The Austrian case

From a legal perspective, the Austrian regulation framework still leaves vast discretionary power to the administration. On the one hand, the framework demands that recipients make use of their own means and the means of third parties first, due to the principle of subsidiarity. Consequently, the caseworker can demand proof of income and assets and can check for any maintenance claims for close members of the family. The recourse against the claimant's liability has now been dropped for close relatives and claimants, and a small amount of savings and some assets (€4,070 in 2014) are allowed.

On the other hand, the recipients have to make use of their capacity to work. Certain groups are excluded from this, such as parents responsible for the care of children under the age of two or persons over the age of sixty-five. However, the legal provision only states that the same regulations as those for unemployment insurance, regarding the capacity to work and the reasonableness of a job, must be upheld, but there are no guidelines as to what recipients ought to do to prove enough effort. The legal rights of the claimants and recipients have been improved. Now sanctions, in the form of step-wise reductions of benefits, can only be imposed after a warning has been issued and recipients have had some time to resolve their shortcomings. However, the national minimum benefit has replaced the provincial standard reference rates, which incorporated a discretionary element, and serves as a guideline for the administration, which now grants a benefit at the stated level.

In our study, the statements of clients, caseworkers, managers and recipients alike indicate the different inherent ways of administering social assistance. The empirical research was carried out in two of the nine Austrian federal provinces. From these two provinces, Styria and Upper Austria, eight vastly different municipalities were selected via cluster analysis,Footnote ¹ taking into account the disparity in the percentage of the population receiving benefit, the number of recipients, rural and urban areas, job search requirements and so on. The sample contained eighty-four qualitative interviews, all conducted between December 2011 and November 2012; these took place first in Styria and then in Upper Austria. They included thirty interviews with administrators from the local authorities of both Upper Austria and Styria, and thirty-one and twenty-three interviews with recipients or claimants in Upper Austria and Styria, respectively.

The gathered interview data were transcribed and then assigned to categories extracted from the empirical research. Similar thematic aspects of the interviews were compared and enriched with theoretical concepts to gain a ‘theoretical generalisation’ (Flick, Reference Flick, Flick, Kardorff and Steinke2000; Meuser, Reference Meuser, Aulenbacher, Meuser and Riegraf2010). The analysis focussed on the interviews with the caseworkers and managers at welfare offices, who represent the ‘problem-solving and decision-making structure’ of a specific organisation (Meuser and Nagel, Reference Meuser, Nagel, Garz and Kraimer1991), and it compared and contrasted their views with the narratives of recipients and claimants. In many instances, the caseworkers and managers told a similar story about how clients are dealt with, and the clients’ perspectives supported these stories. Most of the caseworkers were trained civil servants in secure and regular employment, and at all the sites the bureaucratic procedures are still guided by traditional public management.

From a comparative perspective, distinctive patterns (Kelle and Klug, Reference Kelle and Klug2010) became visible by focussing on eligibility for benefits and on behavioural change. The eight municipalities can accordingly be synthesised into four administrative types: standardised, semi-standardised, disciplining and poor relief.

The poor relief type (municipality 3) is a small district where only 0.4 per cent of the population (or 250 recipients) receive benefits and just one caseworker is in charge of processing the claims, with assistance from the head of the department. In contrast, the standardised administration is exemplified by a larger city (municipality 7), where approximately two per cent of the population (or 5,000 people) obtain benefit payments and a large number of caseworkers are employed on distinctive tasks (Landesstatistik Steiermark, 2012). The disciplining type is demonstrated by two cases where about 1 per cent of the local population receives benefits; in absolute numbers this is 2,460 recipients in municipality 6 and 1,470 recipients in municipality 2. Four of the eight municipalities process their clients in a semi-standardised way despite their different structures, including three municipalities (1, 4, 5) where 0.5 to 0.6 per cent of the population received support (i.e., 200 to 300 recipients in total) and one city (8) where 2.4 per cent of the population (900 recipients) obtained a benefit. In the smaller municipalities, two caseworkers have face-to-face contact with recipients on a regular basis. The larger municipality employs two social workers in the front office and four caseworkers in the back office.

In the first dimension, the standardised and semi-standardised administrations have a service-oriented approach in common. They only differ in the level of bureaucratic processing: the former automatically scrutinises databases, while the latter checks the files when a client proposes to extend his/her entitlement. Both administrations assume and respect the client's right to benefits. However, the administrations differ in terms of their inquiries into personal circumstances. The standardised administration stresses its role as ‘eligibility control and benefit payment’; the caseworkers have neither the professional background nor the function of altering people's behaviour. Conversely, the semi-standardised type singles out groups of people for betterment.

In contrast, the way the disciplining administrations check a client's eligibility inherently produces misrepresentations and, therefore, undeserving clients. The caseworkers establish a framework that almost automatically drives clients into becoming undeserving, as they compare the statement of the claimants with documents and databases. Caseworkers use negative incentives and strict job search requirements.

These two distinctive types of administration are based in the second and third largest Austrian municipality, which have similar levels of general administrative support and work load. Nevertheless, both have constructed distinctive social assistance regimes. Whereas the standardised administration aims to give access to a benefit in a service-oriented way to those entitled to it, the disciplining administration sees itself as ‘gatekeeper’ and applies a rigorous means tests to restrict access to benefits for all.

The standardised professional administration has implemented service-oriented policies to lower restraints for clients within the legal limits. The disciplining administration has introduced more standardised procedures, though uses these bureaucratic tools, such as the job centre database, to discipline clients. Surveillance technology depends not only on the status of the benefit type (Henman and Marston, Reference Henman and Marston2008), but also on the local administrative leitmotif and whether it is focused on the eligibility check or behavioural change. When used in the latter dimension, it can act restrictively (see Marston, Reference Marston2013), while in the former dimension, it can increase the take-up rate.

The poor relief administration separates the deserving and undeserving to a lesser degree on a legal basis, but more on the rationale of the caseworker, who classifies claimants according to social-moral values. Access to benefit payments is predicated in this way, and the behavioural change is driven by a paternalistic assessment of both groups. The individual caseworker assigns the status of (un)deservingness to clients in a way that is seemingly without restrictions, although that constitutes the core responsibility within this type of administration.

‘I cannot let someone starve’ – poor relief administration

People-processing is based on face-to-face encounters and personal relationships between caseworker and clients, as the sole responsible caseworker stresses that she even interacted with the parents and sometimes even the grandparents of recipients.

When the cause of need and the behaviour of the claimant correspond to the expectations of the caseworker, the interview is assessed as an oral claim; benefits are calculated and disbursed instantly.

Conversely, when the cause of need or the behaviour of the claimant does not match the caseworker's expectations, the claimant is marked as undeserving. This can be triggered by an attempted lie or any trick by the claimant to present him/herself as more deserving, as ‘lying is not a trivial offence’ (caseworker 1, municipality 3). Then, the administrative procedure deters the applicants and follows a demanding process:

This administration obliges recipients to come in person for a renewal interview each month. The personal encounter serves two interrelated purposes; on the one hand, the individual has to reconstruct his/her neediness each month and receives a cheque in exchange from the caseworker; on the other hand, the caseworker re-assesses the personal situation of the claimant or recipient each month, and ‘questions’ the person's whereabouts and behaviour. In the caseworker's opinion, the monthly appointments reduce the risk of overpayments (caseworker 1, municipality 3); nevertheless, the personal encounter re-installs a picture of the old poor relief and a recipient's subjection to the caseworker.

Under the previous social assistance scheme, people deemed more deserving could obtain a higher payment, or people with an income above the regular amount granted could still receive some additional financial support. Nowadays the regulation is stricter: ‘Often people come that I cannot help, because the legislation has its rules. If they fall a little bit short [of the requirement], the need will be still there’ (caseworker 1, municipality 3). Then the caseworker and the head of department are willing to go beyond the legal requirements to help:

The deserving clients, like hard-working single parents or a man with severe health problems, appreciated the support and assessed the interaction with the caseworker accordingly, ‘But in that case, when I had a bad time, she was very understanding and she gave me exceptional support. That surprised me a lot’ (Mr Seemann,Footnote ² 50 years, municipality 4).

The division of clients also occurred along the axis of requirements. The caseworker distinguished between those who were searching hard and seemed willing to find employment, and those who were employable but jeopardised all chances of becoming employed:

These clients face harsher treatment and have to make applications every month, and the caseworker monitors the job centre database to detect any wrongdoings. The caseworker keeps a wary eye on clients that regularly miss their appointments at the job centre, and are therefore banned from receiving any unemployment benefit for a few weeks. She refers to them as Pappenheimer (a pejorative term, ‘fools’) and withholds compensatory social assistance payment for the lost benefits from the job centre. By contrast, compliant and deserving clients just have to show their monthly income or hand in their appointment cards from the job centre. ‘And there are really some, who are really looking and looking, and they cannot find anything – a woman, fifty-three years old – one knows that’ (caseworker 1, municipality 3). In such a case, a missed appointment at the job centre and a subsequent ban on unemployment benefit will be compensated for by the caseworker.

In both dimensions, the social−moral constructions about clients are key to understanding administrative actions. The caseworker tends to split clients into two groups, the deserving and the undeserving, in the tradition of the old poor relief system. Grateful and pleasant clients with the right values, who cannot be held responsible for their situation of distress, are considered worthy, whilst ‘impudent’, ‘demanding’ (head of department, municipality 3), ‘lying’ and ‘lazy’ (caseworker 1, municipality 3) clients are classified as unworthy of support and have to face control and discipline. From the perspective of the poor relief approach, social assistance needs to secure someone's existence if every other system of support has failed to do so. ‘I cannot let someone starve’, as the caseworker put it (caseworker 1, municipality 3). Deserving clients ‘are the really poor, they work for little money and are down on their luck’ (caseworker 1, municipality 3), but they can obtain ‘paternalistic’ support. Compared to the professional type, clients are not seen as self-reliant; the right behaviour is re-installed through a paternalistic and, for some, disciplining regime.

‘Not those who cry loudest’ – standardised administration

The eligibility check in this administrative type is highly standardised, and what is distinctive about a larger administration is that more than one caseworker is involved in processing a claim. First-time applicants have to draw a number at the so-called ‘info point’ situated on the ground floor of the building, which has a separate entrance to make it less daunting for the clients. Within half a day, first-time applicants obtain access to a caseworker and their claim is processed. Most of the necessary data are available online. Registration of residence, persons living in the household, social insurance data (past and current employment) and employment service data (level of benefit and periods of sanctions) are routinely checked. In addition, claimants have to deliver numerous documents and hand in missing ones within four weeks. The last bank account statements are monitored for income and savings; however, only a current amount above the income threshold of €4,070 hinders an entitlement, as legally required (caseworker 2, municipality 7). In complex household constellations, a social worker can make a home call (caseworker 1, municipality 7; head of department, municipality 7). After the initial check, the benefit is paid in to the client's bank account on a monthly basis for three to four months. Clients obtain an appointment card for the next renewal date (caseworker 2, municipality 7).

The ongoing check is structured in a client-friendly way. Each morning caseworkers obtain a list of changes from the social insurance and employment service database for their clients; then, they determine whether the clients still fulfil the entitlement criteria (head of department, municipality 7; caseworker 2, municipality 7). Recipients only have to report changes that cannot be monitored through the database. They can e-mail the necessary documents, such as their monthly pay slip, and then the caseworker recalculates the entitlement (head of department, municipality 7):

In summary, it can be described as service-oriented processing technology, as the clients do not have to queue each month in front of the caseworker's office to obtain a cash payment, and it is based on an identical means test for all claimants applied according to the minimum criteria defined by legislation. The administration aims at ‘equal’ treatment for all, as they do not want to privilege those who ‘cry loudest’ (head of department 1, municipality 7). Standardised, automatised eligibility checks reduce the administrative burden on claimants and clients and ensure a higher take-up rate.

In municipality 7, the institutional arrangement introduced a separation between people-processing and people-changing technologies. The head of department points out that caseworkers lack the required professional background; therefore, they are instructed to refer clients to social workers or to other departments or organisations (head of department, municipality 7). During the first appointment, caseworkers have plenty of time to assess the personal needs of the claimants and give them additional advice or refer them to other services (caseworker 2, municipality 7).

The administration restricts itself to means-testing and only monitors the status of clients at the job centre online. Still, the caseworker and recipients identified the job search and job centre as essential to the process (caseworker 3, municipality 7; Ms Siebert, 25 years, municipality 7), as each claimant has to register as unemployed within the first week of placing his/her claim, otherwise the claim cannot be processed (caseworker 1, municipality 7). In the case of missed appointments or sanctions at the job centre, the clients receive a written notification, which warns the clients and asks them to fulfil the requirements within the due time, otherwise their benefits will be cut. Two recipients had experienced warnings, and both acted immediately (Ms Kobler, 30 years, municipality 7; Mr Nickel, 20 years, municipality 7). Nevertheless, the ‘rigid process’ (caseworker 3, municipality 7) does not rest on ‘personal communication’. If recipients turn up at the office and explain their reasons for the missed appointment, the caseworker can consider personal circumstances and withdraw the warning or sanction.

In summary, this type of public administration has streamlined the policy tools to reduce the demands on the clients to a minimum, and it has introduced a system that perceives every claimant as a citizen entitled to benefits if they fulfil the legal requirements. All three caseworkers accepted the views of deserving clients and endorsed standardised service-oriented processing. However, as personal interaction has been reduced to a minimum, caseworkers did not engage in any further aspects of clients’ lives and worries. Recipients accordingly experienced those few minutes of talk at the social assistance office as impersonal – ‘they don't care [about problems], the claim is processed and then you leave. That's it’ (Ms Siebert, 25 years, municipality 7).

‘And it must hurt’ – disciplining administration

Municipalities 6 and 2, exemplifying rather tougher and larger administrations, differ in their local conditions. The former has a centralised administration with numerous caseworkers based in the city centre. The latter is located in the densely populated provincial capital. Consequently, only two caseworkers are employed in a central administration office and numerous ‘social advisory points’ take over the face-to-face encounters and forward the checked claims to the central administration office for decision-making.

For the eligibility check, claimants have to present numerous documents. Bank statements from the last six months are essential (caseworker, social advisory point, municipality 2; caseworkers 2, 3, municipality 6). Caseworkers closely examine all transactions on the clients’ bank accounts, such as transfers from savings accounts to the bank account, income from (irregular) work (caseworker 1, municipality 2), support from relatives and other sources (caseworkers 2, 3, municipality 6). Thus, they gain detailed insight into ‘what they have been living on’ (caseworker 3, municipality 6). The caseworkers also track spending patterns, including whether the claimants deposited money into a ‘hidden’ life insurance scheme or bank savings account (caseworker 1, social advisory point, municipality 2). Claimants have to justify all postings, otherwise their claims will be rejected.

The question of depleted assets is treated differently. In municipality 2, the caseworkers do not question if people have had some savings and spent them within the last few months. If the savings are below the threshold and any expenditure is explained, claimants will generally obtain a benefit (caseworker, social advisory point, municipality 2). In municipality 6, no benefit will be granted when a claimant is at or below the asset threshold if he or she has held some assets in the previous six months but spent them. Then the caseworker will divide the original amount and determine whether the claimant ought to have spent the amount in a more sensible manner; for example, if €20,000 has been spent within half a year, this will lead to a refusal. The caseworker might even reject the claim if the claimant has only €3,000 in a bank account, because one can live on that amount for one or two months more (caseworker 3, municipality 6).

Individual cases are examined thoroughly, and claimants have to answer questions about household members, previous periods of employment and benefit receipts. Each oral statement or document will be checked for coherency via the databases (caseworker, 1, 3, municipality 6; caseworkers 1, 2, municipality 2). The caseworkers therefore require the necessary documents and information from the claimants and then double-check them. Any ambiguity or factoidal statements lead to harsher treatment. In both districts, the investigating civil servants (head of department 1, municipality 6) or local community administrations (caseworker 1, municipality 2) make a house call when implausible statements are detected.

In municipality 2, de-centralised social advisory points support people in accessing both benefits and advice. The advisory point assists the client in handing in a claim, which provides the utmost accurate information for a swift and successful entitlement check at the central office (caseworker, social advisory point, municipality 2). Caseworkers engage as intermediaries, and they developed strategies to fulfil the requirements for the restrictive central office and enable clients to access the benefit smoothly. Conversely, claimants in municipality 6 have to deal with the disciplinary caseworkers in person and the supporting staff do not prepare their files.

Both municipalities rely on monthly payments and monthly limited entitlements. As the social advisory points handle the claims in municipality 2, the central administration had to stop making payments via cash cheques in a face-to-face encounter. Nowadays, recipients obtain the benefit via bank transfer, as the central office could not handle the long queues otherwise (caseworker 1, municipality 2). They still have to renew their claim each month, and recipients face the uncertainty about whether and when they will obtain their benefit. ‘That is normal: if I claim by the 10th of the month, I’ll then get the benefit by end of the month’ (Mr Iljin, 35 years, municipality 2). Due to the uncertainty of the transfer day, it is not easy for recipients to manage their ongoing payments in time (caseworker 1, social advisory point, municipality 2). In municipality 6, the caseworkers hand out a cheque, which is cashed at the city treasury. As this city treasury has short opening hours, from 7 until 11 am, the clients’ payments may be delayed, due to a longer application process, despite having an appointment.

In both administrations, the demands for behavioural change and interference with clients’ lives are extensive and target most of the recipients. The monthly appointments and the subsequent relatively limited entitlement period also impose a behavioural control:

Job search is emphasised in both municipalities; recipients have to be registered as unemployed at the local job centre and show their appointment card each month. The caseworkers regularly monitor the job centre's database to check for benefit bans resulting from infringement of the conditions. If clients are banned, the social assistance office will usually not replace any lost unemployment assistance benefit (caseworkers 2, 3, municipality 6; caseworkers 1, 2, municipality 2) as ‘that is the penalty’ (caseworker 1, municipality 2) ‘and it must hurt’, explained the head of department in municipality 6, ‘otherwise no one would care’.

Additionally, both administrations hand out a form for job search. Each month, claimants have to return it filled with collected company stamps. In municipality 2, recipients can enclose applications and rejections as proof ‘if they feel too ashamed’ (caseworker 2, municipality 2) to use the provided form, as it labels them as social assistance recipients. The caseworker checks the ‘illness list’ (caseworker 1, municipality 2) for the names of recipients searching for jobs, and sometimes calls the contacted employers. Municipality 6, on the other hand, still requires stamps. Each month, recipients have to hand in their list and go through the monthly process of collecting stamps (caseworkers 1, 3, municipality 6):

Up to ten applications have to be gathered each month to establish that there is sufficient commitment (caseworkers 1, 3, municipality 6; caseworker 2, municipality 2).

This bureaucratic technology leads to a vicious circle. The caseworkers compare the client's statement with the databases and operate a harsh means test. Not only do they detect misrepresentations, they have also built a system that produces wrongful statements. The information they require could just be obtained from checking the databases; the monthly questioning of statements serves to reiterate the caseworker's inquiry of client's statements and re-constructs claimant's undeservingness in an ongoing process. In multiple instances, negative incentives like strict work requirements and sanction policies interfere with recipients’ behaviour and classify them as undeserving. Users have to deal with the strict enforcement of job search requirements, and those who are not fit for employment have to get therapy to regain employability (caseworker 2, municipality 6). Recipients have to prove their worthiness for support monthly and are treated as undeserving at the same time. This type of approach could even be considered as reconstructing the poor as the ‘never-deserving’ (Chunn and Gavigan, Reference Chunn and Gavigan2004) on the frontlines. Conversely in the administrative conception, the administration aims to have the recipients ‘standing on their own feet’ (head of department, municipality 6) as quickly as possible, and to prevent ‘twenty years at expense of the province’ (caseworker 1, municipality 2).

‘First and foremost people get their money’ – semi-standardised administration

In the four semi-standardised administrations the eligibility check involves a standardised procedure for all claimants, who have to provide the same documents, and the caseworker checks the database for up-to-date information. In the smaller municipalities, the claimants do not need an appointment and will obtain their first payment within an hour if they are entitled to it and have all the necessary documents with them (caseworker 1, municipality 4; caseworker 1, municipality 1; caseworker 1, municipality 5). Sometimes caseworkers ask the police (caseworker 1, municipality 1) or local authorities (caseworker 1, municipality 5; head of department, municipality 4) to make a home call, if they suspect unreported household members or just do not know how to assess the personal circumstances. In the city, claimants have to make an appointment first, which can take up to three weeks. The claimants are instructed to collect the required documents in the meantime, so that the social worker can decide about an entitlement during the first session (caseworker 1, municipality 8).

The administrations regularly require bank statements, but they only check the current balance of the bank account to see whether ‘the rent is really paid’ (caseworker1, municipality 5), to control the financial situation (head of department, municipality 4) or to check for other incomes at times (caseworker 1, municipality 1). The present circumstances are the decisive factor determining need (caseworker 1, municipality 8). The claimants cannot ‘embezzle’ any income or assets (Ms Ambrosch, 22 years, municipality 5), though their past behaviour does not cause them to lose their entitlement.

Recipients typically obtain their benefit for at least three months, and it is transferred to their bank account. In contrast to the standardised administration, the databases are not monitored automatically under the semi-standardised administration, since the files are only checked when the recipients have to renew their entitlement (caseworker 1, municipality 5; caseworker 1, municipality 4; caseworker 1 municipality 1), or at regular intervals (caseworker 1, municipality 8). Caseworkers obtain an automatic notice about recipients whose social security status has changed, but they cannot follow up all the information provided and just focus on job take-up and unemployment benefit bans. As financial and personal circumstances can change over such a long period, caseworkers and recipients are often involved in negotiations due to previous overpayments (caseworker 1, municipality 1), and recipients are regularly reminded to report any financial or personal changes (Ms Ambrosch, 22 years, municipality 5; Ms Hollar, 40 years, municipality 4; Ms Ganz, 39 years, municipality 1; Mr Folmann, 51 years, municipality 8).

The caseworkers also intervene in some clients’ lives, but their approaches differ. In the rural municipalities, caseworkers target ‘difficult’ clients who it is considered are unwilling to find a job (long-term clients with a full benefit). These clients have to hand in documentation for five to ten job applications and turn up on a monthly basis (caseworker 1, municipality 1; caseworker 1, municipality 4; caseworker 1, municipality 5). Such an approach can be frustrating:

If they do not comply, the caseworkers issue warnings and apply sanctions in the end.

Recipients facing a ban on their unemployment benefit will only obtain compensation from the welfare office if they specifically ask for it, but they will also receive a warning. The caseworkers comply with this regulation to some extent, despite strong personal disagreement (caseworker 1, municipality 1; caseworker 1, municipality 4; caseworker 1, municipality 5). In municipality 8, the social worker does not replace the lost benefit, but checks thoroughly and tops it up to the minimum rate if the recipient's personal circumstances indicate reasons to provide support despite a ban.

In this city, the social work approach clearly determines the target groups for individual assistance, mainly younger people without training, a job or a flat. They have to attend monthly meetings and are required to attain additional support from other social services. Long-term unemployed people receiving full benefit from the social assistance office are also monitored closely and they:

All four administrations undertake a semi-standardised processing of the claim, which is severely curtailed by the lack of adequate professionalised back-office work. Irrespective of that, ‘we take care that people, first and foremost, get their money’ (head of department, municipality 1). Furthermore, all the administrations only target certain groups of clients and seek to transform their personal circumstances and behaviour. Despite sanctions, they also aim ‘to not let [the claimants] starve’ (caseworker 1, municipality 5). In the city, the professional approach involves negative and positive inducements, but does not label claimants as ‘undeserving’. In contrast, rural caseworkers single out clients classified as capable of taking care of themselves, but unwilling to work.