What is worldly shame? This book first suggests that worldly shame is “concerned with an attentiveness to the world that we share in common with plural others” (xi). More precisely, building on Jill Locke's definition, Manu Samnotra characterizes shame as involving negative feelings for failing to live up to standards we should identify with (9). Shame is different from embarrassment (9), alienation (14–15), anomie (17), mourning and melancholia (17–18), and guilt (19), and it is connected to action (15). The central claim is that shame links us to the world, and “when we are worldly, we question the nature of our linkages to others, and just as importantly, act to transform these linkages” (xi). Samnotra explores these linkages primarily through Hannah Arendt's work, although he also discusses many other political thinkers. In response to anticipated objections to using Arendt's thought to understand emotions, Samnotra notes Arendt's emotional commitment in writing, her acknowledgment of the interplay of reason and feeling, and her insights into feeling and motivation. Furthermore, he observes, Arendt considered giving The Origins of Totalitarianism the title Elements of Shame (21–22). The book, Samnotra's first, has five chapters and a preface. His writing style is lucid and engaging, wearing the considerable scholarship lightly, although there are many discursive notes, often long.
Chapter 1, “Shame's Worldliness,” introduces the main arguments. While the potentially debilitating effects of shame (13, 16) and the damaging nature of shaming practices (120) are recognized, Samnotra's contention is that “shame can make us worldly” (1) in Arendt's sense of the world as involving our connection to others, continuity, and durability. He opposes to this view thinkers who hold that shame is fundamentally destructive, and he argues, by contrast, that we should get over our shame aversion and become more shame prone, as Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick terms it (2). Worldliness, for Samnotra, means acknowledging the need to act with others, for judgment, and for a meaningful political space. For example, shame is used in democratic contestation by marginalized groups like Black Americans or gay groups (12). In contrast, worldlessness is thinking “we can act alone,” retreating from the world, or accepting a “we” that is ready-made and not genuinely plural, but a kind of enlarged self (6).
In chapter 2, “Against ‘Magic Wands,’” Samnotra considers shame aversiveness and proneness through Arendt's biography of Rahel Varnhagen. He explains the ambivalence of shame experiences by observing that “shame both prevents and enables the development of our attunement to the world in ways that rely on shared power” (31); if we focus on our shame, we can comprehend our vulnerability. According to Samnotra, Arendt's biography of Varnhagen shows that we need to deepen our sense of powerlessness, as there is a form of power based on the “I cannot.” Shame for Rahel is both individualizing as her shame and social as an experience linked to her Jewishness. Samnotra sees Rahel as awakening to the world: “Arendt reads Rahel as awakening to a hazardous and ambivalent path toward recognizing her power to resist narratives of belonging that had shaped much of her life” (35–36). His intuition is that Arendt is telling her own story about worldliness, and how a worldly shame that involves Rahel embracing her Jewishness grows from a more basic shame about being Jewish. Samnotra adds to Arendt's analysis by considering the role of self-deception in becoming a parvenu. He sees Rahel's later shame as more inclusive as it takes in the gaze of other, poorer, Jewish people, finding a political, plural “we” of community.
Chapter 3, “This Means You,” engages with Arendt's columns in the US German-Jewish emigre journal Aufbau (63–68), considering criticisms of shame's effects and offering an alternative account of shame's political significance. Samnotra argues that shame can lead us to action: “Shame creates the space for a critical democratic citizenship that, as thinkers within the tradition of Black Political Thought argue, is necessary for a revivified political sphere” (62). According to him, experiencing shame leads us to consider whether others are feeling a similar shame, for instance, in being conquered, and so develop a kind of solidarity (71). Failures of justice can make both the oppressed and the privileged experience shame, and Samnotra believes that experience may make us question how we understand ourselves, in a way parallel to the broader perspective of Arendt's political judgment.
In chapter 4, “This Elemental Shame,” Samnotra directly confronts the value of shame and addresses Arendt's articulation of shame and so is more convincing than in earlier chapters. He outlines the elemental shame in response to the horror of the Shoah and provides numerous historical and contemporary examples likely to provoke a similar response. This elemental shame we feel when all humanity appears implicated in a grave crime best fits Samnotra's idea of worldly shame. It also best illustrates the possible ethos that could lead to action, as he writes, “When we learn to acknowledge our shame, we also learn to acknowledge the need for a political community within which we can address our shame” (96). The idea that “the shame of being human” (111) and learning to live with this shame could help us develop solidarity “not bound by the nation-state” bears resonance and power.
The short concluding chapter 5, “The Shame of ‘Who We Are,’” maintains that shame connects to reflection on such a “Who” and the possibilities of a “We can.” It also contains the clearest statement of the book's thesis: “Acknowledging our shame unravels the possibilities that fuel the will, thereby creating a negative space that can provide the kind of stock-taking necessary for reevaluating the political present” (120).
The argument is that shame is allied to judgment and conscience and can connect us to others and lead to action supporting just outcomes. The book would benefit from a more detailed comparison with guilt, although the contrasts and the preference for shame are outlined at several points. Samnotra claims that shame is more important than guilt as guilt is characterized by too narrow a sense of responsibility (19) and that fundamentally Arendt understands shame as more suited for a collective acknowledgment of responsibility. However, Arendt is critical of collective guilt, not guilt as such. Samnotra also claims that shame is future oriented in a way that guilt is not (104, 11) and that shame is particularly connected to the conscience. Nonetheless, the idea that anticipation of the shame we might feel if we did something wrong is linked to conscience would apply equally to anticipation of guilt. At times shame's personification appeared to bear the burden of the argument that it leads to an ethos of action, for instance in the claim that “worldly shame complicates the story that compassion would have us believe because it is not directed toward any one person, but is in fact a receptive vessel that helps us make sense of our social world” (120–21). Similarly, the idea of worldliness has to hold a great deal of weight, and the concept of cosmopolitanism could be brought into dialogue here. Samnotra also mentions the question of forgiveness (93) and thus opens up issues concerning shame's relation to forgiveness and atonement. Worldly Shame is an absorbing work of political thought that challenges the view that shame cannot and should not play a role in our political lives.
