It is never an easy task to write a book on a new legal phenomenon. One needs to overcome the intimidation often accompanying the feeling of full liberty in structuring an argument afresh being independent from the heavy constraints of heaps of literature, academic writings, and legal opinions, while simultaneously one senses the sacredness of deflowering a virgin territory. It might be an even less rewarding task to write a book on a new but fast-developing field. The risk of being outdated, of taking a snapshot of a frozen moment that is about to undergo transformation, keeps hovering throughout the long process of writing.
Eckes's book invites us to dive into the depths of the individual sanctions’ troubled water. Indeed, individual sanctions, since their very birth, became a spearhead in the arsenal kit of fighting international terrorism. However, it needs no reiteration that, with the UN decision to take ‘individual sanctions’, there was a paradigm shift in the United Nations as, for the first time, measures were taken against specific individuals and not against states. Namely, UN measures were voted by states that did not represent the particular individuals’ interests, which were directly affected by those measures. Thus, the individual sanctions brought the otherwise legitimate deliberative inter-governmental process of the United Nations into the realm of a quasi-constitutional and administrative practice that suffered from a serious legitimacy deficit. Indeed, Eckes's is the first book that tackles this thrilling issue of individual sanctions in such a comprehensive manner. The book manages to rise above both hurdles mentioned above while producing a well-written, long-lasting, original treatise. It constructs deep and sound foundations of the individual sanctions regime, providing a comprehensive analytical examination, in a manner that will surely accompany whoever will address, contemplate, or revisit this unique technique of fighting terrorism via imposition of individual sanctions in the future.
There are several strategic decisions that Eckes takes in construing her examination of the subject matter. First, she rightly distinguishes throughout the book between European sanctions implementing UN lists and between autonomous European sanctions. Second, she builds her argument mainly on three heads; one relates to the question of competences (Chapter 2); the second relates to the question of violation of the right of access to justice (Chapters 3 and 4); and the third relates to issues of legitimacy of judicial review by EU courts (Chapters 5 and 6). Finally, Chapter 7 takes a look into the future, searching for possible alternative practices to fight terrorism and exploring the question of whether individual sanctions could lawfully and legitimately be adopted under European law.
Regarding the issue of competences, Eckes reaches the conclusion that the European Union does not have competence to adopt individual sanctions. For those of us who focus more often on courts’ jurisprudence and less on normative layout, the first two chapters of the book are enlightening. They reveal a meticulous, careful, incisive sketch of the shape of the different layers of the sanctions’ regime. Eckes unveils the substantive historical transformation that the utilization of sanctions has undergone and then takes the reader through a three-dimensional labyrinth of the sanctions regime with its horizontal and vertical dimensions: UN resolutions, European legislation, and national implementing acts. Just as competence questions often are, this is a positivistic, careful black-letter reading of treaty provisions and other legal measures. The building blocks used by Eckes in her analysis are mostly positive texts, UN resolutions, EU regulations, courts’ judgments, and legal doctrines. Yet, Eckes manages to bring the issue to life, by not just looking at law in the books, but also supplying the reader with imminent insights into law in action.
It is interesting to make two observations already at this stage. First, although Eckes invests a great amount of time in discerning the international sanctions regime from the European one, she reaches the conclusion that the European Union lacks competences in relation to both spheres. Second, as Eckes sides with those who criticize the regime and question its effectiveness, she is not willing to undertake a traditional lawyer's task of shifting the argument from assessing validity and process to evaluating output and substance. Indeed, the book turns to examine the measures on their merits and further conducts a substantive examination of possible violation of human rights, but this is done without an attempt to tie together the competences issue and the substantive examination. There is no attempt to cover up the absence of competences by contenting oneself with the imperative need for responding to the pressing problem of fighting international terrorism. Indispensability is not perceived by Eckes as a legitimate excuse for acrobatically bending the Treaty provisions and is not offered as a justification for bypassing the careful construction of the horizontal and vertical division of competences in the complex structure of the Union.
In the following two chapters, Eckes turns to examine the ‘Kafka's challenge’ of the sanctions regime. In Chapter 3, she chooses the right of access to justice (mainly derived from Art. 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights) as the target of her examination of the legality of the measures. This choice is interesting, as, at its face value, this right, so might the argument run, is protected at its core meaning within the European sphere. As far as sanctions taken by the United Nations and implemented at the EU level are concerned, individuals may always challenge the legality of these measures before the Community's independent judges. Moreover, it is an interesting choice, as, in the main challenge of the legality of these measures before the European Court of Justice, in the Kadi case, it was the right of fair hearing, the right of effective judicial remedy, and the right of property that were found to be violated. The ECJ in Kadi did not rely, at least in its explicit rhetoric, either on Article 6 of the ECHR or on the European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence while ruling on these human rights violations. Yet, as Eckes carefully demonstrates, the right of access to justice is an overarching broad right that forms part of the right to a fair trial, encapsulated in Article 6 of the ECHR and broadly interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights. Many specific derivative rights – for example, the right of fair hearing and the right of effective judicial remedy – form part of this broader right. Hence, it is further recommended to read this chapter in conjunction with Chapter 6 of the book, in which one finds a comprehensive detailed analysis of the violations of those derivative human rights at the European level.
Interestingly, in Chapter 4, Eckes reaches the conclusion, by invoking the comparative-law method, that security implications ‘could qualify as acceptable restrictions of the right to justice, if they satisfy the test of proportionality in the individual case’ (p. 220). Eckes herself admits that the comparative method, invoked in this chapter, is loosely employed. The cases that are analysed deal with a wide spectrum of counterterrorist measures, some of which differ fundamentally from individual sanctions. Hence, for example, regarding the House of Lords’ jurisprudence, the book makes the choice of analysing rulings regarding orders relating to ‘non disclosure of evidence’ and regarding ‘torture’ (p. 201) while not analysing other cases that deal directly with individual sanctions against terrorists. Those cases, of course, did not escape Eckes's observant attention and are thoroughly analysed in another part of the book (p. 292). The cases addressed in Chapter 4 are intended only to give the reader the taste the extent to which restrictions on fundamental rights can be justified in the fight against terrorism. This examination casts a shadow over the radical approach according to which individual sanctions of freezing assets without prior warning and without ex ante procedure of contestation, by definition, violate human rights. At the end of the day, it seems that, in most domestic legal systems examined, these or similar measures could at least within a certain time frame be perceived as legal and could be justified under the security exception.
Finally, by placing the chapters concerning the possible violations of human rights before the analysis of the actual exercise of judicial review by the courts, Eckes makes us believe that there is a sterile answer to the question of whether individual sanctions indeed violate human rights. This answer is to be revealed independently of the institution that is called upon to exercise reviewing powers and in isolation of the circumstances in which the question is examined, by simply looking inwards at the human rights discourse at the European level. This is, of course, one possible philosophy of human rights that the book vehemently defends. Still, it disregards competing views of normative layering of human rights, depending on the context employed. Indeed, Eckes objects to the negative impact that international law might have on the European legal order, and she is supportive of the EU ‘exceptionalist’ vision. Although she does not directly confront the alternative possible line of argument at this stage of the book, her choice of sources seems to support the classical dichotomies of bipolar relationship between European law and international law and an unwillingness to adopt a multilayered, multifunctional, and multitasking approach towards this relationship. I will elaborate on this point shortly.
Chapters 5 and 6 analyse the judicial review of the European sanctions giving effect to UN lists of terrorist suspects and the protection of autonomous European sanctions, respectively. Undoubtedly, Chapter 6 is an excellent demonstration of Eckes's profound command of European law (issues, such as jurisdiction of the European courts, violation of European human rights, and comparative analysis with the European Court of Human rights, are embedded in rich European jurisprudence, contextualized, and examined from different perspectives). I would like to suggest below an alternative discourse to the one offered by Eckes in relation to Chapter 5, which takes a close look mainly at the Kadi case.
The Kadi case has gained by now the status of one of the most important landmark cases decided by the ECJ. The serious dilemma that the European courts (the Court of First Instance and the European Court of Justice) were faced with in Kadi was: what to do with foreign norms enacted by the United Nations, which are indispensable for the international community for maintaining peace and security at the global level, when they penetrate EU jurisdiction and violate European core norms. On the one hand, there is an important signal to be sent that the European Union (via its member states) takes all the necessary measures to ensure that the Union shoulders its obligations towards non-member countries in a globalized world. On the other hand, it was similarly obvious to the Court that these indispensable norms encroach on what it perceives as the core of the European Union's fundamental values. The existence of a conflict-of-laws was obvious.
More sophisticatedly, Kadi can be presented as dealing with the question of boundaries. What is the relationship between the international community and the European community? What is the boundary for the application of European fundamental rights and internationally recognized human rights? What is the role of the European Court of Justice in assessing international activity against terrorism? The book answers these questions while taking the traditional close look at both the international-law perspective and the European-law perspective. That, in and of itself, reflects the classical dualist–monist dichotomy. Eckes erects a precise legal structure. By closely examining, at the international level, Articles 2(6) and 103 of the UN Charter, a variety of SC resolutions, and the relevant provisions of the Vienna Convention of Law on the Treaties, Eckes adheres to an inward organic point of view, according to which it is the international legal order itself, and not an external theory, which defines the system's legal effects. Similarly, when she turns to the European level, the book puts into the spotlight the well-known story of the famous stream of precedents – that is, International Fruit Company, Germany v. Council, Centro Com, Bosphorus, etc. – cautiously smoothing out any allegedly possible inconsistencies, while searching for an authoritative objective correct definition of the relationship between the legal orders. The ECJ ruling in Kadi is praised, as it is ‘well supported by the European Treaties and [is] a consistent continuation of [the Court's] settled case-law confirming the autonomy of the European legal order’ (p. 260). Indeed, reading this chapter, one is exposed to a convincing neat architecture of the relationships between two separate autonomous legal orders.
As Eckes notes, the judgment of the European Court of Justice stirred both criticism and praise. Eckes sides with those who applaud the Court for insisting on the protection of human rights and for setting the human rights’ protection bar high while robustly defending fundamental principles. The ECJ is commended for stepping in and filling a gap while responding to the citizens’ interests and shielding their rights from the influence of undemocratic, unaccountable, and illegitimate decisions taken by an international organization. Tribute is paid to the ECJ's unwillingness to sacrifice individual liberties on the altar of public security.
Criticizers asserted that the Court was underscoring the autonomy and primacy of the EU legal order, taking a strong Eurocentric approach, and focusing on the constitutional role of the treaties. Eckes does not ignore this serious accusation, but rejects two possible solutions that frequently appear in the literature for solving this problem of overlapping international regimes that have a heterarchical (as opposed to hierarchical) character, and that I will turn to discuss below. It should also be mentioned that there are additional alternative solutions offered in the literature – such as employing technical choice-of-laws rules stemming from private international law – which the book does not address.
The first solution relates to the Solange II approach. According to the first pillar of the Solange II test, to the extent that the UN system takes human rights into account, the EU legal order would follow the measures adopted by the United Nations, even if another measure would have been more consistent with the EU constitutional tradition, ‘so long as’ – and that is the second pillar of the Solange II test – those measures do not systematically violate the ECJ's own understanding of European constitutional essentials. Eckes sides with those who argue that the ECJ in Kadi rejected possible application of the Solange II doctrine (p. 264), or at least argues that the ECJ was justified in ruling that the Solange II rationale was not met by the UN system (p. 268). This is mainly explained by the fact that a prerequisite of application of the Solange II doctrine is a vision of a common ideology and identity that is not shared by the United Nations and the European legal orders. Yet, Eckes does not explain why, despite its origins, the Solange II test cannot be interpreted as outgrowing the shared-values approach, allowing it to be applied also in more estranged pluralistic settings, accommodating overlapping international regimes while leaving enough manoeuvring discretion to the implementing judges and allowing them, in the appropriate constellation, to soften domestic (European) standards in order to cope with the complexity of international relations. A loose reading of the Solange II doctrine could imply that it provides mechanisms that affirm, support, and co-ordinate the coexistence of diverse rules in different fragmented legal orders without demanding harmonization of the substantive rules. The Solange II test seeks cross-fertilization, namely taking into account and making good the contents of the other system for the purposes of one's own system. It is a model that is based on implicit rules that incorporate the idea that there is a crucially defined outer limit of the ‘tolerance of difference’. Under such reading, the ECJ would be entitled to safeguard the essentials of the European legal order and to require the others to respect it. Namely, there is a point at which the interaction between the two legal orders is perceived as an unwelcomed intrusion that imposes undesired constraints by one system on the other and that should hence be rejected. These essentials – described by some as the constitutional identity of the system – do not rest on mutual agreement on any single comprehensive moral doctrine, and are the result of acknowledged persistent differences. Yet, each legal order is accorded the right to interpret these essential principles within broad limits. According this right to others makes the system viable. In my opinion, it is this mutual power of interpretation that plays an indispensable function within the Solange II test, and that increasingly plays an important role in multicultural societies and a globalized world. Indeed, the application of the Solange II test insinuates, to a certain extent, idealism, as the test attempts to underscore actual commonalities within an increasingly diverse world. However, unlike Eckes, I believe that the Court should have been able to overcome this hurdle.
Be that as it may, the perspective offered by the Solange II test, it should be admitted, is essentially ‘inward-looking’. Hence, the second critique of Kadi concerns the ECJ's attempt to painstakingly legally discern between the UN sanctions and the EU implementing regulation, and its endeavours to treat only the latter, while, in reality, the UN individual-sanctions regime blurred these foreign and European spheres and made them intricately connected. Europe's concerns, as the facts of the case demonstrate, are becoming increasingly global in character and orientation. Hence, it can be argued that the Court erred by stubbornly adhering to the foreign–domestic divide and by stripping its reasoning from more liberal, cosmopolitan features, which would have underscored the values and the role of universal rights. Such a post-national, rights-based European Union would have had at its heart fundamental rights and ‘core values’ that are shared by all individuals. The fundamental rights at stake in Kadi indeed may claim global application through their inclusion in almost all universally ratified international covenants (such as the ICCPR) and through their crystallization in customary international law (namely the Universal Declaration of Human Rights). This, in and of itself, is obviously not enough. The ECJ has pointed out on numerous occasions that the interpretation of near-identical provisions can vary greatly between two treaties that have wholly different purposes. The underlying constitutional difference and the different scale of tasks and goals that the United Nations faces, in comparison to regional organizations or its individual member states, might justify the interpretation of norms that look alike but that apply to different circumstances, in a manner that embraces an outcome corresponding to a balancing choice that would be distinctive from, and even stand in contrast to, a balancing choice adopted elsewhere. Alternatively, to the extent that subsidiarity should be regarded as the operative mechanism for the dynamic allocation of shared or non-exclusive powers between different levels of governance, as a matter of constitutional practice, a ‘bottom-up’ attitude as followed by the ECJ should, as a matter of fact, be welcomed rather than the ‘top-down’ imposition of centralized rules as stemming from the international sphere.
Nevertheless, Europe has historically vacillated between a cosmopolitan openness to foreign contacts and cultures and various degrees of ideological wariness and isolationism. Given the fact that the European Union was implementing UN sanctions, the globalized world in which international terrorism operates should have had impact on the approach employed by the ECJ towards the interpretation of domestic European fundamental rights in this context. The ECJ, by employing a loose version of the two-level theory, could have adopted a more global and cosmopolitan perspective on the protected human rights. Under such a perspective, it ought to have thought of the fundamental rights as globally operative and derive them from international sources. This would not have implied that Europe was not an autonomous legal system but that it is a legal system that is woven in an international web that makes it part of the family of nations. As the ties with other countries become closer, commercially, culturally, and politically, this should also have a legal impact. Yet, the book engages with, and systematically deconstructs, the more limited expression of the cosmopolitan view, namely the approach adopted by the Court of First Instance in relation to jus cogens (p. 262). However, this narrow internationalist perspective does not cover the richness of the cosmopolitan argument to which the book, regrettably, does not offer a compelling answer.
Finally, there is room for two more remarks. First, the book celebrates Kadi as an example of the way in which EU law might help in correcting collective-action problems and cross-border externalities among the world nations when involved in tackling one of the most pressing security problems. In this sense, the ECJ was exporting to the global level, and indeed imposing on non-EU member states and on the United Nations as an international organization, European fundamental rights, standards, and values. Many positively approve of that, as this European ‘value imperialism’ served a good cause of increasing the overall level of fundamental-rights protection in the world. However, the ECJ judges should be viewed as neither bolder nor more liberal than other national judges who were facing the same dilemma. Most other challenges of UN measures under national laws and before national courts were destined to fail, as national judges would fear the burden of being responsible either for the failure of successfully fighting against terrorism or for putting their own nation on the spot for violating international law. Once the issue moved from the national level to the European Union, the balance of power between the United Nations and European public authority shifted. One might have the impression that the ECJ rode roughshod over the ‘smart sanctions’ mechanisms that might have their own logic and justification, not least because it simply could afford to do it. Moreover, the price that is paid at the global level regarding the (un)successful implementation of UN resolutions and the broader implications regarding the overall (in)effectiveness of international law, for what might be perceived as the luxurious indulgence of Europe in its adherence to a very high standard of protection of human rights, is only partially discussed. The discussion that can be traced (pp. 274 ff.) does not take a hard look into the implications of judicial dialogue and its repercussions on power asymmetry among non-complying states.
Second, and only in passing, Eckes is not troubled with the discrepancy, and some might say hypocrisy, with which Europe is left after Kadi. The Court's strong rhetoric defending the high standards of human rights protection in Europe and the harsh criticism of the UN measures strongly conflict with the distressing direct result of the judgment according to which the applicant would not be granted immediate remedy, his property would remain frozen, and the European institutions would enjoy yet another grace period to amend previous defaults. The Court's festive reasoning does not translate into concrete rights and does not necessarily guarantee a credible, more optimistic future for Europe. Yet, as the Kadi saga is still ongoing, and the case is again pending before the ECJ, I, for one, would impatiently await Eckes's future insights on this and related matters.
