There was once a dream that was Rome. You could only whisper it. Anything more than a whisper and it would vanish, it was so fragile. (Marcus Aurelius to General Maximus Decimus MeridiusFootnote 1)
“The gripping story of how the end of the Roman Empire was the beginning of the modern world,” extols the cover blurb of S.'s new book. The fall of the Roman Empire has been considered one of the greatest disasters in history. But in this “groundbreaking” book, S. argues that Rome's dramatic collapse was actually the best thing that ever happened, clearing the path for Europe's economic rise and the creation of the modern age. Ranging across the premodern world, Escape from Rome offers new answers to some of the biggest questions in history: Why did the Roman Empire appear? Why did nothing like it ever return to Europe? And, above all, why did Europeans come to dominate the world? The author asserts that the title is not just a nod to his own personal transition from writing traditional history to global comparative history; it seeks to capture the essence of our collective progress (xvii).
Escape from Rome is aimed not at peer academics but, as the jacket's hyperbole suggests, at a popular audience and, my best guess is, airport bookshops in particular, with their jet-setting customers. Its target readership is surely those who reluctantly take high-end vacations and head to Cape Cod, the Hamptons, or Tuscany and, forsaking their quotidian read, The Economist, opt for something “serious” and “historical” to keep their dinner companions exercised. At its heart is a “what-if” narrative, seeking ancient origins for modern circumstances. S. also aims to have written a book for our (pre-COVID pandemic) global age with its balancing of the West (essentially Europe) versus China. As the vacation dinner Chianti is passed and the primo is being consumed, one can picture the reader of this book opining on the now-proven merits of small, as opposed to big, political entities, of the significance of conflict rather than reason in historical process (see also my n.1) and, paradoxically, progress as opposed to stasis. Long before a digestivo arrives, the dinner party, we may assume, will be arguing about whether escape from the Roman world helps to explain the major political issues of the globe today. Is the end of the Roman Republic and its conquest by an emperor a metaphor for the end of American democracy? To be sure, Brexiteers might find heart-warming passages about competitive fragmentation. Unexpectedly, perhaps to keep the dinner-party companions on their toes, the author offers several shout-outs for Scandinavian democracies. Is “getting a Denmark,” as he phrases it, a provocation to his likely readers, who will instinctively have no time for Nordic “socialism?” His final conclusion is barely less provocative: could it be a tacit nod to the Vatican's present principal, as he settles on the Church as the main legacy of the ancient world in modern times? The dinner party, one can safely assume, will have ended in confusion, puzzled as much by the pyramid of analyses, one leading to another, as by its conclusions.
If Escape from Rome had been one-third the size, perhaps it might have succeeded better. With so much new archaeological evidence at S.'s disposal for the ancient world, there is surely the case for a Kuhnian paradigm shift in thinking about Rome and its legacy.Footnote 2 Datasets of scientific information gathered over the past two decades from archaeological excavations that range from demography to diet promise an enriching rethinking of Enlightenment historical models based solely upon textual information. But Escape from Rome, while tacitly promising a paradigm shift, oscillates between events-based history and an almost postmodern stance in dwelling upon counterfactual histories rather than drawing on an archive of new data to shape a new narrative. Spanning more than 500 pages, with very little raw or original data in support of the thesis, its messages might be disarmingly convincing to some readers, yet most are poorly substantiated. In drilling down into the 65 pages of notes and references, too often it transpires that these are works by the author himself or, in the case of the ancient and medieval worlds, secondary histories written by textual historians that make minimal reference to the archaeology of these eras.
On a personal note, I began to read this book believing it might be an attempt to broadly pursue the Euro-Asian historical analysis challenging Eurocentricism that the late Jack Goody tackled in a recent series of well-judged and provocative books which took their point of departure from his wide-ranging anthropological studies (see below).Footnote 3 It is not. Indeed, the vast subject of the so-called European miracle and its growing body of critics is sidelined.Footnote 4 Given the narrative canvas of this book, in order to be clear I shall begin by summarizing the author's argument, mostly in his own words. Then I shall dwell on two issues (from among the countless I could pick) before I attempt to explain the differences between Escape from Rome and Goody's works (selecting these as representative of modern postcolonial scholarship).
Escapism
The book began as a Stanford Ancient Chinese and Mediterranean Empires Comparative History Project to determine “why the world has turned out the way it has” (xvii). Over the course of 500 pages there is an apparent solidity that aims to bear comparison, for example, with F. Braudel's seminal tomes on the origins of capitalism.Footnote 5
In reviewing the origins of the modern world, S. asserts that a single condition was essential to making the initial breakthroughs possible: competitive fragmentation of power (9).Footnote 6 The nursery of modernity was riven by numerous fractures, not only by those between the warring states of medieval and early modern Europe but also by others within society: between state and Church, rulers and lords, cities and magnates, knights and merchants, and, most recently, Catholics and Protestants. This often violent history of conflict and compromise was long but had a clear beginning: the fall of the Roman Empire that had lorded it over most of Europe, much as successive Chinese dynasties lorded it over most of East Asia. Yet, in contrast to China, nothing like the Roman Empire ever returned to Europe. The enduring absence of hegemonic empire on a subcontinental scale represented a dramatic break with ancient history. It also set Europe on a trajectory away from the default pattern of serial imperial state formation. By laying the foundations for persistent polycentrism and the transformative developmental dynamics it generated over the long run, this rupture was the single most important precondition for modern economic growth, industrialization, and global Western dominance much later on.
In graphical terms, S.'s “Great Escape” gave rise to the hockey stick of fantastic growth in per capita GDP (in western Eurasia/the UK, China, and India) over the past two centuries, and a great deal more. Then, with a certain flippancy, he points out that the hockey stick “made it possible for me to write this book, and you to read it” (1). He explores the escape as if it were a seminar lasting a semester. He attributes the kernel of his thesis to a thought expressed by J. W. von Goethe in 1786: “An diesen Ort knüpft sich die ganze Geschichte der Welt an” (“the whole history of the world attaches itself to this spot”) – Rome (18). First, S. explores the why, then the how.
Part I deals with the European anomaly. Much emphasis is placed on the patterns of empire, before the question of why Rome rose to be so significant. In pursuing this story in Part II, he broadly makes use of I. Wallerstein's core–periphery concept (as opposed to, for example, C. Renfrew's peer-polity model).Footnote 7 The core is, in fact, largely a military explanation of the rise of Republican Rome to rule Italy, the equivalent, S. contends (77), of Iowa taking over the United States. The periphery helps to put Rome's extraordinary rise to power into its European/Mediterranean context. The core/periphery comes to pivot during the third quarter of the first millennium BCE around a Mediterranean divide that hinges on political-military networks, with a division roughly creating the West and the East that bisects the Adriatic Sea.
Part III, on why Rome and its collapse matters (“the first great divergence”), reviews the period from Justinian to Frederick Barbarossa. Next, a long chapter, pursuing the central theme, embraces world history from Genghis Khan to Napoleon. Throughout these chapters the size of military power is the overriding measure of success. None of a succession of empires comes close to matching Rome's ancient footprint. Part IV then focuses upon themes: “From convergence to divergence,” “Nature,” and “Culture,” and Part V on “Institutions,” “New Worlds,” and finally a conclusion entitled “Understanding.”
After the last of these comes a long Epilogue that suggests the author was dissatisfied with the summation provided in “Understanding” and felt the need to clarify it. The clarification reveals a dissembling that is puzzling. In the Epilogue, S. asks the celebrated Monty Python question, posed in The Life of Brian: “What have the Romans ever done for us?” (503). He responds:
[T]hey quite possibly may have done something very important for us – if, but only if, their empire, by turning to Christianity, laid some crucial foundations for much later development – but that they just as likely may not have contributed anything essential at all to the eventual outcome and thus failed to shape the general appearance, if not some of the finer points, of the world we live in today … In the end, competitive fracture may well have mattered more … Rome's unreversed demise was an indispensable precondition of modernity. But when it comes to explaining this breakthrough, does it really matter that its empire ever existed at all? (527)
S., it would appear, concludes with the realization – conveyed graphically in fig. E1 (525) – that the Roman period was an aberration. Resorting to counterfactual arguments, he projects that the modern “concentration of state power,” as shown in the figure in percentage terms of the population of Europe ruled by the largest power, might in any case have come about by ca. 1000 CE, even had the Roman Republic and Empire not existed.
There can be no doubt that general histories and analytical approaches to postcolonial globalization have never been more relevant. The combination of the COVID-19 pandemic with the revival of nationalism in many countries has, to a greater or lesser degree, made each of us think about our histories, who we are, and what the future might hold. Contrary to some speculation 20 years ago, the end of history has not happened: quite the reverse. Cross-cultural models analyzing time-depth with the aid of new analytical tools must be welcomed. Indeed, it is the promise of ever-greater analysis that is driving many historical fields, including the study of antiquity. As a result, S.'s premise should be viewed as a step forward, and yet so many of his quantified assumptions, graphically conveyed, are based upon highly contentious statistics. For example, calculating demography before modern times is laudable but highly suspect, especially for the Roman and Medieval periods. The data need to be carefully described and the results deployed with mitigated caution. The author offers no such caution: graph E1, for example, is offered by way of explanation, with its “actual” population peaks in the later 6th c. to 9th c. With the possible exceptions of Scandinavian and eastern Europe, this Early Medieval peak is preposterous, flying in the face of a huge amount of modern archaeological evidence (demonstrating ubiquitous discontinuities and the “first great divergence”).
One eccentricity, among countless others, is illustrative of the character of the book. In discussing a table (9.1) described as a matrix (determinants and outcomes of state formation in [Latin] Europe and China), the author concludes:
The problem is that the congruence of different factors makes it harder to identify the essential variables. The insight is that for present purposes, this does not matter all that much. Regardless of which variables we privilege, the finding is always the same: that prevailing circumstances favored a certain outcome in China and a different one in Europe. In this fundamental sense, these discrepant outcomes were robust, and they were robust because they were overdetermined.
This striking degree of congruence and thus overdetermination likely owes a lot to interaction effects between anthropogenic and environmental factors. Both this mutual reinforcement and the minimal sample size (N = 2) makes grudging acceptance of overdetermination instead of weighing of individual variables seem a justifiable rather than merely an intellectually lazy compromise. (332)
Apart from the specious minimal sample size, numbering just two elements, the explanatory text itself calls for an editor.
Let me turn to issues that appear to challenge the author's thesis.
Getting to Denmark
I shall limit myself to two issues: one a matter of detail, the other an explanatory mode. Taken together, they reveal the inherent problem with S.'s historical vantage point. First, S.'s history is by any standards narrow in its use of sources. He takes little or no account of 50 years of professional archaeology, much of it published in this journal. Second, S. always opts for explanations in which conflict plays a monocausal role, much like many of the sources he cites from secondary texts.
S.'s confused view of medieval history is revealed in his treatment of Denmark and the Vikings. Again, let us turn to his own words:
Our lives today are different only because in the end, “the Romans” – the empire builders – did not, as it happened, always win, even if they came close. Their failure to do so may well have been our biggest lucky break since an errant asteroid cleared away the dinosaurs 66 million years earlier: there was no way to “get to Denmark” – to build societies that enjoy freedom, prosperity, and general welfare – without “escaping from Rome” first. (19, emphasis added)
Getting to Denmark, as S. writes in a footnote, is his shorthand for establishing political and economic institutions highly conducive to modern human welfare. However, he makes no connection between Denmark in the modern era and Denmark in either Roman or Viking times. Roman Denmark lay beyond the Roman frontiers and so, unsurprisingly, has no place in his narrow, text-sourced narrative. As such, he would appear to be telling us that Denmark had no need to escape from Rome. What he omits mentioning is that its fragmented tribal communities procured large amounts of Roman produce, but the moment these failed to arrive there was a well-documented crisis within these communities. There followed a period of competitive political fragmentation, not entirely dissimilar from the circumstances S. describes for the first great divergence in Latin Christendom. From this moment, however, as numerous excavations and studies devoted to Danish later prehistory attest, there was a steady political evolution, producing first the Viking era, which in turn was the platform for the emergence of the Medieval state.Footnote 8
Here counterfactuals are not needed, unless one was to hypothesize that, if Denmark had been a Roman province that was abandoned like Britain, the fragmentation would have been far greater than actually occurred. Indeed, as Danish prehistorians often ruminate, Denmark's “Late Antique” affluence begs the question of why Danes migrated to the wilds of post-Roman Britain with its more than 30 political territories in the 6th c.Footnote 9
Viewed through this historical lens – making use of some of the most proficient archaeological evidence available — the Victorian narrative reproduced in this book, as well as used slavishly to market Netflix films about the Vikings, is, if colorful, now highly suspect. Viking Denmark and its pioneering agents – little different from Elizabethan colonists to the New World – were aggressive change-makers in terms of governance, urban planning, and rural procurement practices. Despite his nod to “getting a Denmark,” S. mentions only the familiar Viking aggression recorded by contemporary authors. A wealth of archaeology now shows that the Vikings were plainly borrowing from Frankish (Carolingian political) concepts when they invaded and then settled in Britain, Ireland, Iceland, and northern France.
Of course, one matter distinguishes these pioneering Vikings and their reputation. They did not practice Christianity until the later Viking era. Indeed, they almost certainly regarded churchmen as the oligarchs of the era. Inevitably, this garnered them the hatred of Christian authors – who inhabited unfortified monastic settlements with a rich material culture – and provides an explanation for why the archaeology and the texts depict two very different views of the same community.Footnote 10 The texts emphasize a barbarism, an emphasis upon violence and conflict; the archaeology bears witness to evolving political standards that, in terms of settlement and social structures, were very advanced by, say, contemporary (Early Medieval) Italian standards. Any comparison – for example, of Ribe in western Denmark and Rome in ca. 800 – reveals an evolved urbanism with complex procurement strategies, artisanal experimentation, and a monetary system, as opposed to an undeniable primitivism in central Italy's premier city, mediated only by its churches.Footnote 11 Safe to say, as numerous excavations illustrate, long before the Church made any great impact upon the region, Denmark and its medieval culture were well developed by European standards. Of course, in the strict sense Denmark never escaped Rome; rather, its genesis was to establish its own brand of political economy, drawn from its past and its peers.
If this small detail bears correction, what of S.'s view of Rome and its provinces? This book deploys hypotheses based upon historical data. Archaeological evidence to provide some quantifiable basis for the thrust of his history is absent. Why? Could it be that, as with the Vikings, the Victorian/Netflix version of ancient history is far too seductively embedded in our modern paradigm to worry about a huge new dataset that might challenge it? Thanks to this database, gathered principally in the past half-century, there are far tighter chronological frameworks for the Roman era. Likewise, new archaeological surveys are revealing how Roman towns functioned, anchored around their networks, just as the configurations of the Roman countryside are only now emerging to be rather different from Cicero's or Varro's eloquent expositions. Slowly, too, we are appreciating how important the Church was to the later Empire and what a strong grip it had on the Mediterranean economy in the Empire's twilight decades. Quantification of its economic importance still eludes us. What we can postulate is that the Church passively observed the collapse of the economy in the later 6th to 7th c. but remained influential, if often isolated, as the extraordinary first great divergence occurred. This divergence exactly paralleled the phenomenal rise of the North Sea communities including Denmark, anchored around ports (emporia) in which, as has been noted, the Church as an agent was apparently absent.Footnote 12 This absence, it needs to be said repeatedly, helps to explain why these vaunting undefended ports are all but airbrushed out of the texts of the time (and missing from S.'s narrative with its emphasis upon political conflict).
A larger issue, then, is the central theme that conflict, rather than non-violent persuasion, is a primary driver in social change. Much of S.'s thesis is devoted to the importance of the military in the rise of Rome, and the huge (and draining) demands made upon manpower to maintain control over conquered provinces. Aside from the author's many calculations, the ancient sources leave no doubt about the significance of the military in the rise and sustaining of the concept of Rome. However, Rome and its hinterland reveal very little immediate evidence of this very militarization or fear of violence. The monuments and sheer grandiosity that grasped Goethe's regard – and continue to command awe – owe their origin to the later 2nd and 1st c. BCE when the invention of a new concrete mix enabled architects and visionaries to re-envision their built communities.Footnote 13 Just as continual war – to cite S. – was being waged, construction projects occurred on a previously unimaginable scale, requiring procurement of an unthinkable magnitude. As M. Mogetta recently put it,
If archaeologists from another planet were to compare the city of around 100 B.C. with that of around 200 B.C., they would have found very little in common, and perhaps even infer that a foreign culture had taken over. Concrete had by then integrated the centuries-old tradition of building exclusively with ashlars, replacing the use of wooden posts and mud-brick for superstructures, and thus revolutionizing the above-ground texture of Rome's urban fabric.Footnote 14
In other words, there was a social will to contrive that was not based upon institutional violence, but upon the evolving and often flawed practice of institutional persuasion (and all that that involved). Villas of Latium in the Republican era, simply put, were not fortified, thanks to the pax Romana.
The Church, in not such a different form of civic construction, was to replicate this vaunting ambition in Late Antiquity. And as in the Early Empire, so in the Late Empire, the power to persuade faltered and failed. In sum, the very essence of Escape from Rome – the creation of a great monolithic empire that harnessed and then struggled with the scope of its military power – can be challenged. The archaeological evidence encourages us to consider that it was the social alchemy that led to Rome's distinctive built environments,Footnote 15 military action being a function of that alchemy. In short, reason and persuasion, however they were institutionalized, made use of institutional violence, just like the Vikings were to do.Footnote 16
The theft of history
This is a big book that examines a major theme in world history. It is simply breathtaking that no mention is made of the late J. Goody's exploration of broadly similar issues. In essence, in The Theft of History, Goody concludes that long-term frameworks can be reworked, and periodization re-envisioned, without resorting to long-held Eurocentric models. There is now a huge literature challenging the preeminence of Europeans in the making of the modern era.
S. might have benefited from considering the 2009 special edition of Theory, Culture and Society dedicated to the later work of Goody. M. Featherstone, in his introduction, to this fascicule embellishes Goody's profound point:
What emerges clearly from … the work of Jack Goody, through his careful focus on detailed historical material from a variety of sources on Eurasia, points towards the need to reconstruct the archive. If the archive stands behind all scholarship, we can expect that an expanded archive would invite researchers to ask different questions and employ different value-orientations. Such an archive would offer the potential to bring forward new material and reclassify old, which could lead to the abandonment of some of the long-held disciplinary conceptual hierarchies: the classifications, dichotomies and assumptions which underpin scholarship that form the grounds for the construction of influential “master” theories. These questions are significant for the shifts in the balance of academic power, along with disciplinary establishments and patronage networks which have seen the dominance of Western concepts and knowledge classifications. The conditions under which they could decline, and in which new forms of knowledge and value-relevant questions emerge, raise central questions for social and cultural theory and research.Footnote 17
S.'s book, to be fair, aims to ask new questions, albeit using traditional (post-Enlightenment) value-orientations. In this, it serves a purpose for a popular audience which is undeniable. But its archive – to take Featherstone's point in celebrating Goody's scholarship – is limited and constructed not upon a modern understanding of the quantifiable elements of the Roman world, for example, but as often as not upon a pyramid scheme of suppositions drawn from unquantifiable sources. This is a serious drawback, since S.'s graphs and equations have specious bases in a largely unquantifiable archive. Add to this the alluring promise of counterfactuals – what if? – and this book amounts to decent but misleading fare for a dinner party. Unlike Goody, or the master he so often cites, F. Braudel, because S.'s archive is limited, it is not very apparent as to why Rome failed and why its collapse matters.
Paradoxically, given the Epilogue, there is no denying that the author bludgeons the reader to believe that the world today likes to think it lies in the shadow of Rome and its fall. To be truly provocative at this notional escapist dinner, S., with his self-professed fascination for getting Denmark, should surely have gone further. If he had known the archive, he would have arrived at a truly intriguing proposition, which is this: forgetting the textual record of violence, and digging deep into the archaeological record, he might have concluded that the world today owes as much, if not more, to Viking best practices as to the legacy of Julius Caesar or the Late Antique Church.
