Dual Lobbying Strategy: Bottom-Up and Top Down

Research on women in party politics shows that pressure for women’s inclusion is most effective when it comes simultaneously from grassroots activists and from the top party leadership (Kittilson Reference Kittilson2006). As more women with higher education and the traditionally requisite skills and resources come forward, women’s under-representation in office stands out sharply. Women dissatisfied with their inability to gain power in electoral politics press for change. When these bottom-up pressures are coupled with the efforts of a few women who have already achieved power, the effects are stronger. Women in top-level positions such as party National Executive Committees can “let down the ladder” by nominating other women for high-level positions, or by pressing for systematic party rule changes such as gender quotas (Kittilson Reference Kittilson2006; Kunovich and Paxton Reference Kunovich and Paxton2005; Tremblay and Pelletier Reference Tremblay and Pelletier2001).

Similarly, dual pressures from the bottom-up and top-down may improve women’s access to the top echelons of political science. By recruiting, training, and encouraging more women in political science graduate programs we strengthen the base of women in our discipline. As the number of women has grown among graduate students in recent decades, the under-representation among women as full professors, endowed chairs, and APSA presidents has been sharpened in our focus.

At the same time, critical actors at the senior ranks and among disciplinary leadership bodies are key agents for change. Critical actors can be men or women—they are actors who have the willingness and power to “bring about women-friendly policy change” (Childs and Krook Reference Childs and Krook2009, 127). These critical actors may already be among the top levels of the discipline, and can expand and institutionalize gains by pressing for changes in rules and existing practices. By codifying gender egalitarian procedures, women’s gains become widespread and routine.

Dual Organizational Strategy: Women’s Organizations and Established Channels

Existing research on women in political parties is split over whether women should organize within separate women’s organizations within parties, or press for change in the existing mainstream party channels. On the one hand, women’s organizations facilitate women’s gains by fostering repeated interactions, supportive networks, and a sense of group consciousness among women. Further, women’s organizations provide a launching pad to collectively articulate women’s demands for greater representation and to influence party leaders to address gender inequality (Kittilson Reference Kittilson2006; Leyenaar Reference Leyenaar2004; Lovenduski and Norris Reference Lovenduski and Norris1993; Wiliarty Reference Wiliarty2010). Walsh’s (Reference Walsh2011) research shows that women’s organizations benefit from links with other organizations. On the other hand, separate organizations may isolate women from the power centers within parties (Appleton and Mazur Reference Appleton, Mazur, Lovenduski and Norris1993).

The benefits of each approach suggest that it is prudent to pursue both simultaneously. Women’s organizations remain important bodies within parties. At the same time, women continue to work with their male counterparts in the mainstream party channels. By having women well placed at all levels and in all arenas of the party, when there is a window of opportunity, these women can act upon it to mobilize for change.

By extension, women can and do mobilize for change in women’s organizations in political science as a discipline, and in women’s faculty associations on campuses across the country. They should continue to do so. For example, the Women’s Caucus for Political Science mobilizes to promote women at all levels of the professoriate, and constructs and publicizes regular reports on women’s progress. The Committee of the Status of Women in the Profession (CSWP) tracks women’s progress at different ranks within the profession and offers nominations for the APSA Board and Presidency. Thus, the CSWP promotes both tracks—women organized as women, and women among the established power centers. Similarly, women within political science departments may organize as women and also seek representation on departmental hiring and administrative committees and as faculty chairs. At the university level, women may simultaneously participate on Faculty Women’s Associations and in general Faculty Senate and university committees. In these sites powerful male allies can be critical actors supporting and advancing women.

Dual Rule Change Strategy: Existing Rules and New Rules

A singular focus on women’s resources and skills or on women’s organizational strategies would implicitly place the burden for change on women themselves. Therefore, we must also ask how our disciplinary institutions, practices, and norms can be altered to encourage women’s advancement to the top echelons of political science. How does the opportunity structure influence the probability of women’s inclusion among the top ranks and women’s (and their allies’) strategies to increase that probability? Research on party politics suggests some types of existing rules that may benefit women: power-sharing electoral rules and clear and transparent rules. In addition, the adoption of new rules such as gender quotas and targets will bolster women’s numbers.

Broadly, power-sharing rules in electoral systems promote gender equality (Norris Reference Norris2008). Power-sharing rules aim to represent a wide array of socio-political groups among decision-makers, and are characterized by proportional representation, low electoral thresholds, and large district magnitudes. One of the strongest findings in women and politics research is that proportional representation systems boost women’s numbers in elected office (e.g., Beckwith Reference Beckwith1992; Norris Reference Norris1997; Reynolds Reference Reynolds1999; Rule Reference Rule1987). The proportional translation of votes into seats gives incentives to parties to run more women for office. The mechanism underpinning this relationship appears to be a “logic of inclusion” under which the parties find an electoral payoff in balancing the ticket—in terms of representing not only women, but also different age groups and ideological factions of the party.

Formalized and clear rules encourage women’s advancement through the party ranks (Kittilson Reference Kittilson2006). When party rules are formalized and transparent, newcomers like women find it easier to figure out the rules in the first place, and then can successfully adjust their strategies. By contrast, informal practices more often benefit established powerholders, who are usually men. For example, in Thai party politics a strong reliance on informal practices, under which male political aspirants frequently network with other male elected officials, virtually assures the nomination of a male candidate in the next election (Bjarnegard Reference Bjarnegård2010).

New rules can also benefit women in politics. Gender quotas and targets provide a “fast track” to women’s election to office (Dahlerup Reference Dahlerup and Dahlerup2006; Tripp and Kang Reference Tripp and Kang2008). Quota policies explicitly acknowledge that gender inequality is a persistent structural problem in need of a systematic and direct fix. In some instances, strict quotas are not feasible. Instead, soft quotas or targets may be enacted to set goals for gender equality on a committee, or rotation among men and women among top officers.

Inclusive power-sharing rules may also be found in political science departments and professional organizations. Rules may benefit women if they encourage wide representation of different groups on departmental leadership committees. Further, women stand to gain from the provision of “clearer information, earlier, about professional careers and the ‘rules of the game’ to women in undergraduate and graduate programs and first faculty appointments” (APSA Task Force 2004, iv). Specifically, transparent and formal guidelines for tenure and promotion may improve women’s gains. Clear formal rules afford each tenure and promotion candidate with equal amounts of information, resulting in a more even-handed process. By contrast, hazy rules and procedures favor those “in the know,” who are often given information in informal networks of existing powerholders. Finally, gender equality targets would benefit departments and professional committees by setting goals to improve diversity. Hiring and personnel committees within political science departments might set targets for gender balance among members.