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Fact or fiction: reducing the proportion and impact of false positives

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 November 2017

D. Stahl
Affiliation:
Department of Biostatistics and Health Informatics, Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology and Neuroscience, King's College London, London, UK
A. Pickles*
Affiliation:
Department of Biostatistics and Health Informatics, Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology and Neuroscience, King's College London, London, UK
*
Author for correspondence: A. Pickles, E-mail: andrew.pickles@kcl.ac.uk
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Abstract

False positive findings in science are inevitable, but are they particularly common in psychology and psychiatry? The evidence that we review suggests that while not restricted to our field, the problem is acute. We describe the concept of researcher ‘degrees-of-freedom’ to explain how many false-positive findings arise, and how the various strategies of registration, pre-specification, and reporting standards that are being adopted both reduce and make these visible. We review possible benefits and harms of proposed statistical solutions, from tougher requirements for significance, to Bayesian and machine learning approaches to analysis. Finally we consider the organisation and methods for replication and systematic review in psychology and psychiatry.

Information

Type
Invited Review
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2017 
Figure 0

Fig. 1. Why more than 50% of published research findings are false. Ioannidis (2005) claimed that more than 50% of published ‘significant’ research findings in natural sciences are false. As others before him explained that the p value of a statistical test does not allow making probabilistic statements about the underlying validity of an effect. For that we need to make assumptions about the prior probability that an effect exists. The probability that a statistical test with a positive ‘significant’ result is a true effect is the positive predicted value (PPV). The PPV depends on our prior probability, the power of a test (the probability of a test to detect a specified effect with a given sample size) and the alpha error. Assume we are assessing 1000 risk factors for a mental health problem and 10% of the risk factors are real (but we do not know which ones). Our statistical tests have got 80% power to get a significant result if a specific effect exists and we usually specify an alpha error level of 0.05 or 5%. We would detect 80% of our 100 risk factors and thus obtain 80 true positive test results. 20 risk factors would not be detected (false negative results). The remaining 900 factors are not risk factors but we would expect that 5% or 45 would be falsely declared as such (false positives). We would therefore obtain 80 + 45 = 125 positive results but only 80 (64%) are true positives and about 1/3rd of the positive results are false positives, far more than our alpha error of 5% would suggest. However, the PPV also depends on the power (and therefore the sample size) and the alpha error. Meta-analyses have shown that typically studies in psychology and psychiatry often have little power: an estimate for animal studies with neurological diseases is 20% power (Tsilidis et al.2013) and 35% for psychological studies (Bakker et al.2012) although low power is not restricted to these research domains (Dumas-Mallet et al.2017a). The figure shows the PPV (Y-axis) against the probability that a hypothesis is true for different powered studies (25%, 35%, 50%, 80%, and 90%) at an alpha error of 5%. Even without publication bias towards positive results the PPV of positive statistical results is far less than we may have expected. It underlines the importance of conducting and presenting a power analyses where feasible.

Supplementary material: File

Stahl and Pickles supplementary material 1

Appendix

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