Since the publication in 1978 of Adam Smith's Lectures on Jurisprudence (Lectures), Report of 1762-1763 (LJ(A)) scholars have had access to the fullest known statement of his theory of property. Donald Winch (Reference Winch1978) and Knud Haakonssen (Reference Haakonssen1981) were among the first to gain access to these manuscripts housed at the University of Glasgow. A significant finding was that Smith explicitly linked his jurisprudence to his moral theory in a way which seriously called into question the idea that Smith was a follower of Locke on the theory of the origin of property (Winch Reference Winch1978, pp. 58-59; Haakonssen Reference Haakonssen1981, pp. 106-107). Following in their footsteps, I have in other published work attempted to argue that Smith's theory of property underpins both his use of the labor theory of value in the early and rude state and his cost of production theory which takes over as soon as labor becomes differentiated (Young Reference Young1995, Reference Young1997).
That there is a strong Humean influence on Smith's theory of morals is evident to anyone who has read The Treatise of Human Nature (THN) and the Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS). However, while this is true for Smith's theory of morals in general (and justice in particular), it is not the case with respect to his specific application of the theory in his account of property. As far as I know, Knud Haakonssen is the only commentator who has noticed such a connection, but he has not developed the point.
In this paper, I propose to argue that Smith's theory is best understood within a Humean philosophical framework. In particular, I will argue that Smith deploys Hume's empiricist epistemology and its associated non-teleological explanations of social phenomena in his theory of property. Seen in the light of Smith's critique of Hume's utilitarianism, Smith's theory becomes a much more thoroughly empiricist theory than Hume's in that the concept of beneficial unintended consequences is more explicitly developed as the empiricist answer to teleological theories. Smith's refined and expanded account of sympathy along with his theory of the impartial spectator operating within the framework of Hume's theory of the mind brought a unity and synthesis to the accounts of property previously on offer. Smith was able to explain the origin, evolution, and social utility of justice and property without recourse to teleological arguments, which presupposed a knowledge of the social function of property prior to any human idea of the concept. By synthesizing his moral philosophy with the natural law accounts of property he was also able to incorporate the idea that one had a natural right to the fruits of one's labor.
I. THE HUME CONNECTION
Equating justice with property, Hume began his account of property by arguing that justice is an artificial virtue. By this he means simply that it arises as a human convention; it is not in any sense original in human nature (THN 3.2.2.9). Since such conventions exist only in civil society, according to Nicholas Capaldi's account of Hume's theory, this is the sense in which justice is said to be an artificial virtue (p. 69). Human beings establish such conventions in daily social life without recourse to external, absolute standards. Benevolence, however, Hume treats as one of a number of natural virtues, that is, present in all societies whether they have developed the conventions associated with justice or not (THN 3.3.1). Although justice is an artificial virtue in this sense, Hume still considers it natural in the sense that “nature must furnish the materials [sentiments], and give us some notion of moral distinctions” (THN 3.2.2.25).
Hume divides his treatment into two questions: how the rules of justice are originally established and how we come to attach merit to the observance of these rules and demerit to their violation (THN 3.2.2.1). The first question is further subdivided into a general theory of the origin of justice and property, and a discussion of the origin of specific rules of assigning property rights. In this latter account Hume considers the typical pattern of the jurisprudence literature of rights arising from occupation, accession, tradition, prescription, and succession. In answering these questions Hume deploys three separate arguments.
As is well known, Hume's general theory rests on the twin pillars of the limited benevolence of human nature combined with scarcity of resources. When these conditions are present people learn from experience that their self interest is better served in the long run, and in the main, if they constrain their natural desire to have more by protecting themselves from each other's encroachment on their possessions. While Hume insists that this arises, “by a convention enter'd into by all the members of the society” it is, however, “not of the nature of a promise” (THN 3.2.2.9, 10). As he has already observed a few paragraphs previously:
But in order to form society, ‘tis requisite not only that it be advantageous, but also that men be sensible of its advantages; and ‘tis impossible, in their wild uncultivated state, that by study and reflection alone, they shou'd ever be able to attain this knowledge (THN 3.2.2.4).
This presents a conundrum in that knowledge of the advantages of society, which seems to be necessary to form society, cannot arise in the absence of society itself. Hume's way out of this, as Haakonssen and others have argued, is to present an unintended consequences theory (1981, p. 20). Thus, the emergence of society must be explained as an unintended consequence of something else, some immediate necessity, the “natural appetite between the sexes” (THN 3.2.2.4). In similar fashion, “the rule concerning stability of possession . . . arises gradually, and acquires force by a slow progression, and by our repeated experience of the inconviencies of transgressing it” (THN 3.2.2.10). In this way justice is like language and money: human conventions that arise unplanned out of experience. Hume, as a leading light in the Scottish Enlightenment, is offering what we would call an “unintended consequences” theory, or as Donald Livingston puts it, “A Humean convention is not the result of conscious agreement but is arrived at over time as the unintended result of man's involvement with the world and with his fellows” (p. 4). Moreover, it is not our ideas, but rather our impressions that lead us to the sense of justice (THN 3.2.2.20). That all ideas derive from impressions, Livingston has called Hume's “First Principle,” and we see it at work here in his account of justice (p. 60).
To explain the quality of moral approval or disapproval people come to attach to the observance or violation of the rules established in this way, Hume develops his seminal account of moral approbation in his doctrine of sympathy, which need not be fully explicated here. For our present purposes we may observe that sympathy provides Hume with the impression necessary to derive this sense of justice, the idea of property as a moral relation. At this point Hume asserts that although, “self-interest is the original motive to the establishment of justice . . . a sympathy with public interest is the source of the moral approbation, which attends that virtue” (THN 3.2.2.24). In this way we derive pleasure or pain from what promotes the pleasure or pain of others in society even when our own interest is not involved. In Hume's view this is the only way we can account for moral approbation when it is the system of justice as a whole, not each individual act, which is socially useful. Indeed, in particular cases it may seem that actions which violate the rules may be seen as more just (THN 3.2.2.22).
Hume postpones to the next part of the Treatise his full treatment of the doctrine of sympathy, but there is some evidence that he was never satisfied with this account. The whole question, for example, received more cursory treatment in the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (Hume Reference Hume, Selby-Bigge and P. H.1777, hereafter EPM) where he simply asserts that justice derives its moral quality from “reflections on the beneficial consequences of this virtue” (EPM III.I.145). Sympathy there seems to be equated to, “the natural sentiment of benevolence” which causes us to be concerned about, “the interests of mankind and society” (EPM V.II.187). Duncan Forbes, for example, suggests that he, “retreated from the suggestive and original analysis of sympathy in the Treatise” (p. 15).
We come now to Hume's treatment of the emergence of particular rules for assigning property rights. He begins:
Tho’ the establishment of the rule, concerning the stability of possession, be not only useful, but even absolutely necessary to human society, it can never serve to any purpose, while it remains in such general terms. Some method must be shown, by which we distinguish what particular goods are to be assign'd to each particular person, while the rest of mankind are excluded from their possession and enjoyment (THN 3.2.3.1).
It is here that Hume takes up the traditional discussion of occupation, accession, prescription, tradition, and succession both in the main text and in a series of lengthy footnotes. Here we encounter minutiae relevant to the assignment of rights, such as when exactly are we deemed to possess an animal we have caught or are chasing, which cannot be addressed by an appeal to reason or public interest (THN 3.2.3.73n.1). Hume, then, falls back on the theory of causation and the association of ideas in the imagination, which he developed in the first book of the Treatise. I take up this aspect of Hume's theory in more detail below. Suffice it to say here that property is a relation between a person and things which the imagination comes to view as closely connected in the same way as the mind learns to connect two events when it makes a causal judgment. Hume's approach to the three questions on the origins of property in general, the sense of morality attached to it, and the derivation of the particular rules for assigning property rights to particular individuals provide the elements of the theory that will be of importance in what follows on Smith. Thus, the utilitarian account of justice as a social convention arising without intentional forethought, concern for the general well-being of others, and the theory of the association of ideas were seminal to Smith in the development of his theory.
As did Hume, Smith begins by distinguishing between the virtues of justice and benevolence. However, Hume's lengthy discussion of the artificiality of justice is missing in Smith's account. Both justice and benevolence are treated as natural. Smith certainly agrees with Hume that the rules of justice are human conventions that arise gradually in society, and Hume agrees that justice is natural in the sense that the sentiments which give rise to justice are natural in humans. The distinction is, therefore, not of great importance in that they both agree that justice is of human origin and that it must be explained in terms of universal characteristics of human nature.
In the Lectures on Jurisprudence (LJ), Smith relates these two virtues to perfect and imperfect rights respectively, thus linking his account explicitly to the natural law tradition going back via Hutcheson to Pufendorf, a maneuver which Hume eschews (LJ(A) i.14). Also, contra Hume, Smith separates his treatment of justice from that of property. Justice is taken up in his general theory of the moral sentiments, while the property is taken up as a category of natural rights, within the general concept of justice. Like Hume, Smith has both a general and a specific account. However, the general account runs under the category of “justice,” while the specific account is treated as “property.” Smith also follows the traditional categories of occupation, accession, tradition, prescription, and succession, but his account of the origin of property falls within these categories. Smith accepts Hume's general account based on scarcity as we see him noting, for example, that air, running water, and the sea cannot become property because “they cannot be lessened or impaired by use, nor can anyone be injured by the use of them,” but fisheries being “not unexhaustible” can legitimately be protected from encroachment (LJ(A) i.60, 63). Smith's approach, based on injury, thus presupposes Hume's general theory.
In the Lectures when Smith takes up the right of property he begins by noting that Property, or dominium, is a right to a particular thing, or real right, by which “a man has the sole claim to a subject, exclusive of all others, but can use it himself as he thinks fit, and if he pleases abuse or destroy it” (LJ(A), 1.17). In taking up the origin and development of the institution of property, Smith first notes that property rights present:
the only case where the origin of naturall rights is not altogether plain . . . It does not at first appear evident that, e.g. any thing which may suit another as well or better than it does me, would belong to me exclusively of all others barely because I have got it into my power; as for instance, that an apple, which no doubt may be as agreeable and as useful to an other as it is to me, should be altogether appropriated to me and all others excluded from it merely because I had pulled it off the tree (LJ(A), 1.25; emphasis added).
Property is not a self-evident idea. It is not an innate idea or deducible from self-evident propositions. Smith implies here that rationalist theories of the type found particularly in Locke will not work. As in the case of the moral sentiments generally, the idea of property, or of an exclusive privilege, must first arise in the course of human experience. The passage also suggests Smith's discontent with the utilitarian approach. It is not clear that assigning rights to a person who has less use for the object than someone else will in fact turn out to help constitute a system of rights that will maximize social utility.
Having thus explained acquisition of an exclusive right or privilege in an object for which another person may have a greater need, Smith goes on to discuss five ways in which a person may acquire property: occupation, tradition (that is, voluntary transfer), accession (by which minerals under the ground belong to the owner of the surface), prescription (“by which a thing that has been for a long time out of the right owner's possession and in possession of another, passes in right to the latter” (LJ(A), 1.26)), and succession (inheritance) (LJ(A), 1.25-26). Of these, occupation, “by which we get anything into our power that was not the property of another before,” (LJ(A), 1.25) and accession deal with the origin of property and are the most relevant here.
In the hunting stage of society, property was only a very rudimentary concept attached to things immediately in a person's possession. In this stage, first possession or occupation is the origin of property rights. In his treatment of occupation, Smith states:
From the system I have already explain'd, you will remember that I told you we may conceive an injury was done when an impartial spectator would be of opinion he was injured, would join with him in his concern and go along with him when he defended the subject in his possession against violent attack, or used force to recover what had been thus wrongly wrested out of his hands . . . The spectator would justify the first possessor in defending and even in avenging himself when injured . . . The cause of this sympathy or concurrence betwixt the spectator and the possessor is, that he enters into his thoughts and concurs in his opinion that he may form a reasonable expectation of using the fruit or whatever it is in what manner he pleases....The reasonable expectation therefore which the first possessor furnishes is the ground on which the right of property is acquired by occupation (LJ(A), i.36-37; LJ(B), pp. 150, 181-82).
In this passage, Smith establishes the general principle that a person acquires property by occupation if an impartial spectator would sympathize with his belief that he has a reasonable expectation of use which, if denied, would cause him an injury. He thus places his theory of the origin of the right of property squarely within his moral theory. Other than the well-known fact that Smith's moral theory in general incorporates strong influences from Hume, there is no trace here of a specifically Humean influence other than the hint, noted above, that a proper explanation must be empiricist, not rationalist.
However, as he proceeds to take up the forms of acquisition of property rights we find the following with respect to occupation (first possession):
At first property was conceived to end as well as to begin with possession. They conceived that a thing was no longer ours in any way after we had lost the immediate property of it. A wild beast we had caught, when it gets out of our power is considered as ceasing to be ours. But as there is some greater connection betwixt the possessor who loses possession of the thing he had obtained than there was before he obtain'd property was considered to extend a little farther, and to include not only those animalls we then possessed but also those we had once possessed though they were then out of our hands, that is, so long as we pursued them, and had a probability of recovering them (LJ(A) i.41; emphasis added).
Still speaking of possession as the basis of property Smith notes that among a nation of shepherds, “They would not easily conceive a subject of such extent as land is, should belong to an object so little as a single man. It would more easily be conceived that a large body such as a whole nation should have property in land” (LJ(A) i. 49; emphasis added).
Continuing to relate the difficulty people must have encountered in attaching the idea of property to land, Smith notes that, “the country people are so wedded to the notion that property in land continues no longer than the crop is on the ground that there is no possibility of getting them to observe it” (LJ(A) i. 53; emphasis added).
Moving on to accession, Smith again notes that, “The action of conceiving, bearing, bringing forth, and suckling appear to produce a much stronger connection betwixt the young and the mother than the transitory act of begetting does with the fathers” (LJ(A) i. 64-65; emphasis added). With respect to subterranean rights, “the connection betwixt the surface and the subterraneous parts is so great that it would soon come to be the rule that every thing betwixt the surface and to the center of the earth, if he could go so far, should be the property of the owner of the surface” (LJ(A) i. 66; emphasis added).
Similar reasoning applies to prescription, the idea that property arises out of long possession regardless of whether the original claim is legitimate: “It is necessary that the possessor should be bona fide, that is, should have an opinion that he is the lawfull proprietor of the subject; if he knows that it belongs to another the greatest length of time can not give him the property of it” (LJ(A) i. 77; emphasis added).
These passages suggest that property is an opinion, or idea, formed in the mind of both the agent and the spectator. More specifically property itself refers to the things owned, but the concept of ownership itself and the conventions by which a thing becomes property ultimately rest on subjective opinions of the agents involved. Thus, judgments about property are based on habits that arise as people observe how their fellows behave toward such things as the fruits of their labor.Footnote 1 As in the case of all ideas in empiricist epistemology, these opinions arise from concrete experience of both the external world (impressions of the five senses) and the internal impressions of the mind (feelings the mind experiences). The agent in the form of the possessor forms the expectation of being able to use the fruits of his labor along with other forms of possessions acquired through accession or prescription. The spectator, through the process of imaginative sympathy developed at length in TMS, concurs in the agent's expectation. His sympathy with the agent's claim to exclusivity makes such claims reasonable, and his sympathy with the agent's resentment toward one who violates the agent's exclusive right gives rise to the moral sentiment of justice attached to these opinions. Moreover, these opinions are formed as a result of strong connections formed in the mind from observation of closely conjoined objects. The idea of property crops up when a third party breaks these connections between the agent and the possessor in such a way that arouses the resentment of the possessor and the sympathy of the spectator with the resentment. In short, property arises out of the Humean association of ideas by which the agent and the spectator form these connections and expectations, giving rise to the idea of an exclusive privilege. Thus, the account of property rests crucially on the Humean theory of the mind, and the account develops in terms of the evolution of the cognitive faculties of the mind.
This may appear to be an overly speculative reading of Smith's text, as no mention is made of public utility, which plays such a prominent role in Hume's account. Nor does Smith make much of the natural/artificial distinction, preferring the natural/adventitious dichotomy found in Pufendorf and his intellectual offspring. Moreover, the secondary literature is virtually silent on such a connection between Hume and Smith in this particular area. However, Hume's general influence on Smith is well documented, and Smith's explicit development of Hume's theory of the imagination in the History of Astronomy is also known (Raphael Reference Raphael and Morice1977, pp. 27-28). In addition, E. C. Mossner, Hume's biographer noted that, “Only within the small circle of Edinburgh intellectuals was his genius fully appreciated, though not fully approved, and of that intimate group his closest friend Adam Smith gave the nod of whole-hearted approval” (pp.4-5).
To my knowledge Haakonssen is the only one who has noticed Smith's use of the association of ideas in his explanation of the emergence of property and its evolution through the four stages of development (1981, pp. 107-108; 1993, p. 213). However, unlike the account I have offered, Haakonssen only mentions the use of Hume's principle of association in passing. He does not comment upon Smith's use of the principle, nor does he show how Smith's account relies on Hume's theory of the development of the mind. I have tried to show in some detail the use of Humean language at key points in Smith's account. Significantly this language reveals not only the use of Hume's principle of association but reveals an underlying Humean epistemology in that property and its evolution is explained in terms of the development of the human mind. Just as Hume famously asserted that political authority rested on “opinion,” Smith makes the same claim about the way property rights evolved. Indeed, Hume notes that property is one of the “opinions” on which political authority rests (Haakonssen Reference Haakonssen1994, p. 16).
Therefore, my case rests primarily on an examination of the parallel discussion in Hume's Treatise. Having first explained his theory of the origin of the virtue of justice, Hume takes up the question of the emergence of the specific rules which govern property. It is here where we find the discussion of first possession (occupation), accession, prescription, and succession. Concerning first possession Hume states:
There remains nothing, but to determine exactly, what is meant by possession; and this is not so easy as may at first sight be imagin'd. We are said to be in possession of any thing, not only when we immediately touch it, but also when we are so situated with respect to it, as to have it in our power to use it; and may move, alter, or destroy it according to our present pleasure or advantage. This relation, then, is a species of cause and effect; and as property is nothing but a stable possession, deriv'd from the rules of justice, or the conventions of men, ‘tis to be consider'd as the same species of relation (THN 3.2.3.7; emphasis added).
Cause and effect, Hume has previously argued, arises out of a particular feeling in the mind of necessity upon the repeated experience of two objects following in close succession (THN 1.3.14). Property, as all ideas, must arise from impressions in the mind. In this way Hume uses the association of ideas to explain the emergence of the idea of property within his general theory of the mind.
Hume inserts a footnote into his discussion of occupation which takes up Locke's labor theory. One of his objections to Locke is that, “We cannot be said to join our labour to any thing but in a figurative sense. Properly speaking, we only make an alteration on it by our labour. This forms a relation betwixt us and the object; and thence arises the property, according to the preceding principles” (THN 3.2.3.6n; emphasis added). Here the language is strikingly similar to Smith's quoted above. To reinforce the subjective nature of property as an idea arising in the imagination we find that with prescription the mere passage of time gives rise to a right of property, “But as ‘tis certain, that, however every thing be produc'd in time, there is nothing real, that is produc'd by time; it follows, that property being produc'd by time, is not any thing real in the objects, but is the offspring of the sentiments, on which alone time is found to have any influence” (THN 3.2.3.9; emphasis added).
Hume is even more explicit in his treatment of accession: “Where objects are connected in the imagination, they are apt to be put on the same footing, and are commonly suppos'd to be endow'd with the same qualities. We readily pass from one to the other, and make no difference in our judgments concerning them” (THN 3.2.3.10).
Associated with this paragraph is a long clarifying footnote in which he observes that it “is nothing but an effect of the relations of ideas, and of the smooth transition of the imagination” (THN 3.2.3.n75.4). He concludes this long footnote with the old case of distinguishing between the claims of labor and those of the owner of the materials with which the labor is combined. One solution offered was that a metal cup should belong to the owner of the metal because it could be returned to its original form, while a ship would not belong to the owner of the wood for the opposite reason.
But however ingenious this reason may seem, it plainly depends upon the fancy, which by the possibility of such reduction, finds a closer connexion and relation betwixt a cup and the proprietor of its metal, than betwixt a ship and the proprietor of its wood, where the substance is more fix'd and unalterable (THN 3.2.3.n75.15; emphasis added).
The aesthetic sensibilities of the mind are also operative as “the mind . . . finds a kind of fitness and uniformity in such an union” (THN 3.2.3.n75.2). The mind finds aesthetic pleasure in uniting the principle with its accession. Smith expresses a similar perspective when discussing the very same phenomena (the propriety of accessions) he notes:
It would appear ridiculous that the milk of an animall should remain common, after the animall had been tamed and appropriated by a certain person; we are naturally inclined to compleat or square ones property or any other right in the same manner as we would incline to square his land estate; we do not incline to have corners sticking into it (LJ(A) i.64).
For Smith also, the mind's aesthetic sensibilities enter into the determination of property in cases of accessions.
Taken as a whole, we see a striking similarity in language between Hume and Smith when we examine their respective discussions of the very same phenomena, namely, the acquisition of property rights through occupation (first possession), accession, and prescription. The evidence that Smith is using Hume's theory of the imagination and the association of ideas is strong. However, unlike Hume, Smith's impartial spectator theory unifies his general account (that of justice in TMS) with his specific account (that of property in the Lectures). Hume's theory of the imagination is combined with the sympathetic sensibilities of the spectator to create a uniform account of justice and property.
To this I would add two further points. First, that they both were trying to answer the same question within the same framework, and, second, that they both rejected for similar reasons contractarian theories.
In his recent book, David Raphael notes that Hume's ethical theory, “as a whole is the most important example of empiricist moral philosophy” (2001 p. 87). Following Hutcheson, both Smith and Hume grounded the moral sentiments in the experience of sense and feeling. As Smith states in The Theory of Moral Sentiments:
But though reason is undoubtedly the source of the general rules of morality, and of all the moral judgments which we form by means of them; it is altogether absurd and unintelligible to suppose that the first perceptions of right and wrong can be derived from reason, even in those particular cases upon the experience of which the general rules are formed. These first perceptions, as well as all other experiments upon which any general rules are founded, cannot be the object of reason, but of immediate sense and feeling . . . If virtue, therefore, in every particular instance, necessarily pleases for its own sake, and if vice as certainly displeases the mind, it cannot be reason, but immediate sense and feeling, which, in this manner, reconciles us to the one, and alienates us from the other (TMS VII.iii.2.7).
Justice being a moral virtue, the empiricist agenda requires one to explain its emergence as a socially useful virtue in terms of immediate sense and feeling. The same may be said of the moral quality we attach to the relation of property. In the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, Hume states the problem thus:
The social virtues must, therefore, be allowed to have a natural beauty and amiableness, which at first, antecedent to all perception or education, recommends them to the esteem of uninstructed mankind and engages their affections. And as the public utility of these virtues is the chief circumstance whence they derive their merit, it follows that the end which they have a tendency to promote must be some way agreeable to us and take hold of some natural affection. It must please either from considerations of self-interest or from some generous motives and regards (EPM V.I.173).
Smith gives a famous, succinct statement of the problem in The Wealth of Nations (WN) when he says that, “This division of labour, from which so many advantages are derived, is not originally the effect of any human wisdom, which foresees and intends that general opulence to which it gives occasion” (WN I.ii.1). Hume and Smith both are searching for what we today would call a spontaneous order or unintended consequences theory. Property and justice have clear social utility. However, they are moral relations, which, like all ideas, must arise from experience—“immediate sense and feeling.” The social utility cannot be experienced before the relations of justice and property exist, and the latter cannot exist until they arise in the mind.
The problem may also be understood in terms of efficient and final causes, as Smith lays it out in The Theory of Moral Sentiments. In a world where, “we observe the means adjusted with the nicest artifice to the ends which they are intended to produce” (TMS II.ii.3.4), when it comes to understanding social life, phenomena produced by the actions of the mind, we are likely to confuse ends and means and to suppose that knowledge of the ends is the explanation for the emergence of the means.
But though, in accounting for the operations of bodies, we never fail to distinguish in this manner the efficient from the final cause, in accounting for those of the mind we are very apt to confound these two different things with one another. When by natural principles we are led to advance those ends, which a refined and enlightened reason would recommend to us, we are very apt to impute to that reason, as to their efficient cause, the sentiments and actions by which we advance those ends, and to imagine that to be the wisdom of man, which in reality is the wisdom of God (TMS II.ii.3.4).
The passage actually occurs in the context of Smith's critique of Hume, but we will take that up below in Part II. Here the point is that the empiricist must eschew teleological explanations and account for moral phenomena in terms of their efficient causes, a point on which Hume and Smith are fully agreed.Footnote 2 The social utility of justice and property, the final cause, must be a perception of the mind that follows the perception of the immediate sentiments attached to possession and expectation of use, namely, resentment and injury. Smith believed his explanation was superior to Hume's. However, it is not the case that Hume failed to understand or state the problem. Thus, their respective theories of property must be seen as sharing a common explanatory problem.
That Smith followed Hume closely in his arguments against contractarian theories of rights and government adds further support to my claim that Smith's theory builds on Hume's foundations. Hume concludes his essay, “Of the Original Contract” (Haakonssen Reference Haakonssen1994), by observing that with regard to morals the only standard or test of accuracy is an appeal to “general opinion . . . And nothing is a clearer proof, that a theory of this kind is erroneous, than to find, that it leads to paradoxes, repugnant to the common sentiments of mankind, and to the practice and opinions of all nations and ages.” The original contract is “plainly of this kind,” as its conclusions apply only to “this island” (p. 200). The essay was originally published in 1748, and Smith follows it closely in the Lectures (LJ(B) pp. 15-18).
In this section I have attempted to lay out the evidence for my claim that Smith's theory of property builds on Hume's. They shared a common empiricist epistemology which required them to explain the emergence of property as an idea derived from experience. Smith constructed his spectator theory of property using Hume's association of ideas to explain how the idea of property could arise prior to a perception of its utility. They rejected teleological and rationalist explanations as they could not account for the moral relation of property in terms of its efficient causes. They regarded the theory of the original contract to be empirically false.
II. SMITH'S CRITIQUE OF HUME
In developing the theory of the impartial spectator Smith advanced a theory of the moral sentiments within the Humean empiricist framework, which he thought superior to the master's. In brief, Hume's solution to the empiricist problem of giving a non-teleological account of the virtue of justice turns on each agent's ability to sympathize with the general well being of society.
Thus, in whatever light we take this subject, the merit, ascribed to the social virtues, appears still uniform, and arises chiefly from that regard, which the natural sentiment of benevolence engages us to pay to the interests of mankind and society. If we consider the principles of the human make, such as they appear to daily experience and observation, we must a priori, conclude it impossible for such a creature as man to be totally indifferent to the well or ill-being of his fellow-creatures, and not readily, of himself, to pronounce, where nothing gives him a particular bias, that what promotes their happiness is good, what tends to their misery is evil, without any further regard or consideration . . . These seem necessary and infallible consequences of the general principles of human nature, as discovered in common life and practice (EPM V.II.187).
The problem with the particular case of justice is that the utility of the virtue lies in the observance of the system of justice as a whole “concurred in by the whole, or the greater part of the society.” Thus, “every man, in embracing the virtue [of justice] must have an eye to the whole plan or system, and must expect the concurrence of his fellows in the same conduct and behaviour” (EPM App.III. 256).Footnote 3 Then Hume makes one final observation, “that after the laws of justice are fixed by views of general utility, the injury . . . which result to any individual from a violation of them, enter very much into consideration, and are a great source of that universal blame which attends every wrong or iniquity” (EPM App. III. p. 260).
Smith was not satisfied with Hume's solution to the problem. Smith essentially turned this last observation around and made resentment with injury in particular cases the basis of the virtue of justice. Deploying the spectator theory in the relevant passages on property, Smith makes injury to the possessor and the spectator's resentment toward the offender the basis upon which the close connection between agent and possession becomes the moral relation of property. These feelings arise naturally in human beings independently of and prior to any perception of their social utility. In this way Smith is able to show how an idea, such as property, which promotes social utility, arises from impressions, thus abiding by Hume's “First Principle.” To do so he made two significant improvements on Hume. First, he clarified the nature of sympathy by which an agent's feelings are communicated to the spectator, and, second, he clarified the role of utility in making moral judgments.Footnote 4
Commentators have pointed out that Smith uses the term “sympathy” to mean different things. James Otteson, for example, notes that Smith uses it in three different senses: natural fellow-feeling, pity, and correspondence of sentiments (p. 17; see also Raphael, Reference Raphael1985, p. 29). It is the latter meaning that is significant in Smith's theory, and he uses the very first chapter of The Theory of Moral Sentiments to develop it.
Pity and compassion are words appropriated to signify our fellow-feeling with the sorrow of others. Sympathy, though its meaning was, perhaps, originally the same, may now, however, without much impropriety, be made use to denote our fellow-feeling with any passion whatever (TMS I.i.1.5).
By means of sympathy, “Whatever is the passion which arises from any object in the person principally concerned, an analogous emotion springs up, at the thought of his situation, in the breast of every attentive spectator” (TMS I.i.1.4; emphasis added). For Smith sympathy is not a passion or a feeling.Footnote 5 It is a technical concept which simply denotes that the spectator and agent have experienced the same passion when the spectator imaginatively changes places with the agent. The spectator's passion is a sympathetic copy of the original. In the process, a passion has been communicated from one to the other.
Since in Smith's sense sympathy can apply to any emotion whatsoever, he is able to explain the origin of justice in terms of the spectator's sympathy with the resentment (an unsocial passion) of the agent principally concerned. Thus, Smithian sympathy can explain where the impressions come from that lead us to form moral concepts in general and justice in particular. As we have seen above, it is a simple step from here to explaining the origin of the idea of property based on first possession in the early and rude state.
Smith's innovative use of the concept of sympathy intersects with his general, more extensive, critique of Hume's theory of the central role of utility in moral judgment. While Smith's original theory of the role of utility in moral approbation is beyond the scope of the present paper, an important conclusion is that the:
love of system, the same regard to the beauty of order, of art and contrivance, frequently serves to recommend those institutions which tend to promote the public welfare . . . From a certain spirit of system, however, from a certain love of art and contrivance, we sometimes seem to value the means more than the end, and to be eager to promote the happiness of our fellow-creatures, rather than from a view to perfect and improve a certain beautiful and orderly system, than from immediate sense or feeling of what they either suffer or enjoy (TMS IV.1.11).
It is not the utility of the system as promoter of public welfare that engages our moral sentiments. Rather it is “love of system” which engages us aesthetically that we are led to promote the public good. Rather than sympathizing with the people whose lives are made better we are carried away by the beauty of the thing.
With respect to the role of utility in explaining the virtue of justice, Smith similarly rejects Hume's position. After summarizing Hume's theory, Smith observes that, “All men, even the most stupid and unthinking, abhor fraud, perfidy, and injustice, and delight to see them punished. But few men have reflected upon the necessity of justice to the existence of society, how obvious soever that necessity may appear to be” (TMS II.ii.3.10). For Smith, it is the particulars of each case, not the system as a whole, which are important. This is because:
our regard for the multitude is compounded and made up of the particular regards which we feel for the different individuals of which it is composed . . . so when a single man is injured, or destroyed, we demand the punishment of the wrong that has been done to him, not so much from a concern for the general interest of society, as from a concern for that very individual who has been injured (TMS II.ii.3.10).
However, in the next paragraph we find a concession to Hume: “Upon some occasions, indeed, we both punish and approve of punishment, merely from a view to the general interest of society, which, we imagine, cannot otherwise be secured. Of this kind are all punishments inflicted for breaches of what is called either civil police, or military discipline” (TMS II.ii.3.11). In a case of military discipline, which actually occurred, a sentinel was put to death for falling asleep on his watch (Raphael Reference Raphael1972, p. 95).
A centinel, for example, who falls asleep upon his watch, suffers death by the laws of war, because such carelessness might endanger the whole army. This severity may, upon many occasions, appear necessary, and for that reason, just and proper. When the preservation of an individual is inconsistent with the safety of a multitude, nothing can be more just than that the many should be preferred to the one (TMS II.ii.3.11).Footnote 6
As Raphael has shown, though, this is the exception which proves the rule, because the spectator feels differently about this case compared to the norm, even though he approves of the punishment (1972, p. 95; 2001, p. 123). As Smith explains:
Yet this punishment, how necessary soever, always appears to be excessively severe. The natural atrocity of the crime seems to be so little, and the punishment so great, that it is with great difficulty that our heart can reconcile itself to it. Though such carelessness appears blamable, yet the thought of this crime does not naturally excite any such resentment, as would prompt us to take such dreadful revenge. A man of humanity must recollect himself, must make an effort, and exert his whole firmness and resolution, before he can bring himself either to inflict it, or to go along with it when it is inflicted by others (TMS II.ii.3.11).
In the Lectures Smith precedes the sentinel case with an example of a law, the prohibition of the exportation of wool from England, which was supposed to serve public utility. However, “This exportation was no crime at all, in naturall equity, and was very far from deserving so high a punishment [death] in the eyes of the people; they therefore found that while this was the punishment they could get neither jury nor informers” (LJ(A) ii.94; LJ(B) p. 182).
“In this instance,” says Raphael, “the thought of social utility was clearly overridden by the idea of justice or ‘natural equity’” (2001, p. 125).
In Smith's view, then, the program of grounding morality in “immediate sense and feeling” must ultimately rule out utility as the basis of the virtue of justice. Furthermore, Smith's solution is wholly within the epistemological constraints Hume himself set out. In a sense it is more thoroughly Humean than Hume as it rids the theory of all vestiges of teleology.
III. CONCLUSION
As Christopher Berry has shown, many of the key features of both Hume's and Smith's thinking were commonplace in the intellectual milieu of the Scottish Enlightenment (1997). The theory of unplanned order, the empiricism of Locke's Essay, the historical approach via the four stages theory, and the relation of this to the development of the human mind were all shared widely in this remarkable group. However, Hume and Smith were clearly seminal figures, and it was Hume's system that was the most immediate influence on Smith. In emphasizing the Humean connection, I do not want to completely ignore or downplay the Protestant natural law heritage on which Smith draws. As I have mentioned in the text, Smith, following Hutcheson's teaching, places his property rights discourse squarely in the natural law tradition going back particularly to Pufendorf. He is, thus, able to synthesize natural law and natural rights with the Humean philosophical system. In doing so he was also able to offer a solution to Hutcheson's problem of synthesizing the moral sense theory with natural law.Footnote 7 This, in turn, provides a framework within which to analyze the historical development of law and government with the four stages theory. These are important aspects of Smith's account, which also reveal his true originality. However, a full development of these historical antecedents and Smith's use of them is beyond the scope of the present paper.
What I have argued for in this paper is that we should understand Smith's theory of property within his larger project of developing and refining Hume's theory of the moral sentiments, while accepting Hume's theory of the mind. Within this framework Hume clearly understood that justice (property) could only be explained as an unintended consequence of sympathetic feeling which arose spontaneously in certain contexts of common life. Smith, however, was unconvinced by certain key parts of Hume's explanation of how sympathy for public utility could arise in such contexts. As with Hume, Smith believed that property must be explained first in terms of the operation and development of the cognitive faculties of the human mind. As such, he deployed a Humean theory of the operation of the mind, and he did so more consistently and more satisfactorily than did Hume. This is an aspect of Smith's jurisprudence that has gone almost unnoticed in the literature. Haakonssen alone has noticed Smith's use of the principle of association, but the point is not developed. In this paper I have shown specifically how and where Smith uses Humean principles, and I have placed it in the larger context of Hume's and Smith's respective accounts of property.
