Introduction: Hegel in the American Scene
In the spring of 1903, Charles Sanders Peirce reviewed John Hibben’s Hegel’s Logic: An Essay in Interpretation. It was not a favourable review. According to Peirce, Hegel did not understand logic, and Hibbens did not understand Hegel.
From the vantage of the present, Peirce’s review looks like yet another instance where an American pragmatist took Hegelian idealism to task. Today’s scholar might be tempted to make a broad generalization concerning the antagonism between the anti-essentialism of the pragmatic movement and the content of Hegel’s Logic. Perhaps they would be tempted to place Peirce’s review next to William James’s comment that Hegel’s system was nothing but a “great arcanum of the identity of contradictories.” I maintain that these assessments would be premature, or at least, overly simplistic. Peirce is not James.
We see this contrast between Peirce and James if we briefly consider the way that Hegel was received in the American philosophical sphere in the late nineteenth century. The conceptual disagreement between the American thought of James and the European idealism of Hegel, which turned on the status of the Absolute, is exceedingly complex. As Robert Richardson has recently noted, Hegel’s followers invaded Harvard and MIT in the 1870s and 1880s, a fact that disturbed James by their total dominance of the philosophical field. It is true that conceptual differences translated into an array of personal and social disagreements in the intellectual centres of nineteenth-century America, but it is equally true that the personal grudges that emerged during this time accentuated philosophical disagreements. These grudges – between James and G. H. Hall, between James and George Palmer, between James and William Torrey Harris – have been all but forgotten. Our forgetfulness has had an impact on our understanding of American philosophy to the extent that we have been tempted to concentrate on the most extreme criticisms of European idealism and to overlook the fact that many of these comments were the result of what James called “my ignorant prejudice of all Hegelians.” Ignorant. James was a singularly original thinker, but an occasionally careless reader who was apt to strawman his philosophical adversaries. Not all “pragmatists” followed James’s lead, in his way of reading the history of philosophy, or in his whole-cloth dismissal of Hegel. Peirce, who lived much of his life on the outskirts of the Harvard intellectual scene, was not involved in the personal-intellectual squabbles that often dominated James’s thinking. Unlike James, Peirce did not vilify Hegel, and at the turn of the century Peirce attempted to rescue what was most important in Hegel’s philosophy. This attempt is seen clearly when we return to Peirce’s 1903 contribution to the Nation.
After describing Hibben’s interpretation of the Logic as simplistic, Peirce makes a suggestion in regard to the future study of Hegel’s system. I believe that Peirce’s suggestion, one that highlights a specific and overlooked section of Hegel’s work, may help us reframe our understanding of American thought and, more specifically, its indebtedness to European idealism. At the end of the review, he writes:
That the Hegelians should have allowed the obviously unsuccessful development of the doctrine of Wesen to stand all of these years uncorrected, is a striking instance of the mental fossilization that results from their method of study. A powerful and original study of what the true Hegelian doctrine of Wesen should be, according to our present lights, might breathe some real life into a modified Hegelianism, if anything could have that effect. (Peirce Reference Peirce, Hartshorne and Weiss1987, 125)
What attracted Peirce to “The Doctrine of Essence (Wesen)” in Hegel’s Logic? Why does he say that Wesen, of all the places in the Logic, is the most fruitful place to reinvigorate Hegel? Here, I will try to piece together an answer to this question. It is a question that deserves an answer since the concept of essence seems to stand against any philosophical movement that eschews the idea of fixed or immutable identities. Peirce’s pragmatism, often characterized as profoundly anti-essentialist, is certainly one such school. Exploring Peirce’s attraction to the concept of Wesen yields two important results. First, in terms of recent Peirce scholarship, an investigation of Wesen expands Robert Stern’s work on the role of Secondness in the writings of Peirce and Hegel. More broadly, this exploration reveals that Peirce understood the Doctrine of Essence as undermining, rather than supporting, traditional forms of essentialism and foundationalism (Houlgate, 25). This interpretation of Hegel’s Wesen has been advanced in a variety of forms since the publishing of Jean Hyppolite’s Logic and Existence (1952), the works of a number of postmodern thinkers whose work stems from Hyppolite’s book, and most recently in the work of Stephan Houlgate. What is unique about the current analysis is that it situates this interpretation firmly in the classical American canon, nearly a century before these more contemporary treatments of Hegel’s Logic.
I believe that we cannot fully understand the affinities between Hegel and Peirce without addressing the writings of another less-known figure from the American philosophical canon. It is for this reason that I turn to the writings of Josiah Royce in the final sections of this article. If one surveys the field of American philosophy in the nineteenth century, it was not Hibbens, nor Harris, nor Hall who carried on the Hegelian torch. It was Royce. Peirce realized this in his reviews of Royce’s Religious Aspect of Philosophy (1888) and The World and the Individual (1900); in both of these reviews, Peirce acknowledges the Hegelian legacy that Royce was attempting to extend. This being said, Peirce does not criticize Royce – as he does Hibbens – for his commitment to the Hegelian corpus. Royce’s reading of Hegel is different. Peirce generally approves of Royce’s later philosophy, even when it seems to smack close to the Hegelian project as it does in The World and the Individual (1900). Peirce does make one suggestion in regard to The World and the Individual, namely that Royce should take up mathematical logic under his tutelage. When Peirce makes this invitation, however, Royce responds with an interesting counter-offer: Peirce should study Hegel. This was especially interesting insofar as Royce seems to have suggested that Peirce read Hegel’s Logic. Royce did not know the ins and outs of modern mathematical logic, and this was a shortcoming that Peirce sought to remedy. Royce, however, did know the ins and outs of Hegel’s logic and believed that such an understanding might allow Pierce to ground his budding philosophy in the history of German idealism.
Many scholars have taken note of the 1900-1902 exchange between Royce and Peirce, but very few have made any sustained progress in explaining its significance in the works of either thinker. I think progress is possible in at least two directions. First, Peirce’s suggestion that Wesen remains the neglected key to Hegel’s logic invites us to reinvestigate this moment of German idealism through a Peircean lens. Second, due to the correspondence between Royce and Peirce, it seems worthwhile to return to Royce’s reading of Hegel in order to identify any important points of agreement between these interlocutors. I recently argued that Royce’s philosophy of loyalty, developed in the first decade of the twentieth century, can be traced back to his reading of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. The evidence for this claim was discovered on the flysheets of Royce’s copy of the Phenomenology – notes that Royce wrote as early as 1890, nearly two decades before publishing The Philosophy of Loyalty (1908) (Kaag). I believe that a similar study is warranted in the case of Royce’s copy of Hegel’s Logic, which is also housed in Robbins Library at Harvard. During the early years of the 1890s, Royce dedicated himself to glossing and interpreting exactly one of the three books of the Logic: “The Doctrine of Essence (Wesen).” While it remains unclear whether Peirce’s interest in this strain of Hegelian thinking can be traced to Royce, I will show that Royce’s notation and interpretation of Wesen is largely amenable to Peirce’s later work. In Royce we find a thinker who was willing to take Peirce’s suggestion seriously, by way of a serious investigation of the concept of essence. It is interesting to note that Friedrich Engels encouraged Carl Schmidt to concentrate on “The Doctrine of Essence” as well in Hegel’s Logik. In an 1891 letter he writes: “In the first section (Being) do not ponder too long over Being and Nothing. . . . The Doctrine of Essence is the main thing” (as quoted in Degrood, 71).
Approaching Hegel’s Logic – “ The Doctrine of Essence”
Jumping into “The Doctrine of Essence (Wesen),” the second of the three books of Hegel’s Logic, is very much like jumping into the eddying swirls of a fast-moving stream. Things are already underway, moving at a fast pace, and you are very likely to lose your philosophical footing if you don’t point yourself upstream, look to its source, and push against the current. Looking upstream in this case means turning toward the first book of the Logic, “The Doctrine of Being (Sein),” and necessarily turning away from the final book, “The Doctrine of the Concept.” Taken together, the first two books of the Logic constitute what Hegel regarded as the “objective logic,” an account of how things appear in the world. It is in these books that he presents a sweeping ontological picture of the determinations of being that are given a priori. As Robert Stern notes, once this objective logic is sketched out, Hegel turned to the meta-logical question of how such a conceptual account could be rendered in the first place. This turn provided the impetus for the third book of Hegel’s Logic, “The Doctrine of the Concept (Begriff).”
Here we will concern ourselves only with “The Doctrine of Being” and “The Doctrine of Essence” of the Logic. According to Hegel, Being (Sein) is the point of departure for an investigation of Essence (Wesen). Being is the sensuous immediacy of things as they show themselves to us in the world. The odd thing about apprehending things in their immediacy, however, is that we never simply grasp them in their immediacy. Instead, we see them as being founded on the basis of something else. There is nothing that is simply immediately given. That is to say that we understand things as being relative, mediated by any number of other beings or descriptions. If we consider any thing in isolation, we quickly come to realize that this thing, in truth, stands in any number of relations to other things. We realize that immediacy, in truth, points to mediacy or relativity. This is what Hegel means in his the opening of “The Doctrine of Essence” when he asserts that the “truth of being is essence.” Things neither appear to us as immediately given nor are known to us in their sensuous immediacy. It is only in the realm of Essence that Being appears and is intelligible. This leads Jean Hyppolite in Logic and Existence to claim that Essence is the appearance and intelligibility of Being.
In line with Hegel’s language, Being is not satisfied merely by describing the surface immediacy of things, and indicates that the “Truth of Being” lies behind this immediacy, in what Hegel describes as Essence (Wesen). Essence is the realm of mediacy or pure relativity. This mediacy shows itself through our reflections on Being and through the very real sense that our reflections on being necessarily point beyond its immediate instantiations. Essence is this process of reflection that reveals mediation at the heart of immediacy. Before moving forward, two caveats seem to be in order: First, to say that Essence lies behind Being is not to suggest that there is some immutable substrate on which Being rests. Essence for Hegel is not a static thing or entity, but rather describes the dynamic process of reflection through which the truth of Being is apprehended. At a point in the Lesser Logic, Hegel remarks that Essence is sometimes envisioned as being covered by a rind or curtain of immediate being. This might suggest that Essence is the definite kernel, core, or pit that could be exhaustively revealed if the proper investigation is marshalled. I believe that this is the wrong way to think about Essence in the Hegelian sense. If the core of being was fully exposed, we would bestow a sense of immediacy to it and reduce Wesen to the mere immediacy of being. Instead, Essence is constantly and inexhaustibly revealed in the process of reflection. The second caveat is more difficult to express and therefore the danger is a bit more pressing. The discussion of Essence as being the realm of mediacy or mediation has been a point of criticism since the publishing of the Logic in 1812. Kierkegaard and other early commentators noted that Hegel equivocated when he suggested that Essence was the realm of “mediation” since mediation simultaneously refers to the relation between two objects and, at the same time, the result of this mediation. I hold that the mediation that defines Wesen in the second book of the Logic refers only to the relation between two things and not the reconciliation between these two things.
These initial remarks allow us to make sense of Stephan Houlgate’s recent account of the way that Hegel’s understanding of Wesen departs from traditional renderings of essence as being foundational in character. Houlgate acknowledges that Hegel considered “The Doctrine of Essence” to be the hardest book to follow in the Logic, but Houlgate also maintains that it is only through an investigation of Wesen that “we see why Hegel cannot be the philosopher of legend – the one for whom everything that occurs is but the appearance of an underlying all controlling absolute” (Houlgate, 45). I find Houlgate’s analysis quite helpful in the way that it foreshadows the interest in Wesen that Peirce and Royce expressed at the turn of the century. If it can be shown in an analysis of Essence that Hegel is indeed not the monistic philosopher of legend, it will be easier to understand why classical American philosophers showed interest in various parts of his corpus. Houlgate, after introducing Hegel’s treatment of Wesen, notes that Essence must be understood by way of the immediacy of things in the world. He writes, “The concept of essence thus cannot stand alone: we cannot talk of essence tout court, but only of the essence of something immediately given” (31). In a similar vein, Essence should not be viewed as the starting point of our investigations, but rather is reached only after we have reflected upon what is immediately given to us. Essence is the elaboration on the immediately sensible. Essence in this regard is not foundational, but rather, in Hegel’s words, “issues from being.” Essence issues from Being and comes into view only when the immediacy of Being passes away through reflection. The immediate character of Being passes away into its opposite or “other” – the mediacy or relativity of Essence. Hegel points us in this direction when he suggests that the word Essence (Wesen) stems from gewesen (been), the past participle of Sein. Essence is the type of Being that has passed away. Essence, however, does not pass away completely or absolutely but, as Hegel maintains, “passes away non-temporally.” What does it mean for Essence to pass away “non-temporally?” Being in its immediacy comes and goes in time. Things, as we find them in the world, come into being and pass away. The immediacy of things as they appear passes away into non-immediacy, into the mediacy of essence. For Hegel, essence “passes away non-temporally” to the extent that it delimits the coming and going of being and corresponds to the transitory appearances of things in the world. Hegel underscores the “absolute negativity” of Essence by maintaining that Essence negates the immediacy of Being; indeed, it is only against the backdrop of Essence that all immediacy shows itself as inessential and illusory. It is a backdrop that forever recedes since the negativity of essence negates even the immediacy that might attach itself to Essence. The St. Louis Hegelian, William Torrey Harris, keys in on this point in his 1895 interpretation of the Logic, paraphrasing Hegel in the following manner: “Being [in this sphere] is only the movement of nothing to nothing, and this is essence itself. Essence does not have this movement within it, but it is this movement, – it is the absolute appearance itself, the pure negativity which has nothing outside of itself that it negates, but which negates only its negative self and is only in this negation”(Harris, 316). Harris’s analysis, one with which Royce was undoubtedly acquainted, allows us to make an important turn in our thinking about Hegel’s understanding of Wesen. At first glance, it might appear that when Hegel suggests that Essence negates Being in its immediacy – and reveals the transitory character of Being – he is suggesting that there is some stable, permanent, or foundational character to Essence. This is not straightforwardly the case. The permanency of Essence is in its continual passing away, in its oscillation of opposing forces. In Wesen, Hegel attempts to show that categories of human thinking, ones that traditionally have been considered diametrically opposed (identity and difference, for example), are in fact dialectically related. In essence, the categories of thought operate or “work” only in this dialectical movement. The idea that some form of stability, or essence, could be found in dialectical movement is a very old thought, one that emerges first in Heraclitus and then in Aristotle, when he claims that “knowing opposites is one.” Hegel’s treatment of Wesen in Book II of the Logic reworks this idea. Jean Hyppolite’s treatment of the concept of Hegel’s Essence gestures toward its odd permanence when he writes that “(Essence) was passing away but always was finding itself again, being in imperishable becoming” (Hyppolite, 172). This point is remarkably similar to Hegel’s remark in the preface to The Phenomenology of Spirit that Appearance is the arising and passing away that does not itself arise and pass away, but is in itself and constitutes the actuality and the movement of the life of truth. The permanency of essence lies in its sheer negativity. I believe that Hyppolite’s suggestion points us in the right direction in understanding what was so appealing to both Peirce and Royce in Hegel’s concept of Essence, namely that Essence is the negative process of “passing away and finding again” that is realized in the “being of imperishable becoming.” Hyppolite, echoing Hegel, directs us away from our tendency to attach a foundational or fixed definition to essence, for this definition would confer on essence a type of immediacy that is wholly inappropriate to Hegel’s rendering of Wesen. Houlgate maintains that this is what separates Hegel from Kant or Fichte. Hegel, unlike his predecessors, is neither trying to understand the preconditions that “grant the possibility” of being nor trying to identifying some immutable substrate that supports beings from behind. Instead of taking the standard transcendental line, Hegel aims to establish a new ontological route that traces out the path of being as such, taking note of its constitutive rather than its presuppositional characteristics. This project resonates closely with Peirce’s writing after 1900, a fact that comes into clearer focus upon a comparison of Peirce’s characterization of Secondness and Hegel’s “Doctrine of Essence.”
Peirce on the Essence (Wesen) of Human Knowing
When Peirce suggested that Hegel’s “Doctrine of Essence (Wesen)” was fertile ground for future philosophical speculation, he was in the midst of preparing his Harvard Lectures that were given in April of 1903. The second of these lectures was entitled “On Phenomenology” and it is here that Peirce attempted to lay out a “short list” of categories that would describe the character and structure of human experience. This short list, Pierce observes, bears a marked similarity to the categories provided by Hegel. He maintains, however, that Hegel’s triune structure of the categories is deficient in a variety of ways and that his development of Firstness (Immediacy), Secondness (Conflict), and Thirdness (Mediation and Law) should be regarded as the natural and necessary extension of the Hegelian system. Robert Stern’s comparative analysis of Peirce and Hegel begins with Peirce’s comments in this 1903 lecture. Stern is especially interested in shedding light on Peirce’s repeated assertion that Hegel did not understand the significance of Secondness, the category of experience that Peirce describes broadly as struggle or conflict. Before turning to the comparison between Peirce and Hegel, Stern quickly outlines Peirce’s mature development of the categories in the following way:
Firstness is manifested in those aspects of things that concern their immediacy or individuality, where they are seen in monadic terms, as unrelated to anything else; Secondness is manifested in the awareness of things as ‘other’ or external, as things with which we react in a relational or dyadic manner; and Thirdness is manifested by the mediation between things, as when the relation between individuals is said to be governed by laws or grounded in the universals they exemplify, and hence is a triadic notion. (Stern, 124)
Following Stern’s discussion, Peirce criticized Hegel for two related reasons: 1) for regarding Firstness and Secondness as “refuted and refutable” since immediacy and conflict must be aufgehoben, and 2) for “being possessed with the idea that the Absolute is One” (ibid.). I believe Stern’s analysis is largely accurate and is one of several important starting places for scholars who would like to think seriously about the relation between Hegel and Peirce, and more broadly about Hegel and American philosophical canon. This article is a pointed response to Isabel Stearns’s claim, made in 1952, that Secondness posed an “unanswerable challenge to Hegelianism” (Stearns, 201; see also Fisch). In response, Stern outlines in great detail the way in which Peirce’s understanding of the categories, and particularly Secondness, departs from Hegel’s philosophy, but also points to the ways in which a Hegelian might respond to Peirce’s criticisms. In my opinion, however, Stern’s argument could be strengthened by looking more closely at Hegel’s treatment of Wesen. Peirce himself sees “The Doctrine of Essence” as a promising philosophical source, and does so for good reason – it is here that Hegel does the most adequate job of preserving Secondness. Stern’s argument rests in large part on comments that Peirce makes in 1903, at a time when Peirce admits that his general feeling toward Hegel was shifting from antipathy to “awe.” In a more detailed analysis of Wesen, I believe we can catch sight of what prompted this sense of awe.
In the previous section, essence was described as the negative process by which being in its immediacy gives rise to reflection and, through this reflection, immediacy shows itself to be necessarily relative – mediated in any number of ways. This is what was meant by the following statement expressed earlier, namely that immediacy, in truth, points toward mediacy. In Essence, the immediacy of being (what Peirce would term Firstness) is shown to be other than what it was supposed to be. This “otherness” that stands against the immediateness of Being is what Hegel termed Essence and what Peirce meant by Secondness. This point is made clear if we consider a few of Peirce’s comments in regard to Secondness in conjunction with those made by Hegel in his treatment of Wesen. Peirce suggests that the “rough and tumble of life renders (Secondness) most familiarly prominent” (CP 1.323). In the broadest metaphysical strokes, Secondness is the phenomenon of conflict and confrontation, in the dynamic of effort and tension. More specifically, in experiencing Secondness, “We are continually bumping up against hard fact. We expected one thing, or passively took it for granted, and had the image of it in our minds, but experience forces that idea into the background, and compels us to think quite differently”(ibid.). Here it is clear that Peirce is describing an experience that is had and underwent in the process of reflective inquiry. Secondness is experienced by human beings when they recognize that their immediate purposes or ideas are radically out of sync with the facts of the world. This type of consciousness is realized in reflection, in thinking one way and then being compelled “to think quite differently.” At this point, Hegel’s remarks concerning Wesen and its relationship to reflection seem to anticipate Peirce’s description of Secondness. Hegel writes, “The point of view given by the Essence is in general the standpoint of ’Reflection’. This word ‘reflection’ is originally applied, when a ray of light in a straight line impinging upon the surface of a mirror is thrown back from it” (1874, 179). This two-fold movement of Wesen – described here as impinging upon and being thrown back from – is very similar to the way that Peirce describes the consciousness of Secondness in his 1903 lecture:
It is a double consciousness. We become aware of ourself in becoming aware of the not-self. The waking state is a consciousness of reaction; and as the consciousness itself is two-sided, so it has also two varieties; namely, action, where our modification of other things is more prominent than their reaction on us, and perception, where their effect on us is overwhelmingly greater than our effect on them. And this notion, of being such as other things make us, is such a prominent part of our life that we conceive other things also to exist by virtue of their reactions against each other. The idea of other, of not, becomes a very pivot of thought. To this element I give the name of Secondness. (CP 1.323; Italics mine)
This passage helps reframe the concept of Secondness in three important ways. First, it suggests, in language reminiscent of Hegel, that Secondness refers to a type of “double consciousness.” The doubling occurs when one acknowledges that he/she is conditioned, determined, and constituted by the “not-self,” the various factors that lie beyond the self in its immediacy. Peirce’s analysis indicates that Secondness is the notion “of being such as other things make us.” The similarity between this point and the earlier discussion of the “otherness” of Wesen should immediately come home to us. Next, pointing to the ubiquity and importance of the category, Peirce explains that this relation of Secondness is so prominent in our lives that we come to understand our world on the whole by way of this category of reaction. This is not merely to say that we understand the relationship between ourselves and our environment as one of conflict and reaction, but rather that we understand other things by the ways that they react to their environments. What a thing is is bound to the way it reacts to what it is not. In essence, identity is inextricably tied to difference and contrast. This is most obvious in the fields of chemistry or physics, but Peirce suggests that this way of categorizing things in the world is operative in every part of our daily lives. Hegel makes a similar comment in regard to “the point of view given by Essence,” stating that “In this phenomenon we have two things – first an immediate fact which is, and secondly the deputed, derivate, or transmitted phase of the same. Something of this sort takes place when we reflect, or think upon an object: for here we want to know the object, not in its immediacy, but as derivative or mediated” (Hegel Reference Hegel and Wallace1874, 208). Human knowing is not satisfied with understanding things in their immediacy, because as Peirce and Hegel both recognize there is no such thing as understanding things in their immediacy. Understanding, in truth, is founded largely on coming to grasp the way that things react, and react with us, in our experiential world. Finally, returning to the passage on Secondness, Peirce places Secondness, very literally, at the center of human thinking, claiming that it serves as the “pivot” of cognition. Secondness is the fulcrum or hinge around which human thinking works. Here, it seems that Peirce is replacing, or at least revising, the “Archimedean point” that Descartes tries to establish in his Meditations. Pierce rejects the hyperbolic doubt of Descartes, which eventually leads to, and underpins, the res cogitans of the Meditations; in its place, Peirce suggests genuine Secondness.
This is an important move for a variety of reasons, many of which cannot be taken up in the current paper. Suffice it to say that Secondness – the experience of conflict and reaction – is the stuff of real doubt that keeps inquiry on the move. It may sound odd that the shock or reaction of Secondness is in fact the pivot of rationality since the brute fact of Secondness has often been described as “irrational.” This is less puzzling, however, when we think about Secondness as the prompt of reflection or as being, in Isabel Stearns’s words, “potentially rational” (Stearns, 202). Without Secondness, reflection would lack impetus and content. Philosophical thinking, according to Peirce, begins with a jolt, a shock to the system, and it is in this sense that Peirce concludes his discussion of Secondness by claiming that “experience,” with all of its struggles and sudden eruptions, “is our only teacher” (CP 1.51). Using the words of Ralph Waldo Emerson, Peirce maintains that that human experience happens by way of a “series of surprises” (Emerson, 73). Hegel anticipates Peirce and Emerson on this last point. Just as Secondness remains the pivot around which the work of human thinking is done, Hegel’s understanding of human thought hinges on the continual problem of Wesen, whereby Being discovers itself and makes itself known through its own alienation in its other. In the realm of essence, we find things, first given in their immediacy, are in fact relative to other things. Hegel underscores the centrality of Essence in human inquiry in the following manner:
The problem or aim of philosophy is often represented as the ascertainment of the essence of things: a phrase which only means that things, instead of being left in their immediacy, must be shown to be mediated by, or based upon, something else. The immediate Being of things is thus conceived under the image of a rind or curtain behind which the Essence is hidden. (1874, 208)
When Hegel describes philosophy as the process whereby things are shown to be “mediated by, or based upon, something else,” he is not suggesting that we comprehend this “something else” in its totality or that we raise the curtain of Being once and for all. Rather, in the realm of essence, we repeatedly realize that there is something else, other than Being in its immediacy, that warrants our attention. The “ascertainment of the essence of things” is the continual process of reflection where we come to see that things are constitutively tied to what they are not. This is not a smooth and uninterrupted procedure, but rather an experimental one that often is defined by abrupt challenges and sudden confusion. To return to Hegel’s language, the “rind” of Being does not come off easily in the pursuit of Essence. The “ascertainment of essence” remains a problem and, according to Hegel, the problem of philosophy. In Fredric Jameson’s words, Essence is the realm in which the categories of the mind act and react upon each other; “it is more properly the realm of the dialectic itself, in which we become aware to the extent that definition is ‘negative’” (Jameson, 34). The process by which Being acquires definition in Essence is one developed by contrast and conflict, by way of difference and identity. In the above passage, Hegel suggests that the task of philosophy should be concerned with this on-going process of exploring Essence. This description of philosophy as the problem of essence is similar to Peirce’s conception of the discipline as an on-going inquiry into the relations and dependences that underpin reality. Human inquiry works through the difficulty of Secondness in order to achieve moments of Thirdness or continuity. On this note, Essence describes how one approaches the Notion (Begriff), the third stage of Hegel’s Logic. The approach to the Notion through Essence is a circuitous path that leads down many dead ends and around many blind curves before finding the right road. In Wesen we find the path of human inquiry defined by fallibility and ever-deeper discovery. Essence is the history of error and discovery by which the notion of something comes into being. In the ascertainment of essence, we get a brief glimpse of what lies behind Being in its immediacy. According to Hegel, each of these views proves inadequate for each one fails to explain various aspects of the thing at hand. Each of these views is partial and inadequate, and eventually is superseded and overcome in the revelation of still deeper forms of essence.
What attracted Peirce to the Doctrine of Essence? I believe he was drawn to its experimental character, a character that obviously defines the normative sciences (aesthetics, ethics, and logic) and all of the special sciences (physics, biology, chemistry, psychology, history, etc.). In his description of Wesen, Hegel is not the monistic idealist who brings everything to rest in a totalizing Absolute, but rather is a thinker who is interested in describing the tortuous path of human inquiry. In developing the Doctrine of Essence, Hegel is interested not in creating a static foundation, but rather in explaining the way in which it is in the essence of things to be on the move. While Peirce does not make explicit this connection between Wesen and his concept of inquiry as fallible and fluid, I believe that this relationship can be established in a detailed analysis of the Logic. I believe also that the point comes home to us more forcefully if we attend to Royce’s interpretation of Hegel’s Wesen developed at the turn of the century, which emphasized its anti-foundational character.
Royce’s Contribution: The Wandering of Essence
The history of philosophy sometimes works in mysterious ways. Some unknown thinkers eventually achieve iconic status while others who were well known in their own day fall out of favour and disappear. Today we are interested in C. S. Peirce but ignore the peers that he found most interesting, peers such as Josiah Royce. Having completed his series of Harvard lectures in the summer of 1903, Peirce returned to his study of the Categories with a deep appreciation for Hegel, or at the very least for the work the American Hegelian, Royce. Peirce tucked his evaluation of Royce – and American philosophy on the whole – into a draft of a letter from 1904:
As for the whole existing race of philosophers, – say John Dewey, to mention a relatively superior man whom you see, – why, they are the sort of trash who are puzzled by Achilles and the Tortoise! Think of trying to drive any exact thought through such skulls! Royce is the only philosopher I know of real power of thought now living. (1904, number 45)
Peirce would have winced at the thought that Josiah Royce has been all but written out of the history of philosophy while John Dewey is one of the few American thinkers whose writings are consistently revisited in the retelling of this history. The cause of Royce’s neglect can be traced to his idealistic leanings, which allowed him to be ignored as pragmatism and analytic philosophy had their turns at dominating the discipline. At the turn of the century, however, Royce was regarded by Peirce and others as the premier metaphysician and philosophical historian in the United States. In Royce, Peirce recognized not only a broad knowledge of the history of philosophy, but also the potential for Royce to go deeply into the technical work of mathematical logic. This recognition is expressed in their correspondence after Royce published The World and the Individual, when Peirce recommends that Royce study logic. This interaction is usually described as an important moment in the evolution of Royce’s thinking, and indeed much of Royce’s later work, especially The Problem of Christianity (1913), has been understood as stemming from Peirce’s logic of relations. This is true enough, but it seems unwise to downplay an alternative direction of influence. I believe that Royce’s interpretation of Hegel’s Logic that he undertook in the 1890s may have encouraged Peirce rethink his opinion of Hegel and recognize the possibilities for Wesen in the Logic. This position will be supported through an analysis of Royce’s copy of Hegel’s Logic, Wissenschaft der Logik, published by Berlag von Dunder und Humblot in 1841 (Hegel Reference Hegel1841). This volume was deposited at Robbins Library at Harvard University in 1917 and is in a collection of books that were previously owned by former members of the department of philosophy. Royce used the flysheets of his copy of Hegel’s Logic to take notes on only one of its three books, namely “The Doctrine of Essence.” Royce pointedly neglects the last book of the Logic, the book often described as Hegel’s attempt to provide a final synthesis of Being and Essence in the Concept. What I will attempt here is to provide a transcription of some of these unpublished notes on Wesen and to make an initial attempt to explain their significance.
In the previous section I conclude by suggesting that Hegel’s Wesen describes quite nicely the role of Secondness in Peircean inquiry. Inquiry is shot through with the experience of Secondness, and it is this sense of conflict and tension that is essential in the experimental search that proves so important to Peirce’s understanding of pragmatic inquiry. This interpretation is carried forward by Royce, who begins to take notes on the Logic by personifying Wesen as a “wanderer”: “The Essence as mere Unmittelbares is itself nothing. Its truth lies in its home=coming (Ruckkehr) to itself out of the world of Unmittelbarkeit. But in this coming home the Wesen finds its home empty, swept, and garnished. It must wander again, until it finds that its home lies only in its wanderings. It is but a wanderer. Reflexion = Ruckkehr des Wesen” (1841, 14). This passage is interesting to the extent that Royce is interpreting Wesen in a way that is very close to more contemporary renderings of The Phenomenology of Spirit as a type of epic homecoming; one might recall the interpretation of Phenomenology expressed by Adorno and Horkheimer in Dialectic of Enlightenment, as the journey of The Odyssey (Adorno and Horkheimer, 35-42). Similarly, in Royce’s 1890 gloss, Wesen is depicted as on a quest for self-realization, but, unlike Odysseus, Wesen never fully achieves a joyful homecoming. Instead, it continues to search in a tragic journey of discovery and loss. If Royce is going to show his Absolutist tendencies, one might expect that they emerge in his treatment of essence, a philosophical concept that traditionally has connoted a stable, unifying ground on which human intellection can operate. Royce, like Hegel, is no traditional essentialist. He maintains that Essence is a realm defined by its struggle between opposites and by the restlessness that attends such a struggle. It is significant to note that this section of marginalia, inscribed in the early 1890s, employs key phrases that appear in Royce’s later works. For example, in ”The Problem of Job,” first presented in the Graham Lectures of 1896, Royce describes his solution to the problem of evil (a problem that is experienced in the painful limitations of human knowledge and power) in terms that are remarkably close to his treatment of Wesen. Royce concludes ”The Problem of Job” by stating that while human beings experience the limitations of human finitude, it is possible to find comfort in struggle against these limitations: “For the triumph of the wise is no easy thing. Their lives are not light, but sorrowful. Yet they rejoice in their sorrow, not, to be sure, because it is mere experience, but because, for them, it becomes part of a strenuous whole of life. They wander and find their home even in wandering. They long, and attain through their very love of longing” (Royce Reference Peirce1915, 26; Italics original). What attracted Royce to Hegelian Wesen was the idea that the essential could be found only in the fluid movement of wandering. As it was described earlier, the permanence and stability of Wesen is in its constant dynamism and struggle. It is worth noting that Wesen, according to Royce, does not wander aimlessly, but rather remains in search of some end, definition, or essential meaning. This end is not, however, given beforehand in some strong teleological sense, but rather is refined and uncovered in the quest. On this note, Royce adds to his marginalia, now referring to Wesen as “Schubert’s wanderer”: “It is the essence of the essence to have no abiding city. Well then, das Wesen must seek a city out of sight” (Hegel Reference Hegel1841, 18).
It is difficult to determine what this “city out of sight” refers to, especially since Royce suggests that the human interests of inquirers and their communities creates this unseen city, adding to his description of Wesen: “But it is the seeker, after all, who creates the idea of the foreign home. It is his home, – his because this is his seeking, thus determined, and therefore creative of his ideal. The true story, therefore, is that of the seekers calling to seek, of his determination to be knight errant.” (Ibid.) The Christian undertones of Royce’s comments are unmistakable here. The search for a “city out of sight” is included in the refrain of various Christian hymns that were popular during the late nineteenth century. It is also quite possible that Royce was attracted to the three-part structure of the Logic to the extent that it loosely fits with the Christian trinity. Wesen would then be regarded as the Son who struggles and wanders in this world so that the Father (Sein) can be known. This point would mesh nicely with Royce’s solution offered in ”The Problem of Job,” in which he states that the struggles of human subjects are in fact God’s struggles.
Regardless of the definition of this goal or city, it is clear that Royce employs “city out of sight” to suggest that Wesen never fully realizes its goal, but instead remains in a type of provisional investigation. Wesen does not “put down roots” in order to ground a static philosophical system. Anticipating Houlgate and Hyppolite, Royce maintains that Wesen does not provide the grounding for epistemic or ontological foundationalism, but rather insists on wandering in a state of unrest. It is worth noting that Royce was not always comfortable with “wandering essences.” The marginalia in Royce’s copy of Hegel’s Logic signals an important turn in his thinking. In 1885, with the publishing of The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, Royce had maintained that the recognition of error in the course of human inquiry required the real and actual certainty of an Absolute judge. In other words, there must be a recognized and fixed “city” or truth that one pursues in her or his investigations. In these early formulations, the “city out of sight” is at the very least occupied and viewed by this Absolute judge. At this stage in his career, Royce criticizes Peirce for failing to recognize the importance of such a judge; this is a philosophical debate that Douglas Anderson describes in detail (Anderson, 33-55). In obvious contrast to his later readings of Wesen, Royce describes the Peircean investigator in the following manner: Peirce is “like a foolish man wandering in a wood, who is asked whether he has lost his way. ‘I have may have lost it,’ he answers. ‘But whither are you going?’ ‘That I cannot tell.’ ‘Have you no goal?’ ‘I may have, but I have no notion what it is’” (Royce Reference Royce and Smith1969, 349).
This criticism serves as an instructive backdrop for us to understand how far Royce’s thinking came between 1885 and 1890, when he took notes on the second book of the Logic. By 1890, Royce had returned from his own wanderings to Australia and had rethought the necessity of fixed and immutable truths in the progress of human inquiry. As Anderson asserts, instead of maintaining that an Absolute judge is essential to human inquiry, Royce’s later writing suggests that the essential (wesentlich) character of truth-seeking was wandering without a predetermined and fully apprehended goal. This reading of Hegel is carried forward in many of Royce’s mature writings, especially at points when Royce wishes to describe the projects, pursuits, and investigations of finite subjects. In The World and the Individual (1900), Royce employs the “city out of sight” metaphor to describe the investigations of individuals who pursue the good, the true, and the beautiful:
Finite as we are, lost though we seem to be in the woods, or in the “wide air’s wildernesses,” in this world of time and of chance, we have still, like the strayed animals or like the migrating birds, our homing instinct. It is this homing instinct that we for the first merely articulate when we talk of true Being. Being means something for us, however, because of the positive presence, in finite consciousness, of this inner meaning of even our poorest ideas. We seek. That is a fact. We seek a city still out of sight. In the contrast with this goal, we live. But if this be so, then already we actually possess something of Being even in our finite seeking. For the readiness to seek is already something of an attainment, even if a poor one. (1959, 122)
Here we can hear Royce amending, and perhaps apologizing for, his 1885 criticism of Peirce as a foolish man wandering in the woods. At this point, Royce seems comfortable in embracing such a conception of philosophic investigation. Returning to our earlier discussion of Hegel is worthwhile in order to note that Royce is discussing “true Being” in this passage and to remember that Essence in the Logic has already been defined as “the truth of Being.” In the pursuit of the truth of being, Royce leads us back through what is now familiar ground in the history of German idealism and in so doing leads us toward Peirce’s conception of pragmatic inquiry. There is strenuousness in the wandering of Wesen, the real experience of conflict and tension that defines most of our lives and certainly all of our sincere intellectual tasks. More often than not, we pursue ideals that are not reachable or that remain too vague for our satisfaction. We are spurred on in the pursuit because of this unrest, because of the contrast between our current state of affairs and the ideal that remains beyond our grasp. This is the necessary tension involved in Wesen. This struggle seems to be the experience of Secondness that Peirce wants to emphasize in Hegel’s work and admires in Royce’s The World and the Individual. Throughout his marginalia, Royce remains interested in the unrest at the core of Hegel’s essence. Picking up on the idea that Wesen searches for a “city out of sight,” he writes the following margin note:
The essence of the essence it is then to seek a home. Let it regard the home as out of sight, and it is its own essence as the seeking. There is no completed homecoming. There is the home, infinitely remote, and there is the coming, the endless search. So far die aussere Reflexion. Subjectively indeed this stage often enough appears as a contented reference to the dark principles, a self-satisfied recognition of the unendlessly unsatisfactory. Good case of Schluss. The union of the seeker and the sought lies in the tie that binds the banished seeker ever to seek. (Hegel Reference Hegel1841, 18)
While Royce agrees with Hegel that the pursuit of essence is the “endless search” of the “infinitely remote,” it is clear that he wishes to caution his reader against a “self-satisfied recognition of the unendlessly unsatisfactory.” He would like us to recognize that Wesen, by definition, is not self-satisfied but rather recovers itself only through its restless seeking. Royce’s notes indicate that we should view its “homecoming as the finding of the calling of Wesen. In its unrest it is self-determinative” (Hegel Reference Hegel1841, 22). Hegel has described a dialectical process of self-discovery that, subjectively considered, involves genuine risk because it entails genuine discovery and genuine loss. Wesen wanders and finds its home only in wandering, but this is not to say that it becomes smugly self-satisfied in its restless condition. Another way of putting this is that the movement of Wesen is described as being Socratic but not sophistical or cynical. There is no sense of resignation in the pursuit of Essence, no realization that the “city” will never be seen, but rather an ongoing search in spite of the likelihood of failure. Along these lines, Hyppolite calls Wesen “ontology’s unhappy consciousness,” but it is clear that Royce wishes to emphasize that the restlessness of this unhappy consciousness serves as the impetus for further wandering rather than as a place of wallowing rest (Hyppolite, 64).
Conclusion: Lingering Interpretative Questions
In closing, several interpretive issues should be addressed. Did Royce’s reading of Hegel’s Logic influence his later writings, or is it the case that his fledgling ideas concerning epistemology and ontology serve as the lens through which Royce understood Hegel? I think that there is good reason to assert both of these claims. Royce had good reasons to downplay his indebtedness to Hegel. The first was the fact that William James, Royce’s next-door neighbour, was the sworn enemy of everything Hegelian. The second reason may be that Royce had accused Francis Ellington Abbot of plagiarizing Hegel’s Phenomenology and Logic in the 1890s; the controversy had grown so heated that Royce may have wanted to create distance between his philosophy and that of Hegel. In any case, I think that the interpretation of Wesen that Royce provides is instructive in fleshing out the possible origins of his later thought. Despite his attempts to distance himself from Hegel’s philosophy, the marginalia that I have cited suggests that Royce’s studies of German idealism continue to percolate through the philosophy that he develops after 1890. These bits of unpublished text allow us to make two important claims: 1) Royce does not understand Hegel to be a traditional one-world essentialist, and 2) if Royce follows the path he traces out in the second book of Hegel’s Logic, then we should not regard Royce as a traditional one-world essentialist. It is, after all, Royce who comments on Hegel’s essence, stating, “Variety is not merely the spice but the content of life for the Wesen” (Hegel Reference Hegel1841, 38).
In addition to helping us understand the maturation of Royce’s thinking, examining the marginalia from the second book of the Logic also helps to explain Peirce’s attraction to this section of Hegel’s text. I have argued that it is in Hegel’s concept of Essence that the thinking of Royce and Peirce converge. Peirce’s suggestion in 1903 that Wesen is a fruitful place for philosophical inquiry has been routinely overlooked at least in part because Peirce himself does not develop the suggestion in any substantial way. Royce, on the other hand, spends large amounts of time in the 1890s considering the significance of Wesen. In this light, Royce’s notes might be understood as the type of interpretation that Peirce would have given had he spent more time doing the exegetical legwork on Hegel’s Logic. Royce’s understanding of Wesen, that concentrates on the struggling and wandering character of essence, responds to Peirce’s criticism that Hegel had failed to account for the category of Secondness. Wesen is Hegel’s attempt to account for Secondness.
Hegel’s “Doctrine of Essence” is an important philosophical touchstone for both Royce and Peirce, and I have argued more broadly that it is a point of contact between German idealism and classical American philosophy. In describing this section of Hegel’s Logic as a possible meeting place for thinkers and traditions, I would be remiss if I neglected to mention a final group of thinkers who might share an interest in this reading of Wesen. To this point, I have referred to Hyppolite’s treatment of Hegel several times, drawing it into proximity with Peirce’s and Royce’s writings. I believe that the resonances between this French interpretation of Hegel and Royce’s work in the 1890s are deeper and more revealing. What Hyppolite found most interesting in his work with Hegel’s Logic was the concept of difference and contrast that Hegel describes in Essence. Hyppolite’s Logic and Existence, published in the early 1950s, initiated French postmodern thought, and it is not an exaggeration to say that its highlighting of the dialectic in Hegel’s “Doctrine of Essence” motivated what Giles Deleuze and many others have termed “the philosophy of difference.” Deleuze, along with Michel Foucault and Jacque Derrida, worked closely with Hyppolite and was influenced by his interest in and particular reading of Hegel’s Logic. In his analysis of Logic and Existence, Leonard Lawlor draws his reader’s attention to Foucault’s comment that “Hyppolite is the one who has established all of the problems that we call ours” (Hyppolite, vii). While a detailed analysis is not possible in the current paper, I believe that further work on this topic would reveal an abiding similarity between Hyppolite and American thinkers such as Royce, who spent extensive time and energy unpacking the same passages from Hegel’s corpus.
