Some six years after the failure of the Israeli–Palestinian peace talks hosted by President Bill Clinton at Camp David in mid 2000, a small library of books has been published that seeks to shed light on those momentous events. The book under review here is composed of papers prepared for a conference held at Tel Aviv University in June 2003. Like most conference volumes, it is a bit of a hodgepodge, containing some very short pieces that add little to our knowledge and others by participants that bring to light new information and interpretations. However, there is little in the way of analysis or theorizing by academic specialists. Not surprisingly, the book is strongest in its presentation of Israeli views, although several American participants in the talks are included, along with a few Palestinian voices. The centerpiece of the book, however, and its real raison d'être, is a lengthy presentation by former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak entitled “The Myths Spread About Camp David Are Baseless,” which gives a pretty clear idea of his no-holds-barred defense of his conduct at the historic summit.
Barak, unlike several of the other participants in the Camp David II Summit, has not written a full version of those events. However, his remarks published in this volume give a very clear picture of his views. To say the least, he expresses himself with great self-confidence, admitting to no mistakes and placing full blame for failure on PLO chairman Yasir Arafat. In summarizing the value of the summit, he states that it succeeded in setting the parameters of an eventual settlement, and it exposed Arafat's “true face” (p. 120). He claims that Israel offered over 90 percent of the West Bank and all of Gaza. “Arafat refused to accept all this as a basis for further negotiations, and deliberately opted for terror. That is the whole story” (p. 123).
Briefly referring to the Syrian front, which was the focus of much of the diplomacy during his first year in office, Barak says that the failure there was due to the leaking of a draft document during the Shepherdstown talks. He darkly hints that this was done by one of the “pro-Palestinian” members of the American negotiating team. Once again he says, “That is the whole story” (p. 133–34).
Barak concludes his presentation with a refutation of a series of twelve “myths” that he claims have been spread about Camp David II. Some of them are minor—that he was not polite with Arafat, that he should have talked to him more—and some are more substantial charges, but all of them are dismissed with equal lack of serious engagement. Barak has barely concealed contempt for what he calls “sophists”—those who question his intentions or performance—which is actually quite a substantial number of people, including many Israelis.
Thus, in Barak's view, what was the sticking point? He claims that a major reason for the failure was Arafat's insistence on the “right of return” for Palestinian refugees. He asserts that Arafat never accepted the legitimacy of a Jewish state. His goal was to use the right of return, and the demographic growth of the Palestinians within Israel, to undermine the Jewishness of Israel, eventually producing an Arab state with a Jewish minority in its place (p. 119).
All of these points are fairly familiar to anyone who has followed Barak's commentary on the conflict over the years, but it is useful to have it spelled out clearly in one place. Barak concludes by saying of the “Clinton parameters” that “we were prepared, albeit with a heavy heart, to accept them as a basis for further negotiations. The Palestinians, in contrast, were not” (p. 141). This, of course, is the standard version, repeated by President Clinton and his negotiator, Dennis Ross. However, how does this square with Barak's own words on the BBC documentary Elusive Peace, broadcast in 2005, in which he says that he called Clinton on 1 January 2001 and told him that he no longer wanted to discuss the parameters? “As they stand, we cannot accept them,” he said. The next day Clinton met with Arafat, who expressed some reservations to Clinton but left the impression with some on the American side that he had, like Barak, accepted with reservations. Indeed, that is what the Americans initially told the Israelis, according to Israeli negotiator Gilead Sher, according to Sher's book The Israeli–Palestinian Peace Negotiations, 1999–2001: Within Reach (Routledge, 2006). A few weeks later, however, Clinton and Ross told the incoming administration of George W. Bush that Arafat was to blame for having rejected the Clinton proposals and that, furthermore, he could not be trusted.
There are many other tidbits in this volume that are intriguing. Yossi Ginossar, former Shin Bet official and member of the Israeli delegation at Camp David II, paints a very different picture of what happened there. He is quite critical of the lack of American leadership at the summit (p. 56), argues that Barak should have dealt directly with Arafat (p. 57), and states bluntly that “we Israelis are somewhat condescending toward Arabs in general, and toward the Palestinians in particular” (p. 59). Another tantalizing claim, this one from Gilead Sher, directly contradicts Barak by saying, “The fact is that the Right of Return was never the obstacle to reaching a permanent status agreement, neither at Camp David nor at any point thereafter” (p. 67).
At some point, a serious effort will be made by someone without a personal ax to grind to look at all the conflicting evidence from the Israeli–Palestinian negotiations of the Clinton era. That moment has not yet come, and this book brings us no closer to the goal of having a fairly coherent narrative and analysis based on solid evidence. However, it does contain some fascinating material and will be mined for the few nuggets it contains by those who are still puzzled, as I am, about what really went wrong with the Oslo to Camp David II marathon.
