Spinoza died suddenly at the age of forty-four while completing his Political Treatise. Like Schubert's unfinished symphony, students and admirers have been left to imagine what the final section of the work would have looked like. The Treatise was meant to culminate in an account and defense of liberal democracy, but Spinoza completed only a page or two before his untimely death. What he did say is, sadly, not very encouraging: his last written words assert that women are inferior to men in “strength of mind and ability.” Nonetheless, since Spinoza was among the first thinkers to advocate democracy in his Theological-Political Treatise, his account remains interesting and relevant. Christopher Skeaff's Becoming Political is the most recent attempt to show that Spinoza's account of democracy has much to teach us democrats.
Skeaff is concerned that the criticism of democracy by both pundits and scholars not only is damaging but betrays a misunderstanding of how democracy was intended to operate. The contemporary discussion is generally critical of democracy on the grounds that its citizens are too prejudiced or ignorant to make wise political judgments. One solution is to mitigate the voice of the people by transferring power to a professional, technocratic elite that rules for the benefit of the people. Skeaff finds this option unappealing and turns to Spinoza to understand how democracies are meant to cultivate political judgment in their citizens.
The basis for politics, according to Spinoza, is neither freedom nor judgment but rather the striving in all things to persist, which he calls the conatus. Judgment reflects this striving as it passes through an individual's peculiarities or complexion (ingenium). As Spinoza remarks in the Ethics, we do not strive for something because it is good, rather we judge it to be good because we strive for it. Even though our passions predetermine our moral and political judgments, those judgments must also pass through our political environment which further directs and focuses desire. Freedom of judgment refers to the power to express oneself according to one's particular complexion, but that judgment continually shifts in light of our political circumstances. Skeaff presents a study of how participatory democracy, or what he calls “vital republicanism,” allows people to “generate and regenerate a political constitution or form of life in common” (3). In other words, the regime itself becomes a means of educating the political awareness of the citizens, even as it invites them to reimagine the basis and meaning of sovereignty.
Skeaff's book is divided into five chapters, each dealing with an element of political judgment. He proceeds by considering contemporary political theory and then relating it to Spinoza for further elaboration. For example, in chapter 1, he examines Roberto Esposito's “immunization paradigm” which refers to the ways in which modern political concepts attempt to safeguard life, especially beginning in the nineteenth century when public health becomes a political object, and politics gradually becomes “patterned on biology and medicine” (14). The nadir of this pattern, according to Esposito, is the attempt by the Nazis to interpret a biological concept such as immunization in political terms so as to justify genocide. Rather than shun biological metaphors, Esposito seeks to introduce new semantics to promote a more inclusive set of metaphors in political life. Skeaff wishes to show both Esposito's indebtedness to Spinoza for his “juridical naturalism” and the way in which Spinoza's thought points beyond “modernity's immunitary dialect” (16, 32). He does this by reading Spinoza's argument on behalf of “freedom of philosophizing” (libertas philosophandi) in terms of Esposito's analysis and then shows how to move beyond it by interpreting “philosophizing” as “citizen-driven reflection on collective affairs.” This view has much in common with Antonio Negri's reading of Spinoza, but whereas Negri is concerned with assimilating Marx's concept of living labor to Spinoza's thought, Skeaff wants to show how Spinoza helps us imagine the combination of “a sovereign power of decision with a pastoral power of governing subjects in a tolerant and non-repressive fashion” (33–34).
Skeaff's approach to Spinoza has the advantage of making him immediately relevant to contemporary politics, or at least, relevant to contemporary political theory. But Skeaff's method presumes that our most pressing concerns are Spinoza's and that modern political philosophy is the best vantage point for appreciating the history of political theory. One way to judge such a project is to make the case that we have understood Spinoza as he intended to be understood. Skeaff asserts that “gaining a feel for the fuller texture of judgment in Spinoza's thought requires much more than attending to his explicit citation of the term [the democratic power of judgment]” (4). This is a reasonable strategy, but it nonetheless raises the question: How do we know to which of Spinoza's texts to give our full attention? One suspects that the reader's discrimination will mirror their own political predilections so that they will discover in Spinoza what they already believed. A reader who is sympathetic to “a ‘universal republic’ (self-consciously distinguished from the national republicanism of the bourgeois state) and its innovations in pedagogy, labor practice, aesthetics, ecology, and more” might tend to neglect Spinoza's statements that are inconsistent with this vision (139). To his credit, Skeaff has embraced this burden, asserting: “I am interested in making Spinoza's thought newly available to contemporary critical and political theory … as an open system of conceptual resources that can help to question prevailing terms of debate and to reformulate the key problems at stake” (5). Under such circumstances, there is an irresistible temptation to smooth out Spinoza's undemocratic features. In chapter 3, for example, Skeaff presents a careful yet creative reading of the relation between religion and philosophy in Spinoza's Theological-Political Treatise. He argues convincingly that Spinoza offers an account of the five books of Moses in terms of a civil religion, directed at encouraging political virtues such as safety and security, rather than spiritual or otherworldly ones. Spinoza then sets out to establish a civil religion for modern democracies, which likewise eschews supernatural claims or metaphysical opinions. This is Skeaff's interpretation of Spinoza's claim that neither faith nor reason should rule the other. Instead, civil religion takes the place of both teaching practical lessons that “all individuals, ‘no matter how slow’ [can] perceive” (110). In this way, according to Skeaff, Spinoza uses civil religion to direct the conatus of individuals in ways that contribute to social and political stability. That the state must take an active role in promoting the happiness of the citizens presupposes a political judgment about the capacities of most people. To raise such an issue points us toward a more theoretical concept of happiness, available to the few. What role does this nondemocratic truth about the highest human possibilities play in our evaluation of political life? Skeaff's account may give short shrift to Spinoza's philosophical project.
This criticism notwithstanding, Skeaff's book has the virtue of placing before our attention the virtues of an older way of understanding democracy, one from which contemporary critics of democracy could learn.
