The economic crisis that erupted across the world market in late 2007 exposed two fundamental flaws of contemporary capitalism. The one was being denied by central bankers even as financial turmoil spread across Britain and the US: the unsustainability of the fantastical growth of credit markets and financial capital. Financialization had been a central feature of the neoliberal era dating back to the initial rise of the New Right under Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan in the 1980s. The other was more subtle, but now an equally apparent flaw. Neoclassical economics, particularly in its dominant rational expectations theorization, had next to nothing to say about either the causes or the course of the crisis. Indeed, many of its most touted theses—such as the “efficient market hypothesis”—had been the justification for the credit explosion, the transformation in bank regulation and the centrality of finance in neoliberal economic policy. Mainstream economists had even less to say about possible exits to the crisis; their basic refrain was to stay the course, and let the market sort things out.
The financial crisis thus gave further evidence to what many social scientists had been arguing for some time: economics as ideology had become more important than economics as science. A turn to interdisciplinary approaches, whether in paradigms owing their origins to Weberianism or Marxism, was in order. Indeed, the “return of the state” to stabilize market turbulence and to manage a new “age of austerity,” as the financial crisis was shifted from the private to the public sector, gave this disciplinary shift some urgency.
The new collection gathered by Terrence Casey, The Legacy of the Crash: How the Financial Crisis Changed America and Britain, demonstrates some of the ways that comparative politics can contribute to our understanding of the political economy of the crisis. Nurtured by the British Politics group of the American Political Science Association, the essays explore how “political and economic relationships and institutions would be remade” (p. x). In particular, the volume is animated by a fundamental question—one elided in most policy debates and generally ruled out of order in economics—of whether the crisis emerged out of “specific policy failures, or was this a systemic crisis of the neoliberal growth model?” (p. 6).
The essays cluster in three groups of contributions, each assessing the political trajectory of the two cases over the course of the crisis. One set of essays takes up the economic policy response to the crisis, particularly fiscal policy, bank regulation and industrial policy. The central contention here, outlined in the analysis of David Coates and Kara Dickstein, is that even if the excesses of the banking system formed the crisis, its spread to the public sector has left financial institutions as central pivots of economic power (pp. 76–7). It is a significant gap here that the politics of money and central bank policy is not given more full treatment in these essays. Political scientists have developed considerable insights into the real policy operations of the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England, moving far beyond abstract discussions of the relations between various quantities of money and economic stability to analyze the politics of financial power.
A second group of contributions assesses post-crisis electoral trends, covering the election of Barack Obama to the presidency and the surge of Republicans in the House in the US, and the coalition government of David Cameron in Britain. Some attention is given over to the rise of “third parties,” notably in Arthur Cyr's essay, with the spectacular emergence of the Tea Party (not formally a third party) and the unexpected surge of the Liberal Democrats into the UK's coalition government. These essays offer numerous insights into what made for the defeat of incumbent politics, but at the same time observe the limited impact of the economic crisis on the overall balance of electoral politics. The focus of the essays on elections, however, reveals little of the politics that also generated the dissent of the Occupy movement, UK Uncut, the Wisconsin Uprising and the turmoil and strikes besetting the union movement. Even the quite fine essay by Graham Wilson on the “downfall of the left” fails to move beyond the travails of centre-left parties caught in the trap long-ago identified by Charles Lindblom, that “markets constrain political choice” (p. 129).
The last grouping of essays covers post-crisis politics around healthcare reform, security and judicial activism. But the essays only tangentially link them to the legacy of the crash. Still, the essays all explore the key theme of highlighted in the essay by John Owens and Mark Shephard—he continuing concentration of executive power in the post-crisis governments in Britain and the US, which has been a central feature of the neoliberal state.
This volume neatly documents the variation in policy timing and responses and political coalitions between the two cases. A few interesting themes emerge: important differences within the “Anglo-Saxon model that continue in the post-crisis responses, such as over industrial policy pointed to in Wyn Grant's essay; the lax policy and regulatory environment surrounding finance that contributed to the crisis yet the incredibly modest banking reforms; the political ascendancy of fiscal retrenchment despite divergent political partisanship; and that a new “age of austerity” has not yet foretold a new political era. Whatever the initial policy mistakes that contributed to the crisis and the emergency policies needed to avert economic collapse, it is now policy continuity as opposed to policy innovation and reform. The radical policy breaks that marked the New Deal in the Great Depression do not appear on the horizon.
This is not to say that the essays furnish a single perspective on the legacy of the crash. But to the extent there is a common thematic, it is found in the “varieties of capitalism” approach associated with Peter A. Hall and David Soskice (Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage, 2001). The “varieties” approach treats Anglo-Saxon capitalisms like Britain and the US as an ideal-type cluster of liberal market economies, and the heartland of neoliberal economic policy. This tends to lead to a focus on the degree of continuity or divergence from neoliberal norms in policy responses to the crisis in Britain and the US in many of the contributions. The question that begins the volume on whether there has been only a specific policy failure or systemic crisis gets lost
In the concluding essay Casey reiterates the volume's central theme: “We are thus most likely to see the development of a new phase of neoliberalism, not its elimination. The open question is whether this neo-neoliberalism will, after some years of retrenchment, return Britain and America to prosperity” (p. 274). The question of alternate readings of the systemic sources of the crisis, whether in the Marxist theory of finance capital or the neo-Weberian theory of the casino-like features of modern finance, and the accompanying question of alternative forms of political mobilization and strategy, seem to fall to the side. But Casey's conclusion can also be read to suggest that comparative politics should remain attuned to the big themes of class and state power that lie at the heart of comparative political economy.
