For a long time, Kant's texts about education, in particular moral education and ethical didactics, have been neglected. In the English-speaking world, Lewis White Beck offered what might be seen as a typical assessment: Kant, Beck claimed in an essay published some time ago, ‘does not even seem to see that his strict moral philosophy has, and can have, no place for moral education’ (Beck Reference Beck1978: 201). Kant and Education tries to fill this gap in Kant scholarship and also attempts to ‘broaden and deepen discussion of the implications of Kant's moral and political philosophy and aesthetics for education’ (p. ix). The anthology is only partly successful in this task.
The book has a clear structure. The first essays investigate the historical influences on Kant. There are two contributions on Rousseau's legacy and one chapter on Kant's assessment of Johann Bernhard Basedow's educational reforms. In particular Robert B. Louden's essay on Basedow's ‘both wide and deep’ influence is a fine piece of scholarship, highlighting the fact that Kant's support for the Philanthropin movement was ‘the only time in his life when he stuck his neck out, albeit briefly, to unequivocally champion a progressive social movement’ (p. 52). The second group of essays is the more comprehensive one. They focus on the philosophy of education and its status within the broader Kantian system, for instance its relationship with anthropology, moral philosophy or the humanities. I think some of these contributions are the best part of the book, especially those by Lars Løvlie, Paul Guyer, Richard Dean, Alix Cohen, Paul Formosa and James Scott Johnston. A final group of essays deals with Kant's relevance and importance for contemporary educational theory.
Ever since Herbart's review of Kant's major publication on education, the Lectures on Pedagogy (edited by his former student Friedrich Theodor Rink in 1803; the review appeared in 1804), interpreters like Beck have claimed that Kant's pure moral philosophy is incompatible with his theory of moral education. This ‘incompatibility thesis’ takes various forms: in the first place, it means that Kant's reliance on discipline, on corporal and ‘moral’ punishments (like showing contempt) does not sit well with the idea of self-determination and autonomy. This is the ‘freedom-under-constraint’ problem or paradox (cf. Ak. 9: 453). There are two more tensions, which Paul Formosa labels the ‘knowledge and revolution tensions’ (p. 163). The first one arises because Kant claims that humans, and even children, do have a sound moral knowledge, helping them to distinguish right from wrong. On the other hand, Kant holds that we do need moral instruction and education. According to the revolution tension, it is difficult if not impossible to reconcile Kant's thesis of a gradual moral progress with the help of education and the postulate of a sudden moral revolution to achieve a proper moral disposition.
Several authors tackle the first problem and try to offer a solution. Gary B. Herbert points out that a pure moral disposition is not identical with freedom or liberty from external authority. ‘Punishment is not incompatible with freedom considered as autonomy. On the contrary, it may well be recognition of one's autonomy’ (p. 83). Education promotes a character that helps children to accept moral demands as meaningful and rational (cf. p. 92). Jørgen Huggler adds that the problem may be read as considering either sufficient or just necessary ‘conditions for pedagogical intervention’ (p. 105). Finally, Lars Løvlie draws attention to the fact that Kant did not claim that freedom has to be created through or by means of coercion or force, but rather, (‘bei dem Zwange’, Ak. 9: 453) in a situation where coercion is also present, as part of an educational process aiming at freedom. He muses that the first paradox may rest ‘at the heart of pedagogy itself’ (p. 110), and thus cannot be eliminated. Paul Formosa solves the knowledge tension by pointing to Kant's assertion that ‘there is a strong correlation between the historical progress of a society and the moral development of its members’ (p. 172). They have been partly socialized with the help of ‘disciplinary training, culture, and civilization’ (9: 451), enabling them to make potentially correct moral judgements. However, this is not identical with having understood ‘the normative basis of those judgments’ or having formed a moral character (p. 172). Along these lines, Formosa also resolves the revolution tension. Moral education is necessary for moralization, as without it the rational predispositions would remain uncultivated. However, it is not sufficient for moralization, since the adoption of a new disposition can only be done by the agent herself (cf. pp. 173–4).
My major criticism of this book is that relevant secondary literature in German is usually not considered. It seems that most authors rely exclusively on English publications: Beck's misleading and outdated essay from 1978 is mentioned several times (see for instance pp. 82–3 and 152), whereas Lutz Koch's seminal work (Reference Koch2003) is listed only by Lars Løvlie. I did not find any treatment of Kant's unique method of moral education, discussed at length in Koch (cf. pp. 189–97). In addition, Koch deals with the various forms of the ‘incompatibility thesis’ in his 400-page study, also the topic of one of my essays (Cavallar Reference Cavallar2005). Some essays are simply too short. Alix Cohen tackles a complex issue, namely the ‘anthropological dimension of education’, in a mere seven pages (excluding notes and bibliography; pp. 152–62). Furthermore, the articles are apparently badly coordinated. Some touch upon the same or related issues; the topic of the highest good is mentioned in the introduction (cf. pp. x–xvi), but not developed by any of the following contributions (though I take it that it offers one of the keys to a systematic integration of Kant's educational theory into his overall philosophy). This lack of an overall design contrasts with other publications dedicated to one specified aspect of Kant's philosophy, such as Rorty and Schmidt (Reference Rorty and Schmidt2009). Finally, I find some interpretations unconvincing; for instance Richard Velkley's essay on ‘Kant and the German Enlightenment’ (pp. 69–80) uses a very broad brush and includes some sweeping generalizations about the Enlightenment, Idealism, aesthetic education, and the ‘German teleological project’ from Kant to Schelling (p. 73).
As mentioned, Kant and Education does include some excellent essays, such as Paul Guyer's contribution on the role of moral examples or Paul Formosa's article on Kant's theory of moral development. There can be no doubt that ‘Kant and education’ is still a terra incognita. In ‘Kant as Moral Psychologist?’, James Scott Johnston shows that even interpreters lenient with Kant such as John Rawls or Lawrence Kohlberg have grossly distorted his educational theory (cf. pp. 177–92). In addition, Lars Løvlie and Klas Roth suggest that contemporary educational theories and policies could benefit from a reassessment of Kant's legacy. Løvlie argues that educationists hostile to transcendental thinking sell short the ideas of moral freedom and self-determination: ‘That the Kantian approach is nearly absent in today's educational discourse can be explained by the inability of going beyond a taxonomy that translates the general aims of education into the particular pieces of knowledge or skills that can be taught and tested in the classroom. There is the professional inability to think abstractly and look beyond the restricted vocabulary of the social sciences’ (p. 119). As Roth points out, these limitations of educational scientists correspond with current policy texts in the European Union which encourage people to develop their skills and competences to become efficacious and useful members of consumer societies, thus turning these members into additional consumer or market commodities. Autonomous citizens are a subordinate end – if at all (cf. pp. 214–16).
This makes it fairly easy to side with Kant's noble ideal of our moral vocation or Bestimmung and the highest moral good in this world, that is, the establishment of a global ethical community. In the words of Lars Løvlie: the idea of dignity ‘refers to the child's right to an inner integrity of feeling and thought free from the intrusion of others. It reminds the teacher of her duty to preserve that integrity also in herself. Dignity is not a skill or competence, but an idea that in all its ramifications, social and professional, serves as a standing check against the lopsided view of education as only a matter of management, efficiency, and achievement’ (p. 116).
