Paul Spicker opens Reclaiming Individualism by explaining that ‘This book is about individualist ideas, and how they shape the way we think about public policy’ (p. 1). Spicker's thesis is that individualism is a broad church – broader than is commonly thought – and that while certain individualist ideologies, for example those of the libertarian or neoliberal varieties, can be used to deny the state much scope for promoting and guaranteeing people's wellbeing, other individualist ideologies find it necessary for the state to do so. Thus, while for one person individualist ideas might imply the absence of state interference or coercion, for another they might find expression in the demand for basic social and economic guarantees from the state. Spicker's concern is that state-denying variants of individualism have not only gained ascendency, but that they have become so dominant as to risk giving the false impression that they constitute everything that is to be said of individualism. One of the aims of the book, then, is to ‘save individualism from some of the interpretations it has been subject to’ (p. 199).

In the opening chapter, Spicker distinguishes between three types of individualism: moral individualism, the idea that ‘everyone should be treated as if they are an individual’ (p. 6); methodological individualism, the idea that society can be studied as if people are individuals even if this is just a simplifying assumption; and substantive individualism, the idea that society is just a collection of individuals and that people behave as such. For the substantive individualist, then, methodological individualism is not a simplified ‘way of working’, but is instead a ‘description of social reality’ (p. 14).

The subsequent chapters engage with moral and methodological individualism in greater depth, discussing, first, the variety of forms of individualist thought and, second, the problematic nature of many of the assumptions which underpin modern welfare economics. The distinction between moral, methodological and substantive individualism returns repeatedly throughout the book, and Spicker argues not only that moral individualism is a good deal broader than is often assumed, but that policy makers at times fail to maintain the distinction between methodological and substantive individualism – with disastrous consequences when policies are constructed on the basis of the former but in ways which ignore the simplifying assumptions. There is a fine line, then, between erecting the assumptions in the first place and discarding them altogether.

The second half of the book consists of chapters on substantive policy and individuals, and collective action while the concluding chapter, government and public policy, articulates a commitment to welfare, but from a decidedly individualistic basis. If we believe that there is a value to each and every person, Spicker argues, then this points towards policies in favour of individual rights – including citizenship rights, basic security and empowerment. The types of policies which might be pursued under these domains are then outlined, demonstrating the broad scope for policy making which can be supported by an individualist position.

Reclaiming Individualism is an extremely engaging book – indeed, it is engaging in both senses of the word. It takes on, and argues with, a large body of thought – from Pareto and Ricardo, to Rawls and Nozick, to Sen and Arrow, to Titmuss and Tawney. Impressive in its breadth, though perhaps at its best when closest to home, it engages with other disciplines, their central texts and their implicit assumptions in a way which ought to be much more commonplace.

In Reclaiming Individualism, Paul Spicker asks us to look carefully at – and to rethink – some of the assumptions upon which policy is based. This is a book in which the devil, as is so often the case, is found in the detail. In stressing the value of individualism, while at the same time pointing to the inconsistencies between assumptions which underpin much existing policy making, and considering the consequences of policies which have been enacted, Spicker puts forward a case for a very different, but nonetheless individualist, form of policy making. This is a book with much relevance for students and scholars of Social and Public Policy and, indeed, for anyone who wishes to understand more about the dominant paradigms of public policy.