception of the good.”
Beyond this, I think it at least plausible that there can be “inconsistent”Footnote 3 (valid) conceptions of the good and in fact that a single person could have inconsistent conceptions of the good without making any logical or evaluative mistakes. Clearly a single person can have inconsistent desires in this way. Is the scholastic view committed to the thought that whenever there are inconsistent desires at least one of these “appearances of the good” must be illusory? That seems implausible given the sorts of examples just mentioned, but if there can be genuinely good but inconsistent goals then presumably one might have at some point to choose between them. In fact I would say that this is a common experience. But then it is hard to see how that choice (and the resulting action) could be understood or explained just by referring to it as pursuing the good since the other choice, had it been made, would have had exactly the same explanation. To put this another way, if two inconsistent desires, that is inconsistent appearances of the good, can both be non-illusory then presumably I could believe (correctly) both that it was good to pursue A and good to pursue not-A. But according to the scholastic view, concluding that something is good is to intend to pursue it. So doesn’t the scholastic view have to say that in such a case I intend to pursue A and also intend to pursue not-A?
