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Estimating Spatial Preferences from Votes and Text

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 May 2018

In Song Kim
Affiliation:
Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA. Email: insong@mit.EDU, URL: http://web.mit.edu/insong/www/
John Londregan
Affiliation:
Professor of Politics and International Affairs, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544, USA. Email: jbl@princeton.edu, URL: http://www.princeton.edu/∼jbl/
Marc Ratkovic*
Affiliation:
Assistant Professor, Department of Politics, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544, USA. Email: ratkovic@princeton.edu, URL: https://scholar.princeton.edu/ratkovic
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Abstract

We introduce a model that extends the standard vote choice model to encompass text. In our model, votes and speech are generated from a common set of underlying preference parameters. We estimate the parameters with a sparse Gaussian copula factor model that estimates the number of latent dimensions, is robust to outliers, and accounts for zero inflation in the data. To illustrate its workings, we apply our estimator to roll call votes and floor speech from recent sessions of the US Senate. We uncover two stable dimensions: one ideological and the other reflecting to Senators’ leadership roles. We then show how the method can leverage common speech in order to impute missing data, recovering reliable preference estimates for rank-and-file Senators given only leadership votes.

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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s) 2018. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Society for Political Methodology. 
Figure 0

Figure 1. Accounting for zero inflation. This figure presents the fitted values for the 38,585 cases of an observed zero count in the legislator-term matrix for a Poisson density over term counts (left) and SFA (right). Of these zero counts, SFA gives a fitted value of below one for 23,532 of them, versus 3037 for the Poisson model. The marginal density used by SFA better fits the zeros in this data than does the Poisson model.

Figure 1

Figure 2. Posterior density over number of underlying dimensions for the joint word and vote model. We find a pronounced mode at two dimensions consistently across Senates. The average across all Senates appears in the top left corner.

Figure 2

Figure 3. Log density of term weights, after scaling votes and terms together. The weights are oriented such that terms more likely to be spoken by Republicans are to the right. Each local mode is labeled by the terms closest to that mode. The left figure presents results from the Republican controlled 108th Senate, the right figure contains results from the Democratic-led 112th Senate.

Figure 3

Figure 4. Latent dimensions estimated by SFA, 112th Senate. Legislators’ preferred outcomes on the first dimension ($x$-axis) and the second ($y$-axis). The left plot labels party leaders, whips, and top chairmen. In the right plot cutting lines separate frequent from infrequent users, of the terms: Boehner, student loan and fiscal cliff.

Figure 4

Figure 5. Estimated underlying dimensionality for Senate floor speeches. Results across all sessions are in the top left corner and remaining sessions follow.

Figure 5

Figure 6. Extreme terms by dimension, 112th Senate. Extreme terms for the first six dimensions as estimated by SFA from the 112th Senate. The type size of each term is proportional to the absolute value of the associated coefficient; terms earning positive coefficients appear in the upper part of the panel, those assigned negative coefficients are presented in the lower segment.

Figure 6

Figure 7. Estimated ideology when only leaders votes are informative. The voting dimension estimates appear in the left panel, with the censored estimates measured on the vertical ($y$-axis) while the uncensored ones appear on the horizontal ($x$-axis). In the censored data the salience of the voting dimension drops, so that it becomes the second dimension. The right hand panel exhibits the leadership dimension, again the censored estimates correspond with the vertical ($y$-axis) and the uncensored ones coincide with the horizontal ($x$-axis).

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