Outer movements resemble inner movements, they speak the same language.
—Jacques Lecoq, The Moving Body Footnote 1It may even be possible to say that bodily movement, transformed onto the level of action, is the very thing that constitutes the self.
—Shaun Gallagher, How the Body Shapes the Mind Footnote 2The theatre pedagogy of Jacques Lecoq (1921–99) is founded on the principle that all physical, psychological, intellectual, and emotional performance registersFootnote 3 can be accessed by prioritizing the moving body. Therefore, a Lecoq-based approach is in contrast to dominant principles of psychologically based acting that privilege working through emotion and psychology. While Lecoq pedagogy does not discount these performance registers, normally considered to belong to the “internal” world of the actor, Lecoq's work reaches them through physical action. Lecoq pedagogy considers it possible to learn how to shape and manage these registers by mastering the moving body as creative theatrical agent.Footnote 4 This pedagogical strategy at first reiterates and then inverts the mind privilege of a Cartesian mind–body dichotomy, but ultimately confounds it, reorienting the constitution of body and mind. This reconstitution results in a new, emergent, antidualistic configuration where somatic intelligence accesses and encompasses all intelligence, and is initiated and accomplished through the physical act.
This article considers Lecoq pedagogy in relation to the cognitive protoparadigm of enaction, born from the work of Francisco J. Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch in 1991,Footnote 5 and as outlined by John Stewart, Olivier Gapenne, and Ezequiel A. Di Paolo.Footnote 6 From an enactive vantage point, it engages the work of cognitive philosophers Shaun Gallagher, Alva Noë, and Mark Johnson, along with cognitive linguist George Lakoff. Bringing Lecoq pedagogy into conversation with Gallagher's definitions of body image and body schema, Noë’s notion of enactive perception, and Lakoff and Johnson's understanding of image schema, this article proposes that these theatrical exercises do not merely equip the performer with theatrical technique. By enhancing body schema, perception, and meaning-making abilities, these practices make a more significant change by inducing a fundamental cognitive augmentation that leads to a broad creative agency. This manifests as Lecoq's ultimate theatrical figure—the “actor-creator.”Footnote 7 Putting Lecoq pedagogy and enaction into this conversation further reveals the ramifications of Lecoq's actor-creator as not just a creative or even cognitive agent, but ultimately an epistemological and ontological one.
Introducing the Terrains
Jacques Lecoq was a theatre artist who developed his own unique theatre pedagogy through his experience in sports, physical therapy, and a variety of theatrical traditions including that of Jacques Copeau (via Copeau's son-in-law, Jean Dasté) and commedia dell'arte during an eight-year stay in Italy. As a mid-to-late twentieth-century European theatre artist, Lecoq's ideas circulated from within certain European theatrical traditions but were also in contrast to major Western psychologically based approaches. In this way his work, even as it was widely disseminated, often remained as an alternative to mainstream approaches. Rare in both his longevity as principal teacher and his relative isolation from wider theatrical movements outside of his school, École Internationale de Théâtre Jacques Lecoq, Lecoq developed his pedagogy in a concentrated, sustained way for more than forty years. Lecoq did not claim to invent anything new; rather, he gathered material from his wide range of influences to craft a pedagogical journey that includes movement analysis, improvisation, collective creation, and investigation into a variety of European theatrical forms. All of the elements of his pedagogy are explored through movement as the main investigatory mode.Footnote 8 The primary aim of Lecoq pedagogy is to equip actors with the ability to create theatre that does not yet exist, theatre that they will fashion in response to their respective future contexts. Although the pedagogy does venture into various styles, including commedia dell'arte, Greek tragedy, and melodrama, it does so with the aim of investigating how these styles grow out of a broad theatrical bedrock, remanifesting in particular dramatic contexts. This is why there is no particular Lecoq “style.”Footnote 9 Lecoq pedagogy sees style as transitory—a result of a particular crystallization of theatrical dynamic in a specific context. The actor-creator, the ideal figure forged by Lecoq pedagogy, can become responsible for the entire process of theatrical creation. This figure is not merely an actor who can interpret roles in a variety of styles, but someone who can also cross into the arenas of writer, director, or designer. This total theatre artist, versed in the most foundational principles of theatrical creation, may take on a single creative position at any particular time, but bases her or his work on a deep, broad, and visceral understanding of overall theatrical composition, performance, and communication.
Lecoq's pedagogy was developed over the same period as contemporary cognitive science. An early approach to cognitive science—cognitivism—was developed in the 1950s and used the metaphor of a computer to explain human cognition.Footnote 10 In cognitivism, the brain is conceived of as a hard drive into which the body feeds information about its sensorial experience with the environment, for processing. The mind and behavior become a result of this “computational” process. Cognitivism did three things relevant to this discussion: it attributed “mind” to a brain that was separate from the body; it separated the person from the environment; and because of these bifurcations, it proposed that the mind needed a mechanism that could mediate between mind and body, and between person and world. This mechanism was envisioned to be responsible for creating “representations” that the mind could use to understand sensorimotor inputs from the body and environment. The notion of a representational mechanism was vague and underexplained, and it locked in a separation between brains and bodies, not to mention between people and environments.
The enactive approach to understanding cognition, however—with which I am primarily concerned here, and which developed a little later—sees cognition as an emergent process constituted by the whole body–brain organism in conjunction with the environment. In this sense, “mind” is accomplished in the very fact of brains, bodies, and environments in cooperative relation. This account does away with such notions of “representation” altogether.Footnote 11 Ezequiel A. Di Paolo, Marieke Rodhe, and Hanne De Jaegher articulate the central tenets of enaction as, “autonomy, sense-making, emergence, embodiment, and experience.”Footnote 12
Autonomy points to the fact that an organism exists to survive distinct, but not separate, from its environment. An organism must take from the environment to survive, so both its dependence on and distinction from the environment are crucial. Sense-making articulates how “organisms cast a web of significance on their world.”Footnote 13 In other words, by virtue of the fact of their autonomy, organisms have a certain purposefulness in the world—to sustain themselves. Therefore their actions are always directed with this goal and are sense-laden from the beginning. Emergence refers to the fact that enaction explains an organism as process, not a static product. The organism manifests through a process of interaction. Embodiment points to enaction's understanding of cognition as constituted through the entire body (including the brain and all other parts of the body). This is in contrast to the notion of a mind that is encased in a brain. Experience, in the enactive approach, is not a result of cognition but, rather, an important function within it. For an autonomous organism, experience allows it to monitor its status and sustain or adjust itself for the sake of its maintenance. Experience is also a method for understanding cognition, since enaction sees scientific and phenomenological approaches as complementary rather than oppositional.
Cognitive scientists have taken enaction (many of its core ideas having come from biology) and extended it to other areas, including cognition as a whole and even the notion of the “self.”Footnote 14 I take up their invitation to extend its application by thinking about Lecoq's actor-creator as an enactive system. Because enaction envisions cognition as an emergent process, in one important temporal sense, cognition happens as one ongoing, complex, processual event.Footnote 15 According to enaction, all factors of an emergent system converge to manifest it.
While I propose emergence as a feature of the actor-creator, I also use the conceptual framework offered by the two developmental levels in Lecoq's pedagogy: the foundational and the executional.Footnote 16 Foundational refers to the basal capacities of the actor (many of which are unconscious) that create the bedrock upon and through which particular skills can emerge. Executional refers to the more visible (and often conscious) capacities and skills needed to execute theatrical choices. For example, a masked actor-creator can choose (or execute) a particular blocking and distance between herself and the audience suitable to the particular mask only because she has developed her (foundational) proprioceptive sensitivities and capacities through actor training.
In this article, I am prioritizing the foundational to see how basal cognitive features, introductory exercises, and basic principles create a bedrock that informs the rest of Lecoq pedagogy. In the cognition of daily life as an emergent process, abstract abilities emerge “through and from”Footnote 17 the more basic sensorimotor capabilities. This hierarchical perspective expresses how Lecoq pedagogy uses the preexisting biological and cognitive capacities of movement as the precondition for the emergence of the creative foundations of the actor-creator, just as enaction views embodiment as the precondition for the emergence of cognition. In other words, such a developmental hierarchy in Lecoq pedagogy and the continuous emergence of the actor-creator are not in opposition. Although certain attributes develop first, or take “primacy,”Footnote 18 in human evolution or development, and though certain Lecoq exercises occur at the beginning of the actor's training, this does not mean that acts of human living or theatrical creation occur in disconnected steps. I emphasize how, in practice, both cognition and the development of the actor-creator are emergent.
Situating This Lecoq–Cognitive Science Encounter
This article joins the voices of a host of scholars who have looked at how cognitive scientific approaches and theatre studies might provoke new conversations in both fields.Footnote 19 These scholars have written about important topics in theatre such as dramatic literature, spectatorship, and acting. Rich, full-length discussions of acting in particular include the work of Rhonda Blair, John Lutterbie, and Rick Kemp. Blair's book The Actor, Image, and Action reframed Stanislavsky-based acting in terms of cognitive neuroscience to propose how the actor's entire process of acting does multifaceted, deep, and broad cognitive work.Footnote 20 Lutterbie's Toward a General Theory of Acting focused on using Dynamic Systems Theory to propose a fresh articulation of overarching principles of acting across a variety of Western acting traditions.Footnote 21 Kemp's Embodied Acting zeros in on how body-based approaches to acting training resonate with principles of embodied cognition and how actors might take advantage of that resonance to improve the practice of acting.Footnote 22 Although both Lutterbie and Kemp discuss the pedagogy of Jacques Lecoq, Kemp's interest in Lecoq's corporeal focus in particular matches my own interest in how Lecoq prioritizes movement and the body in actor training. My work in bringing Lecoq and cognitive science together, however, is distinct from Kemp's approach in three ways:
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1. Where Kemp is most interested in the practical ramifications, I am most interested in the epistemological and ontological ramifications.
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2. Where Kemp's practical interest in improving actor training largely focuses on the executional level of actor training and performance, my theoretical interest focuses on the foundational level of Lecoq's training.
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3. Where Kemp considers a variety of cognitive scientific principles alongside Lecoq pedagogy, I focus on applying the enactive approach in particular.
By focusing on the foundational aspects of the pedagogy, my aim is to articulate how the development of the actor-creator moves from skill to epistemology, and from epistemology to ontology.
Historical Forces and Kindred Developments
Enaction and Lecoq pedagogy may be considered as reactions to similar historical pressures and as proposing similar solutions in response. They both developed in the midst of twentieth-century displays of technological power in warfare and information technology; both were likewise deeply shaped by and disappointed in efforts to extend this capacity into overarching conceptual frameworks. Enaction moved away from computational models of the brain, mind, perception, thought, and action, seeing them as insufficient for explaining the dynamic, lived phenomenon of cognition. Though the computer was revolutionizing information technology at an unprecedented scale, enactivists saw limits to the application of this framework to cognition. Lecoq's experience with World War II and the scale of its destruction, made possible by advanced technologies of war, catalyzed a necessity to remake a devastated Europe; the old rules had failed.Footnote 23
These reactions against the perceived limits and applications of technology occurred despite the fact that technological thinking had initially shaped, or at least enabled, both enaction and Lecoq pedagogy. Whereas early cognitive science conceived of cognition as a “meat machine,”Footnote 24 this gave way to computing frameworks that helped scientists move toward conceptions of cognition that became less mechanistic and more dynamic and interconnected. This dynamism and interconnectivity became even more boldly articulated in enaction. Lecoq's French theatrical heritage includes the absorption of ways of seeing, segmenting, and shaping the body instigated by photographers, scientists, physiologists, inventors, physical education enthusiasts, and artists whose work was made possible (and sometimes funded) by a French government that wanted to shape citizen bodies for successful war efforts.Footnote 25 These scientific approaches to the body and its movements were also applied to making it more efficient for industry: Taylor's principles of scientific management bear some nonaccidental relation to the mime work of Étienne Decroux.
Lecoq and enaction developed not only within the context of these important historical developments but also within particular historical modes of thinking. Both resist Cartesian dichotomies of body and mind, not to mention binaries and dichotomies in general. This resistance also leads both to antirepresentationalist stances. Although Lecoq worked in a hotbed of theatrical modernism—twentieth-century Paris—he had a complicated relationship with it, working both in contrast to some of its major commitments and yet still being influenced by others.Footnote 26 Pardis Dabashi explains how the modernist “investment in non-knowing” makes its way into Lecoq pedagogy, and how modernism questioned the ability to know and represent the world objectively, generating a desire for “epistemic erasure.”Footnote 27 Lecoq's exercises are often framed first as investigations rather than transfers of knowledge, and, as such, are based on this premise of “non-knowing.” So while the existentialist answer to modernism's push toward epistemic erasure is to evacuate all meaning from existence, Lecoq proposes an alternative. For Lecoq, what matters is complicité: the joint, playful, complicit relation of the performer and spectator.Footnote 28 In other words, Lecoq saw the theatrical task not as a transference of stable or unstable knowledge from performer to spectator, but rather as a complicit, joint investigation. Lecoq's response to the so-called crisis of Cartesianism was to transform a modernist subject–object preoccupationFootnote 29 into a proposition of action-in-relation led by the moving body. Here, the primary duty of the theatre or the actor is no longer representation.
Enaction's reaction against the strict divide between the subjective and objective in scientific inquiry is one manifestation of its anti-Cartesianism.Footnote 30 Part of the crisis that led to the development of enaction is what Varela, Thompson, and Rosch identified as the gap between science and experience in the study of cognition.Footnote 31 That is to say, as traditional scientific inquiry into cognition objectified its issue of study, it also deauthorized the experience of consciousness and cognition (phenomenological or otherwise) as a “proper” mode of investigation. For Varela et al. this was first of all hypocritical, since scientific inquiry is always enabled through the scientist's experience of experimentation, no matter how it is structured. Second, Varela et al. suggested that there can be unique value and rigor to methods of experiencing consciousness, and this should directly augment and shape traditional scientific inquiry rather than be barred from it. In The Embodied Mind, they show how one long-standing experiential tradition that has much to say about consciousness—Buddhist meditation and philosophy—might close the gap between scientific inquiry and experience. In their formulation, mind and body are not separate to begin with, and they argue for this by demonstrating how techniques that eschew a Cartesian divide can give new insights into how consciousness and cognition work, and how they might even participate in scientific inquiry. Because enaction focuses on cognition as interaction, it also counters Cartesianism and binarism by thinking of cognition as an emergent process. Andy Clark calls the development of cognitive science “an escalating retreat from the inner symbol: a kind of inner symbol flight.”Footnote 32 In other words, a flight from the notion that symbols must do the intermediary work of representing information. According to enactive approaches, cognition does not represent something already in existence, cognition directly brings itself into existence through an emergent cocoupling with the environment. Like Lecoq, enaction proposes an emergent embedded process as an alternative to representation, with its binaries of mind–body, subject–object, and subject–environment.
For enaction and for Lecoq, focusing on the body in relation to its environment is key to proposing solutions for their disappointment in technology as a conceptual paradigm and their disapproval of Cartesian binaries. Both of these solutions that look to the body (for enaction: biology, the notion of autopoiesis, and the sensorimotor; for Lecoq: the physical body in motion) are, in effect, a harking back to the body. That is to say, both discourses looked back to previous body-centered conceptual frameworks within their own traditions and applied them to contemporary questions. Because of this harking back, both enaction and Lecoq have, at certain times, risked appearing nostalgic, old-fashioned, or naïve. But both insist on the value, for the contemporary moment, of a return to neglected understandings of the body.
Enaction's attempt to move beyond cognitivist approaches, which had made strides by using concepts from computing and neuroscience, by appealing to biology and its sensorimotor capacities seemed a rather retroactive move. Enaction was apparently rejecting more “cutting-edge” scientific fields, working against the tide of scientific epistemological “advancement.”
Lecoq's look back to the body sits squarely within French theatrical tradition. Copeau had already revived commedia dell'arte and other body-centered forms in his actor training and repeatedly retreated to the countryside as an ideal, preindustrialized environment for company activity. Copeau's work also gave rise to new strands of miming traditions that built upon the old. Lecoq himself spent eight impactful years in Italy that included a deep study of commedia dell'arte. Though not part of Copeau's training project in the countryside, Lecoq's own looking back also included seeing the body in preindustrialized environments. Lecoq's neutral mask work is centered on the neutral mask in nature, and important exercises include the actor engaging with the elements of earth, fire, water, and air.
In addition, as both Lecoq's theatrical heritage and enaction experimented with new ways of understanding the intelligence of the body, both had an interest in Asian conceptions of body–mind relations. Whereas Lecoq as a young theatre maker staged two nō plays with Copeau's daughter Marie-Hélène and son-in-law, Jean Dasté,Footnote 33 Copeau more decisively aimed to incorporate Asian practices and principles. Copeau was like his theatrical contemporaries (Antonin Artaud and Edward Gordon Craig, to name only two) who had limited contact and understanding of actual Asian practices, but nonetheless were inspired by them. Directed by Suzanne Bing, Copeau's school created a production of a Japanese nō play, Kantan. Though it could have only been an approximation of nō without the expertise of actual Japanese artists involved at that time, and it only went as far as dress rehearsal because of an actor injury, it was still understood as a particularly notable production for all who saw it.
While this attraction to the East was made possible by the orientalist gaze and historical flows of power, its potency for Western theatre artists was also due to an existing dissatisfaction with their own Cartesian formulations of mind–body relations. One of the things they saw in these texts or performances was a new way of conceiving what the body could do. Although these Western artists didn't understand these practices, this difference opened up new possibilities of thinking through the body in performance.
At the same time, if Varela et al.’s The Embodied Mind consolidated thinking that permitted the development of enaction as a protoparadigm, it has to be recognized that one of the book's central proposals is to bring Eastern thought and practice into the Western scientific conversation. To hard-nosed Cartesian scientists, this would have at first seemed like a rather New Agey, soft, and unscientific proposal. Yet not only has their book spawned the development of enaction, but science and meditative practices have since interacted in numerous ways, with meditation itself becoming a legitimized subject of scientific investigation.
Enaction and Foundations of Cognition and Creation
In both enaction and Lecoq pedagogy, action is the key mode that connects a person and her environment, giving rise to foundational capacities. In enaction, these are cognitive capacities for living, and in Lecoq pedagogy they are cognitive capacities that suit the aims of the training. By “creation” and “creativity” I am referring to the way Lecoq pedagogy sees these terms. Lecoq's notion of creation is grounded in the creation of theatrical work—including dramaturgy, writing, design, directing, character invention, and character interpretation. He also acknowledges that the work might be applied in new ways that have not yet been established. Lecoq's wife and collaborator, Fay Lees Lecoq, explained that, after Lecoq's passing, the school remained grounded in the main structure that he developed, but it continued (and continues) to expand into new directions, such as writing and voice work.Footnote 34 Lecoq himself also acknowledged, perhaps reluctantly, the possibility that his work could be taken into realms beyond the theatre: “If students feel better after doing the course, that is a bonus, but my aim is not to provide therapy through theatre. In any process of creation the object made no longer belongs to the creator. The aim of this act of creation is to bear fruit which then separates from the tree.”Footnote 35
For Lecoq pedagogy, physical action is the route to creativity. For enaction, action reconceptualizes cognition as an ongoing process of cognition and cocreation rather than as an act of recovering something that already exists. In previous articulations of cognition, the mind and its environment were separate. Cognition was the mind's act of recovering the environment's contents, as if taking an object out of a box.Footnote 36 Considering notions of “body schema” and “body image” as foundational features of both enactive cognition and Lecoq pedagogy sheds light on how each prioritizes action. To start, I examine Shaun Gallagher's notions of these terms to propose how Lecoq's theatrical embodiment might cognitively manifest an actor-creator able to encounter a wide array of theatrical inspiration and material.
Shaun Gallagher is a philosopher who has worked at the intersections of phenomenology, philosophy of mind, philosophical psychology, and cognitive sciences, with a keen interest in embodiment. Gallagher has taken his perspectives on embodiment to critique conceptions of it in enactivism, and, along with Matthew Bower, has argued against notions of embodiment that see neuronal activity as a sufficient definition of embodiment. For Gallagher and Bower, taking the full scope of embodiment seriously means acknowledging that neuronal activity is but one aspect of embodiment, and that a “strong” embodiment is one that acknowledges the whole body organism as embedded in its environment.Footnote 37 Gallagher's work is useful in thinking through an enaction–Lecoq dialogue because of this “strong” conception of embodiment, which clearly resembles Lecoq's prioritization of the moving body. Gallagher describes body image and body schema as two related levels of function: “A body image consists of a system of perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs pertaining to one's own body. In contrast, a body schema is a system of sensory-motor capacities that function without awareness or the necessity of perceptual monitoring.”Footnote 38 Lecoq pedagogy leads its students to become actor-creators by taking advantage of the preexisting workings of body schema and body image, employing and enhancing these cognitive systems to manufacture the artistic sensibilities of the actor-creator. The goal of this process, which can be achieved through repetition and enforcement, is for the lessons from conscious physical and imaginative exercise to become unconscious aesthetic sensibility.Footnote 39 Though Gallagher makes a distinction between conscious and prenoetic (unconscious) functions of the body schema and body image, respectively, he explains the functional relationship on a behavior level: “Various experiments show that visual awareness of one's own body can correct or even override body-schematic functions.”Footnote 40 Activating the results of this conscious training do not occur, Gallagher reminds us, because of prenoetic sensorimotor function, but because of the intention of the agent.Footnote 41 In other words, it takes conscious intention-determined practice to hit a tennis ball with a tennis racket. This triggers the activation and reorganization of new body-schematic abilities. This organization is indeed in excess of consciousness, but the trigger that provokes that new organization is conscious.
In Lecoq work, intention is harnessed through the structured action of the pedagogical exercises.Footnote 42 While it is action that develops the body schema, action is also the goal of the body schema. A research team led by Pietro Morasso emphasizes that the body schema is part of an overall simulation network whose purpose is to prepare the body for potential action, which means offering “information on the feasibility and the meaning of potential actions.”Footnote 43 Besides highlighting that the body schema enactively participates in cognition by using its coupling with the world to contribute both to cognition about action and to action itself, this proposes a new perspective on the Lecoq pedagogy's tightly structured proposals of action.
For example, Lecoq pedagogy introduces actors to movement analysis through a few select movements, such as eclosion, where a person stands in one spot, legs about shoulder width apart, and moves from a fully folded, compact position to a fully extended position. Instructors teach this in two ways: first by inviting actors to find the most efficient way to move from the most compact physical position to the most extended position, and then by demonstrating Lecoq's eclosion and inviting students to mimic it and experiment with the movement dynamic in their own bodies.Footnote 44 In the first stage, actors focus not on copying movement, but rather, on a process. The second stage allows students to take whatever they have gleaned from investigating a process and link it to a mimed movement. In this way action is prioritized over executing particular mimed “positions.” The organized action provides intention to engage the body schema in particular ways aimed toward Lecoq's vision of aesthetic creativity and, in turn, shapes it. The exercise also provides a model for a method of investigation through the body. In this sense, Lecoq pedagogy takes advantage of the body schema as part of an enactive tautology to teach actors how to learn through action. Here, Lecoq pedagogy can be seen as both an epistemology and a route to the actor-creator.
Although all actor training could be considered to work through, on, and with the body schema, Lecoq's goal of fashioning the actor-creator means that its engagement with the body schema is different from one that primarily or exclusively aims for character creation.Footnote 45 Lecoq pedagogy engages the tautology of the body schema for any aspect of theatrical creation, including those that have not yet been invented. It is in this way that the Lecoq pedagogy's work through and on the body schema can be seen as prioritizing foundational aptitudes. These aptitudes include confidence to engage spontaneously any new material or subjects, sensitivity to new contexts, and the ability to find creative starting points by engaging any material–physical stimuli. Because Lecoq prioritizes physical action in the pedagogical process, foundations of creativity that are activated with and through the body schema are not just proposed or modeled, they are enacted.
Part of the aim of Lecoq-based actor training, via movement analysis such as the eclosion exercise, is the development of a new mode of perception that feeds into theatrical creation and performance. Alva Noë works at the intersections of cognitive science, philosophy, and consciousness. As a leading proponent of enactivism, he has developed a theory of “enactive perception” that defines perception as enabled by sensorimotor abilities. Noë is useful to this discussion because his notion of perception as action offers a way to think about how perception, and not just skill, might be a basic capacity forged through body-based actor training, and central to what the actor-creator needs to develop. Noë’s enactivism makes a slight shift from what Di Paolo, Rodhe, and De Jaegher outline. Noë is not committed to the notion of autopoiesis, the process by which an autonomous system accomplishes operational closure, that is, not only maintains its autonomy but also produces its own components.Footnote 46 This means that Noë’s enactive perception offers a more open conception of how sensorimotor contingencies enact perception through an organism–environment coupling; it is not dependent on the person establishing operational closure in her acts of perception. In addition, whereas Gallagher is looking at basal notions of how the sensorimotor participates in creating unconscious features that enable all sorts of action (including perception), Noë considers more conscious sensorimotor abilities. Taking up Noë’s enactive perspective, one might say that Lecoq's actor-creator overtly engages her sensorimotor functions through the specific physical action of the pedagogy, and in turn shapes her abilities of perception. Forging a movement-sensitive perceptive ability is part of what makes up the actor-creator.
Traditional approaches to perception are modeled after the snapshot. This theory suggests that when we view our environment, our brains take a detailed snapshot of everything within the scope of our visual field.Footnote 47 However, Noë opposes this theory,Footnote 48 suggesting that vision cannot act like a camera, for the mechanics of the eye can take in only tiny parts of our visual field at once. The feeling of having access to the whole field of vision, Noë suggests, is something else entirely, created through a complex sensorimotor process. Furthermore, Noë claims that though vision certainly plays a role in overall perception, it is not all of it nor even its basis. Rather, Noë proposes that perceiving “is a way of acting. Perception is not something that happens to us, or in us. It is something that we do.”Footnote 49 Noë’s enactive theory of perception suggests that it is only through the possibility of physical movement and encountering the external world that we activate perception:
I argue that all perception is touch-like in this way: Perceptual experience acquires content thanks to our possession of bodily skills. What we perceive is determined by what we do (or what we know how to do); it is determined by what we are ready to do. … [W]e enact our perceptual experience; we act it out.Footnote 50
Noë suggests that the reason we have the feeling of encountering a complete and perceptually accessible panorama is because, based on corporeal experience, we trust our ability to move around and probe our object of perception with all of our sensorimotor capacities. Noë refers to perception in two ways: the actions of sensorimotor ability to investigate the environment, and the resulting and enduring confidence in those sensorimotor abilities due to prior sensorimotor experience. According to this perspective, when we encounter a tree, we perceive it as an entirety in three dimensions not because we probe every single tree with each sensorimotor capacity (which would be a highly inefficient way to live), but rather because, having probed the environment before, we trust that if we walk around the back of the tree, we again will see the other side of it. Sensorimotor experience creates an inherent confidence in the stability and pervasiveness of sensorimotor possibility.
There is no sense, then, in which the enactive approach is committed to the idea that perceivers have cognitive access to the content of experience prior to their grasp of sensorimotor knowledge. Sensorimotor knowledge is basic.Footnote 51
To consider the conclusions of Gallagher and Noë together, basic cognitive structures such as body schemas, body images, and basic cognitive actions such as perception do not just work for or with a moving body, but work because of one. Lecoq-based pedagogy shares this perspective: it is founded on an analogous principle that only through attending first to movement does the actor-creator discover and create.
Mime as Acts of Epistemological Investigation
By joining Lecoq's theory of mime with these notions of body schema, body image, enactive perception, and image schema, physical embodiment is situated as not only the key to understanding, but also the guiding mode for acting in a context that encompasses bodies, minds, selves, and others. On this view, the engaged body cannot help but produce knowledge that is tethered to the external world, poised for cooperation, and aimed for action.
Mime is central to Lecoq pedagogy as a tool for understanding and making theatre. Lecoq has long justified mime as a primary working method by asserting that it is an inherent human ability. Lecoq finds a touchstone in philosophy:
[Mime] is implicit in the phenomenon of human life itself. The ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle wrote that: ‘man is, of all human animals, the one most drawn to mime and it is through miming that he acquires all his knowledge’.Footnote 52
Lecoq situates mime as central not just to theatre but to all human knowledge acquisition. He finds his second touchstone in childhood:
Children gain their understanding of the world around them by miming it: they mimic what they see and what they hear. They replay with their whole body those aspects of life in which they will be called on to participate. In this way they learn about life, and, little by little, take possession of it.Footnote 53
For Lecoq, miming both makes contact with knowledge, and through repetition and accumulation, leads to owning it.Footnote 54 What, exactly, Lecoq means by “mime” is important, for he is not referring to the silent, trapped, white-faced pantomime panicking in a glass box fashioned of gestures. Lecoq refers to pantomime, and all other style-focused mime, as mime de forme (formal mime).Footnote 55 What Lecoq is interested in is mime de fond (a more fundamental act of miming), which he sees as a process of investigation.Footnote 56 In the process of mime de fond, the actor mimes her subject by observing and embodying it. If the actor takes a cat as her subject, she will, as closely as possible, take on qualities such as the body position, movement contours, respiration, and speed of movement. She does it, first and foremost, to grasp what this cat is. This process works with anything—people, animals, objects, even abstract things such as colors and music. Through miming her subject, the actor comes to understand it. If the actor were to then transpose this knowledge into a product-oriented mime performance of this cat, she would be employing mime de forme. Lecoq warns that too much emphasis on product-oriented mime can hinder mime's very ability to function as a process.Footnote 57 In Lecoq's pedagogical work, he excises mime de forme from the general term to point directly to “mime” as an active process. Mastering the miming process (epistemological investigation) becomes the foundation from which the actor explores how movement can be theatrically transposed into different styles. The focus of this corporeal process, as always in Lecoq pedagogy, is not the body in tableau, but the body in motion. Gallagher also focuses on the productive potential of the moving body. He suspects that the moving body is responsible for creating the body schema even as early, again, as in utero: “it may be movement (motor experience) that one requires for the formation of a body schema.”Footnote 58 For Gallagher, body movement, or motor ability, makes cognition. For Lecoq, body movement makes aesthetic ability. From both Gallagher's and Lecoq's perspectives, active embodiment enables first understanding, then engagement.
In agreement with Gallagher and Lecoq that the entry point into this knowledge is the moving body, the team of philosopher Mark Johnson and cognitive linguist George Lakoff developed the practical and philosophical ramifications of the image schema.Footnote 59 The notion of the image schema proposes that physical interaction with the world enables concepts that give rise to language, metaphor, and value systems, prescribing ways in which people interact with the world. From this perspective, the human experience of experiencing an inside and an outside gives rise to the Containment Footnote 60 image schema. The idea of the Containment image schema is that babies, or perhaps even fetuses if you take Gallagher seriously, experience taking things into their bodies and expelling them. Thus they learn the concept of a container into which things go and out of which things come. This physical experience, according to the logic of the image schema, gives rise to the cognitive concept of Containment. Therefore instead of using the concept to mean only a literal container, it can also mean something more abstract, such as being “in” or “out” of a social group. In this way the image schema describes how physical experience could give rise to conceptual construct.
Putting this into relation with Gallagher's body schema, Lakoff and Johnson's concept of the image schema would work because of and on top of the body schema. Lakoff and Johnson envision a hierarchical (yet intertwined) system whereby the most basic structures inform the development and existence of higher cognitive function—similar to the way I am conceiving of Lecoq's foundational and executional levels. Just as a vine crawls up the wall, using that wall's shape, texture, and architecture for form and height, an image schema can function only because it crawls through preexisting body-schematic processes. Johnson defines the image schema as “a dynamic, recurring pattern of organism–environment interactions. As such, it will reveal itself in the contours of our basic sensorimotor experience.”Footnote 61 Johnson goes on to give an example: “because of our particular bodily makeup, we project right and left, front and back, near and far, throughout the horizon of our perceptual interactions.”Footnote 62 According to this logic, we have concepts such as right and left because of how our bodies are situated within the world. For Lakoff and Johnson, the image schema, guided by sensorimotor experience, is dependent upon our relationship to the environment, and gives birth to cognitive concepts. These concepts, in turn, feed language and communication systems. It is this chain of events that articulates how the body, always coupled with the environment, gives rise to meaning making and communication. Johnson articulates the ramification of image schemas:
Although they are preverbal, they play a major role in the syntax, semantics, and pragmatics of natural language. They lie at the heart of meaning, and they underlie language, abstract reasoning, and all forms of symbolic interaction.Footnote 63
Johnson explains that categories of image schemas have been established, and one in particular resonates with a key principle in Lecoq pedagogy: “Because of our ongoing bodily encounter with physical forces that push and pull us, we experience the image-schematic structures of Compulsion, Attraction, and Blockage Of Movement.”Footnote 64 These structures in turn contribute to the way humans understand their experiences and guide the kinds of meaning we fashion from them. According to this logic, image schemas give rise to “primary metaphors.”Footnote 65 For example, the image schema of Compulsion, or “the primary experience” of “[a]chieving results by exerting forces on physical objects to move or change them,” gives rise to the primary metaphor that “causes are physical forces,” which in turn gives rise to phrases like, “they pushed the bill through Congress.”Footnote 66 On this view, image schemas are structures based on corporeal encounters that can extend the logic of sensorimotor experience to abstract thought.Footnote 67 In a similar vein, Lecoq pedagogy routinely extends the corporeal lessons of miming to abstract thought. This process, through Lecoq's notion of mime, proposes a continuum between the concrete and the abstract as accessed through the body. In this continuum, physical interaction not only teaches physical principles and offers physical knowledge, but also by extension teaches dramatic principles and offers dramatic possibilities.
Lecoq isolates three “modes of physical action,” which he locates at the heart of dramatic dynamic: I push or pull, I push or pull myself, and I am pushed or pulled.Footnote 68 Actors undergo a variety of exercises, from literally pushing and pulling themselves and each other to exploring where the dynamic of push and pull appears in different dramatic contexts.Footnote 69 This is Lecoq's recurring technique of moving from the sensorimotor to the abstract. Kemp categorizes push and pull as “primary actions,” a physical and theatrical corollary of Lakoff and Johnson's notion of “primary metaphor.”Footnote 70 He proposes that understanding primary actions can help actors and teachers clarify strong acting choices. I am interested in how an experience with primary actions leads the actor back to the image schema, giving her information about foundations to conceptual ideas. Going back to the foundation of communication, actors can wield it not only for the sake of character choices, but also to come into contact with the basis of “sense-making”Footnote 71 that might indeed be funneled into acting choices but could also inform dramaturgy, directing, writing, and all creative acts within the theatre.
In this sense, actors work through primary actions to experience the image schema so that they may know how to wield its potentials in a variety of modes and contexts, aligned with the actor-creator's broad creative base. Because this technique parallels how image schemas function, Lecoq pedagogy could be understood as teaching actors about how image schemas work by inducing an analogous aesthetic experience in image-schematic development: how image schemas move from embodied experience, to concept, to communication. This is because theatre makers, in an audience-targeted aesthetic such as Lecoq's, need to know how to create meaning that is legible to the audience. Through the “push/pull” exercises, actors are taught how to identify the more foundational components of image schemas in a particular dramatic context, and how to install them as central animating forces in their own theatrical moments. In traditional theatrical terms, if a scene has no “conflict,” there is no drama. Lecoq-based pedagogy translates that concept of “conflict” into a set of actions that can be literally performed, calibrated, and fashioned to resonate through and beyond the literal. Through an experience of the development and dramatic application of image schemas, Lecoq pedagogy shows how to make conflict, not just that it exists.
Masks and Cognition: Projecting the Actor into Three Dimensions
Because Gallagher's articulation of the body schema suggests that it can incorporate external objects, we can consider that Lecoq's use of the mask might be a way of taking advantage of this cognitive ability to forge an actor-creator capable of attending to the changing relationship among three dimensions: actor, space, and audience. Philosopher Drew Leder uses the notion of “incorporation” to express how things external to the body can be annexed into it, offering itself up to the body's disposal.Footnote 72 Leder identifies both temporal and spatial aspects of incorporation, and suggests that this corporeal process applies to skills, tools, and even other peoples’ affectivity. In this view the body not only interacts with the world but also absorbs it into its own expressive capacities.Footnote 73 Leder's incorporation suggests that mask work might augment cognition, permitting a recalibration of these three dimensions.
Lecoq makes use of many masks first and foremost as pedagogical tools. Only later in the training do actors explore masks designed for performance in specific styles. Masks first appear as apparatuses that cover the face. Eventually, this concept is revealed to extend to many things. Lecoq pedagogy instructor Giovanni Fusetti explains:
A mask is a structure of movement. In theater, everything is a mask. A character is a mask, a costume is a mask, the clown is a mask, the red nose is a mask, even the scenography is a mask—a mask of the space. A mask is something that reveals a body that is other than the body of the performer.Footnote 74
Significant to the mask, therefore, is a margin of difference between the mask and the performer. Lecoq instructs that a mask must maintain a certain literal distance from the actor's face, and must not be the same size as the face of the performer: “it is precisely this distance which makes it possible for the actor to play.”Footnote 75 In this way, it is difference that enables a creative state. Putting Lecoq mask work in conversation with Gallagher and Noë, difference enables the actor to augment the body schema and to forge new perceptual abilities. By donning the mask, the actor exploits the difference between herself and the mask, changing the way she moves, and therefore acting upon her own body schema, body image, and perceptual abilities.
Masks, although often literally limited to the face, shape the entire body. They make the actor use her whole body, responding to the specific provocations of the particular mask. Masks are often used in actor training as a tool to locate an actor's expressivity in the entire body, rather than just the face. Masks immediately project the actor into a mode of performance composed of a heightened three-dimensional relationship among the actor, space, and audience. Though any theatre actor encounters this relationship, the actor trained for mainstream psychological realism is often taught to preserve the integrity of the fourth wall. Since psychological realism takes the audience into account in an indirect way, psychologically based acting exercises are designed to negate the immediate presence of the audience, or to help the actor behave as if the audience were neither watching nor there. In this style, the actor's success is dependent upon the ability to focus her efforts on herself in order, paradoxically, to eliminate her normal self-consciousness. This imperative to preserve the fourth wall keeps the actor's focus squarely in front of the footlights. In turn, much of the psychological actor's focus is on herself—her behavior, her emotions, and her capacity to live in her imaginative life. Some schools of psychological acting, such as Meisner technique, ground the actor in features beyond herself, such as the relationship to other actors on stage. Psychologically based training systems, however, do not normally attend so directly to space or audience.
Masks, on the other hand, project the actor outward into the dimensions of space and audience, fashioning the actor's physical action for the sake of this three-dimensional relationship. The mask teaches that a three-dimensional engagement is the theatrical dimension. This dimension may shift according to style—such as forms that incorporate the audience into the theatrical world to a greater or lesser degree—but is an enduring, basic dramaturgical architecture for stage performance. Masks force the actor to attend to each of the three dimensions simultaneously, juggling them in each moment of performance. The mask shapes the body while the instructors’ thematic provocation feeds the specific contextual use of the mask in relation to space and audience. The nature of mask work emphasizes the importance of audience reception by virtue of its construction. If the mask covers only the front of the face, the back of the actor is not masked, and therefore the mask is only playing when the actor is facing forward. To learn to perform wearing a mask is to maintain the mask's visibility to the audience so as not to lose the cohesion of the illusion of unity created by the mask and the rest of the actor's body. The audience's ability to read the mask is paramount in masked acting. Therefore the actor must constantly monitor, in the course of her movement, that the audience has access to the mask. This is a very clear tool to teach maintaining a direct connection between actor and audience, no matter the style of playing. Different masks, however, provoke different kinds of three-dimensional relationship. Lecoq describes the mask's function as a filter, provoking the actor to make physical and spatial choices within the more limited range inspired by mask's shape and theatrical potential.Footnote 76 Mira Felner notes that, for Lecoq, masks “facilitate the discovery of the central point, the essence of a relationship, or a conflict.”Footnote 77 In Lecoq pedagogy, masks serve as distillers, tools to make choices and refine performance within the parameters of the three-dimensional relationship among masked actor, space, and audience.
Lecoq asserts that, through continued use, the mask's functions are absorbed into the actor's work.Footnote 78 At a certain point, the lessons learned through mask work will remain with the student even if she is no longer wearing the mask. Gallagher describes how tools and objects can become incorporated into the body schema, participating in its very formation:
[The body schema] frequently incorporates into itself certain objects—the hammer in the carpenter's hand, the feather in the woman's hat, and so forth. … Such extensions of the body schema are most often based on intentional usage of the tool or object.Footnote 79
Applying this principle to Lecoq's mask work suggests that it does not merely advocate a particular performance style or characterization process, but instead feeds into the foundational formative processes of Lecoq's aesthetic enhancement of the body schema. This function profits from the dynamism of the body schema, organized under the imperative to perform action. In Lecoq's mask pedagogy, the theme proposed by the instructor becomes the intention that organizes the incorporation through action. Gallagher succinctly expresses the result of such object incorporation into the body schema: “the carpenter's hammer becomes an operative extension of the carpenter's hand.”Footnote 80 In effect, the actor's mask becomes an extension of the actor in terms of both skill and body schema formation and function.
Lecoq's neutral mask, the first, foundational, and most important pedagogical mask, is fashioned from brown leather and made by the Sartori family of Italy, famed mask makers. It is a full-faced mask, calm in expression, with a relaxed mouth, cheeks, and forehead, and large oval-shaped eyes. Lecoq himself calls absolute neutrality a “temptation.”Footnote 81 Therefore, embedded within Lecoq-based practices of the neutral mask is an agitation to its founding principle. This is the pedagogical purchase of the neutral mask—it induces an impossible struggle toward neutrality, or equilibrium, and through this struggle the student learns to orchestrate the theatrical dimensions of mask, space, and audience. Lecoq suggests that work with neutrality creates “a series of fulcrum points” for further theatrical work, because only through the struggle to find theatrical equilibrium does the actor understand the full range of theatrical expression.Footnote 82 From the struggle to equilibrium, the actor can learn to follow trajectories out of neutrality, which is where most theatrical conflict (and interest) resides. This is why the neutral mask is the first mask and foundational to the actor's development.
The neutral mask is also foundational to wielding the three dimensions of space, audience, and actor because it propels the actor to encounter space and audience directly. This is not to say that the mask uses direct address; rather, the mask's neutrality inspires the actor to communicate movement-based images clearly to the audience through the space. The neutral mask does not have subtext:Footnote 83 it does not seek to comment on the action separate from inhabiting it. The neutral mask has a direct and clear relationship to space and audience. The neutral mask's inhabitation of the action is the action. In other words, the mask's action does not contradict any possible internal state of the “character” the mask portrays. If the masked actor moves toward something to make contact with it (another actor, an imagined scene), the masked actor is playing a desire to make contact. In no way is moving toward making contact a psychological strategy to move away from contact. The neutrally masked character is simple and direct.
Sears A. Eldredge suggests that the neutral mask work is based on imagery produced through sensory experience.Footnote 84 Kemp refines that assertion with a nod to cognitive science to suggest that neutral mask work is based on the sensorimotor.Footnote 85 I distinguish this from psychological realism's practice of “sense memory.”Footnote 86 Analyzing neutral mask work as a sensorimotor endeavor reveals how the sensorimotor creates the three-dimensional experience. Neutral-masked actors are given a broad theme, such as “the neutral mask moves through the forest.”Footnote 87 After the theme is given, the masked actor begins the exercise, entering the dynamic of mask, space, and audience. In the empty space, the actor is responsible to all of the three dimensions simultaneously, and begins to draw upon sensorimotor material to give the image of the theme to the audience. For example, the masked actor spontaneously chooses among a host of possible forest imagery to perform moving through branches, stepping over logs, or bending under tree canopies. Neither audience nor actor is required to recognize or use actual situations from the actor's life. Rather, performing a sensorimotor engagement with forest items (such as touching bark, walking through leaves, or negotiating the forest floor's impact on the human step) gives birth to forest images. The actor then begins to distill what is most useful. The actor is not just within a forest, but has to move through the forest. This requires a physical engagement that activates sensorimotor imagery. In this way the struggle to move through the forest is exactly what gives the neutral masked actor the ability to offer images of “forestness” to the audience.
It is not important in these exercises that every micromovement is literally understood. However, as the masked actor learns, the more specific the sensorimotor images she creates in her physical encounter with the space, the more clearly she communicates imagery to the audience and the more successfully she creates an overall sense of forestness. In this way, the actor begins to fashion her every move with this responsibility in mind, linking herself, the space, and the audience. This kind of an exercise reveals itself to be sensorimotor-based, because it works not due to actual memories of being in a forest, but through the sensation of encountering forest-like items. Even if an actor has never been in a forest, she can still do the exercise. And, unlike sense memory as something that gets the actor to a particular emotional or psychological state, the sensory engagement of the neutral mask is focused on imagery aimed at the audience. One of the tenets of some psychologically based acting is that if the actor feels the emotion, the audience will feel it as well, automatically and correctly registering the actor's internal emotional state. Lecoq-based actor training, on the other hand, does not accept this one-to-one correspondence and communication of feeling and emotion. It does not concern itself with what the actor feels but instead focuses on delivering imagery that may have emotional resonance with the audience. The sensorimotor work of the neutral mask is not the sense memory of psychological realism. Rather, in neutral mask work, sensorimotor capability is what links the three dimensions and highlights them as a foundational theatrical relationship.
This sensorimotor sensitivity serves as a permanent departure point for any style of mask or unmasked performance because it helps the actor develop the ability to calibrate the relationship among these three dimensions. As the mask is incorporated into the body schema of the actor, it augments that body schema and that body's perceptual abilities, to move the actor beyond her quotidian body. By augmenting the body schema and perceptual possibilities, the neutral-mask-trained actor moves through her creative activities in a new way. The calibration of the three-dimensional mode of actor, space, and audience is made possible through the way in which sensorimotor abilities affect the body schema and enactive perception. Through the intention of the pedagogical exercises, mask work harnesses and organizes action on body schema and perception. Masks work upon the actor at a deep cognitive stratum, affecting not just skills to inhabit particular styles, but basal abilities of perception, movement, and creation.
Breaking Binaries, Enacting Emergence
All of the thinkers and doers whom I have ushered into this conversation have had to wrangle longstanding Western binary conceptual constructions such as mind–body and self–other. While Johnson emphasizes the body's role in image schemas, he also asserts that this is part of an understanding that “mind” is fully embodied: “image schemas are not to be understood as either merely ‘mental’ or merely ‘bodily’ but rather as contours of what [John] Dewey called the body-mind.”Footnote 88 If Lecoq pedagogy proposes an aesthetic image-schematic education by prioritizing physicality, it is indeed, in one sense, privileging the body, even if it ultimately enacts a holistic body-mind for the sake of aesthetic creation.Footnote 89
To untangle this apparent contradiction we can begin by looking at how Lecoq, in practice, privileges and foregrounds the body in movement in all aspects of his training: “the body knows things about which the mind is ignorant.”Footnote 90 By separating “mind” and “body” and attributing knowledge to the body, Lecoq is clearly making use of the mind–body binary to make a point about what the body can do. He destabilizes the traditional Cartesian binary, however, by connecting knowledge to the “body” node of the binary, normally something attributed to “mind.” On the one hand, to ignore the practical and rhetorical ways that Lecoq prioritizes the body is to miss a core principal of his pedagogy. On the other, Kemp, I, and others who have written about movement and Lecoq have demonstrated how Lecoq's physically based work uses movement as an entry point into and a tool to shape attributes of “mind.” Lecoq's practical and rhetorical strategies of privileging the body are not only in resonance with a wide variety of principles of embodied cognition, but are also a necessary strategy in the face of his Western philosophical culture. Straight reversals of conventional mind–body binaries, like Lecoq's statement above about the body, endow the body with privilege in opposition to a Western Cartesian-inflected tradition that makes the mind more important than the body because it is the storehouse of intelligence and spirituality.Footnote 91 In order to teach his work in a Western twentieth-century context, Lecoq needed to counteract the legacy of this “mind” privilege. An analysis of embodied cognition and Lecoq pedagogy suggests how, although such binary conceptions may persist, Lecoq practice ultimately demonstrates that they do not hold. Enaction, as I argue below, offers a way of understanding how such tactical uses of binary thinking can actually work to produce a more holistic conception of mind–body relations.
The idea of “structural coupling” offers a way of considering how image schemas, enaction, and Lecoq pedagogy break down the self–other binary. The principle of the image schema is dependent upon a coupling between the self and other, sometimes understood as self and environment. The moving body's role in the development of the body schema, which provides the foundation for the image schema, turns upon an inextricability of self and other. Gallagher identifies this inherent relation in body schemas: “Body schemas, working systematically with proprioceptive awareness, constitute a proprioceptive self that is always already ‘coupled’ with the other.”Footnote 92 Even the body schema, so fundamental to how the individual organizes herself on an unconscious level, necessarily exists and functions in relation to the other. This destabilizes the very notion of a strict divide between self and other. Lecoq, using the example of the mime, offers another way to think through how the self and the other might be connected:
The greatest of mimes can touch the very rhythm of life, which they draw from the universal poetic sense, composed of time, space, tension, thrust, colour, light and matter, like the comic actor, who draws from the raw material of life the characters he represents. But this raw material is also present within him.Footnote 93
Lecoq's poetics always assumes that this “raw material” is something that exists both in the mime and in the other, running through basal levels of existence. The way that Lecoq enacts this sensorimotor–cognitive coupling is by assuming that, at the most basic level, the body, mind, self, and other all stem from the same substance. Significantly, however, Lecoq finds and accesses the potential of these relations through action—miming in particular—that is an active physical engagement accessing and conjoining both external and internal processes simultaneously.
For enaction, a key feature in human cognition across cultures is the sensorimotor coupling with the environment. For Lakoff, Johnson, Gallagher, and Noë, privileging the body articulates how humans access the matrix of inextricability containing self and other, and what they do with that matrix. Like Lecoq, they do this to dispense with the Western privilege of the “mind” over the “body.”
In their own ways, all of these enaction theorists and Lecoq alike privilege the body to propose configurations of dynamic interaction. Conceptually and practically privileging the body allows them to think about foundational cognitive and creative capacities. In order really to escape the binaries of mind–body and self–other, however, I suggest that features of enaction move the conversation beyond simply showing that binaries do not hold. In particular, the concept of emergence resituates these cognitive and creative approaches as active, ongoing processes, and in so doing demonstrates how even binary conceptions, articulations, and rhetoric can actually serve a holistic conception—since the entire organism is always dynamically emerging from a variety of components in interaction. Structural couplings allow a way to express difference and sameness at the same time. It also allows for different ways of articulating the same phenomenon in different contexts. At some times, it may be important to consider the wholeness of the body-mind; at other times, it might be important to privilege the body as an entry point into the organism. In this sense, binaries do not hold, but more important, binaries do not matter.
Lecoq's Actor-Creator as an Ontological Figure Created through Epistemology
By bringing an enactive perspective into conversation with core principles of Lecoq pedagogy, I have suggested how its embodied work might fashion foundational creative cognitive capacities. On the practical side, the result of this interface illuminates how the actor-creator's foundational capacities contribute to the development of a total artist with broad and flexible aesthetic cognitive sensibilities. However, we can also see that this conversation has implications that extend beyond theatrical practice. We have seen how these discourses and practices can make new conceptual tools out of old binaries. In addition, acknowledging the epistemological and ontological ramifications of enaction, we can pivot on the enaction–Lecoq parallel to see that the actor-creator also has implications for epistemology and ontology.Footnote 94 Because enaction proposes cognition as an emergent process whose experience monitors and maintains its emergence, we can consider it an epistemological process. Cognition as an enactive phenomenon must constantly “learn” about its dynamic coupling in order to sustain itself. The principle of autonomy also suggests that cognition is not just about “understanding”; rather, it is fundamentally ontological.
Enaction suggests that cognition is an emergent process born from an organism–environment coupling. Although cognition is always already coupled with the environment, the principle of autonomy proposes that, from the perspective of the cognitive organism, the coupling exists for it to sustain itself as distinct from the environment. Because its whole purpose and all of its actions are oriented toward its own existence, cognition in this sense is fundamentally an ontological pursuit. Following this parallel between enaction and Lecoq pedagogy, the actor-creator is an epistemological agent in that she comes into being through a movement-based process of learning about herself in relation to her environment and the potentialities of this coupling. In other words, the actor-creator comes into being through epistemological processes.
The actor-creator offers an ontology in that she exists as a figure who maintains her autonomy in relation to her environment. She may at times be a traditional actor-interpreter, or a deviser, or a director, but these are merely particular executional roles that she takes on in specific situations. For the actor-creator, these particular roles are outgrowths of her more broad ability, but they do not define her. Her broad bedrock of agency, on top of which specific abilities emerge, is what defines her. If we look at the actor-creator as an entity who is autonomous, her purpose is to sustain herself as capable, flexible, and able to take on a variety of practical tasks. In the theatre world, this means maintaining a broad sense of agency. This agency is a foundational capacity that serves the executional capacities. The ontology of the actor-creator makes working in any specific context possible. A performer may be gifted at the executional level as an actor-interpreter but may or may not be an actor-creator. Though action is key to both enaction and Lecoq pedagogy, for at least the latter, movement is the vehicle to action. If we take the actor-creator as an ontological figure created through an epistemological process, movement may be seen as the enactive force that gives rise to this epistemology and ontology. In this light, the ramifications of the actor-creator are wide and deep, and the full scope of movement's power is profound: movement is the engine for creativity, cognition, epistemology, and ontology. If Lecoq is known for saying that “everything moves,”Footnote 95 an enactive–Lecoq conversation can recast the importance of movement in both Lecoq pedagogy and enaction by responding, “moving is everything.”
