Deriving the Extended Typology

Mearsheimer's account of offensive realism distinguishes among continental great powers, island great powers, and regional hegemons. This classification is missing a fourth, important category: where a great power is the only local state with significant resources. Under these circumstances, such a state will try to expand to dominate its region, even if it is an island state. While this category is not named by Mearsheimer, he does describe at least one example in his case study narrative, that of Japan in Northeast Asia between 1900 and 1945.¹

Besides adding a fourth category of sole great power, my expanded offensive realist typology also considers different strategic circumstances that a state might face when it operates outside of its own region. The extended typology takes the different state types, extracts the elements attributed to them, and recasts the four nominal categories as extraregional contexts (Elman 2005; see also K. Bailey 1972, 1973; Barton 1955; and Lazarsfeld 1965). For example, a state that is one of several continental powers in its own region might be operating in another region that has several continental powers with or without an island state, a single great power, or a regional hegemon. This expansion adds four columns for “other regions,” resulting in an additional 16 cells.

The new typology is shown in Figure 1. Although there are initially 20 cells in the 4×5 matrix, those that are shaded gray can be deleted using empirical functional reduction. In the modern era there have been no cases of multipolar regions without an insular offshore power. Accordingly the second column [cells (5)–(8)] can be deleted in its entirety. Similarly, there have been no examples of multiple multipolar regions, and hence cells (9) and (10) in the third column can also be deleted. There have also been no cases of two isolated great powers, and so cell (15) is empty.²

Expanded Typology of State Behavior Predicted Under Different Distributions of Power

It should be stressed that this “stretched” version of offensive realism is already nascent in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. At least one “sole great power” is discussed in the case studies (Mearsheimer 2001, 264–65), and allowing for different extraregional contexts is implicit in Mearsheimer's use of different in-regional state types. However, explicitly adding these elements to the extended typology enhances the descriptive content of both axes of the property space. Compared to Mearsheimer's original formulation, my extended version allows for more nuanced hypotheses that collectively can explain a wider range of state behavior.

The Extended Typology's Predictions⁴

This section looks only at the cells in the typology which are directly relevant to the case discussed in this article, namely, how the United States achieved regional hegemony. See Elman 2005 for a fuller discussion of the methodology used to derive the extended typology, as well as of other cells in the matrix.

Mearsheimer argues that the stopping power of water makes global hegemony impossible, with the corollary hypothesis that the best a state can hope for is to be the world's sole regional hegemon. But a second corollary of a regionally focused offensive realism is that local power considerations will dominate a state's strategic calculations. This second corollary makes little difference when it comes to in-regional behavior, and hence here Mearsheimer's and my version of the theory overlap in their predictions. Accordingly, cells (1), (2), and (4) of my typology (Figure 1) agree with Mearsheimer's predictions for the local behavior of continental and insular great powers and regional hegemons. While the extended version adds the in-regional behavior of a sole great power, the prediction in cell (3) that states like the United States will expand to fill the vacuum in their region is entirely consistent with the thrust of Mearsheimer's other predictions regarding in-regional state behavior.

However, my extended version of offensive realism suggests that, because they will give precedence to local power considerations, both island and continental great powers make very doubtful extraregional balancers. In responding to the security demands posed by an anarchic international system, an insular great power should support an extraregional attempt at hegemony [cell (14)], and a continental great power should only intervene when its local situation permits [cell (13)].

As I suggest in cell (14), a regionally focused version of offensive realism predicts that insular great powers will prefer to support, not block, the emergence of a regional hegemon in another neighborhood. Taking Anglo-American relations as an example, Britain's main concern should have been of a continental hegemon emerging in its own region. Since an American regional hegemon would share Britain's fear of a European hegemon, the British could rely on it to serve as balancer-of-last-resort. Hence, conducting an extraregional campaign against the Americans made no sense, since it would misdirect British resources away from local balancing, as well as rob the island state of an inevitable future ally. This suggests that the British should have acquiesced in America's rise to hegemony and quietly ceded control of the Western Hemisphere. Since the two states both feared rising European continental great powers, however, we would expect the two states to engage in mutual buck-passing. Because Britain was much closer to Europe, it comes as no surprise that it would catch the buck in 1914 and 1939. But if Britain proved unequal to the task, the United States was required to step in, as it did in 1945.

Although I do not provide a direct test of cell (14)'s hypothesis in this article, Britain's behavior in 1803 is consistent with the expectation that it would acquiesce in America's rise. If France had not sold the territory, it is very likely that an Anglo-American alliance would have followed. In addition, in the event that Britain had conquered Louisiana from the French, it is probable that they would then have transferred all or part of the territory to the United States, in order to maintain that alliance (Perkins 1955, 290–94; Skolnik 1969, 124–25). Britain's willingness to see the United States take New Orleans is further demonstrated by its permitting the British merchant bank Baring Brothers to participate in the transaction's financing.

In contrast to the likely extraregional intervention by a regional hegemon to prevent the rise of a peer competitor, and to the expected acquiescence in that rise by an insular great power, a continental great power may intervene in another region, but only when that action will not undermine its relative position in its own neighborhood. As I note in cell (13), the anarchic international system provides cross-cutting incentives for and against extraregional balancing by continental great powers. Perhaps the best reason for intervention is that a continental great power anticipating its own bid for supremacy will want to preempt the creation of an offshore balancer likely to interfere with its future plans. The strongest argument against extraregional balancing is that a continental great power worries far more about its local competitors than about what is happening in other regions. Hence, it is not surprising that France, Prussia/Germany, and Russia paid far more attention to each other, and to Great Britain, than to America. Some European states also worried, with good reason, that by blocking the United States' expansion they risked pushing an increasingly powerful state into the arms of their enemies. In addition, since the United States was the only powerful state in North America, great powers interested in balancing against it would have had to do all the heavy lifting themselves, without the aid of local allies. Finally, by allowing the United States to become more powerful, it could serve as a useful counterweight in the European balance.

The claim being made in cell (13) is not the neoclassical realist argument that an otherwise determinate structural prediction is rendered inaccurate by left-out domestic variables (see, e.g., Schweller 1993, 1994, 1996, 1997, and 1998). Rather, because local and extraregional considerations compete, when it comes to extraregional balancing by continental great powers, offensive structural realism is indeterminate on its own terms. To be sure, a continental great power may not be in favor of another state achieving regional hegemony elsewhere. But it will not care enough to deflect resources that could otherwise be used in its own bid for local dominance, or commit resources that should be used to block another local power from achieving regional hegemony, or so provoke the extraregional would-be hegemon that it throws its weight on the side of the state's local enemies. That is, we cannot know in advance what a continental state will do about an extraregional rising great power without much more information about local conditions.

Analyzing France's sale of Louisiana to the United States provides an opportunity to test the argument made in cell (13) that continental great powers are indifferent extraregional balancers, and that their own local considerations dominate. The case is important as the last occasion on which a powerful extraregional continental state had an indigenous presence on the North American continent.⁵

The Background to the Purchase

Several European great powers had an interest in the region and, at various times, had exercised different degrees of control. The first Spanish expeditions in 1528 and 1541 resulted in no permanent settlements in Louisiana but helped to substantiate Spain's later claims to the territory (DeConde 1976, 4–5; see also Shepherd 1904, 443). A French mission down the Illinois and Mississippi rivers reached the Gulf in 1682. Its leader, Robert Cavelier, sieur de La Salle, claimed the territory for France, and named it in honor of Louis XIV (DeConde 1976, 6–7). France lost the east bank of the Mississippi (as well as New France) to England in 1763 following the Seven Years War. At the same time, England also received East and West Florida from Spain. France's exclusion from the continent was completed by its cession of the west bank of the Mississippi to Spain by the Treaty of Fontainebleau (Aiton 1931, 718).

Between 1762/63 and 1776 the only two colonial powers seriously vying for control of North America were England, in the north and east, and Spain, in the south and west. Having withdrawn from the continent, France was more interested in interfering with the English empire than in reestablishing its own (Fletcher 1930, 368, 375–76). England's position on the continent was dealt a serious blow by its defeat in the War of Independence. The Floridas were restored to Spain, and the remaining Anglo-American territory was divided between England and the United States. Despite recovering Florida, however, Spain gained little long-term advantage from these developments. While the amount of territory England controlled was much diminished, it was still easily capable of invading Louisiana from Canada. In addition, Spain now had to cope with increasing westward migration of Americans into territory it claimed, as well as with large-scale smuggling that undercut its own economy. For their part, the Americans considered themselves heirs to the English colonies' original land grants that gave competing titles to territory claimed by Spain. In addition, the Americans were determined to reduce the vulnerability of their trade to Spanish control of the Mississippi River.

Spanish–American friction was briefly eased by the Treaty of San Lorenzo (Pinckney's Treaty) of 1795. Spain ceded claims to land east of the Mississippi and north of the 31st parallel and guaranteed American vessels free navigation of the lower river. The United States was also granted the right to transship goods at New Orleans free of tax for three years, with Spain able to nominate an alternative site thereafter (DeConde 1976, 61–62; James 1914, 44). These generous Spanish concessions did not long solve their problems with either American expansion or American smuggling. Migration west of the Mississippi and south of the 31st parallel continued (DeConde 1976, 71). The American newcomers refused to assimilate in language or custom and were correctly viewed by Spain as an inevitably irredentist diaspora. In addition, American smuggling of goods via New Orleans to other Spanish colonies was a constant source of irritation to the authorities (Deconde 1976, 72).

In November 1799 France's interests in the Western Hemisphere, renewed under the Directory, were boosted by Napoleon Bonaparte's seizure of power (Fletcher 1930, 374–75; Lokke 1925, 80; Sloane 1899; 1904, 508–9; Turner 1905, 268–69, 277). France sought to mold a new empire in the west, with Louisiana supplying food, timber, and other commodities to the sugar island of St. Domingue (DeConde 1976, 77, 86; Lyon 1934/74, 109; see also Turner 1905, 257). While Louisiana would supply St. Domingue, it was the island colony that would turn a profit by restoring what had previously been the source of 70% of France's sugar, which in turn produced 20% of its exports (Kukla 2003, 213–14).⁷

While ostensibly offered by France as compensation for Spanish losses in the Seven Years War, the original cession in 1763 was in large part made between two states for which “Louisiana was not merely destitute of intrinsic value, it entailed a positive deficit” (Shepherd 1904, 439). One French official observed, on September 20, 1762, that the colony “costs France eight hundred thousand livres a year, without yielding a sou in return” (447; see also Cerami 2003, 11). The Spanish in the intervening decades had done little better (Fletcher 1930, 368–69). On June 22, 1800, Mariano Luis de Urquijo, Spain's secretary of state for foreign affairs, observed to the Spanish ambassador in Paris that the territory “costs us more than it is worth” (cited in Lyon 1934/74, 104; also cited in DeConde 1976, 92; Kukla 2003, 214, and Whitaker 1934, 469–70). Spain regarded Louisiana as a necessary part of its defense-in-depth for its much more valuable holdings farther south and west. A twice-yearly grant from Mexico to Louisiana was regarded as part of the cost of doing business (Kukla 2003, 18, 37–39, 74, 91–92; see also DeConde 1976, 72).

While not an economic asset as a stand-alone colony, a French-controlled Louisiana would nevertheless serve three strategic roles, all operating to contain the United States: a barrier to westward expansion, a choke-point on the Mississippi, and a rival metropole. First, French Louisiana would provide a much stronger obstacle to American expansion than Spain's rapidly declining empire (Fletcher 1930, 375; James 1914, 47–48; Lyon 1934/74, 149; Whitaker 1934, 456). The barrier rationale was a central theme in discussions of the comparative merits of French and Spanish ownership, both in the 1790s and earlier (Kukla 2003, 205; see also DeConde 1976, 8, 26, 78, 80, 82–83, 86–87, 93, and Lyon 1934/74, 14, 51, 81, 88). Second, New Orleans “commanded the single most strategic point between the Appalachians and the Rocky Mountains of North America” (Kukla 2003, 31; see also 231). The economies of the interior depended on the Mississippi River for transport, and New Orleans controlled the waterway (Lyon 1934/74, 117). A state that could restrict egress from the Mississippi had powerful leverage over upstream territories (Robertson 1885, 254). Finally, French Louisiana could serve as a rival metropole for parts of the United States to the west of the Appalachian mountains. Given the long-standing rivalry between northeastern and southern states, and the widespread acceptance of Montesquieu's argument that large republics inevitably fragment, it was believed that America was ripe for division (Cerami 2003, 13–14; Kukla 2003, 59–66, 93, 97–98). France hoped that, in order to guarantee access to the lower Mississippi, territories on the Eastern bank would transfer their loyalty from the United States. Hence a contemporary British observer noted that “the state of Kentucky must unite with France as the Mississippi is the only communication that fine country has with the Sea, and she is deprived of Commerce with the United States by that Barrier the Apalachian [sic] mountains…” (quoted in H. Bailey and Weber 1960, 244, emphasis in the original). The French would be adopting a strategy previously advocated by the Spanish and feared by the United States, but doing so with a government that was far more attractive to some Americans than the decaying Spanish monarchy (Kukla 2003, 20, 77–78; Riley 1897, 180–81). For these reasons, it was hoped that territories to the east of the Mississippi could be persuaded to remove to Louisiana, and a French state could be constructed stretching from the Rockies to the Appalachians (DeConde 1976, 59, 83; Lyon 1934/74, 113–14).

In October 1800, by the second Treaty of San Ildefenso, the Spanish agreed to retrocede Louisiana to France in return for territory in northern Italy and six ships (DeConde 1976, 95; Lyon 1934/74, 108). At the same time, France verbally agreed not to alienate the territory to a third party. In July 1802 this assurance was repeated in a written promise by Gouvion St. Cyr, French Ambassador to Spain, which included the sentence, “I am authorized to declare to you in the name of the First Consul that France will never alienate [Louisiana]” (quoted in Lyon 1934/74, 124). Documents authorizing transfer of the territory were finally prepared on October 15, 1802 (DeConde 1976, 105; Lyon 1934/74, 120).

The United States had caught wind of an impending agreement between Spain and France earlier, although it was unsure about both the timing—believing that the retrocession might have been agreed as early as the 1795 Treaty of Basel—and the extent—believing that the deal included the Floridas. By May 1801, the Americans were certain that some kind of deal had taken place, although they were still unclear on what territory had been transferred (DeConde 1976, 107–108). If France's possession was allowed to operate as a barrier to westward expansion, as a chokehold on the Mississippi, and as a magnet for disunion, it would do so entirely at the expense of the United States. Americans were acutely aware of these risks (see, e.g., Cerami 2003, 27, DeConde 1976, 69, 81–82, and Lyon 1934/74, 150). Not surprisingly, the United States much preferred “pacific” and “feeble” Spain, which “might have retained it quietly for years” (Skolnik 1969, 36–39). The Spanish were viewed as “more safe, quiet, and useful neighbors” (DeConde 1976, 84), and Rufus King, U.S. representative to Britain, observed that the Spanish, like the Turks, “are the most proper to possess a great Empire with great insignificance” (Kukla 2003, 227).

In December 1801, Robert Livingstone, America's ambassador to France, was directed to discover the extent of the retrocession and whether the French intended to send troops to its North American possessions (Kukla 2003, 238). Livingstone was instructed to persuade the French not to reoccupy Louisiana and to obtain the Floridas from them if they had title or from the Spanish if they did not (Kukla 2003, 239). U.S. concerns about Louisiana were considerably heightened on October 16, 1802, when Spain's Acting Intendant of Louisiana, Juan Ventura Morales, disregarded the Treaty of San Lorenzo by suspending America's right to deposit goods at New Orleans (Documents 1927, 822–23; 1928, 331–32, 341; Lyon 1934/74, 167; Skolnik 1969, 54–55). The move enraged Americans, especially those whose livelihoods depended on free egress from the lower Mississippi (Pelzer 1913, 122; Perkins 1955, 285). The United States (as it turns out, wrongly) believed that Spain had already transferred the territory to France and that the suspension was the first act of the new owners (Lyon 1932).⁸

Monroe's arrival in Paris coincided with a remarkable reversal by the French. Napoleon told his ministers on April 11, 1803: “Irresolution and deliberation are no longer in season. I renounce Louisiana. It is not only New Orleans that I will cede, it is the whole colony without any reservation” (quoted by Barbé-Marbois 1830/1977, 274). Neither Livingstone nor Monroe was instructed to ask for, or expected to be offered, the whole colony (Lyon 1934/74, 240). Nevertheless, even without instructions from Jefferson, they readily agreed to France's proposal. By the first week of May 1803, 10 months after France's written promise to Spain not to alienate its new possession, negotiations were completed for the territory's purchase by the United States.

The purchase met with overwhelmingly positive reactions in the United States. To be sure, die-hard northeasterners were very critical of westward expansion, and some were deeply angered by the acquisition. Knudson (1969, 184) relates the “hard-core Federalist” response: “The price was not right. The territory was too large; the Union would be rended. Spain would never agree to the transaction…. The cities of the east would be depopulated…the center of political power would drift southward and westward… New England would be ruined” (see also Knudson 1969, 198–202; Robertson 1885, 262–63). But previous critics of the administration who were not so driven by sectional interests had to admit the obvious value of the territory to the United States and were largely reduced to claiming that Jefferson's administration deserved no credit for a happy accident (Kukla 2003, 290–91).

France's Options in 1803

While America's readiness to buy Louisiana clearly fits both versions of offensive realism, France's sale poses a problem for the argument that continental great powers prefer to contain would-be extraregional hegemons. By contrast, the decision fits my prediction that extraregional foreign policies are subordinate to local power considerations. The possible options France had in April 1803 are shown in Table 3, together with two previous policies that were no longer feasible.

Until the end of 1802, French policy was based on the hope that it could suppress the rebellion on St. Domingue. By December, the prospect of a larger Caribbean empire was much reduced, and with it the economic raison d'être of the Louisiana retrocession (Kukla 2003, 254). France's military force on St. Domingue had been decimated by yellow fever, with 29,000 troops killed or incapacitated (Stoddard 1914, 326–28, 338–40; see also Sloane 1904, 513). From January to March 1803, France continued to pursue the retrocession, despite the very bad news from St. Domingue. In March 1803, however, with Britain preventing French troops from sailing for Louisiana, Napoleon had four options: conciliate the British long enough to allow the military expedition to depart; sell its whole interest to the United States; sell only New Orleans and navigation rights on the Mississippi River to the United States; or live up to the nonalienation promise and transfer Louisiana back to Spain.

Analysis

The key argument made in my extended version of offensive realism is that the anarchic international system provides dissimilar cues to different types of states to engage in extraregional balancing. An analysis of France's sale of Louisiana tests the hypothesis set out in cell (13) of Figure 1 that continental great powers make indifferent extraregional balancers, because local power considerations dominate their calculations. It investigates the central question of what local price France was willing to pay to contain the United States in another region. French policy evolved as the costs and benefits of containment changed.

Until December 1802, Napoleon was willing to risk an Anglo-American alliance by garrisoning Louisiana as part of a larger western empire that included the sugar producing island of St. Domingue. The period from January through March 1803 partly disentangles the economic benefits of the Caribbean from the strategic benefits of the west bank of the Mississippi. By January, Napoleon knew that France's plans for St. Domingue were in serious trouble, and he had firm indications that French control of Louisiana would provoke an alliance between the United States and Great Britain (Lyon 1934/74, 194–195; see also Lokke 1925, 86). Yet neither the failure of the St. Domingue expedition nor the strength of America's reaction to the closure of New Orleans led Napoleon to cancel plans for garrisoning Louisiana. For example, in February 1803, ignorant of the ice that prevented it from leaving Holland, Napoleon ordered “the entire Louisiana expedition to sail directly to its destination,” countermanding his previous order to divert much of its military force to St. Domingue (DeConde 1976, 152; Lyon 1934/74, 139–40). The expedition was repeatedly ordered to depart throughout February and early March (Smith 1971, 33, note 36). This suggests that, with or without St. Domingue, had local (i.e., European) power considerations allowed, Napoleon would have tried to contain the United States.

French policy changed in March 1803 when deteriorating relations with Britain forced Napoleon to make a choice between containing American power and pursuing French ambitions in Europe. France was unable to hold Louisiana unless it could get troops to the colony, which was only possible if Britain permitted the Helvoet-Sluys expedition to sail (Barbé-Marbois 1830/1977, 253). Britain's control of the sea routes to the Western Hemisphere had been readily demonstrated when France sent earlier military expeditions to St. Domingue. France's first attempt in May 1800 was only made possible by a storm dispersing the British blockading squadron, and the second by the Peace of Amiens and British sympathies with the aims of the expedition (Lokke 1925, 81, 85). By contrast, in early 1803, as the Peace of Amiens unraveled, France found itself faced by an uncooperative and potentially hostile Britain, in large part thanks to French provocation.

The Treaty of Amiens had restored all of France's overseas colonies, but required France to evacuate Naples and the Roman States and surrender Egypt to Turkey (Ward and Gooch 1922/70, 306). In return, Britain was to vacate Elba and Malta (Mahan 1897, 81). In the summer of 1802, Franco-British relations were reasonably congenial, but they quickly deteriorated in September and October following evidence of France's renewed ambitions, most notably in Egypt and Switzerland (Schroeder 1994, 231–32). France compounded its provocation by publishing a report by the leader of its Egyptian expedition in the Moniteur on January 30, 1803, including the observation that it could be conquered by 6,000 French troops. Britain subsequently refused to surrender Malta (Gill 1909, 73; Mahan 1897, 93–96; Sloane 1904, 509). On February 21, France published the official View of the State of the Republic, which noted, inter alia, that France needed an army of 500,000 men to be safe from the threat from Britain (Ward and Gooch 1922/70, 318). On March 8 the British government sent a royal message to Parliament announcing that in consequence of military pre- parations going on in the ports of Holland and France, it was prudent to make additional provision for defense (Ward and Gooch 1922/70, 319; Mahan 1892, 97).

Lord Whitworth, the British Ambassador to France, forwarded a March 12 memorandum from Napoleon noting that the troops in Helvoet-Sluys were intended for America but that, given the royal message, orders for their embarkation and departure had been countermanded (quoted in Browning 1887, 114). Napoleon's message was at best misleading, since he did not order the expedition to stand down until after the sale of Louisiana had been completed in April (Smith 1971, 34–35). Indeed, French Foreign Minister Charles Talleyrand complained to Lord Whitworth on March 25 that English frigates cruising off of Helvoet-Sluys were preventing the French vessels from leaving (Browning 1887, 142). Lord Hawkesbury (147) replied to Talleyrand, via Whitworth:

Because France was unwilling to modify its territorial ambitions in Europe, it had no opportunity to garrison Louisiana, and hence a sale was mandated (Perkins 1993, 116). The three sale options (all to the United States, part to the United States, all to Spain) had the same basic configuration of costs and benefits: All would provide some immediate remuneration to France and forestall an Anglo-American alliance, but each would result in U.S. regional hegemony. Transfer of the whole colony to the United States was the best of the three sale options for France, because it provided the largest monetary return and gave France the best chance of befriending the Americans.

Since local power considerations dominated French calculations, it is entirely unsurprising that the sale was directed to improving French power in Europe, especially vis-à-vis Britain. For example, the 52 million francs France received was used to build barges for an invasion of Britain (Barbé-Marbois 1830/1977, 313; Richmond 1941, 53). In addition, Napoleon viewed the sale as helping the United States become a more formidable competitor for Britain, observing that “this accession of territory strengthens for ever the power of the United States; and I have just given to England a maritime rival, that will sooner or later humble her pride” (quoted in Barbé-Marbois 1830/1977, 312).¹⁰

In sum, so long as the cost of securing Louisiana could be borne largely by the colonies, and so long as retaining it did not unduly interfere with its own strategic interests vis-à-vis the other European great powers, France was willing to prevent American regional hegemony. But by April 1803 that was no longer a plausible position. Thanks to Spanish delays, the constant drain of rebellion and disease in St. Domingue, and the failure of the Louisiana garrison to depart Holland because of ice and blockade, France did not have the means to hold the territory once it took clear title. The only way to garrison Louisiana was to appease Britain and reign in French ambitions in Europe. Since France was unwilling to do this, at that point it reversed course because going into war with an indefensible Louisiana was worse than surrendering the colony before the conflict with Britain resumed.