Robert Nozick once wrote that “Political philosophers … must work within Rawls’s theory [of justice] or explain why not” (in Anarchy, State, and Utopia [New York: Basic Books, 1974], p. 183). In his latest book Amartya Sen persuasively chooses the latter option. The Idea of Justice is a pleasure to read, oscillating effortlessly and illuminatingly between tightly argued political philosophy, stories, and parables, and historical-empirical illustrations. Sen takes an admirably long and wide perspective on his subject, drawing on an immense and rich array of sources and thinkers — from the Mughal emperor Akbar to Thomas Hobbes; from Buddha to Bentham; from Dickens to Dworkin. The result is surely one of the most significant books on the topic of justice in several decades.
Spanning more than four hundred pages, The Idea of Justice is organized into four main parts. Part I — “The Demands of Justice” — sets itself against theories of justice that Sen consolidates under the name “transcendental institutionalism.” Such theories have two general features. They are “transcendental,” first, in that they aim “to offer resolutions of questions about the nature of perfect justice” (p. ix). Such theories tend to focus on the pure concept of justice — the nature of “the just” — rather than on relative comparisons of justice and injustice. Second, such theories are “institutionalist” in that they concentrate on getting the institutions right, as it were, while neglecting (or altogether ignoring) questions that arise about the actual societies that would ultimately emerge from any given set of institutional arrangements.
One might be forgiven for thinking that “transcendental institutionalism” is merely John Rawls’s theory of justice by another name. While Rawls is certainly at the centre of Sen’s worries — there is a whole chapter dedicated explicitly to Rawls’s work, and several other chapters which are implicitly so dedicated — it is made clear that transcendental institutionalism picks out an approach to justice which is much older and more expansive. The theories of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Kant are paradigmatic no less than those of Rawls, Nozick, Gauthier, and Dworkin. Sen rightly observes that “transcendentalism” and “institutionalism” have (by themselves or in tandem) come to dominate political-philosophical reflection on justice. Let me say something about each of these in turn.
“Transcendental” accounts of justice stand in contrast to what Sen calls “comparative” accounts. The latter eschews the search for perfect justice, focusing instead on locating criteria for some alternative being “less unjust” than another. There are obvious advantages to this way of conceiving of justice. First, a comparative approach helps us make sense of real-world struggles for justice in a way that transcendental approaches simply cannot. “What moves us,” Sen writes in the book’s preface, “… is not the realization that the world falls short of being completely just … but that there are clearly remediable injustices around us which we want to eliminate” (p. vii). Gandhi, Nelson Mandela, Martin Luther King Jr., and others whose names are associated with struggles for justice were surely moved by the same thing. A comparative approach also reminds us that in the real world (where else can justice be struggled for?), demands for justice are always demands for something specific: a particular right or benefit; a more fair distribution of wealth or resources; the abolition of carefully identified forms of oppression, aristocratic privilege, subordination, domination, unfairness, inequality, and so on. There has never been a political movement that mobilized without an agenda or a set of demands — in the name of nothing but transcendental “justice itself.”
“Institutional” theories of justice are contrasted with what Sen calls “realization-focused” theories. The contrast is brought into focus by way of an old distinction in classical Indian jurisprudence. In ancient Sanskrit, Sen explains, there are two words — niti and nyaya — both of which are co-extensive with the English word justice. The former refers to “organizational propriety and behavioral correctness,” whereas the latter stands for “a comprehensive concept of realized justice” (p.20). Each concept has its role and place; Sen’s aim is not to defend one entirely at the expense of the other. The argument rather is that wholly “institutional” accounts do not typically or sufficiently address a central dimension of what most of us have in mind when we think of justice. The basic “institutionalist” premise is almost always the same: if a theory’s abstract principles of justice call for certain sorts of institutions, or allow for certain inequalities or disparities, then that is the end of the story. Questions that arise about the actual societies that would emerge from a particular set of institutions, or about citizens’ capacities for positive freedom, or the extent to which too much disparity in the distribution of various goods can lead to unacceptable inequalities are beside the point. As long as the principles are satisfied, there is simply no room left for complaint. In Rawls’s theory, for instance, there is no space within which to entertain the possibility that in a society committed to the “difference principle” there might still be significant numbers of citizens who lack the resources required to lead genuinely self-authoring lives. Nor does Rawls entertain the possibility that in such a society the (difference-principle-sanctioned) gap between the best-off and worst-off might be great enough to culminate in unjust social inequalities. The “difference principle” merely requires that the “worst-off” be as well-off as they could be (with respect to Rawlsian “primary goods”) as compared with their condition under any other system. But there is simply no room in the Rawlsian schema to suppose that, with respect to their ability to freely develop lives of their own choosing, they might nevertheless be not well-off enough. As Sen (rhetorically) asks, “If the justice of what happens in a society depends on a combination of institutional features and actual behavioral characteristics, along with other influences that determine the social realizations, then is it possible to identify ‘just’ institutions for a society without making them contingent on actual behavior? …” (p. 68).
It is in the context of “realization-focused” thinking about justice that Sen’s seminal work on “functionings,” capabilities, and real freedoms are in point. Part III — “The Materials of Justice” — perspicuously makes the connections between the “capabilities-approach” and a “realization-focused” account of justice explicit. Much of part III will be familiar to those who have followed Sen’s work. Still, having the material set forth in this context is particularly useful for recognizing the extent to which capabilities and real freedom contribute to, and are necessary “materials” of, a viable theory of justice — something that was less clear in earlier writings.
Sen’s characteristic generosity as an author is wonderfully on display in The Idea of Justice. He seemingly never misses an opportunity to register his intellectual debts and to heap praise upon the thinkers and theories he is discussing — even where deep disagreements are clear. As a writer he is never merely polemical. Readers are made to feel, simultaneously, that “transcendental institutionalism” is both hopelessly off the mark and also that it is a source of invaluable insight. This is the case particularly for the work of John Rawls, to whose memory The Idea of Justice is dedicated.
Sen’s tone throughout is deeply pluralist: wisdom is to be found in many corners; there are many sources of learning; no one has a monopoly on insight. Indeed, a central argument of the book is that there is no such thing as the one best approach to justice, one ideal form of reasoning, one privileged perspective, one procedure or rubric with which to make all decisions about justice. “[I]t is not defeatist,” writes Sen, “for an approach … to accept the absence of once-and-for-all finality” (p.89). He emphasizes throughout “the need to accept the plurality of reasons that may be sensibly accommodated in an exercise of evaluation,” sensibly noting that, “[t]he fact that a person can reason his or her way into rejecting slavery … does not indicate that the same person must be able to decide with certainty whether a 40 per cent top rate of income tax would be better than — or more just than — a top rate of 39 per cent” (pp. 394-396).
What is called for is a greater sensitivity to different modes of argument and reasoning that bear on the assessment of justice and injustice. Part II of Sen’s book — “Forms of Reasoning” — is dedicated to setting forth that argument. Here a number of standpoints and forms of reasoning (objectivity, positional bias, impartiality, and so on) are discussed with an eye to examining their various roles and limitations in a theory of “comparative, realization-focused justice.” Again, the underlying ideal is a pluralist one: “Judgments about justice have to take on board the task of accommodating different kinds of reasons and evaluative concerns” (p. 395).
The Idea of Justice concludes on an empirical note. Part IV, “Public Reasoning and Democracy,” touches on an assortment of issues including terrorism, voting, famine, the role of media in a democratic culture, the connections between law and human rights, and the interconnectedness of the global economy. The argument of these last chapters is that the role of public reasoning is central in the understanding of justice, and that this recognition takes us to a connection between the idea of justice and the practice — not the theory — of democracy. This emphasis on the empirical realities of democratic practice is important for at least two reasons. First, it adds substance to Sen’s claim — made much earlier in the book — that understanding the demands of justice is “no more of a solitarist exercise than any other discipline,” and accordingly that there are good reasons “to be sceptical of the possibility of ‘discussionless justice’” (pp. 88-89). Second, it reaffirms the larger idea that debates about justice must touch down on earth somewhere, must bear on actual lives — they must, as Sen puts it, “relate to practicalities” (p. 400).
Written by one of the most sophisticated and humane intellectuals of his generation, The Idea of Justice will be read and discussed for a long time. It is mandatory reading for anyone working in political philosophy.
