LANG'S SOLUTION TO THE WRONG KIND OF REASON PROBLEM

In a recent article in this journal, Gerald Lang provides a compelling solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason problem. According to Lang's solution, wrong kind of reasons for us to have pro-attitudes are reasons that would not be reasons for us to have these pro-attitudes if having these pro-attitudes would not benefit us. And having a pro-attitude benefits someone if they would be better off having that attitude than not having that attitude.Footnote ⁴ More formally, according to Lang, the BPA should be modified in the following way to solve the Wrong Kind of Reason problem:

On Lang's solution the reason for us to desire a saucer of mud for its own sake in Desire a Saucer of Mud comes out as a wrong kind of reason because there would be no reason for us to desire a saucer of mud for its own sake if we would not benefit from so desiring a saucer of mud. Similarly, the reason for us to admire the demon in Admire the Demon comes out as a wrong kind of reason on Lang's solution because there would be no reason for us to admire the demon if we would not benefit from admiring it.

In the rest of this article I discuss John Brunero's and Jonas Olson's recent objections to Lang's solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason problem. I argue that Brunero's objections do not undermine Lang's solution and that Lang's solution can be modified so as to avoid Olson's objections.

BRUNERO'S RESPONSE TO LANG

In his reply to Lang, John Brunero claims that Lang's solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason problem is incompatible with two types of consequentialism.Footnote ⁶ First, Brunero claims that Lang's solution is incompatible with a consequentialist view, according to which there are reasons to have pro-attitudes towards things that are not of final value just because of the benefits of having these pro-attitudes. Brunero calls this view indirect consequentialism.

Consider a version of this type of consequentialism according to which pleasure is the only thing that is of final value. Call this view hedonic indirect consequentialism. According to hedonic indirect consequentialism:

1. (1) Pleasure is the only thing that is of final value.

And

1. (2) There are reasons to have a pro-attitude, such as to aim to have friends, but there would be no reason to aim to have friends if there were no good consequences to aiming to have friends. There is a reason for us to aim to have friends only if aiming to have friends will produce more pleasure.

According to Brunero, (3) follows from (1) and (2):

1. (3) Pleasure has features that give us reasons to have a pro-attitude, namely to aim to have friends, but these reasons to aim to have friends would not persist in the absence of the consequences of aiming to have friends.

But, according to Lang's solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason problem,

1. (4) X is of final value if and only if X has features that give us reasons to have a pro-attitude, and X would give us reason to have a pro-attitude if there were no benefits to having this pro-attitude.

But (5) follows from (3) and (4):

1. (5) Pleasure is not of final value.

And (6) follows from (1) and (5):

1. (6) Pleasure is both of final value and not of final value.

So, according to Brunero, Lang's solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason problem is incompatible with indirect consequentialism because the combination of the two views yields a contradiction.Footnote ⁷

But (4) importantly misrepresents Lang's solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason problem. Lang's solution, and the BPA, does not hold that X is of final value if and only if X has features that give us reasons to have a pro-attitude, but rather that X is of final value if and only if X has features that give us reasons to have a pro-attitude towards X. So (4) should be modified to (4′):

1. (4′) X is of final value if and only if X has features that give us reasons to have a pro-attitude towards X, and X would give us reasons to have a pro-attitude if there were no benefits to having this pro-attitude.

But (3) and (4′) do not entail that pleasure is not of final value, since according to hedonic indirect consequentialism pleasure gives us reasons to have a pro-attitude towards friendship and not towards pleasure. So, Lang's solution is not incompatible with indirect consequentialism.Footnote ⁸

Brunero claims that Lang's solution is incompatible with another type of consequentialism, which Brunero calls direct consequentialism. According to this type of consequentialism, we should aim to promote value. But there would be no reason for us to aim to promote value if aiming to promote value did not have the beneficial consequence of making it more likely that we will promote value.

Consider a version of this type of consequentialism according to which pleasure is the only thing that is of final value. Call this view hedonic direct consequentialism. According to hedonic direct consequentialism:

1. (1*) Pleasure is the only thing that is of final value.

And

1. (2*) There are reasons to have a pro-attitude towards pleasure, specifically to aim to promote pleasure. But there would be no reason to aim to promote pleasure if there were no benefits to aiming to promote pleasure. Or rather, there are reasons to aim to promote pleasure only if aiming to promote pleasure has the beneficial consequence of making it more likely that we will promote pleasure.

But, according to Lang's solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason problem,

1. (3*) X is of final value if and only if X has features that give us reasons to have a pro-attitude towards X, and X would give us reasons to have a pro-attitude if there were no benefits to having this pro-attitude.

And according to Brunero (4*) follows from (2*) and (3*):

1. (4*) Pleasure is not of final value.

And (5*) follows from (1*) and (4*):

1. (5*) Pleasure is both of final value and not of final value.

So, Lang's solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason problem is incompatible with direct consequentialism because the combination of the two views yields a contradiction.Footnote ⁹

If pleasure only gave us reasons to aim to promote pleasure, it would follow from the combination of Lang's solution and part of hedonic direct consequentialism – namely (2*) – that pleasure is not of final value. But pleasure does not only give us reasons to aim to promote pleasure. Pleasure gives us reasons to have other pro-attitudes such as to desire it for its own sake and to wish that we could promote it. And there would be reasons for us to desire pleasure and wish we could promote pleasure even if desiring it and wishing that we could promote it had no beneficial consequences. Whatever is of final value, that which is of final value gives us reasons to desire it for its own sake or to desire that it is preserved for its own sake regardless of the beneficial consequences of our desiring these things.

Lang's solution and (2*) would entail that pleasure is not good or of value in this case only if Lang's solution entailed the following claim:

If X gives us reasons to have pro-attitudes a, b, c, and d, but the reasons to have pro-attitudes a and b would not persist in the absence of the benefits of having pro-attitudes a and b – even though the reasons to have c and d would – then X is not of final value.

But Lang's solution does not entail this claim. So, the combination of Lang's solution and (2*) does not entail that pleasure is not of final value – (4*) does not follow from (2*) and (3*). Thus, Lang's solution is not incompatible with this type of consequentialism either.

CONSEQUENTIALISM ABOUT ABSOLUTELY EVERYTHING

There is a worry that lies behind both of Brunero's objections. Some consequentialists, consequentialists about absolutely everything, hold a consequentialist account of reasons for pro-attitudes.Footnote ¹⁰ These consequentialists about everything hold that there is a reason to have a pro-attitude only if having that pro-attitude has good consequences; there is a reason to φ only if φ-ing has good consequences.Footnote ¹¹ So, consequentialists about everything will hold that there are reasons to desire something for its own sake only if there are good consequences to desiring that thing for its own sake.

Notice that consequentialism about everything is far less plausible than the view, which Brunero describes, according to which there is a reason to aim to φ only if there are good consequences to aiming to φ. It might seem that there is no reason for me to aim to fly like a bird when I cannot fly like a bird and my aiming to fly like a bird has no good consequences. But there is of course a reason for me to wish that I could fly like a bird even though I cannot fly like a bird and even if my wishing that I could fly like a bird has no good consequences. Similarly, there is a reason for us all to desire to avoid excruciating pain, even if we are being tortured and cannot avoid excruciating pain, and our desiring to avoid such pain will not enable us to avoid this pain.

However, regardless of whether consequentialism about absolutely everything is plausible, and whether a consequentialist constraint on all reasons for pro-attitudes is plausible, it is not a problem for Lang's solution that it is not compatible with such a consequentialist constraint on reasons for pro-attitudes. The BPA is an account of good simpliciter and final value. As such it must be compatible with all substantive views about what things are good simpliciter or of final value.Footnote ¹² The BPA must not take sides on whether pleasure is the only thing that is good, for instance. But the BPA need not be compatible with all accounts of normative reasons or views about when there are normative reasons. And a consequentialist account of, or constraint on, reasons for pro-attitudes is not a consequentialist account of what things are good or of value but an account of normative reasons for pro-attitudes. So it is not a problem for the BPA if it is not compatible with this consequentialist account of reasons for pro-attitudes. And so it is not a problem for Lang's solution that it is not compatible with a consequentialist account of reasons for pro-attitudes.

Furthermore, it seems that this type of consequentialism about reasons for pro-attitudes was always going to be in conflict with the BPA. This type of consequentialism about absolutely everything involves an account of the relationship between reasons and the good; it holds that reasons are defined in terms of, or derive from, the good. But the BPA also explicitly provides an account of the relationship between reasons and the good; according to the BPA, the good is defined in terms of reasons. Consequentialism about everything provides an account of reasons in terms of the good, and the BPA provides an account of goodness in terms of reasons. And because these two views of the relationship between reasons and the good are incompatible, consequentialism about everything was always going to be incompatible with the BPA, and not only Lang's solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason problem for the BPA.

Lars Samuelsson understands the worry behind Brunero's objections differently. According to Samuelsson, if having an

Samuelsson concludes that BPAs in terms of reasons for pro-attitudes are incompatible with consequentialism.

I presume that by ‘a consequentialist’ Samuelsson has in mind someone who holds the position that is normally referred to by this name in normative ethics, that is, someone who holds the position that an act's rightness or wrongness depends on its consequences. But this sort of consequentialist need not accept that we have reasons to have pro-attitudes towards value even when there are no good consequences to doing so because this sort of consequentialist qua this sort of consequentialist only holds a view about rightness and wrongness and not a view about reasons for pro-attitudes. Consequentialism about reasons for action and reasons for attitudes are views distinct from consequentialism in normative ethics that, as I've been arguing, the BPA need not be compatible with, and was always going to be incompatible with.

Samuelsson, however, seems to think that consequentialism about reasons for attitudes is a more ordinary consequentialist view, or a view more closely linked to consequentialism in normative ethics, than consequentialism about reasons for action. And Samuelsson claims that any BPA should be made in terms of reasons for pro-responses rather than reasons for pro-attitudes in order to make it compatible with a consequentialist view of reasons for pro-attitudes.Footnote ¹⁴

It might be that the BPA should be made in terms of reasons for pro-responses rather than reasons for pro-attitudes. Indeed Ewing, who endorsed the BPA at least thirty-five years before Scanlon, understood ‘pro-attitudes’ to include actions such as pursuit, and not just (mental) attitudes such as desire and admiration.Footnote ¹⁵ However, a BPA in terms of only reasons for pro-actions is a non-starter. And in order for the BPA to be compatible with a consequentialist view of reasons for attitudes the BPA would have to be made in terms of only reasons for pro-actions and not reasons for pro-actions or pro-attitudes.

To see that a BPA in terms of reasons for pro-actions alone is a non-starter, imagine an isolated world in which there is a being that is in a pleasurable state but is incapable of action. Hedonists will hold that there is value in this world. But there are certainly no reasons to perform actions in response to the value in this world; we cannot preserve or promote the pleasure in this world, since the world is isolated. And there is no one in that world who can promote or preserve the pleasure either. The BPA must be able to account for the possibility that this being's pleasure is of value because the BPA must be compatible with hedonism in order to be an adequate formal account of value.Footnote ¹⁶ This is easily done by holding that there are reasons for this being to hope that her pleasure continues, and for us to be glad that she is in a state of pleasure and to hope that it continues. But according to a BPA in terms of only reasons for actions there is no value in this world, since there are no reasons for action in this world.Footnote ¹⁷ So, we should reject a BPA in terms of only reasons for pro-actions.

So, Brunero's objection to Lang's solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason problem does not undermine Lang's solution. And we should not modify the BPA or Lang's solution in order to make it compatible with consequentialism about absolutely everything or a consequentialist account of or constraint on reasons for pro-attitudes.

OLSON'S RESPONSE TO LANG

In his reply to Lang, Jonas Olson raises several different objections to Lang's solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason problem. First, Olson imagines that an evil demon will punish others and not us if we do not admire him. It seems that there is a reason for us to admire the demon in this case. This is a problem for Lang's solution because according to his solution a reason is of the right kind if and only if it would still be a reason for us to have a pro-attitude in the absence of the benefits to us of having that pro-attitude. So Lang's solution entails that a demon that will punish others – rather than us – if we do not admire him is of final value.

Second, Olson imagines that unless we admire an evil demon, that demon will create a number of individuals whom he will make suffer greatly. But if we admire this demon, no one would benefit from our admiring him, since there would be no one who did not suffer greatly, and we cannot benefit individuals who do not and will not exist. So, according to Lang's solution, if the demon will create a number of individuals whom he will make suffer greatly unless we admire him, then the demon is good or of value because our admiring the demon would not benefit anyone. The consequence of our admiring the demon would be that the demon did not create a number of suffering individuals; no one would be benefited.Footnote ¹⁸

Third, we can imagine cases in which an evil demon will make the world less valuable in a way that does not harm anyone unless we admire him. Suppose that unless we admire him a demon will make the world less beautiful than it is now, and the demon's making the world less beautiful will not harm anyone. (The demon will, for instance, erase everyone's memories of the world being as beautiful as it is now.) In this case it seems that there is a reason for us to admire the demon because the demon will make the world a less beautiful place if we do not. But there are no benefits to our admiring the demon because we will not be harmed if the demon does make the world a less beautiful place.Footnote ¹⁹ And, according to Lang's solution, X is of final value if and only if X would still give us reasons to have a pro-attitude towards X regardless of the benefits to us of our having a pro-attitude towards X. So, according to Lang's solution, an evil demon who will make the world less beautiful – in a way that will not harm us – if we do not admire him is good or of value.

But Lang's solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason problem can be revised in a way that avoids Olson's three objections. Instead of distinguishing between wrong kind of reasons and right kind of reasons in terms of counterfactual benefits, Lang's solution can be amended so as to distinguish between wrong kind of reasons and right kind of reasons in terms of counterfactual additional consequences. According to this revised version of Lang's solution:

BPA Additional Consequences: X is good simpliciter or of final value if and only if X has properties that give us reasons to have a pro-attitude towards X regardless of the additional consequences of our having a pro-attitude towards X.

An additional consequence of P is a logical consequence of P that would not have obtained were it not for P. When a demon will punish us if we do not admire him our avoiding punishment from the demon is an additional consequence of our admiring the demon because if we did not admire the demon, we would not have avoided punishment. 2 + 2 = 4 might be a logical consequence of our admiring the demon. But the fact that 2 + 2 = 4 is not an additional consequence of our admiring the demon, since if we had not admired the demon it would still have been the case that 2 + 2 = 4.

BPA Additional Consequences avoids Olson's objections. It avoids Olson's first objection because one additional consequence of our admiring a demon that will punish others if we do not admire him is that others are not punished. If it were not the case that our admiring such a demon would have the additional consequence that others are not punished, there would be no reason for us to admire him.Footnote ²⁰

BPA Additional Consequences also avoids Olson's second objection. When an evil demon will bring new agents into the world that will suffer greatly unless we admire him there is a reason for us to admire the demon. But there would be no such reason if it weren't for one of the additional consequences of our admiring him. One of the additional consequences of our admiring the demon in this case is that the demon will not bring agents into the world who will suffer greatly.

And BPA Additional Consequences avoids Olson's third objection because there would be no reason for us to admire a demon that will make the world less beautiful unless we admire it if it were not for the additional consequences of our admiring such a demon. One of the additional consequences of our admiring such a demon would be that the world is not made less beautiful; if this were not one of the additional consequences of our admiring the demon, there would be no reason for us to admire it.