This is an engaging and very significant book — if not always clear in its presentation. Its aim is to re-centre the study of Apuleius, away from the Metamorphoses to his other work, mainly what we think of as the philosophica, but also the Apologia and Florida, which turn out to be no less philosophical. Richard Fletcher in effect proposes a Kuhnian paradigm shift in which we kick the habit of arguing about Apuleius’ doctrinal consistency and look rather at how Apuleius through his method of presentation projects the image of the philosopher, or of Philosophy.
No one can pretend that the existing state of study of the ‘other’ works is ideal and, whilst they are quarantined, there is a great danger of inauthentic readings of the Met. As F. points out, the De Platone is read insensitively (and formulaically) as a ‘dry handbook’ (4, 31) and banished to a drab region of discourse called ‘Middle Platonism’ (4–5, crediting John Henderson). Apuleius’ philosophical commitment and skill are habitually demeaned in order to promote the more accessible literary-sophistic persona (8–9). The antidote to all this is to realize that in all of these ‘other’ works Apuleius engages in some mode of impersonation, making in effect narratological choices, to convey a philosophy with which, in a surprisingly total sense, he identifies.
I most enjoyed F.'s treatment (ch. 2) of the De Platone. F.'s key concept is ‘biographical exegesis’ (32), which is the particular way in which philosophy is ‘impersonated’ in this work. Though F. does not quite say it, Apuleius’ attitude is practically scriptural. Plato is constantly with us: he sentit, pronuntiat, commemorat, putat (78); we learn about his decreta (dogmata, but it comes out differently in Latin), and learn what he censet (82–4). Yes, these are dressed up reports of Platonic texts, but the effect is that the biographically-grounded Plato lives, walks and talks in these pages (84). Oddly, what may be missing from F.'s account at this point is more of an analysis of the voice of Apuleius-narrator, more of a sense of quis ille? This is an authoritative narrator, but one who pursues stylistic brevity in his narratio (and indeed exegesis) with studiously underplayed rhetoric. It would also now be interesting to know what F. might make of the alleged third book: see J. A. Stover, A New Work by Apuleius: The Lost Third Book of the De Platone (2015).
In ch. 3, F. rather oddly groups together the De mundo and the De deo Socratis to form ‘Apuleius’ Platonic Universe’. The De mundo offers what F. delights in calling a ‘catascopic’ perspective on the universe (for example, 110), that is top-down from the standpoint of God, who is here given shape and impact by Apuleius as the rector mundi (translated, unhelpfully, as ‘universal ruler’). It is only (personified) Philosophy that can reach these giddy heights and she is our exegete, just as Plato had been in the De Platone. Though Apuleius has made changes to the text of the ps.-Aristotelian De mundo and F. deals with those changes, I do worry that this text remains a translation and that some of F.'s discussion is of a borrowed narratology. The De deo Socratis is, on F.'s view, concerned with mediators rather than the ‘catascopic’ view from above (146): this is a question not just of that shuttle service, that navette, of demons, but also of the lofty voice of Plato (as in the De Platone) and the (demonic?) interpreter constituted by Apuleius himself.
Ch. 4 turns to the ‘rhetorical’ works — the Apologia and the Florida. Both have us step into the life of Apuleius: the biographical exegesis of the De Platone has now switched over to an autobiographical exegesis, even if the philosopher himself continues to impersonate Philosophy — and, in the Apologia, defends Philosophy by defending himself. Part of his armoury is a theatre of philosophical ‘masks’ — Odysseus, Minerva, Crates or Hercules. Even when he switches to issues of family (219–26), he continues as the philosophical instructor in a world of a culture which Aemilianus will never share — but in which the judge, Claudius Maximus, must conspire. The Florida present an obvious problem: we only have highlights of the epideictic speeches and do not really gain a sense of how they went as a whole. Nonetheless, F. ingeniously stresses their recourse to the autobiographic mode and their propensity for portraits of philosophers serving to recall Apuleius’ philosophical agenda from other works, most notably Pythagoras in quest of knowledge (236–41), who comes out as rather a placeholder for the Plato of the biography in the De Platone, also seeking knowledge through travel.
What is most evident from this book is how deep Apuleius’ Platonism runs. Everything he touches, every strategy he adopts is constructed through it. And in the last chapter, we turn to the elephant in the room: the astonishing, and deeply problematic, Metamorphoses. It is not a happy chapter. F. does not have the room to develop a clear interpretation; instead, he gives us an unclear interpretation, which is apparently to some extent consistent with Winkler's approach (J. J. Winkler, Auctor & Actor: a Narratological Reading of Apuleius's The Golden Ass (1985)), though the latter over-privileged (291) the sceptical-Socratic mode of Platonism. Likewise, Lucius is evidently the exegetical vehicle for the Met. but cannot be described as a philosopher (278). Maybe Lucius is like the Plato of the De Platone, seeking progress through his travels (292). Maybe it is all Winklerian hermeneutic games and maybe that is what philosophy is (293).
F.'s book is mind-changing and I think we need a chance to digest it if we are to engage with the task of understanding the Met. He has constructed a new and coherent Apuleius from texts that we do not read carefully enough, or indeed at all. His work, whatever problems one claims in a review like this, is highly original, stimulating and provocative. We can now read the ‘other’ works in a wholly different, and fruitful, way. Lector intende etc.
