What is the relationship between state and finance in the United States and how does this relate to American global power? Mainstream American international political economy tends to answer this question by dichotomizing and opposing state and finance, consistent with its deeper ontological divide between politics and markets. This opposition implies that increased power for finance, or market forces in general, diminishes state power or autonomy. Martijn Konings, by contrast, argues that a unity of state and financial power characterizes the long run of American history. The continental and then global expansion of American finance reflects and enhances the growing power of the US state. This heterodox position is more likely correct than the orthodox one, but the author does not deliver enough evidence to make a compelling case.
Konings argues against two orthodox or conventional understandings of the state–finance relationship and what it means for the global economy. First, orthodoxy sees financial markets as a constraint on states. States that need to borrow in global capital markets must conform to financial firms' criteria for good behavior. Finance thus constrains state autonomy and shapes state policy choices. Second, orthodoxy (including arguments inspired by Karl Polanyi, rather than hegemonic stability theory) sees the dynamic history of the global political economy as a sequence of states powerful enough to impose order on otherwise unruly markets. First Britain and then the United States created a stable global financial order. Order broke down in the interwar period and, seemingly, after the collapse of the Bretton Woods arrangements, as finance escaped regulatory constraints.
The author's attack on the first position reflects the growing, if subterranean, influence of Michael Mann's Sources of Social Power (1986). For Mann, social power is the ability to harness human effort through large-scale organizations in pursuit of elite aims. In this view, markets are not inherently disorganized and presocial arenas in which dynamic actors constantly break through barriers created by states seeking some kind of social stability. Instead, Konings looks to the blended power of state and finance. Market expansion involves the creation of new social forms and linkages that, in turn, constitute new social institutions that can shape and direct human labor. Scaled up to the level of the world economy, this means that markets, and especially financial markets, can be a vehicle for state power, where state and finance are seen as a unity and not a dichotomy. Practically, for Konings, this means that in the contemporary era, deregulated finance has freed the US state from the fiscal constraints of a closed economy. America's current account deficit becomes a sign of strength, rather than weakness, as it harnesses global savings to US foreign policy goals and the profitability of US financial firms. Simultaneously, the state can use markets and market signals to direct human behavior, rather than more clumsy command-and-control mechanisms.
In his attack on the second position, Konings demonstrates that, from the very beginning, US finance practices diverged from British financial practices in three interconnected ways. First, where British finance was commercial, American finance was more developmentalist, in Alexander Gerschenkron's sense. Early-American states charted banks to be used as developmental agonists that financed infrastructure, but in an economy dominated by farmers, banks also financed land development. Consequently, second, where British finance was oriented to short-term loans, American finance was oriented toward longer-term loans, often secured against land. This created ongoing maturity mismatches and thus recurrent financial panics. Third, US banking was more intimately connected to the share market until it developed ways to move long-term loans off of its books through securitization. Securitization both made debt liquid and insulated banks from their maturity mismatch. Over the long run, this gave the US economy more liquidity and more dynamism than the British economy. And, in the contemporary period, these tendencies matured into the highly leveraged, securitization-based open and shadow banking systems that gave us the global financial crisis.
Konings' two critiques combine to produce the heterodox claim (p. 12) that “post World War II financial globalization [was] not … the reemergence of international finance but rather [w]as a process whereby long standing dynamics of American financial expansion began to assume global dimensions.” In short, having projected the prewar US model of assembly-line-based mass production onto the world after World War II, the state then projected the US-based model of securitized, highly liquid finance onto the world when Bretton Woods no longer served its interests. Deregulation of finance turned the world into a source of savings for the US economy. By the 2000s, foreign entities held roughly half of marketable US Treasury debt. On the other side of the balance sheet, US financial firms had inserted themselves into virtually every global market.
As noted, I think these arguments are largely correct. The weakness of The Development of American Finance is the lack of systematic evidence backing up its claims. The book covers considerable terrain—two hundred years and the better part of the international political economy literature on post–Bretton Woods finance—in a concise 160 pages of text. It does so by presenting stylized narratives based largely on secondary sources. Most readers who are not already sympathetic to the argument will leave unconvinced, as actors' motives are presented without confirming evidence and any sense of the relative magnitude and uses of financial flows is missing. Equally, the sanguine claim at the book's end that the current crisis will not disturb US financial hegemony will surely raise eyebrows even among those who find the credit-rating agencies' downgrade of treasury debt an amusing diversion from the ongoing and immense subsidy that the Federal Reserve system provides to the too-big-to-fail banks with each new phase of quantitative easing.
Konings' historical journey through American finance is replete with prior examples of contradictions exploding into crisis, and being overcome. But as the saying goes, past performance is no guarantee of future returns. Earlier American financial crises either occurred when the United States was not at the heart of the global financial system or, when it was at the heart, occurred out in the periphery. In the former cases, the United States could wait for growth elsewhere to bail it out because it was a small part of the world economy. Roughly speaking, the United States accounted for about 2% of global GDP in 1820 (roughly the relative size of Greece in the European Union) and 9% in 1870 (roughly, Canada relative to the United States). External demand for raw materials could reflate the relatively small antebellum US economy, just as robust US growth in the 1990s bailed Canada out of a truly desperate fiscal situation. In the later financial crises, peripheral financial systems collapsed. Today, the United States is too big and too central to get external help.
In sum, Konings makes a good case for a social power–based understanding of US financial expansion, rather than a “states versus markets” view, and provides a valuable service in distinguishing American financial practices from British. Both are important correctives to the dominant understandings of the pre– and post–Bretton Woods worlds.
