This is a very significant contribution to a long-standing historiographical debate over what happened to the Armenians during the last days of the Ottoman Empire. Was it a premeditated genocide perpetrated by the Ottoman officials, as most Armenian and other scholars believe, or the unfortunate result of wartime excesses, as the Turks and a few others argue? Lewy accepts neither interpretation. Instead, he finds that “both sides have used heavy-handed tactics to advance their cause and silence a full and impartial discussion of the issues in dispute” (p. 258). Although he might have mentioned that Raphael Lemkin actually coined the term genocide based on what he believed had happened to the Armenians, Lewy does aptly declare that “the key issue in this quarrel…is not the extent of Armenian suffering, but rather the question of premeditation: that is, whether the Young Turk regime during the First World War intentionally organized the massacres that took place” (p. ix).
Lewy takes on what many who back the Armenian contentions consider to be some of the most damning evidences of a premeditated genocide and shows how they are “materials of highly questionable authenticity” (p. 250). These suspect documents include the so-called “Ten Commandments…issued by the Committee of Union and Progress [CUP] relative to their plan for massacring Armenians” (p. 47), “still another secret meeting that is said to substantiate the element of premeditation…described in memoirs written by a purported member of the central committee of the CUP, Mevlanzade Rifat” (p. 51), and the Naim Bey “telegrams allegedly sent out by minister of the interior Talaat Pasha, ordering the extermination of the Armenians” (p. 63) and published by a minor military censor at that time, Aram Andonian.
Lewy also questions the methods of arguably the leading current Armenian scholar–advocate for the premeditated genocide thesis, Vakhakn N. Dadrian. Lewy points out Dadrian's “selective use of sources” (p. 282–83), how when “checking the references provided by Dadrian…it becomes clear that these sources do not always say what Dadrian alleges” (p. 83), Dadrian's “manipulating the statements of contemporary observers” (p. 84), how “only through shrewd juxtapositions of words and insertions (which he puts in square brackets) that Dadrian ends up with the desired result” (p. 85), and how “it is Dadrian's gloss and not the original text quoted that includes the incriminating words” (p. 86).
Lewy examines many other sources that help “establish the terrible suffering of the deported Armenians and the occurrences of massacres. But, contrary to Armenian claims, they do not prove the responsibility of the central government in Constantinople for these killings” (p. 135). These sources include the German missionary and Orientalist Johannes Lepsius, the German poet Armin T. Wegner, the famous British Blue Book edited by Lord James Bryce and a young Arnold Toynbee, and Henry Morgenthau, the U.S. ambassador to the Ottoman Empire.
On the other hand, Lewy finds “most valuable…the consular reports…of Leslie A. Davis, the American consul in Harput…Of special importance are accounts of his visits to several mass execution sites, one of the few such reports available from any source” (p. 139). Recently released Turkish publications “focus almost exclusively on Armenian rebellious activities. Hardly any documents are included on the relocations or the confiscation of Armenian property” (p. 132). In addition, “only a fraction of the massive Turkish archival holdings are available to researchers, and these are carefully controlled by the Turkish authorities” (p. 133). Lewy also accuses “the Turkish side, which seeks to dismiss the mass killings as ‘excesses’ or ‘intercommunal warfare’ and often speaks of ‘so-called massacres’ ” as “distorting the historical record” (p. 252).
As for the argument that “the large number of Armenian deaths—genocidal consequences—as proof that the massacres that took place must have been part of an overall plan to destroy the Armenian people” (p. 43), Lewy counters that it “rests on a logical fallacy and ignores the huge loss of life among Turkish civilians, soldiers, and prisoners of war due to sheer incompetence, neglect, starvation, and disease. All of these groups also experienced a huge death toll that surely cannot be explained in terms of a Young Turk plan of annihilation” (p. 250). Lewy further takes to task the recent French law punishing those who in effect do not agree with the premeditation thesis. In 1995, for example, a French court found the prominent scholar Bernard Lewis guilty of denying that the Armenians suffered a premeditated genocide and imposed a token fine.
How does Lewy explain what happened to the Armenians? “The momentous task of relocating several hundred thousand people in a short span of time and over a highly primitive system of transportation was simply beyond the ability of the Ottoman bureaucracy…Under conditions of Ottoman misrule, it was possible for the country to suffer an incredibly high death toll without a premeditated plan of annihilation” (p. 253).
There has long been a need for somebody with the academic objectivity and courage to take on this challenging issue. Although Lewy's analysis is certainly not going to constitute the definitive answer, there is no other comparable work that so objectively and thoroughly reviews and analyzes so many different sources on both sides of this bitterly divisive issue. Lewy's study also contains three maps, a very brief list of abbreviations and glossary, thorough notes, a lengthy list of works cited, and a good index.
Given the increasing importance of the Kurds, several new books on the subject have recently appeared, an important one being Turkey's Kurds: A Theoretical Analysis of the PKK and Abdullah Ocalan by Ali Kemal Ozcan. Most of the books, however, have dealt with the Kurds in Iraq—who constitute only 4 to 5 million—while as many as 12 to15 million live in Turkey and another 6 million in Iran. Thus, this sophisticated, well-documented sociological study of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in Turkey and its longtime leader Abdullah (Apo) Ocalan is most welcomed.
“A modified and [slightly] updated version” of Ozcan's 2002 doctoral dissertation (p. ix), this study is largely based on “prolonged observations, an unstructured interview with Ocalan, and an ‘illegal’ questionnaire” (p. 6) to 184 Kurdish respondents in Diyarbakir, Mersin, and Ankara. Ozcan was even allowed to join the PKK's education program at its Central School in Syria in the summer of 1994, an experience that might have influenced him to overemphasize the success of the party in the “education war” (p. 241). A table detailing the rigorous “daily timetable of party education” from 7 a.m. until midnight appears on p. 270, whereas another table on p. 271 contains “a list of Ocalan's [48] published works” totaling 16,501 pages.
In general, Ozcan seeks “to throw light on the processes of the PKK's ‘massification’—its mobilizing sources and dimensions among the people of Kurdistan” (p. 18). He concludes that the “PKK's organizational performance lies behind the revitalization of the Anatolian Kurds” (p. 242). The author also reviews theories of the nation and nationalism—Marxist conceptualizations in particular. He is impressed with the inadvertent role played by the emergence and formation of Turkish capitalism and the [Turkish] Republic in giving rise to the PKK and Kurdish detribalization.
Ozcan repeatedly argues that “in the face of the organization's total abandonment of all national liberation objectives…the ethnic resistance of the Kurds under Turkey…shall have to be defined as an ‘identity’ liberation movement, rather than a national liberation movement” (p. 233). By this he means that since the capture of Ocalan in February 1999, the PKK has lessened its former demands to merely democratic rights for the Kurds as Turkish citizens within the borders of a unitary state. The author even speculates about Ocalan's “philosophy of human nature” (p. 241) being applicable “not just for the Kurds and the neighboring societies of the Middle East but for the whole of humanity” (p. 242). Many, however, believe that the former position is simply a tactical move given Ocalan's incarceration, whereas the latter is indicative of his megalomania.
Ozcan adds that “the actuality is that the globalization of ‘supranationalism’ is enjoying its heyday, through which national markets of nation-states—and its outdating nationalism—are becoming less and less significant, and are doomed to eventual meaninglessness” (p. 233). Such a blanket conclusion is very debatable. Although globalization has dramatically spread, nationalism too continues vibrant. The two phenomena, while seemingly inversely related, apparently are not necessarily so. A generation ago, for example, modernization was supposed to lead to the decline of nationalism, but instead helped lead to its renewal in such states as Britain with its growth of Scottish and Welsh nationalism. There is no inherent reason why a Kurdish nation cannot exist within a truly democratic Turkey joined to the European Union (EU).
Regarding Ocalan's capture in February 1999, Ozcan seems to believe that “the US had decided to hand Ocalan over to Turkey following a detailed report presented by Michael M. Gunter [the present reviewer] who interviewed him in Damascus on 13 and 14 March 1998” (p. 15). If Ozcan means that this reviewer was someone working for the U.S. government to aid in Ocalan's capture, he is completely in error. Rather this reviewer recommended—and continues to do so—that the United States look upon the PKK more favorably than as merely a terrorist organization, but he has been ignored given Turkey's role as an important NATO ally of the United States. (Contrast the negative U.S. position toward the PKK with its positive attitude toward the Iraqi Kurds who were enemies of the Saddam Hussein regime.) Ozcan also concludes that the United States helped to capture Ocalan because of the PKK's “calculable decline of organizational (and consequently military) capability” (p. 232). This reviewer instead would explain the U.S. action here as again support for its NATO ally, Turkey.
These differences notwithstanding, the present reviewer finds Ozcan's study to be an even-handed, sophisticated analysis of an important Kurdish movement that has clearly reordered the Kurdish situation in Turkey and will continue to do so with powerful repercussions for the future of this important country and its candidacy for membership in the EU. Despite the book's occasionally obscure style of writing, scholars as well as governmental practitioners will read it with great benefit. Ozcan's study concludes with appendices containing the questionnaire he administered to his 184 Kurdish respondents, along with its statistical results (pp. 254–76); the basic organizational structure of the PKK; and a list of the 75 Kurdish self-immolations that briefly occurred from 1998 to 1999. There also is ample documentation, as well as an index and a useful bibliography of English- and Turkish-language sources that still omits some important recent work.
