Attempts to derive from Nietzsche a positive political philosophy have fallen largely into two broad camps. First, the aristocratic reading sees Nietzsche as a proponent of a hierarchical society wherein the great majority exists only to serve the ends of a select few noble exemplars. Second, a separate camp finds in Nietzsche a spirit of democratic agonism, or cultural contest organized around excellence, that might underpin an egalitarian politics in which each has moral worth insofar as each has the capacity to achieve excellence. Jeffrey Church wades into this debate not by choosing sides but by attempting to move us past it. Nietzsche is neither aristocratic nor democratic, although both readings get something right. Instead, Church argues that Nietzsche in his early period puts forward a meritocratic conception of politics according to which, with the aristocratic reading, excellence is rare, but, with the democratic reading, is in principle something to which everyone may aspire. Nietzsche, then, advocates a political society in which everyone will be supported in their pursuit of achievement, but which also affords extra resources to those who show the greatest potential in achieving it.
The book has considerable strengths. It is impeccably clear and well organized. It deals systematically with a quarter century's worth of relevant literature in philosophy and political theory, and does so carefully and charitably. Perhaps most importantly, Church's is an honest attempt to move a debate forward. Given the vagaries of Nietzsche's corpus, its rhetorical flourishes, abrupt departures, and obfuscations, it is perhaps too easy for Nietzsche scholars to pick and choose among passages to suit their preferred reading of Nietzsche, a situation that lends itself to a landscape of entrenched positions. Church, refreshingly, looks closely at the very passages that have become standard in defenses of the extant schools of interpretation, showing again and again how a more careful reading that pays closer attention to the place of a passage in a paragraph, work, or even intellectual tradition might change our conception of what Nietzsche is up to.
Church's focus is Nietzsche's early-period works, from notebook material from the late 1860s to the last of the Untimely Meditations published in 1876. In part 1, Church seeks to establish that the early Nietzsche is concerned to offer an account of culture, its preconditions, impediments, and ultimate ends. Culture is crucial for Nietzsche because through it we become self-determining, transcending our natural state and conferring meaning on an otherwise meaningless world. For Church, such commitments place Nietzsche squarely within the tradition of Kantian and post-Kantian German philosophy. In particular, it is argued that Nietzsche's ultimate view represents a synthesis of commitments from Kant and Herder. From Kant, Nietzsche takes a perfectionist ethic that locates value in a human being's realization of her essence as a free being; from Herder, Nietzsche takes the imperative to conceive of the embeddedness of such freedom in concrete cultural conditions.
In part 2, Church argues that Nietzsche understands culture as a partnership for the promotion of freedom. Once more, Kant and Herder loom large. From the latter, Nietzsche develops a conception of national culture which underpins the free subject's sense of wholeness of character impossible apart from an appreciation of her situatedness in a certain cultural tradition at a certain time and place. From the former, Nietzsche develops a conception of cosmopolitan culture according to which a few geniuses must sometimes rise above their time and place and join a community of exemplars linked instead by their shared commitment to the goal of humanity's development.
In part 3, Church attends to Nietzsche's concrete proposals for the creation and maintenance of culture, providing close readings of Nietzsche's conception of education in On the Future of our Educational Institutions and of the state in The Greek State, both texts which have received relatively scant attention from Nietzsche scholars. In the relatively brief final part, Church anticipates the concern that since Nietzsche himself abandons many of his early-period views, they are of little intellectual value. Church argues for continuity between the early and late periods evinced by the continued prominence of themes in Nietzsche's thinking including nihilism, redemption, and the relationship between the few and many.
Church's central aim is to develop a meritocratic reading of Nietzsche that allows us to move past the debate between the aristocratic and democratic readings. The bulk of this argumentative work takes place in the exploration of culture in part 2. There, Church argues that the aristocratic reading is correct in claiming that for Nietzsche there is a necessary and substantive difference and distance between the few and the many, but wrong that this difference requires domination and coercion where the few unfeelingly and uncritically use the many for their own cultural goals. Instead, Church sees Nietzsche as advocating a reciprocal relationship between the few and the many where it is spiritual persuasion rather than physical coercion that causes the many to devote themselves to the production of exemplary excellence rather than to their own narrow self-interest. The democratic reading, however, is correct that excellence for Nietzsche is in principle open to all, not reserved for a select hereditary few. Although excellence is rare, it is so not because of aristocratic breeding and descent, but because excellence is demanding. Excellence is an achievement, it is merited, and it is simply a fact of life that the great majority of us will fail to achieve it.
Church's thesis is novel and compelling, though not without its problems. For one, the attempt to situate Nietzsche's concerns within the tradition of Kant and Herder faces some difficulties. Nietzsche read little Kant, and less Herder, though certainly would have known of them through secondary literature. Church suggests that Kant and Herder nonetheless would have occupied a central place in the general intellectual milieu in which Nietzsche was writing, and so would have influenced him greatly. Yet Nietzsche's milieu, like many aspects of his career, was idiosyncratic, trained as he was in philology rather than philosophy, and coming to the latter largely on his own terms and only during those very early years of his academic career during which Church would have him already synthesizing and overcoming a century's worth of problems. This is not to suggest that Church does not draw interesting connections between Nietzsche and his ostensible role models, only that such attempts sometimes have the feel of a just-so story.
The issue is apparent, for instance, in Church's claim that Nietzsche holds two conceptions of culture, one Herderian and national, the other Kantian and cosmopolitan. Where Church seeks to portray Nietzsche as ambitiously synthesizing Herder and Kant, we might ask whether it is just as likely that Nietzsche, rather than having two well-developed conceptions of culture, had none, and instead offered sometimes conflicting ruminations on culture never organized into a single coherent account.
On balance, this is an impressive work that promises to spur interest in Nietzsche's early-period writings, much as recent decades have seen an increase in interest in his middle-period works.
