Matthew Beckmann offers a penetrating, insightful, and eminently fair review of my book. Although I agree with most of his critiques, I offer my thoughts with respect to three questions that Beckmann says are not fully addressed by my study.
The first question is when Speakers choose to exercise legislative leadership. Although my book is primarily about why, rather than when, Speakers act, the case studies I examine suggest that two factors make such leadership more likely: majority party unity and the salience of a given issue. As I note in the book (and which Beckman acknowledges), the cases serve as thin evidence for this hypothesis because they lack variation on the dependent variable (i.e., Speakers exercise leadership in every case). I disagree with him, however, that my data on Speakers' floor speeches (which do show such variation) cannot be used to test this claim, since floor statements are a potential tool of influence and imply other, less visible acts of Speaker leadership. Statistical tests of that data suggest that certain issues, if not party unity, are more likely to bring Speakers to the floor.
Those same tests also suggest an answer to a second question Beckmann raises: When will Speakers follow nonparty goals? The answer, at least for floor speeches, is that Speakers are more likely to act on behalf of such objectives when the majority party is less unified—a finding that supports a “bounded rationality” model of leadership, first proposed by Arturo Vega and Ron Peters. I readily admit that this question is not the primary concern of the book, however, though it is important and interesting enough to warrant future research.
Finally, Beckmann asks a methodological question: What evidence would constitute a falsification of my theory? He rightly points out that my study deals with post hoc analyses of events, and indeed, it is often easy to “read into history” that which we want to find. Also, at its core the book is about motivation—something extremely difficult to measure, especially since most former House Speakers are either dead or unlikely to remember the details of legislative battles from long ago. I did, however, make every effort in my analyses to avoid bias toward a confirmation of my theory. For each instance of Speaker leadership, I only argued that hypothesized Speaker goals mattered when clear and compelling evidence existed for such a claim. And I do note instances when Speakers seemed to be driven for reasons unexplained by my theory, such as protecting their own reputation or the autonomy of committees.
In fact, my research was in many ways motivated by a similar concern about falsifiability. Too many studies, I believe, have strained so mightily to put all congressional leadership actions into one causal “box”—the preferences of the majority party—that they become effectively nonfalsifiable. I leave it to the reader to decide whether I have persuasively suggested a more realistic model.
