For decades, scholars have been asking what motivates members of Congress. Some of the most enduring works in this regard have tried to explain congressional action by focusing on rational choice, institutional structures, or both. For instance, in Congressmen in Committees (1973) and Home Style (1978), Richard Fenno claims that members of Congress are rational actors whose goals are shaped, in part, by congressional committee structure and the makeup of their constituencies. Another seminal work, David Mayhew's Congress: The Electoral Connection (1974), views reelection as the proximate goal, but how members achieve this can only be understood by examining the rules of Congress and its structure. William F. Connelly's James Madison Rules America synthesizes these and other traditions by claiming that rational choice and institutions both matter.

Connelly's work begins with a rather simple question: “Should the minority party in the House adopt a strategy of compromise or confrontation in seeking to advance their agenda and ambition?” (p. 1). From this, he builds on many other questions about the best ways for members of Congress to achieve their goals, which include not just reelection but also “reputation, honor, love of the Senate or House, concern for the common good, patriotism, and even veneration for the Constitution” (p. 174). James Madison, claims Connelly, correctly identified these diverse goals. Indeed, Madison noted in Federalist No. 10 that the latent causes of faction are sewn into the seeds of man; these include differences of interest, opinion, and passion—meaning that more than self-interest (i.e., reelection) motivates the members. Connelly correctly understands Madison's complex, realistic view of human nature and the varied motivations that Madison believed we all possessed. Madison expressed this realism throughout his career in many works, including both before and after he penned his selections to The Federalist.

Connelly goes further, describing Madison and the other Founders' enduring influence. Not only are House members and Senators motivated by more than their own interests; the structure of Congress and the Constitution also mold their goals and actions. In other words, institutions matter. Connelly correctly illustrates the differences between the British parliamentary system and our system of separated powers. Each party in the British system knows if it is in the majority or the minority once a government is formed. In the United States, however, it is not that simple. The author explains that both the majority party and the minority party in Congress can be the government and the opposition at the same time. For instance, in divided government, the majority party in Congress may be acting in opposition to the president of the other party (p. 3). Likewise, even if a party holds majorities in both chambers of Congress, the House will tend to be more parochial in nature and the Senate more national in nature because of the different constituencies they have (p. 168), and this was even more the case under Madison's original design, wherein senators were selected by state legislatures (p. 240). Thus, Madison and the other Founders still influence how members of Congress act and what they need to do to be successful.

Madison's view, just like his system, was a complex one. Pluralism, the Wilsonian vision of party government, and rational choice all bring something to the table, but only if we incorporate all of these paradigms do we fully understand partisan behavior in Congress. According to Connelly, our “republican institutions balance the ambition of individuals, the pluralism of intense minorities, and the majoritarianism of party government” (p. 233). Again, he demonstrates that he grasps Madison's complex vision, one that too many, including political science giants such as Woodrow Wilson, have misunderstood. Connelly himself points this out, noting that Wilson's simplistic vision of the separation of powers as nothing more than checks and balances misses the Madisonian mark because this structure also makes each branch a specialist in its area and empowers each branch (pp. 120–22). Connelly correctly notes that Madison was not a pessimist who wanted government to grind to a halt. Rather, he wanted to ensure that government had the ability to act when necessary. Indeed, one of Madison's primary objections to the Articles of Confederation was the inability of the national government to respond to crises such as Shays' Rebellion.

Connelly gives many examples detailing how Madison's complex structures still inhibit and empower members of Congress. These examples range from Federalist and Democratic-Republican battles of the 1790s to the most recent health-care debate. In particular, he focuses on the way that institutional rules ultimately have curbed the behavior of those who forget that the Constitution still matters. Here, he discusses the speakerships of Nancy Pelosi and Newt Gingrich. For example, according to the author, one of Gingrich's problems was trying to run the government as Speaker of the House, neglecting the president's unilateral position of energy and the Senate's tendency to slow down congressional action. These seem like self-evident truths in a separation-of-powers system, but Connelly reminds us of their (and Madison's) enduring importance more than two centuries later.

The author could have gone further in describing how the American constitutional structure does not just shape the methods the two parties should use to succeed; it also has given us the two party system itself. Although Connelly touches upon this idea, he could have more fully explained how our first-past-the-post, single-member districts also make our system gravitate toward only two viable congressional parties at any one time.

Connelly offers a complete and accurate picture of Madison's theory. Although he confines most of his evidence to the fourth president's contributions to The Federalist, Connelly does try to broaden his sources a bit, such as referring to Madison's 1792 essay, “A Candid State of Parties.” He could have been even more thorough by examining more of Madison's public writings and public letters before and after the ratification struggle. Doing so would have helped demonstrate that Madison truly held these views and was not simply taking these positions when defending the proposed Constitution in 1787–88.

Another qualm (and it is a small one) regards the overall structure of the book. After briefly describing his theory, Connelly wades through the struggles of Pelosi and Gingrich in two chapters, then spends two more chapters describing Woodrow Wilson's and Alexis de Tocqueville's views of the separation of powers and Congress. Finally, the author describes Madison's views in detail in Chapter 5. One wonders why he waited this long to fully reveal his position on Madison, as doing so leaves the reader unsure for approximately 150 pages as to why the struggles of Pelosi and Gingrich are due to Madison's theories and institutional design. This structure also forces Connelly to restate some points multiple times throughout the book, although this is not necessarily a bad thing when explaining such a complex subject.

These minor quibbles aside, the book is an important work of scholarship on Congress, the separation of powers, and American political parties. Connelly carefully weaves virtually all major works on Congress into his analysis and thoroughly explains to the reader why James Madison still rules America.