S. Adam Seagrave's The Foundations of Natural Morality is a terrific book. It is well researched, carefully and judiciously argued, lucidly written, and timely—though discussion of its subject matter could never be truly out of season.
It is also an admirably ambitious undertaking. As he thinks through long-standing disputes over the relation between natural-rights and natural-law doctrines, Seagrave offers constructive, illuminating contributions to diverse controversies philosophical and political, ranging from the first principles of moral and political life to selected public policies lately in dispute. In every case, he pays scrupulously respectful attention to contending arguments and writes with a view toward repairing or narrowing divisions and elevating the terms of debate.
The deepest of those controversies—those concerning the relations between moderns and premoderns, natural-rights and natural-law doctrines—have pitted scholars who view the respective terms as historically or philosophically continuous and mutually compatible against those who view them as discontinuous and incompatible. Seagrave proposes an alternative, the “discontinuity-compatibility position” (21), whereby both older contending positions, best represented by Jacques Maritain and Leo Strauss, appear partly right and partly wrong: Maritain is right that natural-rights modernity and natural-law premodernity are mutually compatible but wrong in thinking the former an evolutionary outgrowth of the latter, whereas Strauss is right in viewing natural-rights modernity as a philosophic break from natural-law premodernity but wrong in holding them mutually incompatible. In Seagrave's alternative, natural-rights modernity is indeed a new thing under the sun, resting on a historical and philosophic basis independent of the natural-law tradition, but to affirm the newer we need not reject the older. Their mutual compatibility yields the possibility of a composite position, the “natural morality” proclaimed in the book's title.
Ground zero in the controversy is the political philosophy of John Locke, who “uniquely bestrides the medieval and modern eras” (24). Locke supplies arms for opposing sides by presenting what appear to be two doctrines of justice in the Second Treatise of Government: a natural-law doctrine grounded on the premise that human beings are God's “workmanship,” thus God's property, and a natural-rights doctrine grounded on the premise of human self-ownership. Based on insightful analyses of Locke's ideas of rights, law, and property, Seagrave concludes that Lockean justice is grounded in “concurrent ownership”—joint divine and individual human ownership of each human person, with God making and owning our specific humanity and each of us making and owning our uniquely individuated selves (43–49). In Locke we find “an ingenious and promising inspiration” for the “reconciliation of ancient/medieval and modern conceptions of morality” (54).
To make good on the promise incompletely fulfilled by Locke himself, Seagrave undertakes his own inquiry into the grounds and justifications of natural-rights and natural-law arguments. His analysis of the idea of self-ownership as the basis for natural-rights claims earns a place among the most rigorous and intensive analyses of the concept to be found anywhere in the rights literature.
Following that is a complementary account of natural law, for the main elements of which Seagrave recurs to ancient and medieval sources (Aristotle, Cicero, and St. Thomas Aquinas). He prefers those old sources to the lately emergent “new natural law” school, whose proponents affirm the disjunction of “Is” and “Ought” propositions and thus reject nature-based moral reasoning. Seagrave contends that to affirm such reasoning is not necessarily to commit the naturalistic fallacy; embedded in human nature rightly understood is a “blueprint for action” from which the moral laws of nature are properly derived (90–92, 107–9, 119). No less provocatively, he argues that natural law is capable of standing on a purely natural foundation, independent of divine authority, and that natural law thus conceived is law proper, as its rules signify morally obligatory commands of an authoritative lawgiver (or its functional equivalent), sanctioned by natural rewards and punishments (117).
In the composite idea of natural morality in which the argument culminates, natural rights and natural law coexist in a mutually complementary, interdependent relation; neither element is reducible to or derivative of the other. In its still broader significance, this composite idea yields an interesting revision of the schematic history of political philosophy propounded by Leo Strauss. In the Straussian view, the turning point in that history appears as modern philosophers reject the nature-based moral reasoning characteristic of premoderns and adopt a convention-based approach. In Seagrave's revision, the salient difference between modern and premodern naturalists is that premoderns focus on the “supra-individualist” foundations of morality, consisting in the morally significant qualities in our common human nature, whereas moderns led by Hobbes and especially Locke focus on the moral significance of our individuation as unique selves (60, 132, 135). The implication, contra Strauss and other eminent thinkers of our age, is that not all modern thought is destined by its own ineluctable logic to end in radical conventionalism or antifoundationalism.
The Foundations of Natural Morality is a compact, elegantly argued book, dense with original and important insights. Questions do remain, however, concerning the completeness of its accounts of the lawfulness of natural law and the naturalness of both natural law and natural rights.
As to the claim that natural law is law proper, it seems defensible to argue that human nature stands as morally prior and superior to one's individual selfhood and thus may function as a kind of authoritative lawgiver. The claim that natural-law rules are sanctioned by effectual rewards and punishments immanent in the order of nature seems more problematic. The explanation that such punishment “consists primarily in alienation of oneself from one's nature” (95) needs fuller substantiation and defense to provide convincing support for the broader claim that the law is effectively sanctioned.
As to natural rights, questions arise concerning the basic Lockean idea of self-ownership through self-consciousness. How does the fact of self-consciousness justify us in the claim of a property in ourselves, as opposed to a mere possession—in a claim of moral right, that is, rather than of mere power? What role do our capacity and concernment for our own happiness—prominent in Locke's definition of the self but absent from Seagrave's account—play in enabling us to moralize our claim over ourselves?
A final question concerns the account of human nature upon which natural rights and natural law depend. Here Locke poses a problem extending well beyond the ambiguity of his writing. Seagrave's argument grounds natural law and natural rights in the twofold structure of human beings as members of a common species and as individual selves—a Lockean insight that Locke himself renders problematic by his direct attack, in Book III of An Essay concerning Human Understanding, on our ideas of substance and natural species. An explanation of how Locke's own idea of human nature, as well as those of Aristotle, Cicero, and Aquinas, can withstand that attack would further strengthen the book's argument.
Those questions notwithstanding, The Foundations of Natural Morality is all in all a most impressive achievement—impressive for any scholar at any stage and especially so for one so early in his career. It is a remarkably well educated, finely crafted, and in many ways ingenious effort. It should serve also as a salutary scholarly intervention. At a moment in the history of our discipline marked by the ascendancy of antifoundationalist thinking and by internal division and confusion among those who continue to inquire into moral and political foundations, students of political philosophy can learn much from Adam Seagrave's fine book, both about the possibility of recovering our rational foundations and about our prospects for governing ourselves without them.
