How should we think of Homer and his epics, the Iliad and the Odyssey? Do they still pose enduring questions to contemporary audiences? Moreover, we might wonder, as did Giambattista Vico, whether Homer is a very salutary mentor at all given that his gods seem “capricious” at best, and his hero, Achilles, is so “savage” (19) that he sacrifices twelve Trojans at the funeral of his beloved Patroclus. Against these charges Peter Ahrensdorf asserts the continuing relevance of Homer for living an ethical life, and aims to show that Vico inaugurated a tradition of misreading Homer that must be overcome in the face of contemporary postmodern challenges to rationality. Ahrensdorf principally aims to demonstrate two things: (1) Homer teaches that the Olympian gods are fickle and that humans must rely on their own abilities and wisdom; and (2) Achilles is the Homeric hero who best embodies this human wisdom.
Rather than seeing Homer as a defender of traditional piety and the warrior ethic, Ahrensdorf makes a thoughtful case for a rationalist Homer whose poetry is best understood as a critique of the society it depicts. Homer's subtle teaching is that “the gods are capricious, unreliable, and fundamentally indifferent beings” (59), and that it is the humans of the poems rather than the gods who are actually wise. The key to human wisdom is that humans are mortal and the gods immortal, and what seems a boon—life everlasting—is the crucial weakness of the gods. Without the prospect of death they cannot truly suffer, by experiencing the terror of death for themselves or for their friends, and thus they lack the gravity that suffering imparts and the knowledge its ordeal brings. But more than this they also cannot truly love, as Ahrensdorf shows us in the inability of Thetis to really understand her son's feelings for the departed Patroclus, because immortal beings lack the mutual interdependency that marks the mortal condition.
Following the revelation of human wisdom contra the divine as a “central teaching” (59) of Homer's, the bulk of the text makes the case for Achilles as the embodiment of this human wisdom. As Ahrensdorf sees it, there are two primary antagonists for this title: Hector and Odysseus. For those critical of Achilles, his anger over his wounded honor seems more like petulance than a mature response to Agamemnon's offensive behavior, and his brutality in pursuing vengeance against Hector goes beyond the pale of humanity. Hector's courage and loyalty to his family and city are certainly an appealing alternative, and Odysseus's intelligence seems an even better candidate, since he is not just a clever strategist but also a teller of tales and thus akin to Homer himself. But for Ahrensdorf both Hector and Odysseus fall short of Achilles, not because they are better or worse in combat, but because neither approach Achilles's philosophic comportment.
While Achilles's alienation from his comrades might appear as a moral failing, in fact it is this distance from his peers that presages his singular virtue: he alone of the heroes in the Homeric epic questions divine providence and challenges the heroic ethic. Both Hector and Odysseus are trapped by their commitment to their honor: Hector is not actually the paragon of loyalty he appears to be, but is instead focused so exclusively on his reputation that he repeatedly shows poor judgment—all because he loves fame more than he cares for his family or the city of Troy. And while Odysseus is certainly wily, his intelligence is never sufficiently liberated from an overreliance on divine help to count as fully human wisdom, and he actually becomes more vengeful and irrational as the Odyssey concludes. By contrast, at the close of the Iliad Achilles has detached himself from his addiction to glory and commiserates sympathetically with Priam. Under Ahrensdorf's hand, Achilles emerges as the only hero who truly rivals Homer himself in terms of the depth of his wisdom, and his liberation from convention inspires the later birth of philosophy in classical Greece.
For all the strengths of Ahrensdorf's reclamation of Achilles, there are a number of worrying absences in the text. One of them is that the bibliography is not as extensive as one would hope (there are no references to Bernard Williams, Dean Hammer, Kurt Raaflaub, or Simone Weil), leading to real lacunae in his argument. Ahrensdorf claims, for instance, that Achilles decides to preside over the funeral games of Patroclus rather than compete in them because he has essentially divorced himself from his peers: “Achilles has come to see that the honor of the Achaians is not worth having, because they are not truly worthy of honoring him” (189). But here the voice of Hammer is particularly to be wished for, since he provides (in The “Iliad” as Politics [University of Oklahoma Press, 2002]) a compelling alternative interpretation of Achilles's actions that sees Achilles's new leadership role as an act of engagement rather than indifference—and indeed as a replaying of Agamemnon's failure of leadership in Book 1 over questions of distribution and honor that results in a more just community under Achilles's guidance.
My second concern is that Ahrensdorf's interpretation raises a crucial puzzle that he never tries to answer: if (1) Homer's Achilles is not just the man of “force” but a protophilosopher who offers the audience a critique of both the Olympian gods and the heroic ethic, yet (2) most ancient authors largely misunderstood these aspects, and instead took Homer's epics to be defending the gods and the warrior ethic, then (3) in what sense is Homer a founder of “classical civilization,” as Ahrensdorf contends? If he was, in the main, so widely misinterpreted by the Greeks, it would be helpful for Ahrensdorf to unpack how to understand Homer's seemingly ambivalent influence—and here again a broader engagement with the literature on the mentalité of the archaic and classical Greeks would be useful. Without such an explanation, Homer's record as the educator of the Greeks seems suspect, so much so that Plato's Socrates could accuse him on the very counts (capricious gods and savage heroes) on which Ahrensdorf aims to acquit.
I conclude with a brief point on the subject of Achilles's love. Ahrensdorf claims that Achilles is surpassingly great not simply because of his powers, but because of how his passions lead him to suffer. Now if it is true that he “loves more deeply” (252), it strikes me as important that the main subject of his love is Patroclus, and that (for most ancient Greek authors) this love was undoubtedly homoerotic. While modern scholars are divided on the particulars of Achilles's feelings for Patroclus, we do not get any sense of this dimension of Achilles's love from Ahrensdorf, crucial as it was to sensibilities of classical civilization. But if Achilles's passion is so central to his exceptional heroism, then we might wonder: was Achilles's queer love the crucial spur to the human questioning of divine providence (which Ahrensdorf celebrates)? A discussion that brings the classical literature on the Achilles/Patroclus relationship into conversation with contemporary queer theory, read through Ahrensdorf's particular interpretive orientation, would likely be of interest to a wide audience.
