Within the history of Hegelian scholarship, one central concern is clarifying the nature of Hegel’s dialectical method. The early expositors of Hegel’s philosophyFootnote 1 posited that the unfolding of the dialectical method followed the simple process of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. Even though commentators, such as McTaggart, pointed to the interpretive problems involved with such a simple readingFootnote 2, it was this simplification that became popular. With the publication of Gustav Mueller’s essay The Hegel Legend of Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis, in 1958, things changed. This paper was so influential for subsequent scholarship that, as of 2007, Donald Phillip Verene was able to write, “No first-rate Hegel scholar speaks of Hegel having a dialectic of thesis-antithesis-synthesis.”Footnote 3
Leonard Wheat’s book, Hegel’s Undiscovered Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis Dialectics, argues that the three part dialectical method is present in Hegel’s work but not in this simplified form. The novelty of Wheat’s conception of Hegel’s dialectic is that each step (thesis, antithesis, synthesis) contains two concepts. For example, in describing the first dialectic in the Phenomenology of Spirit, Wheat describes the thesis as composed of the concepts of unconsciousness and union, the antithesis stage contains the concepts of consciousness and separation, and then the synthesis is composed of consciousness and union. This is similar to what Wheat describes as Hegel’s macrodialectical movement of estrangement and return. We begin in an unconscious or potential unity with nature, we are then separated from this unity through consciousness of particularity and difference, and we then return to a higher union as conscious individuals. In addition to the macrodialectic, Wheat provides accounts of intermediate and microdialectics. Each micro and intermediate dialectic is an exhibition of the macrodialectic but is unique in its particular content as well as its position in the advance of spirit to its ultimate end. The dialectic of master and slave, as an instance of the macrodialectic, is constituted in its three complex moments as a movement of estrangement and return, yet as a microdialectic, it has its particular subject matter and gives way to the next microdialectic, i.e., stoicism. Wheat’s divisions are such that there is a) a macrodialectic of spirit coming to full self-consciousness, b) intermediate dialectics as the steps in the macrodialectic, and c) the microdialectics as steps involved in the intermediate dialectic. This means, for example, that to give an adequate account of Hegel’s conception of the master-slave relationship would require analysis involving all three levels.
Wheat believes that there are two thinkers who have truly understood Hegelian dialectics and who utilize this method in their own writings—Marx and Tillich. His praise of Tillich functions as a propaedeutic for his rather exhaustive and helpful reading of the dialectical process of the Phenomenology of Spirit. Anyone interested in this process would find Wheat’s work useful. Wheat describes the basic structure of Tillich’s rendering of Hegelian dialectics as consisting of a Yes-No-Yes process. For instance, Tillich’s thesis stage is: Yes to God and Yes to supernaturalism, the antithesis stage is: No to God and No to supernaturalism, and the synthesis stage is: Yes to God and No to supernaturalism. Wheat shows that Tillich grasps that each stage of Hegelian dialectics is composed of two concepts. The synthesis stage preserves a No from the antithesis and a Yes of the thesis. It is a Yes to a God that is at the same time a No to the God of supernaturalism. Wheat’s praise of Marx happens in conjunction with his reading of Hegel’s The Philosophy of History. Wheat criticizes most expositors of Marx for misunderstanding the nature of dialectics and Marx’s philosophy of history. He claims they focus mainly on base-superstructural dialectics involving the relation of economic conditions of production and culture (249-250). Base-superstructural dialectics are not the complex thesis-antithesis-synthesis dialectics that are the true engine of history and that indicate the process of estrangement and return. Marx’s Hegelian dialectics concern the historical process that underpins the base-superstructural dialectic. At the thesis stage is primitive communism, consisting in communal ownership (classless society) and poverty. Then, at the antithesis stage, there is private ownership (class society) and wealth. The antithesis stage lasts through slavery, feudalism, and capitalism. Then, in the synthesis stage, there is communal ownership and wealth. In Marx, as in Tillich, Wheat identifies the properly Hegelian dialectic as that where the synthesis includes one concept from the thesis (classless society) and one concept from the antithesis (wealth).
Wheat situates his own work as saving Hegel’s dialectic from false and simplified characterizations. His readings of the Phenomenology of Spirit and the Philosophy of History are cautious, rigorous, and provocative. However, in addition to his sometimes unduly dismissive criticisms of existing Hegel scholarship, the major shortcoming of this text is the inadequate defense he provides for his most controversial claim, namely that Hegel’s Science of Logic does not contain thesis-antithesis-synthesis dialectics. He consistently claims that the Science of Logic contains static triads, and that these are to be distinguished from the dynamic triads of the Phenomenology of Spirit and Philosophy of History. This is strange for a number of reasons, most notably1) Hegel nowhere addresses such a distinction, and 2) Hegel discusses a) the method of the Science of Logic as having been outlined in the preface to the Phenomenology,Footnote 4 and b) the dialectical method of the Science of Logic as a movement of becoming, transition, and development.Footnote 5 Wheat does not provide enough evidence that the method of Hegel’s two published works, the Phenomenology and the Science of Logic, utilize two distinct kinds of dialectic. If Wheat is right about this, his argument needs to be developed more rigorously—such a distinction is far too significant for Hegelian scholarship to be passed over so lightly.
