After the assassination of Alexander II in 1881, a frightened minister of internal affairs told the director of the Department of Police, Viacheslav Plehve, that both statesmen would soon be hanged by the revolutionaries. No such thing took place and in 1903 Plehve would play a major role when Russo-Armenian relations hit rock bottom. The minister was Mikhail Loris-Melikov, who symbolized mutually rewarding relations between Russia and tsarist Armenians in the nineteenth century. Son of an Armenian merchant family from Tiflis, Loris-Melikov served the tsarist regime with distinction as soldier and statesman.

Stephen B. Riegg's book uncovers the changing dynamics behind this relationship from 1801 to 1914. The initial phases of this relationship went smoothly for both parties. When tsarist Russia aimed at expansion in the South Caucasus, the Armenians of Persian and the Ottoman empire acted as settlers, soldiers, and spies who facilitated Russian political aims in the region. In the first three chapters, one can understand why these Armenians were so eager to join the Armenians under Romanov rule: they wanted political and economic stability under a Christian ruler. For the Russian administration, this eagerness would render these new imperial subjects politically more reliable and their economic benefits would vitalize a region where the tsarist regime had tense relations with Georgians and Muslims. Institutions like the Lazarev Institute, as Riegg aptly demonstrates, made this transition easier.

More importantly, the center of the Armenian Church, Echmiadzin, was now under Russian suzerainty. An understanding with this institution could help Russia exert a level of influence on the Armenian diaspora. In Chapter 3, Mikhail Vorontsov, the first viceroy of the Caucasus, embodies the spirit in which the local administration worked in harmony with tsarist Armenians. For Vorontsov, the Russo-Armenian symbiosis brought tangible benefits, although for some other tsarist administrators this took place at the expense of other nationalities of the region.

As Riegg shows us in Chapter 4, various tsarist officials began to voice concerns about Armenian political activism and the Armenian Church, which was not as obedient or useful in foreign policy as the Russian administrators had hoped. Alexander III created more complications as the new tsar and his like-minded ministers (who despised Loris-Melikov) launched cultural Russification and political centralization. In the South Caucasus, this resulted in the abolishment of Caucasus viceroyalty and increased scrutiny at the Armenian Church, especially its educational activities, a major theme in Chapter 5. Unsurprisingly, Armenian parish schools were shut down twice by tsarist authorities, in 1885 and 1896. In the same period, when Russia had an understanding with the Ottoman empire, tsarist Armenians’ pleas for the Ottoman Armenians created problems in foreign policy. Some of these pleas came from the members of the recently found Armenian revolutionary parties, who crossed the Russo-Ottoman border and maintained links with broader Russian revolutionary movements. These revolutionaries refrained from operating against Russia but the tsarist regime took note.

These troubles intensified when Nicholas II decided to follow the footsteps of his father on the nationalities question. Despite the complications it would bring, Nicholas II sided with Plehve and Grigorii Golitsyn and approved the confiscation of Armenian Church properties in 1903. This decision marked the low point in Russo-Armenian relations and coincided with the events leading up to the Revolution of 1905, which forced Nicholas II to change his mind. In Chapter 6, Riegg describes how Armenian discontent was addressed, starting with the restoration of the Caucasian viceroyalty. Soon after the new viceroy, Illarion Vorontsov-Dashkov, arrived, the confiscation act was annulled and the partnership between the tsarist regime and its Armenian subjects was mostly maintained. This would be a key asset for tsarist authorities until 1914. Meanwhile, as the tsarist regime recovered under Piotr Stolypin, Armenian revolutionary organizations would be crushed in an effort to ensure the political reliability of tsarist Armenians. After all, activities of these revolutionaries (both at home and abroad) had been one of the key reasons why the Russo-Armenian symbiosis was broken earlier. The impact of Armenian revolutionaries on the Russian Armenian political scene and their role in the changing tsarist attitudes deserve a slightly deeper look in Chapters 5 and 6, which cover a period in which revolutionary politics became a huge political force.

Armed with a rich arsenal of primary and secondary sources, Riegg methodically explains the evolution of this relationship from 1801 to 1914, which is not an easy feat. This careful study will make readers wonder how the Russo-Armenian relationship evolved from then on.