Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-fvjsw Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-12T11:57:29.680Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The Politics of Presence in Academic Professional Associations: A Research Note on Governance at the APSA

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 October 2017

Amy Atchison
Amy Atchison*
Affiliation:
Valparaiso University
Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Professional associations like the American Political Science Association (APSA) are intended to represent the interests of all of the members of the profession. The APSA has worked diligently to increase diversity in its leadership, successfully bringing more women and minorities into APSA governance. However, there has not been a corresponding effort to ensure that members from diverse institution types have a seat at the table. This is important because different institution types have different professional issues and interests. In this research note, I explore the extent to which APSA’s leadership is reflective of the range of institution types in higher education. I find that the APSA’s leadership is disproportionately comprised of members from large doctoral-granting universities and elite graduate programs. I conclude with potential ramifications and suggestions for further research.

Information

Type
Articles
Information
PS: Political Science & Politics , Volume 50 , Issue 4 , October 2017, pp. 970 - 978
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 2017 

The purpose of professional discipline-specific associations such as the American Political Science Association (APSA) is to represent the interests of the entirety of the members of the discipline. Academic research into the politics of presence reveals that who is represented matters. Footnote 1 For example, we know that when women and minorities hold political office, they generally advocate for women and minorities, respectively (Bratton, Haynie, and Reingold Reference Bratton, Haynie and Reingold2006; Brown and Banks Reference Brown and Banks2014). In the business world, research shows that more diverse corporate boards deliver stronger firm governance and performance (Matsa and Miller Reference Matsa and Miller2013; Post, Rahman, and Rubow Reference Post, Rahman and Rubow2011). Given that the presence of diverse members matters in both politics and industry, it stands to reason that who is represented also matters to governance outcomes in academic professional associations such as the APSA.

Whereas most political science and corporate research uses a relatively narrow definition of diversity (i.e., race and gender), the APSA’s governing documentation defines diversity not only as gender and race but also as a wide range of personal characteristics:

In selecting the nominees, the Nominating Committee shall make recommendations with due regard for geographic distribution, field of professional interest, methodological orientation, types of institutions where members are employed, race, ethnicity, gender and gender identity, sexuality, disability, and other important forms of diversity. (APSA 2016, emphasis added).

This research note explores the extent to which APSA governance bodies represent the diversity of institution types in higher education. Institution type matters because it is a key dividing line in the academic profession. Higher-education institutions often are broadly characterized as research or non-research institutions. These categories then play a role in the relative prestige of an institution within the discipline (Brewer, Gates, and Goldman Reference Brewer, Gates and Goldman2004). Institution type also is an indicator of faculty members’ research versus teaching load, and it often is a rough proxy for access to research resources including travel funds, graduate assistants, and library materials.

The APSA Council and committee compositions indicate that the association has made a concerted effort to increase representation of many of the groups and characteristics noted in the by-laws. More women and minorities now serve on the APSA Council and committees monitor the status of multiple groups in the profession, including Asian Americans, blacks, community colleges, first-generation scholars, Latinos and Latinas, LGBTI scholars, and women. However, there has not been a similar effort to ensure proportional representation of different institution types in APSA Council and committee nominations—with the notable exception of the newly created APSA Committee on the Status of Community Colleges in the Profession. Footnote 2 The concern in this article is that if some institution types are largely missing from the council and committees, there is likely to be an effect on how well the APSA acts to protect the interests of all of the members of the profession.

I begin by explaining the general purposes of professional associations in higher education. I then briefly discuss the extant literature on the substantive representation of women and minorities in politics and the effects of diverse boards on corporate governance. Together, these explain why the composition of the APSA’s governing body matters. I then examine the share of institution types in the composition of the APSA Council from 2011–12 to 2015–16 compared to the composition of the APSA’s membership and the professoriate more broadly. I conclude with potential ramifications and suggestions for future research.

THE ROLE OF DISCIPLINARY ASSOCIATIONS IN HIGHER EDUCATION

As academia became more specialized during the twentieth century, there was a proliferation of discipline-specific professional associations in the United States (Clark Reference Clark, Alexander, Marx and Williams2004). The purpose of these disciplinary associations has traditionally been to aggregate the interests of academics in a particular field. Put differently, academics use their disciplinary associations both to solve problems within the discipline and as “a way of furthering [disciplines] without regard to institutional boundaries” (Clark Reference Clark1987, 233). Associations provide a range of services to their members, including (but not limited to) the following:

Despite their potential to benefit all levels of the academy, much of the literature regarding disciplinary associations lauds their importance to academics at top-tier institutions. As Scott (2013, 72) noted, disciplinary associations and the quality-control work they do are “particularly salient for the upper tiers of the field,” given the place of those institutions in the hierarchy of the discipline. The literature also points out that membership in larger governing bodies in academia (e.g., the American Association of University Professors) is largely composed of faculty in top-ranked institutions—primarily because those faculty have the resources with which to join. Furthermore, they may also join governance structures from a sense of duty, as Clark (1987, 252) stated “in the nature of noblesse oblige, done with a sense that less fortunate colleagues in other places need a defense league to protect them against the batterings [sic] of politicians, trustees, and administrators.”

The dominance of top-tier institutions, which Whitley (Reference Whitley2011) conceived of as an “academic oligarchy,” can prove detrimental to governance within a disciplinary association such as the APSA.

The dominance of top-tier institutions, which Whitley (Reference Whitley2011) conceived of as an “academic oligarchy,” can prove detrimental to governance within a disciplinary association such as the APSA. Footnote 3 As Whitley (2011, 368) stated, “academic oligarchies…dominate disciplinary associations and communication media.” As a result of this dominance, academic oligarchies unintentionally may drown out the voices of lower-tier institutions, all the while thinking—if Clark is correct—that they (i.e., scholars from top-tier institutions) are actually representing the interests of “less fortunate colleagues.” Footnote 4,Footnote 5

In the social sciences, the extant literature indicates that the American Economic Association is clearly led by an academic oligarchy, with 72% of its board members coming from only five top departments (Fourcade, Ollion, and Algan Reference Fourcade, Ollion and Algan2015, 26). Evidence presented by Fourcade et al. (Reference Fourcade, Ollion and Algan2015) seems to indicate that the APSA is less elite-driven, given that only 12% of its council members come from top-five departments. Footnote 6 Their analysis, however, is limited to the top-five departments, which is a narrow view of the “elite” in a field. If expanded to include the top-10 or top-25 programs, it is likely that the APSA leadership is not overly pluralistic. APSA’s leadership-selection process also suggests that there may be a lack of pluralism. The APSA Council and officers are not a product of competitive elections; instead, they are the product of the APSA Nominating Committee—which is comprised of six APSA members appointed by the APSA president (APSA 2016; Schwartz-Shea and Yanow Reference Schwartz-Shea and Yanow2016). Footnote 7 The committee method of leadership selection has strong potential to become self-reinforcing because people are likely to mine their professional networks for nominees. Footnote 8

If the APSA’s leadership is elite-driven, this has serious implications for (1) which issues are likely to be on the agenda, and (2) the solutions put forth for solving them. This matters because the lived experiences of professors in elite institutions are quite different than those of faculty at non-elite institutions. Furthermore, because of misconceptions about workload and working conditions, it would be difficult for the former—no matter how well intentioned—to accurately represent the interests of the latter (and vice versa, for that matter). An example of these misconceptions is from Southern Methodist University (SMU) professor Michael Harris. As an associate professor of higher education and as the director of SMU’s Center for Teaching Excellence—an institute that specializes in teaching in higher education—it is reasonable to expect that Harris has a solid understanding of academic teaching loads. Yet, in his explanation of teaching loads, he wrote, “A 4-4 load indicates an exclusively teaching assignment and would be most common for instructors, lecturers, and other non-tenure earning positions. There would be little to no expectation for research or service for anyone teaching a 4-4” (Harris Reference Harris2015). In an ideal world, this might be true; however, the reality for many tenured and tenure-track professors at so-called teaching schools is that they teach a 4-4 and are expected to publish and do service. The same is true for people who teach a 4-3. Harris (Reference Harris2015) noted also that for those teaching a 3-3, “the expectations for research are typically pretty minimal…while some evidence of research might be expected for earning tenure, the primary criteria for tenure is teaching competence and excellence.” That assessment would likely come as a surprise to many faculty who, like me, teach a 3-3 and are expected to publish relatively regularly in order to obtain tenure or promotion.

Given the misconceptions about life at smaller institutions, it might be difficult for faculty at large institutions to see why the policy solutions that work well at their institutions do not travel well to smaller institutions. For example, the parental-leave policies adopted by large universities often are made possible by the fact that these institutions have larger faculties and more capacity to offer classes (APSA CSWP 2016). Those solutions are unworkable for smaller institutions. Because APSA makes recommendations about the best practices around professional issues (e.g., leave), Footnote 9 it is important to ensure that smaller institutions and those with fewer resources have an opportunity to weigh in on both issue definition and the solutions that APSA ultimately recommends.

REPRESENTATION MATTERS

In this section, I review the relevant literature on representation from political science and business. I use those literatures to put forth a series of propositions related to APSA governance.

In Politics

Political science indicates that who represents us matters. Our discipline’s research tells us that women and minorities have different policy preferences than their white male counterparts (Beckwith and Cowell-Meyers Reference Beckwith and Cowell-Meyers2007; Bratton et al. Reference Bratton, Haynie and Reingold2006; Shapiro and Mahajan Reference Shapiro and Mahajan1986). It also indicates that when women and minorities are elected to office, they advocate for policies that are particularly salient to women and minorities, respectively (Brown and Banks Reference Brown and Banks2014; Wängnerud Reference Wängnerud2000). Although the outcomes of this advocacy may not be as clear (Preuhs Reference Preuhs2006), research shows that minority, female, and female-minority representation matters in agenda setting (Bratton et al. Reference Bratton, Haynie and Reingold2006); policy formulation and sponsorship (Brown and Banks Reference Brown and Banks2014; Gamble Reference Gamble2007); and legislative debate (Franceschet and Piscopo Reference Franceschet and Piscopo2008; Htun and Jones Reference Htun, Jones, Craske and Molyneux2002).

In Industry

It is not only in politics that representation matters. A growing body of management literature draws connections between board diversity and corporate outcomes. The general argument is that by increasing diversity, firms can maximize the pool of talent and expertise in order to succeed (Villiers Reference Villiers2010). Although the results are mixed, studies tend to show that more diverse boards lead to better return on invested capital and assets (Erhardt, Werbel, and Shrader Reference Erhardt, Werbel and Shrader2003; Lückerath-Rovers Reference Lückerath-Rovers2013) and that diverse boards are more stringent in their oversight of corporate activities (Adams and Ferreira Reference Adams and Ferreira2009). Studies of gender and board composition suggest that women may tend to have more care-centric goals on corporate boards (Matsa and Miller Reference Matsa and Miller2013) and are likely to spend more on environmental protection and corporate social responsibility (Marquis and Lee Reference Marquis and Lee2013; Post et al. Reference Post, Rahman and Rubow2011).

The association has increased inclusion of women and minorities in both the APSA Council and APSA committees, and it has had notable success including women and minorities on the APSA Council and as APSA presidents. No such broad initiative exists relative to institution type.

In APSA Governance

Applying the findings from political science and corporate boards to governance at the APSA indicates that the level of inclusivity on the APSA Council should have an effect on the association’s governance outcomes. The association has increased inclusion of women and minorities in both the APSA Council and APSA committees, and it has notable success including women and minorities on the APSA Council and as APSA presidents. No such broad initiative exists relative to institution type. Thus, it is important to understand how well APSA’s leadership embodies the diversity of institution types in the profession. First, I propose that due to the dominance of research universities in disciplinary associations, it is logical to expect that the proportion of APSA Council members from doctoral-granting institutions will be larger than:

  • • Proposition 1a: the proportion of doctoral-granting institutions in the United States

  • • Proposition 1b: their share of APSA membership

  • • Proposition 1c: their share of the full-time professoriate in American higher education

Additionally, as noted previously, extant research indicates that leadership in academic professional associations is dominated by those with the greatest resources (Burawoy Reference Burawoy2015; Fourcade et al. Reference Fourcade, Ollion and Algan2015). In this case, the pertinent resources are time/flexible schedules and money. Based on teaching schedules and grant funding, full-time faculty members at research institutions are likely to have more of both.

First, a professor who teaches two classes is in the classroom for fewer hours per week and has more flexibility to travel to conferences than a professor who teaches four classes. Conventional wisdom indicates that the teaching load at doctoral-granting institutions typically is a 2-2. Footnote 10 Teaching loads are a tricky metric, however Footnote 11 ; they can vary from the standard and are not good indicators of workload. Nevertheless, our basic understanding of teaching loads indicates that faculty at doctoral-granting institutions are physically in the classroom fewer hours per week than many of their colleagues at nondoctoral-granting institutions. Additionally, their course loads are unlikely to increase but often decrease based on course releases for administration or research. Footnote 12 In addition, if course releases are not possible, faculty may be able to use grant funding to buy themselves out of part of their course load.

In that it can pay for travel to conferences, grant funding plays a role in the ability of faculty from larger institutions to participate in the APSA and its governance. Footnote 13 Conventional wisdom indicates that larger institutions tend to obtain more grant funding and the more elite the institution, the greater is the pressure to bring in grant money to publish research. Although National Science Foundation (NSF) data do not address the pressures at elite institutions, they do indicate that elite institutions (i.e., the top-25 political science graduate departments) receive the bulk of NSF political science funding. As shown in figure 1, this was about 70.4% between 2010 and 2016 (NSF 2016). In addition to grant funding, elite institutions typically have larger endowments than non-elite institutions, and endowments are an indicator of the institution’s resources.

Figure 1

NSF Awards and Funding by Department Rank, 2010–2016

The NSF lists 120 awards from the NSF Political Science program.

Finally, other than time/flexibility and money, it seems that some top departments simply expect that their faculty will actively contribute service to the profession at high levels. In conversations with current and past APSA Council members, this expectation was variously described as being built-in to the lower teaching load; as evidence of international engagement with and/or of prominence in the profession (such evidence is necessary for promotion); and simply as the “right thing to do.” Given the likelihood of access to resources and the expectation of professional service, I further propose the following:

  • • Proposition 2: higher-ranked doctoral-granting institutions will comprise a disproportionate share of the membership in the APSA Council

The next section explains the data and analyses used to analyze the evidence related to these propositions.

DATA AND ANALYSIS

In the following, I use Carnegie Classifications, data from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System, and data gleaned from APSA records to examine each of the propositions stated above.

Investigating the Diversity of Institution Types in APSA Governance

Considering Proposition 1a, I compared the diversity of institution types among the APSA leadership with the diversity of institution types in the American higher-education system. First, I examined the 2015–16 APSA Council and committees versus the diversity of institution types in the American higher-education system. To gather these data, I first searched the APSA website, which provided data on the 2015–16 APSA Council and committees (“APSA Leadership and Governance” 2016). Footnote 14 I then searched The Carnegie Classification of Institutions of Higher Education (n.d) to determine classifications for the institutions affiliated with each 2015–16 APSA Council or committee member. Footnote 15 I compared these data with the percentages of higher-education institutions by type, according to the Carnegie Classifications (figure 2).

Figure 2

APSA Governance Body Membership, by Institution Type 2015–2016

Figure 2 provides support for Proposition 1a: it indicates that whereas only 7% of degree-granting institutions in the United States are doctoral universities, 67% of the total members of APSA’s 2015–16 governing bodies are from doctoral universities. That number increases to 85% if we look solely at the APSA Council. Given that women and minorities are disproportionately concentrated in lower-ranked institutions (Grant and Ward Reference Grant, Ward, Dubeck and Borman2013; Tuan et al. 2013), it is unsurprising that the percentage of doctoral-granting institutions (57%) is lowest—but still a majority—in APSA’s status committees.

It could be, however, that the 2015–16 APSA Council was an aberration and that previous councils have better represented the diversity of institution types in which political scientists are employed. Thus, I used APSA’s annual reporting in PS: Political Science & Politics to determine the composition of all APSA Councils between 2011–12 and 2015–16, and I again classified members’ institutions using Carnegie Classifications Footnote 16 (figure 3).

Figure 3

APSA Council Membership, by Year and Institution Type

These data also provide support for Proposition 1a, indicating that the overrepresentation of doctoral-granting universities is not limited to the membership of the 2015–16 APSA Council. Most notable in figure 3 is that for three of the five years presented, there is not a single member of a master’s-granting institution on the APSA Council; for the remaining two years, faculty master’s-granting institutions comprise only 4.35% (i.e., one person per year) of the council members. Footnote 17 From the 2011–12 council through the 2015–16 council, 95 of the 115 APSA Council seats Footnote 18 were filled by scholars from doctoral universities (about 83%), whereas only six (5.2%) were filled by scholars from baccalaureate colleges, two (1.7%) from master’s colleges and universities, and 11 (9.5%) from international universities.

Because doctoral universities are only 7% of American academic institutions, the percentages presented in figure 3 indicate that doctoral universities comprise about 12 times more of the membership of APSA governance bodies than they should if the intent of APSA’s by-laws is to ensure that the council composition is reflective of the different institution types at which political scientists are found. However, departments at doctoral-granting institutions have more people than those at nondoctoral-granting institutions. Therefore, the percentage of doctoral-granting institutions (7%) may not be indicative of their share of APSA’s membership or their share of the broader political science professoriate. For example, a small institution might have just six faculty members in its political science department or three political scientists in a social sciences department and no graduate students. In contrast, a doctoral-granting institution might have 20-plus faculty and dozens of graduate students.

Because doctoral universities are only 7% of American academic institutions, the percentages presented in figure 3 indicate that doctoral universities comprise about 12 times more of the membership of APSA governance bodies than they should if the intent of APSA’s by-laws is to ensure that the council composition is reflective of the different institution types at which political scientists are found.

Does APSA’s Leadership Reflect Its Constituent Groups?

To determine how reflective APSA’s leadership is of its constituents, it is also important to examine the composition of its membership (Proposition 1b) and the composition of the professoriate more broadly (Proposition 1c). I used the 2016 APSA Annual Meeting data to determine how well the APSA leadership reflects the composition of its membership (Proposition 1b). I used Annual Meeting data because the APSA Research unit classifies members’ institutions by the highest degree granted by the department rather than by the institutions’ Carnegie Classifications, which are the standard in higher-education data and reporting. Department-level classification is useful for the APSA’s purposes because it indicates the highest degree granted by the department rather than by the institution—but this makes external comparison difficult. Thus, rather than using APSA’s membership data, the APSA Research unit provided attendee data (with names and identifying features removed) for the 2016 APSA Annual Meeting. This allowed me to add Carnegie Classifications to the data and facilitated comparison with other higher-education data. Although this is a crude proxy for APSA membership and it likely masks a degree of bias because research-focused scholars are the most likely to attend, it does indicate the levels at which different institution types are engaging with the APSA. Footnote 19

The attendee list included 6,607 records. After removing records for which a higher-education institution was not listed (658 records), the dataset included 5,949 records. I searched The Carnegie Classification of Institutions of Higher Education (n.d) to determine the classification for the institution affiliated with each record. To determine how characteristic APSA Annual Meeting attendance is of the US professoriate (Proposition 1c), I used Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) data (NCES, 2016) to determine the number and percentage of full-time faculty at US doctoral-, master’s-, baccalaureate-, and associate’s-granting institutions. Footnote 20 The composition of the APSA Council (2015–16) and 2016 APSA Annual Meeting attendees are contrasted with faculty at US-based institutions in figure 4. Footnote 21

Figure 4

Comparison of the APSA Council, Attendees, and Faculty at US-Based Institutions

Figure 4 supports Proposition 1b, showing that the APSA Council is not indicative of the diversity of institution types found among the membership (as measured by Annual Meeting attendance). The data also show that, as indicated by Proposition 1c, APSA’s membership may not be reflective of political scientists in the professoriate.

Investigating Institution Rank in APSA Governance

To test Proposition 2, I matched the US-based institutions of APSA Council members (2011–12 through 2015–16) Footnote 22 to their institutional rankings in the 2017 US News & World Report Rankings (US News 2016). Footnote 23 These results are shown in figure 5.

Figure 5

APSA Council Member Institutions by Rank, 201–12 through 2015–16

These data support Proposition 2: higher-ranked doctoral institutions will comprise a disproportionate share of APSA’s leadership. During the period included in this study, top-25 political science graduate programs comprised nearly 45% of the association’s leadership. Also noteworthy is that of the baccalaureate institutions in the dataset, three of the four are top-15 national liberal arts colleges and three of the six international institutions are ranked in the global top 50 (QS 2015; US News 2016). This indicates that elite institutions of all types heavily dominate APSA governance.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

The dominance of elite doctoral-granting institutions in APSA governance may be a function of higher visibility, more research output, greater access to financial resources that facilitate travel and APSA participation, and perhaps more time to engage with the profession. Footnote 24 As a discipline, however, we do not know this for certain. We also do not know why master’s, baccalaureate, and associate’s institutions are underrepresented in APSA governance. Is it analogous to citations, wherein people cite (i.e., nominate) the scholars they know? Alternatively, are scholars from smaller institutions being nominated but decline to serve, perhaps as a result of time and resource constraints? Furthermore, when baccalaureate institutions are represented, are they from elite small liberal arts colleges (SLACs) or from both elite and lower-ranked SLACs? At some elite SLACs, the teaching load and research expectations are in line with expectations at doctoral-granting institutions, thereby making elite SLACs’ concerns far different than those of lower-ranked “teaching” SLACs.

Arguably more troubling is the indication that APSA’s membership is not reflective of the full-time professoriate more broadly. If, as noted previously, the disciplinary association is meant to aggregate the concerns of all members of the profession, why are more members of the profession—particularly those from smaller institutions—not joining APSA in larger numbers? Fourcade et al. (Reference Fourcade, Ollion and Algan2015) indicated that the APSA’s membership fees are among the highest in the social sciences; is the financial barrier to joining too high? Is it that the nonmembers do not see their lived experiences reflected in the work that the association does? If the answer to the latter question is “yes,” then it may be that leadership and membership combine to form a negative feedback loop in which lack of participation by faculty at smaller institutions reinforces the perception that APSA is concerned only with faculty at larger institutions. Again, we simply do not have data on the question of why some scholars do not join APSA (or join only if they are presenting at the Annual Meeting). Both the dearth of leaders and members from smaller institutions are questions that the APSA and its leadership should explore. Furthermore, this research note examined institution types only among full-time faculty, yet we know that adjunct professors make up an increasingly large portion of the professoriate (Stenerson et al. Reference Stenerson, Blanchard, Fassiotto, Hernandez and Muth2010). Given the debates about adjunct labor in higher education, Footnote 25 future research should address at what rate adjuncts join the APSA and how well the association addresses the issues that are specific to the precarious nature of adjunct employment.

Finally, the role of top-tier doctoral-grating universities in APSA governance is another avenue for future research. First, it must be noted that the dominance of top-tier programs in APSA’s governance is likely larger than it appears due to the fact that top-tier graduate programs are responsible for a large share of job placements in the discipline (Oprisko Reference Oprisko2012). More important, however, is to determine the extent to which these institutions’ outsized presence has an effect on the services and functions performed by the APSA.

For example, one key area of concern is the APSA/APSA Council’s role in the conception and promotion of the Data Access and Research Transparency (DA-RT) policy. In their recent review of the DA-RT initiative, Schwartz-Shea and Yanow (Reference Schwartz-Shea and Yanow2016) alluded to the representation issues described previously: elite dominance in decision making, wherein top-tier scholars believe they are appropriately representing the wider membership:

From DA-RT’s leaders’ account, they sought out various views, with few results…But what may seem inclusive from one perspective can appear quite exclusive from another. That DA-RT proponents saw only consensus before the 2015 meeting might be understood as resulting from a networking effect: reaching out through one’s own networks likely yields participants with similar views.

Schwartz-Shea and Yanow (Reference Schwartz-Shea and Yanow2016) further questioned the legitimacy of APSA’s leadership on this issue, asking if DA-RT would have progressed this far had the association’s leadership been elected and truly representative of the membership. I extend that question, asking “Is the association’s approach to DA-RT unique, or is it symptomatic of broader practices in the association’s governance?”

In summary, research is clear that who is represented matters—for instance, we know that representatives from marginalized groups are more likely to put their groups’ issues on the agenda than non-group-member counterparts (Bratton Reference Bratton2002). We also know that more diversity brings new ideas and different perspectives that widen the scope of a board’s discussions and provides a broader base of expertise on which to base decisions (Erhardt et al. Reference Erhardt, Werbel and Shrader2003). By increasing the diversity of institution types included on the APSA Council, we will not only more closely align the leadership with the spirit of APSA’s by-laws but we also will potentially increase the efficacy and even the legitimacy of APSA’s governance.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author thanks the current and former APSA Council members who provided input for this article and to Betsy Super for providing annual meeting attendance data. Thanks also to Stefanie Chambers, Sue Tolleson-Rinehart, Denise Walsh, and the Brain Trust for providing suggestions and support for this project. Finally, many thanks to the reviewers for their feedback. All errors in this article are my own.

Footnotes

1. The term the politics of presence was coined by Phillips (Reference Phillips1995) as part of her seminal work on how underrepresented groups should be represented in the political process.

2. The committee started during the 2015–16 academic year.

3. For the purposes of this article, the top-tier is composed of the Top 25 political science graduate programs, as ranked by US News (2016).

4. For example, it was recently explained to me that political scientists from nondoctoral-granting institutions were not asked to serve on an upcoming task force because “we (task force organizers) didn’t want them to have to expend their limited resources in order to participate” (personal communication).

5. Although one could argue that scholars from top-tier universities may have no intention of representing their colleagues from lower-tier institutions, the creation—by elite members of the profession—of the APSA’s status committees indicates some level of interest in the issues faced by marginalized groups in the profession.

6. They also analyze the American Sociological Association (ASA), noting that 20% of the ASA’s board come from the top five sociology programs (Fourcade et al. Reference Fourcade, Ollion and Algan2015, 26).

7. APSA rules allow nominations from the floor; however, this is not the typical method for council nominations. The new APSA by-laws, passed in 2016, require that in his or her appointments to the nominating committee, the president must give due consideration to the same diversity considerations noted previously, including institution type (Article IX, Section 1, para. A).

8. Evidence from corporate boards indicates that in an unregulated environment, board appointments tend to go to industry insiders/executives at related firms; this practice forms “interlocks” (i.e., networks) between companies (Gerber Reference Gerber2007). As Simmons (2012, 56) noted, these networks are a function of the “existence of a powerful upper class that uses interlocks as a means for controlling the marketplace.”

9. See, for example, Women’s Advancement in Political Science (APSA 2004) and Pipeline Practices (APSA CSWP 2016).

10. This masks considerable variation among lower- and higher-ranked institutions. Evidence gathered from APSA eJobs postings and personal communications indicates that there are some doctoral-granting/moderate-research-activity universities in which the standard/advertised political science teaching load is a 3-2, 3-3, or 3-4. These sources also indicate that whereas most doctoral-granting/higher-highest institutions have 2-2 loads, some are variable based on research productivity (e.g., a less-productive professor would have a 3-2 or even 3-3 load). Additionally, some Ivy League institutions have a standard 2-1 (or 3 courses) per year.

11. One complicating factor is that a person’s load reveals nothing about class size or the distribution of undergraduate and graduate classes.

12. Some faculty can negotiate course releases for research; the more successful they have been at research in the past, the more leverage they have in that negotiation.

13. I do not address individual compensation and research funds because data on salaries are difficult to find for private institutions—and solid data on individuals’ research and/or travel funding are nonexistent.

14. I counted the following committees: Committee on Departmental Services, Committee on Teaching and Learning, Committee on Civic Education & Engagement, Development Committee, Organized Sections Committee, Professional Ethics Rights and Freedoms Committee, Nominating Committee, and Committee on Publications. I did not include ad hoc committees.

15. Further explanation of the Carnegie Classifications and why I used them is explained in a subsequent discussion.

16. APSA status and administrative committees are not included in the PS reports, which is why I can report them only for 2015–16. Data are from “New APSA Council Members Elected (2011)” and “Meet the APSA Council and Officers” (2012, 2013, 2014, 2015).

17. In this case, Michelle Deardorff of the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga.

18. “Seat” is not analogous to “person” because most council members serve two-year terms and officers serve one-year terms. Thus, the six baccalaureate seats were filled by four people during the time frame in question; the 95 doctoral-granting seats were filled by 61 people; the two master’s seats were filled by one person; and the 11 international seats were filled by seven people.

19. It does not account for the fact that members with fewer resources are less likely to attend the Annual Meeting, and that each Annual Meeting’s attendance is somewhat skewed by location (i.e., driving distance) (personal communication with the APSA Research unit).

20. IPEDS’ most recent data at the time of this writing are from the fall of 2014. There are several other Carnegie Classifications other than the four I include, including tribal, specialty, law schools, and medical schools—to name a few. However, the four on which I focus are where the bulk of full-time US faculty are concentrated.

21. The APSA Research unit confirms that scholars from international institutions comprise about 20% of the APSA membership; therefore, their attendance rates are commensurate with their membership rates. Also, graduate students are included in the APSA Annual Meeting data, whereas the IPEDs data include only full-time faculty.

22. I used the full dataset because one member’s institutional rank can skew a single APSA Council.

23. For doctoral programs, I examined public affairs and political science rankings; for baccalaureate institutions, I examined overall school rank.

24. As one scholar from a doctoral-granting institution explained, “If the standard teaching load for [smaller institutions] is a 3-3 [or higher]…in my mind I am already advantaged in pursuing service outside of my university with a 2-2 load at an R1, even without course release.”

25. See Inside Higher Ed’s news topic: Adjuncts. Available at www.insidehighered.com/news/focus/adjuncts.

References

REFERENCES

Adams, Renee B., and Ferreira, Daniel. 2009. “Women in the Boardroom and Their Impact on Governance and Performance.” Journal of Financial Economics 94 (2): 291–309.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
APSA. 2004. Women’s Advancement in Political Science: A Report on the APSA Workshop on the Advancement of Women in Academic Political Science in the United States . Available at www.apsanet.org/portals/54/Files/Task%20Force%20Reports/Womens_Advancement_in_Political_Science_2005.pdf.Google Scholar
APSA. 2016. “By-Laws of the American Political Science Association.” Washington, DC: American Political Science Association.Google Scholar
APSA Committee on the Status of Women in the Profession. 2016. Pipeline Practices . Available at http://web.apsanet.org/cswp/pipeline-practices.Google Scholar
APSA Leadership and Governance. 2016. Available at www.apsanet.org/ABOUT/Leadership-Governance.Google Scholar
Beckwith, Karen, and Cowell-Meyers, Kimberly. 2007. “Sheer Numbers: Critical Representation Thresholds and Women’s Political Representation.” Perspectives on Politics 5 (3): 554–65.Google Scholar
Bratton, Kathleen A. 2002. “The Effect of Legislative Diversity on Agenda Setting: Evidence from Six State Legislatures.” American Politics Research 30 (2): 115–42. doi:10.1177/1532673x02030002001.Google Scholar
Bratton, Kathleen A., Haynie, Kerry L., and Reingold, Beth. 2006. “Agenda Setting and African American Women in State Legislatures.” Journal of Women, Politics & Policy 28 (3–4): 71–96. doi:10.1300/J501v28n03_04.Google Scholar
Bray, Nathniel J., and Major, Claire H.. 2011. “Status of Journals in the Field of Higher Education.” The Journal of Higher Education 82 (4): 479–503.Google Scholar
Brewer, Dominic J., Gates, Susan M., and Goldman, Charles A.. 2004. In Pursuit of Prestige: Strategy and Competition in US Higher Education. Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers.Google Scholar
Brown, Nadia, and Banks, Kira Hudson. 2014. “Black Women’s Agenda Setting in the Maryland State Legislature.” Journal of African American Studies 18 (2): 164–80. doi:10.1007/s12111-013-9260-7.Google Scholar
Burawoy, Michael. 2015. “Facing an Unequal World.” Current Sociology 63 (1): 5–34.Google Scholar
Clark, Burton R. 1987. The Academic Life. Small Worlds, Different Worlds: A Carnegie Foundation Special Report. Washington, DC: Education Resources Information Center.Google Scholar
Clark, Burton R. 2004. “The Organizational Foundations of University Capability.” In Self, Social Structure, and Beliefs: Explorations in Sociology, ed. Alexander, Jeffrey C., Marx, Gary T. and Williams, Christine L.. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Dill, David D. 1982. “The Structure of the Academic Profession: Toward a Definition of Ethical Issues.” The Journal of Higher Education 53 (3): 255–67.Google Scholar
Erhardt, Niclas L., Werbel, James D., and Shrader, Charles B.. 2003. “Board of Director Diversity and Firm Financial Performance.” Corporate Governance: An International Review 11 (2): 102–11.Google Scholar
Fourcade, Marion, Ollion, Etienne, and Algan, Yann. 2015. “The Superiority of Economists.” Revista de Economía Institucional 17 (33): 13–43.Google Scholar
Franceschet, Susan, and Piscopo, Jennifer M.. 2008. “Gender Quotas and Women’s Substantive Representation: Lessons from Argentina.” Politics & Gender 4 (03): 393–425.Google Scholar
Gamble, Katrina L. 2007. “Black Political Representation: An Examination of Legislative Activity within US House Committees.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 32 (3): 421–47.Google Scholar
Gerber, Benjamin M. 2007. “Enabling Interlock Benefits While Preventing Anticompetitive Harm: Toward an Optimal Definition of Competitors under Section 8 of the Clayton Act.” Yale Journal on Regulation 24: 107.Google Scholar
Grant, L., and Ward, K. B.. 2013. “Women in Academia.” In Women and Work: A Handbook, ed. Dubeck, Paula J. and Borman, Kathryn, 679: 165–8. New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
Harris, M. 2015. “What Is the Typical Teaching Load for University Faculty?” Available at http://higheredprofessor.com/2015/05/11/what-is-the-typical-teaching-load-for-university-faculty.Google Scholar
Htun, Mala N., and Jones, Mark P.. 2002. “Engendering the Right to Participate in Decision-Making: Electoral Quotas and Women’s Leadership in Latin America.” In Gender and the Politics of Rights and Democracy in Latin America, ed. Craske, Nikki and Molyneux, Maxine, 32–56. New York: Springer.Google Scholar
Lückerath-Rovers, Mijntje. 2013. “Women on Boards and Firm Performance.” Journal of Management & Governance 17 (2): 491–509. doi:10.1007/s10997-011-9186-1.Google Scholar
Marquis, Christopher, and Lee, Matthew. 2013. “Who Is Governing Whom? Executives, Governance, and the Structure of Generosity in Large US Firms.” Strategic Management Journal 34 (4): 483–97.Google Scholar
Matsa, David A., and Miller, Amalia R.. 2013. “A Female Style in Corporate Leadership? Evidence from Quotas.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 5 (3): 136–69.Google Scholar
Meet the APSA Council and Officers. 2012. PS: Political Science & Politics 45 (1): 151–4.Google Scholar
Meet the APSA Council and Officers. 2013. PS: Political Science & Politics 46 (1): 178–82.Google Scholar
Meet the APSA Council and Officers. 2014. PS: Political Science & Politics 47 (1): 232–6.Google Scholar
Meet the APSA Council and Officers. 2015. PS: Political Science & Politics 48 (1): 202–206.Google Scholar
Mendoza, Pilar, and Berger, Joseph B.. 2008. “Academic Capitalism and Academic Culture: A Case Study.” Education Policy Analysis Archives 16 (23): n. 23.Google Scholar
National Center for Education Statistics. 2016. “Number of Full-Time Instructional Staff Employed by Degree-Granting Postsecondary Institutions by Degree-Granting Status Carnegie Classification 2000 for Fall 2014.” IPEDS Trend Generator. Available at http://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/trendgenerator.Google Scholar
National Science Foundation. 2016. “What Has Been Funded (Recent Awards Made Through This Program, with Abstracts) (Political Science).” Available at www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/advancedSearchResult?WT.si_n=ClickedAbstractsRecentAwards&WT.si_x=1&WT.si_cs=1&WT.z_pims_id=5418&ProgEleCode=1371&BooleanElement=Any&BooleanRef=Any&ActiveAwards=true&#results.Google Scholar
New APSA Council Members Elected. 2011. PS: Political Science & Politics 44 (1): 184–5.Google Scholar
Oprisko, Robert L. 2012. “Superpowers: The American Academic Elite.” Georgetown Public Policy Review. Avalable at http://gppreview.com/2012/12/03/superpowers-the-american-academic-elite/.Google Scholar
Phillips, Anne. 1995. The Politics of Presence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Post, Corinne, Rahman, Noushi, and Rubow, Emily. 2011. “Green Governance: Boards of Directors’ Composition and Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility.” Business & Society 50 (1): 189–223. doi:10.1177/0007650310394642.Google Scholar
Preuhs, Robert R. 2006. “The Conditional Effects of Minority Descriptive Representation: Black Legislators and Policy Influence in the American States.” Journal of Politics 68 (3): 585–99.Google Scholar
QS World University Rankings. 2015. “Top Universities.” Available at www.topuniversities.com/universities/region/asia/region/europe/region/north-america/country/united-states.Google Scholar
Rice, R. Eugene. 2002. “Beyond Scholarship Reconsidered: Toward an Enlarged Vision of the Scholarly Work of Faculty Members.” New Directions for Teaching and Learning 90: 7–18.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schwartz-Shea, Peregrine, and Yanow, Dvora. 2016. “Legitimizing Political Science or Splitting the Discipline? Reflections on DA-RT and the Policy-Making Role of a Professional Association.” Politics & Gender 12 (3): doi:10.1017/S1743923X16000428.Google Scholar
Scott, William Ricard. 2013. “The Field of Higher Education in the US: Trends and Challenges.” Revista Universidade em Debate 1 (1): 66–74.Google Scholar
Shapiro, Robert Y., and Mahajan, Harpreet. 1986. “Gender Differences in Policy Preferences: A Summary of Trends from the 1960s to the 1980s.” The Public Opinion Quarterly 50 (1): 42–61.Google Scholar
Simmons, Charlene. 2012. “Will You Be on Our Board of Directors? We Need Help: Media Corporations, Environmental Change, and Resource Dependency Theory.” Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly 89 (1): 55–72.Google Scholar
Stenerson, James, Blanchard, Loren, Fassiotto, Michael, Hernandez, Mark, and Muth, Ann. 2010. “The Role of Adjuncts in the Professoriate.” Peer Review 12. Available at www.aacu.org/publications-research/periodicals/role-adjuncts-professoriate.Google Scholar
The Carnegie Classification of Institutions of Higher Education. N.d. “Institution Lookup.” Available at http://carnegieclassifications.iu.edu/lookup/lookup.php.Google Scholar
Tuan, Mia, Robin, Leah, Alvarez, Rodolfo, and Huang, Amily Shui-I. 2013. “Women of Color in Academe.” In Women and Work: A Handbook, ed. Carreon, Sonia, Cassedy, Amy, Borman, Kathyrn and Dubeck, Paula J., 679: 165–8. New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
US News. 2016. “Best Political Science Programs, Ranked 2013.” US News & World Report.Google Scholar
Villiers, Charlotte. 2010. “Achieving Gender Balance in the Boardroom: Is It Time for Legislative Action in the UK?” Legal Studies 30 (4): 533–57.Google Scholar
Wängnerud, Lena. 2000. “Testing the Politics of Presence: Women’s Representation in the Swedish Riksdag.” Scandinavian Political Studies 23 (1): 67–91.Google Scholar
Whitley, Richard. 2011. “Changing Governance and Authority Relations in the Public Sciences.” Minerva 49 (4): 359–85. doi:10.1007/s11024-011-9182-2.Google Scholar
Figure 0

Figure 1NSF Awards and Funding by Department Rank, 2010–2016The NSF lists 120 awards from the NSF Political Science program.

Figure 1

Figure 2APSA Governance Body Membership, by Institution Type 2015–2016

Figure 2

Figure 3APSA Council Membership, by Year and Institution Type

Figure 3

Figure 4Comparison of the APSA Council, Attendees, and Faculty at US-Based Institutions

Figure 4

Figure 5APSA Council Member Institutions by Rank, 201–12 through 2015–16