A much neglected aspect of the history of generic fascism is the ideological and organizational interaction between the various national fascisms. As Dietrich Orlow points out, despite the fact that fascists in interwar Europe were hypernationalists, they still viewed themselves as part of a rapidly emerging international phenomenon. During the 1930s it seemed as if fascism was in the vanguard of history, especially following Hitler's seizure of power which triggered both envy and intense fascination among indigenous fascists in neighboring countries. Later, when Germany set about establishing its Nazi empire, the contradictions of such fascist internationalism would soon emerge. For the moment, however, indigenous fascists looked upon the Third Reich as a source of cooperation rather than subjugation.

This book offers historians a valuable and compact study in “interfascist” relations. Impressively rooted in extensive archival work, it delivers depth but it does forgo some breadth. The focus is exclusively upon German Nazis and their relationship with indigenous fascists in France and the Netherlands. Unfortunately, such a tightly defined study reveals nothing of the interaction between the Third Reich and indigenous fascists in other countries. Indeed, despite Mussolini's best efforts to establish his own form of fascist internationalism, Rome's attempt to export “Universal Fascism” is written out of Orlow's concise account. A more ambitious study would have offered greater engagement with the origins and development of fascist internationalism. Some broadening of scope would have enabled the author to position his detailed case studies in their wider international context.

Nonetheless, as Orlow reveals, both France and the Netherlands make for valid and fascinating case studies. Not only did both countries experience relatively strong indigenous fascist movements, but their domestic fascists, according to Orlow, were also among the most “internationally minded” in Europe. This was particularly true for France with its rich tradition of “literary fascism,” where intellectuals such as Pierre Drieu La Rochelle, Robert Brasillach, and Bertrand de Jouvenel fulminated on the decadence of the Third Republic and heaped lavish praise on the destruction of parliamentary democracy in Germany. Furthermore, in drawing our attention to the fact that “interfascist” relations were not one-sided, Orlow also makes the important distinction between “collaborationists” within the Nazi camp, that is to say, those Nazis who sought genuine cooperation with potential partners elsewhere in Europe, and the “conquerors” who viewed indigenous fascism in countries such as France and the Netherlands as a threat to the Third Reich's hegemonic aspirations. In the end, of course, the “conquerors” prevailed.

The first chapter of the book disentangles the numerous different agencies, organizations, and central figures involved in the interaction between German National Socialism and Dutch and French fascism after 1933. In the case of France, Orlow traverses some complex terrain, negotiating the bewildering organizational diversity that characterized the extreme right in interwar France. In marked contrast, the Dutch far right, as Orlow reveals, is a picture of comparative simplicity in that the only important Dutch fascist party was Mussert's Nationaal Socialistische Beweging (National Socialist Movement). In terms of their interaction with the Nazis, indigenous fascists could expect to encounter a host of competing Nazi organizations that all claimed jurisdiction over “interfascist” relations: the Foreign Office; the Propaganda Ministry; the NSDAP's Foreign Organization; or even the NSDAP's youth organization, which established links with fascist youth movements abroad.

The remainder of the book is structured according to chronology: relations with the Third Reich as the dictatorship is established (1933–34); the mid-1930s (1934–36); the period when the Third Reich enjoyed its greatest prestige and popularity (1936–38); followed by a final chapter (1938–39) that examines relations in the context of the machinations of Nazi foreign policy, and the radicalization of racial policy that was occasioned by the Reichskristallnacht pogrom of November 1938. Orlow's narrative reveals that even though there was much effusive praise for the Third Reich's Volksgemeinschaft, both Dutch and French fascists had serious reservations about various aspects of the Third Reich. The Dutch fascists were critical of Nazi policy toward the Christian churches; Mussert was also reluctant to embrace racial anti-Semitism. With regard to foreign policy, while Dutch fascists praised Hitler's challenge to French hegemony in continental Europe, they were irked by Hitler's ties with Japan, which threatened the Dutch East Indies, as well the patronizing tendency of the Nazis to classify the Dutch as “ethnic Germans” who inhabited a “lower German” region. As for French fascists, similar reservations were expressed about church-state relations and, despite the French far right's obsession with the “Jewish question,” the place of racial as opposed to political anti-Semitism. Hitler's Francophobia, which had peppered the pages of Mein Kampf, was also an issue. But all this could be forgiven against the backdrop of the Franco-Soviet Pact, the election of the Popular Front government, and the Spanish Civil War. In this context, Nazi Germany stood as a bulwark against the advance of Bolshevism. Ultimately it was aggressive Nazi foreign policy ambitions after the Munich crisis that gave rise to profound divisions on the French far right. Even so, as Orlow shows, some French fascists, such as Marcel Déat, still remained under the lure of Nazism.

Needless to say, international fascism was a failure. With regard to German National Socialism, this succinct book, through its two case studies, tells us why. In the first place, in pursuing its war of conquest, Nazi Germany had no interest in international fascism as a cooperative venture. Second, for a variety of reasons, both French and Dutch fascists failed to secure governmental power in the 1930s (the same was true for fascist movements elsewhere). Third, international fascism foundered on the stubborn fact that indigenous fascists were essentially committed to their own permutations of hypernationalism—a case of putting the national before the European Volksgemeinschaft.