Historians have often turned to metaphors of madness to describe political repression in US history. Richard Hofstadter's “paranoid style,” Michael Rogin's fevered “countersubversive imagination,” and the ubiquitous use of the term “hysteria” impute a continuous pattern to episodes ranging from the 1790s through the present. Alex Goodall's Loyalty and Liberty treats antiradicalism and antifascism as political movements, not psychological phenomena, and his close study of interwar countersubversive campaigns shows that their history is more faltering than standard accounts suggest.
Goodall seeks to explain a seeming paradox: why did Americans with a “long-standing hostility to the centralization of power” create a robust “domestic security state” (9) in the twentieth century? He finds the answer in the “politics of countersubversion,” which saw democracy endangered by “covert threats” and demanded vigilant political policing to detect and contain seditious subterfuge. Communists and radicals were targets of countersubversive conservatives, but fascists could be painted with the same brush by liberals and leftists. By tracing the deployment of countersubversive charges, Goodall shows how a “rhetorical arms race” (7) escalated in the 1930s and created a political consensus on “the basic need for a degree of state-based political repression” (8) by the 1950s.
Loyalty and Liberty begins with the familiar story of suppression of antiwar dissent during World War I, and Goodall shows how the Wilson administration, lacking a domestic national police force, mobilized voluntary groups to police loyalty. Goodall describes the rise of the federal Bureau of Investigation (BI) and the anti-sedition laws that authorized its countersubversive operations, but, unlike many accounts, the book also explains how the lapse of wartime sedition statutes left the BI without a mandate for political policing and the countersubversives to organize privately funded information-gathering operations such as the American Legion and the National Civic Federation. Countersubversives lost credibility in the 1920s when their dire warnings failed to materialize, and civil libertarians won the argument. By the 1930s, liberals learned to use the language of countersubversion to attack critics of the New Deal, casting corporations and conservatives as “fascists.” Conservative countersubversives countered by red-baiting Roosevelt's administration, and the state's expansive new powers allowed conservatives to marry antistatist sentiment with anticommunism. As both liberals and conservatives embraced the notion of “totalitarianism,” the stage was set by the outbreak of World War II for the anticommunist campaigns of the 1940s and 1950s.
This narrative arc of countersubversion rests on a scaffold of chapters that describe the party politics of the interwar years and the various Congressional committees that investigated communism and fascism, the network of “professional patriots,” and the history of American communism and American fascist groups. Goodall devotes a fascinating chapter to antiradical Catholics and other Christians and their complex negotiations with antiradical capitalists who did not share their antimodern views. Henry Ford plays an outsized role in the latter half of the book, standing in for antiunion capitalists like those in the Liberty League. The book effectively ends in the early 1940s with the Dies Committee and the prosecution of American fascists for violating the new Smith Act. The book's strength is less in its archival discoveries than in its reinterpretation of the development of the domestic security state. In contrast to histories that exaggerate the coherence and velocity of its rise, Goodall shows that the politics of countersubversion were contested and fluid, and that its later manifestations – McCarthyism, COINTELPRO, and the war on terror – were far from inevitable.
Goodall mentions Michael Kazin's Populist Persuasion in his introduction, and Loyalty and Liberty resembles that book; it is a history of political ideas, and Goodall's narrative is driven by the dynamic interplay between countersubversives calling for political crackdowns and civil libertarians who cast state repression as the greater threat to liberty, their ideas operating like “pistons in an engine” (7) to push the story forward. Treating antiradicalism, anticommunism, and antifascism as variants of a core politics allows Goodall to show their hidden similarities and assumptions and explain how they developed in an almost dialectic form, borrowing gambits from each other such as the Congressional investigating committee and the drawing of elaborate spiderwebs of intrigue. The approach has its drawbacks as well. Equating antiradicalism and antifascism also flattens their differences; antifascists never enjoyed the same legitimacy or indulged in the malign slander that was a regular habit of antiradicals, and movements like the Ku Klux Klan or the Black Legion experienced dramatically less scrutiny and repression than leftist movements. State institutions like the FBI, which was a powerful center of ideas and practices of countersubversion, or the Army's Military Intelligence Division receive little attention, while comparatively minor figures such as Archibald Stevenson feature as significant players. Nevertheless, Goodall's sparkling prose and sharp observations make this book an essential read for scholars of modern American politics.
