Mexico is the country of inequality. Nowhere does there exist such a fearful difference in the distribution of fortune, civilization, cultivation of the soil and population. […] This immense inequality of fortune does not only exist among the caste of whites, it is even discoverable among the Indians.
8.1 A Political Transformation
With these words Prussian geographer and explorer, Alexander von Humboldt, described Mexico at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The paragraph could have been written to refer to most other Latin American countries today. Income inequality is one of the most distinctive traits of the region. This book has recounted how a Latin American developing country combated poverty in myriad ways and what it took for competing political parties to relinquish discretion in the allocation of public transfers, limiting the capacity of incumbent governments to distort antipoverty programs for partisan or electoral purposes. The book traces a major political transformation in Mexico’s emerging democracy, which led elected officials and bureaucrats to serve the poor. We have demonstrated how clientelism distorts incentives to alleviate poverty. We have also explained how a society can transit from this type of suboptimal equilibrium in distributive politics to one in which governments deliver public goods and politicians become more accountable. From both a historical and a comparative perspective around the world, these kinds of transformations are relatively rare.
In Mexico millions of families were lifted out of extreme poverty through the establishment of a new system of social protection.Footnote 1 Despite lags in the remote areas of the country, the poor unquestionably benefit from properly targeted transfers, and enjoy better sanitation and access to local public services than before.Footnote 2 This book argues that what underlies this progress is a monumental political transformation.
The transition to democracy empowered Mexico’s poor citizens. When winning votes in democratic elections became decisive for the fate of politicians, the policymaking arena changed. Contrary to what many observers at the outset feared, the transition to democracy did not reinforce clientelistic ties, but resulted instead in the design of effective social policies. The ability of political parties to manipulate social transfers was curbed, and more competent and autonomous bureaucrats were pushed to better target social assistance to the poor.Footnote 3
The Mexican state deployed its considerable capacity and resources, including teachers, doctors, nurses, and social advocates, within a centrally controlled bureaucratic agency to extend a Conditional Cash Transfer program to virtually every village and irregular urban settlement in Mexico. At the same time, investment funds for social infrastructure successfully combined federal revenue-sharing (targeted transfers skewed in favor of the poorest municipalities) with effective decentralization (with local elected officials in charge of project selection). Removed from the national partisan considerations that drove the allocation of such funds in the typical dynamic of pork-barrel politics inherited from the past, investment in public works has translated into the delivery of water, sewerage, electricity, and other basic services in a more efficient and inclusive manner. And changes in social policy have had impacts beyond the income effects of cash transfers. Thousands of children who would otherwise have died have been saved by timely interventions.
Throughout the developing world most social programs are still characterized by clientelism and political manipulation. Can the experience of Mexico shed light on how to improve the design of social protection and poverty relief reforms elsewhere? In this conclusion we recapitulate our theoretical contributions, summarizing the main empirical findings of our study, and push for an agenda of future research that embraces conditional cash transfers as a legitimate strategy of social protection, rather than a defective intervention falling short of the social-democratic ideal of a contributory universalistic welfare state. In outlining this agenda, we provide a comparative institutional perspective on poverty alleviation through cash transfers. We suggest that this entitled social protection is here to stay, and is not better nor worse than other institutional solutions for poverty relief, such as the welfare state, church-based charity, or private philanthropy. In the final section we speculate about the future of social policy in Mexico.
8.2 Democratization, State Capacity, and the Demise of Clientelism
At least since the classic work by Scott (Reference Scott1972b), social scientists and many policymakers understand that clientelism is a false solution to the quandaries of the poor. But for politicians clientelism is an extremely attractive strategy for assuring political support. Although the scholarly literature provides good accounts of the conditions under which clientelism thrives, there is lesser consensus about the factors that lead to the demise of this form of intermediation between politicians and voters.Footnote 4
Clientelism depends on both supply and demand conditions that allow political machines to broker votes and entice citizens to pledge them. Kitschelt and Wilkinson (Reference Wilkinson2004) note the profound association between modernization and the erosion of clientelism, summarizing the channels through which economic development undermines both demand and supply factors. On the demand side, they suggest that with modernization social networks become territorially larger, which create voter loyalties to larger groups; lower discount rates make voters more patient in awaiting the benefits of programmatic promises; and the cognitive sophistication of poor voters enhances their capacity to see the causal process linking public policies with personal benefits.
On the supply side, Kitschelt and Wilkinson (Reference Wilkinson2004) note that the monitoring problem of local brokers becomes more challenging as social networks expand and citizens are spatially more mobile; there will be greater constraints on parties obtaining the resources to pay increasingly expensive votes as citizens become richer; the greater heterogeneity of voters may create greater trade-offs for politicians and deter them from continuing with particularistic appeals; and media exposure may hinder the capacity of parties to engage in corruption, fraud, and favoritism.Footnote 5
The experience in Latin America suggests, however, that the demise of clientelism can take a very long time, even under conditions of economic development.Footnote 6 Furthermore, the historical experience with clientelism in European democracies should warn against a simple modernization story being taken as the explanation for the difference between countries that embraced the programmatic design of social transfers, and those that have not, even under long consolidated democratic regimes.
In the European context, the historical emergence of clientelism is often understood as an institutional process intrinsically linked to the emergence of political parties and democracy. As initially formulated by Martin Shefter (Reference Shefter1994) and explored more fully in the essays collected in Piattoni (Reference Piattoni2001), demand conditions for clientelism depend fundamentally on cultural norms and voter attributes that may be relatively unchanging, making some countries more susceptible to this form of political intermediation. But most of the variation in clientelism across Europe, following the institutionalist account, lies on the supply side.
According to Shefter (Reference Shefter1994), when the enfranchisement of voters occurred historically after a charter of bureaucratic autonomy for public servants had been established, clientelism and patronage ceased to be an option and parties decided to mobilize voters more readily on the basis of programmatic appeals. As noted by Piattoni (Reference Piattoni2001), this institutional approach seems to be accurate for continental Europe, but is harder to reconcile with cases that successfully reformed highly clientelistic systems, like the United States and Britain.
Stokes et al. (Reference Stokes, Dunning, Nazareno and Brusco2013) suggest a mechanism for the reform of clientelism that seeks to reconcile a modernization account with the institutionalist one just described. In their view, the thrust to abandon clientelism emerges from within political parties, responding to shifts in the electorate. In their account party leaders are at odds with their copartisan brokers because of problems of agency loss. Public resources intended for clients are appropriated by intermediaries who are interested in capturing rents and not only in winning elections. The agency problem emerges because brokers have local knowledge and monitoring capacity that leaders lack. In their model party leaders are concerned about excessive leakage of scarce financial resources within their organizations. Reforms in machine politics are driven by this motivation, not an effort to curb corruption per se.
Using this theoretical framework, Stokes et al. (Reference Stokes, Dunning, Nazareno and Brusco2013) seek to explain the demise of clientelism in Britain and the United States, precisely the cases that are more difficult to explain in the Shefter model (Hicken, Reference Hicken2011). The largest weight of their explanation, however, is not institutional. Primacy is given to the effects of industrialization and economic growth on voters. As the electorate became richer, they argue, it was harder for parties to monitor their behavior; and as costs of communication were reduced, parties could appeal more directly to voters. Given the conflict posited with party brokers and confronted with these modernizing trends, “leaders were only too happy to slough off their machines” (Stokes et al., Reference Stokes, Dunning, Nazareno and Brusco2013: 201).
This is not the place to adjudicate between explanations for the demise of clientelism in the United States and Britain. But our evidence, drawing from the case of Mexico, suggests that changes in bureaucratic autonomy had powerful effects on clientelism, independent from modernization processes. In our discussion of social policy reform in Mexico, we noted that a more professional administration of federal agencies tasked with social policy was made possible by a process similar to that described by Barbara Geddes (Reference Geddes1994) in Brazil, where politicians found it to their advantage to allow bureaucracies to decide resource allocation without partisan considerations. Similar stories are told regarding the reform of the postal service in the United States, from a system of patronage structured around party careerism, to what Carpenter (2001) has characterized as reputational autonomy built on the basis of a “coalition of esteem” among the publics at large.
The main thrust of social policy in Mexico changed, as clear and transparent formulas, instead of political discretion, determined the allocation of decentralized social funds and the selection of beneficiaries of CCT programs.Footnote 7 Although we recognize that serendipity played a role in this transformation, in the sense that one individual’s role (Santiago Levy) in both designing and skillfully gaining support for his new architecture for social policy played a critical role in these changes, there is no question that the autonomous bureaucratic capacity of the Mexican state loomed large as an enabling condition for these changes to take place. The social policy bureaucrats (and the indefatigable promoters on the ground, like Enrique Bentzul) were able to put in place a program that works and to implement credible evaluations of its performance. Political actors initially opposed to the policy changes had to tolerate the new programs. As the programs expanded, beneficiaries became further empowered, shifting the balance of power within the ruling coalition and achieving permanence for entitled social protection. PRI politicians in Mexico would probably have preferred to keep their party machines; and politicians from the other parties, in fact, spent substantial resources trying to build machines of their own in the states. But agencies in charge of social policy, at least at the federal level, became professionalized and relatively free from political influence.
A final comment is in order with respect to the links between clientelism and the process of democratization. The literature has noted the importance of ballot secrecy for the weakening of clientelism. For example, throughout Latin America, an important discussion has involved the use of the Australian ballot as an effective way to prevent electoral corruption.Footnote 8 In one of the most interesting contributions, Baland and Robinson (Reference Baland, Robinson and Schaffer2007 and Reference Baland and Robinson2012) studied the effects of Chile’s adoption of the secret ballot, including a decrease in the value of political brokers and, perhaps most remarkably, a decrease in land values (owning large expanses of land with captive blocks of voters became less valuable for the oligarchy). Research in Argentina, and elsewhere, however, has suggested that political operatives on the ground can often monitor votes even when they are secret.Footnote 9
For the specific case of Mexico, Larreguy (Reference Larreguy2012) has exploited, in a truly creative manner, the difference between electoral precincts drawn to respect the boundaries of rural communities with communal ejidos and those that do not. He shows that monitoring is more likely when the “fit” between those two territorial units is close than when they are only loosely matched. In his evidence, the PRI successfully obtains more votes in places where it can easily monitor voters in their ejido community. He also shows that the provision of public goods (public education facilities) suffers in those same places easily monitored. Hence, politicians choose clientelistic intermediation with those ejidos’ poor inhabitants. It is clear that even in the presence of the secret ballot and after the decline of PRI hegemony, it is feasible for clientelism to survive, particularly in small, poor, and isolated communities.Footnote 10
8.3 The Range of Poverty Alleviation Programs in Mexico
Clientelism has commanded much attention among development specialists, particularly in Latin America, but it has seldom been studied, as in this book, in the context of the range of options for social policy interventions available to politicians.Footnote 11 The decentralization of federal programs for the construction of basic social infrastructure in favor of the municipalities in Mexico led to the creation of poverty-formula-based transfers that have transformed the way municipalities undertake basic public works projects. The Fondo de Infraestructura Social Municipal (FISM) has become a reliable source of federal monies not conditioned by partisan alignments. By decentralizing control over the selection and execution of local public goods projects, the federal government created incentives for mayors to be more attentive to citizen demands and more effective in the use of these resources. It is probable that corruption in public works, or at least some of the leakage in the flow of resources among levels of government, has also been reduced. Resources have flowed away from state capitals and metropolitan areas to more peripheral and underdeveloped municipalities, where a higher social impact of infrastructure funds can be achieved.
In contrast, Pronasol left poverty seriously unattended. Political discretion is a key explanatory variable accounting for the distortion of that antipoverty program. Ample discretion remained for government officials to fund and operate projects through the party’s clientelistic networks. There was also a great deal of corruption in the implementation of Pronasol. Government officials at all levels of government –federal, state, and municipal – diverted resources for personal gain because there was virtually no public scrutiny of resource employment. Given the lack of transparency and accountability in Pronasol’s operations, it is not at all surprising that a massive amount of government resources meant to alleviate poverty ended up in the wrong hands. Very few of these investments reached the extreme poor.
To be self-sustaining, clientelistic linkages require voters’ complicity. Poor voters willingly support a party machine because it gives them access to a steady stream of benefits and favors. Voters willingly sustain a system that is corrupt and keeps them poor. To exit the system, the voter needs to know that many others like her will vote against the machine, for otherwise she alone would bear the costs of defection. The equilibrium is perverse because everyone is an accomplice of a system that is collectively suboptimal.
This book has argued that the impetus to restrain clientelism in Mexico first came from a voter rebellion against the system. Massive voter defection after the peso crisis of 1995 brought about a reshuffling in the workings of the institutional apparatus, fundamentally transforming presidential-legislative relations, the balance of power between the president and the party, and between the federal and subnational governments. The critical moment was the loss of majority control by the ruling party in the lower chamber of Congress after the 1997 midterm elections.
All these changes, however, fall short of institutionalizing a universalistic system of social protection in the mold of the European welfare state. For many critics on the left, the new programs represent a defeat in the effort to create truly redistributive arrangements of social solidarity through which risks can be shared fully among citizens and the most disadvantaged members of society protected. CCTs are decried for displacing an agenda of social reform instead of being hailed as a triumph for the democratically empowered poor majority.
8.4 Poverty Relief in Comparative Historical Perspective
Beyond the Mexican case or the current debates on clientelism, how should we think about poverty relief strategies in the context of a redefined role for the state in the provision of social protection in the twenty-first century? In order to do so we should understand the transformation of clientelistic poverty relief into social entitlements from a comparative historical perspective. We can gain, in fact, a richer perspective of the experiences of poverty relief strategies by looking at the deep historical origin of entitlements and cash transfers, well before the advent of the welfare state.
Targeted transfers and entitlements should not be judged primarily on the basis of how they compare to an ideal-typical welfare state like the ones developed in the advanced industrial democracies during the twentieth century. Conditional cash transfer programs are not defective systems devised by neoliberal technocrats to avoid caring for the poor. They are a new institutional strategy for poverty relief emerging at the outset of the twenty-first century, in response to democratic challenges faced by policymakers from across the political spectrum. Responsive to citizen demands at a time of fiscal retrenchment, governments have become more efficient and more effective in their resource deployment. Depending on the bureaucratic capacity of the state, those strategies may well succeed in bringing an end to extreme poverty, not just in Mexico but throughout most of Latin America.
Latin American nations failed to develop welfare state systems like those of Sweden or Canada – and it remains highly unlikely they ever will. Behind the lofty ideals of the welfare state proclaimed by many governments in the region since the early twentieth century, what has prevailed in practice throughout the region is a discriminatory and regressive system of state transfers benefiting corporatist interests and the middle classes. The counterfactual against which antipoverty policy reforms should be compared is this truncated welfare state, or the alternative of leaving the poor to be tended by private philanthropy or religious charity.
While the new systems of social protection may be criticized as a step backward in their evolution toward the welfare state, Latin American nations have never been on a clear path toward the creation of European-style solidarity systems of redistribution. The welfare state in Latin America has remained truncated, benefiting only a fraction of the urban working class. Furthermore, the adoption of pension, health, and social security reforms in several countries in Latin America during the past decade suggests that, despite the evidence of overall retrenchment in expenditures (Haggard and Kaufman, Reference Haggard and Kaufman2008), many countries have in fact expanded the coverage of risk-mitigating social security institutions (Mares and Carnes, Reference Mares and Carnes2009).
The social protection regime emerging from the neoliberal adjustment at the turn of this century is undeniably far removed from the social democratic ideal. In some regards, as stressed by critics on the left, the new arrangements are a reversion to features characteristic of poor relief strategies during the liberal era of the nineteenth century. Poor relief institutions were in place for several centuries in several European countries before the advent of the modern welfare state, and had been transplanted in a rather tentative, embryonic manner to many Latin American cities, also during the nineteenth century. The political motivations and constraints explaining these forms of social protection are poorly understood, whether before the emergence of the modern welfare state or after the fiscal crisis impelling its retrenchment.Footnote 12
The new institutional responses to poverty in the twenty-first century can be traced from a comparative historical perspective to processes occurring before the advent of the welfare state. A good place to start is with the very prominent debates assessing the effects of the English Poor Laws.Footnote 13 In his classic work, Karl Polanyi (1957 [1944]) argues that a critical institutional shift (The Great Transformation) occurred in England with the abolishment of the so-called Speenhamland system of poverty relief to be replaced by the New Poor Laws of 1834. This shift would shape the way in which the state dealt with poverty from then on. The Poor Law Reform of 1834 was motivated by a vigorous debate in Britain and in continental Europe, to a large extent neglected by current scholarship. The debate is important because it demonstrates that targeted systems of poverty relief existed well before the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when poor relief was substituted by welfare state systems of social protection. In the developing world, this replacement did not occur, but poverty relief systems did have precedents in the colonial period and postindependence in the nineteenth century.
A connection between the early strategies of poverty alleviation and the emergence of the welfare state in Europe is now better appreciated (Kahl, Reference Kahl2005; Van Kersbergen and Manow, Reference Van Kersbergen and Manow2009). Specifically, the budding scholarship has highlighted the importance of Catholic versus Protestant traditions of charity (and the peculiar Calvinist version). Going back to the pre-welfare-state era allows us to understand the full range of strategies for poverty relief that were available and attempted by governments at various moments, and how they were distinct from the polar extremes of clientelistic practices and welfare-state redistributive compensation.
Tracing the origins of entitlement and cash transfer systems of poverty relief to nineteenth-century liberalism also highlights the role of church-based charitable organizations, mutualist societies, and other philanthropic forms of associational life that, for many decades if not centuries, were the mainstay of poverty assistance in Europe, Latin America, and the United States before the advent of poverty relief. The political conditions under which liberal social reformers wrested control of social policy from the Church and forged new forms of social policy shed some light on the emergence of contemporary systems of social protection as progressive rather than regressive developments.
In his Memoir on Pauperism published in 1835, Alexis de Tocqueville noted that there were two alternatives for “welfare” (p. 26): either the Catholic model of charity found on the continent, or what he characterized as the Protestant model of public charity, found in England. Indeed, during much of the premodern and modern eras, European nations dealt with poverty through a relatively uniform model of parish-centered charity organizations. The English Old and New Poor Laws were in fact institutional innovations in response to the model based on the Church.
To understand the political conditions that give rise to poverty relief strategies in the world today, it is useful to highlight the history of the country with the longest tradition of poverty alleviation programs, England. The English Poor Laws were established as a compulsory system of poor relief administered and financed by local governments (parishes) through the Elizabethan Acts of 1597–1598 and 1601. Able-bodied males were supposed to be put to work, children given apprenticeships, and the so-called deserving poor (old or disabled) relieved with “competent sums of money.” The system was secular, public, and national in scope, but administered by local government.
The so-called Speenhamland system was introduced in 1795, to a large extent, as a reaction to the challenges posed by the French Revolution, to provide compensation for the poor through local parishes, for the first time ensuring a minimum income to the poor. Eliminating this system in 1834 was a momentous decision that occurred only after a sea change in English politics. As Polanyi notes, “The Parliamentary Reform Bill of 1832 disenfranchised the rotten boroughs and gave power in the Commons once and for all to the commoners. Their first great act of reform was the abolishing of Speenhamland” (p. 101). The Poor Law Reform of 1834 was a critical moment in the evolution of modern capitalism, according to Polanyi, since it created unfettered labor markets, abolished most outhouse poor relief, and replaced it with poorhouses.Footnote 14
The larger part of the debate over the English reform concerned the issue of whether poverty relief created the correct incentives for work.Footnote 15 The main conclusion of the Report of the Poor Law Commission in England was that poor relief fostered massive voluntary unemployment. The “mythology” of the Old Poor Law has been debunked by recent scholarship, starting with the influential essay from Blaug (1963), who suggested that the 1834 report’s findings regarding the effects of poor relief on incentives to work were unfounded. The evidence regarding the use of relief by able-bodied men was highly suspect.Footnote 16 Moreover, recent scholarship suggests that the Old Poor Law and Speenhamland may have, in fact, played a critical role in preventing famine and chronic malnutrition (Kelly and O’Grada, Reference Kelly and O‘Grada2010). But as noted by Block and Somers (Reference Block and Somers2003), the dispute over weak work incentives generated by direct income transfers to the poor has loomed large in later debates over entitlements in countries like the United States.
Perhaps a more instructive precedent of the importance of poor relief before the advent of the welfare state, less tainted by the misinformed discussions of the effects of poor relief on the poor, is the case of the Netherlands. According to De Vries and Van der Woude (Reference De Vries and Wan der Woude1997), transfers for income support in Dutch municipalities, primarily for the poor, unemployed, or dependent persons in urban areas and mostly during winter months, may have accounted for as much as 3–4 percent of the national income since the mid-eighteenth century. They may have reached up to 15 percent of the population by the nineteenth century (Lindert, Reference Lindert1998).
The origin of the system of charitable and poor relief institutions in the Netherlands can be traced back to the revolt against Spanish rule and the expropriation of Church property by the provinces in 1574. Continuing the Catholic tradition of charity, but under a Calvinist model, parishes and Reformed deacon boards (consistories) from various denominations became responsible for poor relief (De Vries and van der Woude, 1997: 656).
In 1682 a clearly decentralized system emerged in which cities and villages became legally responsible for the support of “their” poor. By the second half of the seventeenth century a coordinated network of religious and public agencies were in place, and remained so until the twentieth century. As this system became financially more burdensome and under a mounting critique of the incentives for work it may have generated, not dissimilar to the one voiced by many in the English setting, efforts were made to transform the outdoor relief efforts into workhouses. But those municipal poorhouses were never particularly successful, so that the basic outline of the poverty transfers system of the Netherlands survived well into the beginning of the twentieth century.Footnote 17 The modern welfare state of the country was built on this foundation.
From a historical vantage point, what were the alternatives to the poor relief systems of income transfers? In the case of the Catholic countries, the system of compensation to the poor remained primarily under the control of the Church.Footnote 18 The state did not succeed in wresting control of these compensatory resources away from religious corporations. Thus, instead of public funds playing a complementary role as in England and Holland, systems of almsgiving were based primarily on voluntary philanthropy and Church endowments. No system was deemed superior to the other at the time, and, in fact, a moral argument was made justifying the voluntary charity system as superior on the grounds that it created mutual obligations between persons (Tocqueville, 1835 [1997]).Footnote 19
In Italy, for example, as late as the end of the nineteenth century, institutions for pious works (opere pie) were very numerous, although poorly endowed. According to a contemporary study (Emminghaus, Reference Emminghaus1870) of the more than 20,000 institutions operating throughout the Italian peninsula and Sicily, the vast majority of them had insufficient resources to run their own administration, let alone to provide relief to the poor. Venice (and probably other cities, including Florence) was an exception, with around 13 percent of its population receiving some form of support (Emminghaus, Reference Emminghaus1870). But by leaving poverty relief to voluntary almsgiving and private philanthropy, the Italian state had, for all practical purposes, abandoned the poor.
A particular element of the Italian model of opere pie was brought to Spain by the Bourbon kings in the 1760s with the establishment of Montepios, official agencies providing pensions for survivors of public functionaries, that evolved into lending institutions and, in a residual fashion, providers of beneficence to the poor (Chandler, 1991). In the case of New Spain (now Mexico), the Bourbon innovation was the direct precedent to the establishment of the Sacro y Real Monte de Piedad y Animas (now the Nacional Monte de Piedad), founded in 1775 as a pawnbroker and still functioning today. The scale of these interventions was not trivial. For example, from 1775 to 1792 the Monte de Piedad in New Spain engaged in almost one million transactions (Villamil, Reference Villamil1877).Footnote 20
During the nineteenth century debates regarding “pauperism” wrongly conflated the prevalence of poverty with the count of the population actually receiving transfers. The assumption that pauperism could be equated with poverty led Tocqueville, for example, to claim that Portugal and Spain had lower poverty rates than England. The empirical evidence showed only that a greater share of inhabitants received aid in England than elsewhere. As late as 1875, studies commissioned by the British Parliament to explore poor relief around the world noted, in a discussion about the Russian peasantry, that widespread peasant poverty notwithstanding, “absolute pauperism or want of food is rarely met” (Doyle, 1875: 404).Footnote 21 In the same report, Portugal was characterized as follows:
In Portugal pauperism does not exist […] This evil which accompanies the development of industry in the large centres of operatives, and which casts large populations into permanent conditions of brutish ignorance and misery, does not exist in our country, which is more agricultural than industrial.
In the case of New Spain, Alexander von Humboldt knew better. In his careful statistical analysis of the demographic and social conditions at the end of the eighteenth century, the German scholar calculated that between 15 and 20 percent of the population in Mexico City was completely destitute. He understood well that poverty in the countryside was even worse. “Mexican Indians … offer a picture of extreme misery” and the “natives live only from hand to mouth” (Humboldt, 1811: 139). He characterized poverty in rural settings as a consequence not just of the culture or the Indian character, a commonplace among European observers at the time, but he linked poverty to the deficiency of colonial administration, the racial divisions of the caste system, and a general situation of disempowerment of Indian communities. He did note that conditions in mining towns were probably better, a pattern in poverty profiles that persists in Mexico even today.
The Catholic model of continental Europe was transferred to the Spanish crown possessions, although with adaptations in both the colonial and postindependence periods. During the colonial period, a combination of hospitals funded by private beneficence, almsgiving through the Church (including the resources channeled to the needy through the tithe), public granaries (alhondigas) to deliver food during droughts and famines, and pawnbroker institutions conformed a fragmented system of social protection for the poor.
Perhaps the most notable example of the hospital model in Mexico would be the Hospital de Jesus, the first hospital in the hemisphere founded by Hernan Cortez himself in 1524, sustained until 1932 by the Pignatelli family, the heirs of the conquistador, and still operating to this day. Juan de Dios Peza (Reference Peza1881) describes the system of hospitals that took care of the poor in the latter part of the nineteenth century, to which he adds orphanages, the poorhouse, and incipient vaccination campaigns.
Almsgiving (through the moral duty of caritas) and beneficence (bienfaisance) were the prime mechanisms through which the poor were compensated for their misfortunes during the liberal era of the nineteenth century. In Mexico, the first law establishing and regulating nonreligious benevolent charity organizations was decreed in 1899. This law was subsequently modified and reformed multiple times after the Revolution, but remains in place today.
This piecemeal package of poor relief, anchored by charity and philanthropy, is the origin of the frequent accusation that social programs aimed at the poor are merely asistencialistas,Footnote 22 connoting minimum assistance that is degrading, creates dependence and possibly alienation, and is inadequate to the task of helping the poor to escape from their destitution.Footnote 23 Yet this same package is historically grounded in an early modern approach widespread in continental Europe and bequeathed to Latin America through Spanish colonialism.
Tocqueville was concerned with the moral implication of moving away from a model of charity, which in his view connected citizens in mutual obligations in a way a state transfer would never do. In the United States conservatives often argue that entitlement programs, such as Aid to Families with Dependent Childern (AFDC), make recipients dependent on the state and remove the natural incentives for work. AFDC is the most important entitlement program in the United States, emerging from the New Deal.
Arguably, one of the most striking features of the debate surrounding means-tested relief in the United States is how much of the rhetoric resonates with the much earlier debate surrounding the Poor Laws in England. As Skocpol (Reference Skocpol1992) argues, the broad popular acceptance of common public schooling was not present for the case of social protection for the poor (p. 92).Footnote 24 In contrast “local communities did not so readily compete to emulate and outdo one another in their provisions for the poor and the dependent” (p. 93). Although the United States developed Almshouses and “outdoor relief” in the English model, the support of either the federal government or local legislatures for these efforts at compensation were more driven by the distributive politics imperatives of political parties than by efforts to benefit the poor. Indeed, the rise of entitlements has the same origin, as parties sought at both state and national levels to outbid each other in legislating benefits for veterans and their families after the civil war. In their timing, entitlements for soldiers coincided with the rife clientelism of machine politics throughout the North.
In a remarkable turn of public discourse, in the United States citizens have, in fact, internalized a stigma associated with the understanding of “being on welfare” as a derogatory term, very different from a situation of participating in the “welfare state” (Gordon, 1994), which at least for “liberals” or “progressives” should have a positive connotation. Although this is not the place to provide a nuanced account of the rise of entitlements in the United States, from a nineteenth-century perspective the critiques are not particularly novel or buttressed by hard evidence.
Skocpol (Reference Skocpol1992) has helpfully clarified that social policy in the United States developed through regulations and social spending that indeed buffered citizens from market dislocations, family crises, and material want, just like in Europe. But rather than creating “sets of regulations and benefits devised by male bureaucrats and politicians for the good of male wage earners and their dependents” (p. 525), the United States protected mothers and soldiers. This first phase of social protection for the disabled, elderly, widowed, and orphaned was accompanied by female enfranchisement and expansions in health expenditures to protect children and mothers (Miller, Reference Miller2008). This process never quite developed into a “maternalist welfare state” (Skocpol, Reference Skocpol1992: 526) focused on families, but it does signify that the United States was not as much a laggard in social protection as the literature on the European welfare state would lead us to believe.
The American case also suggests a rather important connection between social protection and the threat of conflict and protest which the more or less linear evolution of welfare state development in Europe tends to obscure. In their now classic work, Piven and Cloward (Reference Piven and Cloward1993) suggest that poverty relief in the United States was determined by cycles of protest and threats of civil unrest, which were counterbalanced by market forces seeking to prop strong incentives to work. In their study of poverty relief, specifically the most important means-tested program in the United States from 1935 to 1996, Aid to Families of Dependent Children (AFDC),Footnote 25 the poor seldom had any voice in government, and therefore did not necessarily benefit from many of the social policies enacted. But at times of social turmoil the poor can make their voices heard loud and clear. This resonates strongly with our discussion of the Zapatista uprising as an impetus for the reform of social policy in Mexico.
8.5 Entitled Social Protection: An Emerging Paradigm?
Most scholars have a great admiration for the history of social democracy and its success at creating a comprehensive welfare state system in Europe. They do acknowledge that the influences that led to the development of institutions that generated solidarity, socialization of risks, and redistribution are not the exclusive province of the left, but that one can trace their origin to preemptive reforms like those of Bismark in Germany. And recent scholarship has allowed a better understanding of how there were also other influences, including a religious one noted by Kahl (Reference Kahl2005), that are not dissimilar to some of the processes observed in Latin America, where the Catholic Church has had such a prominent role in charity and tending to the poor.Footnote 26
The liberal reforms of the nineteenth century in England do not appear as particularly progressive from the vantage point of the welfare state literature. And the US American historical development, moving away from partisan-controlled bureaucracies to provide clientelistic transfers under the guise of social protection, to be substituted by entitlements are usually seen as small achievements compared to the monumental task of creating full-fledged welfare state institutions. But all these are remarkable stories of social reform.
Our previous discussion, however, should recast the image of one of the three worlds of Welfare Capitalism. The “conservative welfare regimes” from Esping-Andersen (Reference Esping-Andersen1990) should perhaps be conceived in a new light. The truncated welfare state of Latin America is not retrenching because it was never too complete to begin with. It is rather being complemented by new forms of poverty assistance programs, which have precedent in the fragmented, local, and Catholic inheritance of social protection systems inherited from the past. Conditional Cash Transfers do not simply represent a neoliberal abandonment of the ideal of a comprehensive welfare system for compensation and redistribution. They are part of a less centralized or less unified approach to social protection, which was characteristic of poverty relief systems existing before the twentieth century.
The failure of Latin American welfare states to develop should be understood as only one more element within a complex system of aid to the poor. The fragmented systems of poverty relief in Latin America have always included private philanthropy, public interventions targeted to specific groups or behaviors, and the coexistence of some more or less comprehensive universalistic systems to share risks of disease, unemployment, or old age.
Entitlement transfers are often regarded as inferior because they usually involve less money than the massive mobilization of financial resources associated with the welfare state. Hence the amount of cash deployed by the state, rather than the coverage and targeting or the effects on well-being, became the metric of success. It is an inappropriate standard. Can the demographic and financial conditions that allowed for the two waves of expansion of welfare state be reproduced in the future? Can the political conditions that enabled a coalition of progressive reformers to be entrusted with such an enormous amount of power and resources be repeated? We do not think so. But this does not mean that welfare states are doomed. We are fitfully learning in the current retrenchment era how to reduce costs while respecting acquired rights and protecting the less fortunate members of society.
Mares and Carnes (Reference Mares and Carnes2009) suggest that the future of Latin American social protection is not easy to surmise under a simple linear monocausal story where globalization pressures inexorably erode the truncated social protection institutions already in place, nor by a political account where reformist programmatic parties on the left or the right articulate a new vision of how to create social policies for the realities of the twenty-first century. Mares and Carnes (Reference Mares and Carnes2009) demonstrate “the existence of significant variation across policy areas in the trajectories and distributional implications of social policies in developing countries” (p. 110), quite at odds with the conventional wisdom emerging from a narrow subsample of countries that covers fourteen–eighteen OECD economies (p. 94). In their view, means-tested policy solutions are the significant product (relatively neglected by scholars) of a political equilibrium supported by a coalition of the middle classes and the poor. This equilibrium differs from the much discussed privatization scenario where welfare states unravel and become dismantled under the forces of globalization and fiscal restraint. It also diverges, of course, from universalistic coverage with redistribution and socialization of risks. In what they label the “targeting” regime, there is a high degree of redistribution of resources from rich to poor, but risk is fundamentally individualized, meaning that “individuals face risk alone and not as part of a broader community of risks” (Baldwin, Reference Baldwin1990, p. 3). Risks are not socialized because the state exhibits very low extractive capacity, and because citizens are willing to accept only a very short temporal lag between the contribution and the receipt of benefits.
The two cornerstones of the new forms of social protection are, we argue, the establishment of conditional cash transfer programs and the use of decentralized social funds to produce public goods. Those strategies are very different from both old poor relief and welfare state interventions. The differences can be summarized in terms of the financing of transfers, their redistributive effects, the fragmentation of the institutions involved, and the role of women.Footnote 27
Financing. The first major difference between classic welfare state interventions and CCTs (and most of the new social protection interventions) is that the former are financed from contributory payroll taxes for both workers and employers while the later are financed from general taxation. In contrast to the Poor Laws of the nineteenth century and other forms of poverty relief from the modern era, CCTs are centralized in their administration: the responsibility to provide for the poor is in CCT is usually met by national governments rather than each local parish or municipality. Compensation is hence accomplished at the national level. In this sense, although there is no socialization of risk among occupational classes or industries, in the manner of the welfare state, the new forms of social protection still pool risks across the national population. The financing of public works through decentralized social funds also comes from general revenues. Rather than expecting local governments to privatize public services, or to pay for them with their own revenues, the compensatory logic of these systems is that regional redistribution can be achieved through formulas that provide more resources to the neediest local governments.
Redistribution. The systems of entitled social protection will not generate dramatic changes in the distribution of income. But to the extent that they are well-targeted they have an important income effect that reduces poverty instantaneously, and they might even improve at the margin the measures of income distribution. Even though CCT transfers are a very small portion of social expenditures, they constitute a very large part of the income of families in extreme poverty. In combination with targeted expansion of basic public services, these benefits may well suffice to provide the very poor with a gateway to what Deaton has called the “Great Escape” (Deaton, Reference Deaton2013). With CCTs children will no longer die prematurely and we should expect that people will be able to live healthier and longer lives. Decentralized funds for the provision of local public goods can be mildly redistributive, but this will depend fundamentally on the allocation formulas created to distribute them. In the Mexican case they are highly redistributive toward poor places, but this is not an intrinsic characteristic of their design. It is conceivable that such funds could be structured to favor the largest urban metropolitan areas, with very large demands for public good, rather than in favor of poor municipalities.
Institutional fragmentation. The motivation to introduce or expand entitled social protection system does not necessarily come from the imperative of serving a large social class or group, but usually from specific challenges of destitution faced by smaller groups, including the elderly, the unemployed, indigenous peoples, or single mothers. This suggests that from an institutional standpoint, there is no reason to expect a single coherent national system of entitled social protection to emerge in Mexico or elsewhere. The combination of pressures emerging from the democratic process channeling citizen demands and specific capacities of the state in various arenas and realms might determine the coverage and relative coherence of the various policy interventions. The generosity of benefits might be defined through the political process in ways that defy the idea of a minimum support or income line. After all, the definition of the relevant poverty line to establish thresholds for targeting and who deserves to be included in the social benefits will be endogenous to political processes. Perhaps the process of creation of new forms of social protection through the cumulative but fragmented social choices will gradually lead to more comprehensive coverage. Decentralization and federalism might play a role here, in closing off the route to the welfare state, leading to more piecemeal reforms for the creation of specific transfers to specific groups, many of them managed by local or state governments. That was precisely the story of entitlements for soldiers and mothers in the United States in the later part of the nineteenth century. In this sense, an important issue is whether the centralization of entitled social assistance will continue in the future. In the Mexican context, for example, the addition in 2006 of income supplements for the old (70+) in very poor communities has been replicated by many state governments and after 2010 turned into a national entitlement program for persons 65+. There is no definite trend toward centralization or decentralization, but there is no question that the institutional architecture will remain fragmented.
The role of women. The English Poor Laws sought to distinguish the deserving poor by emphasizing that aid would be targeted preferably to women. In the United States the emergence of entitlement involved the imperative of protecting mothers and widows. Mothers have in fact played a crucial role in the expansion of social services benefiting the poor, particularly in the realm of health and provision of services for children.Footnote 28 We should expect that the systems of social protection of the future will continue empowering women, rather than providing transfers to male heads of households. In poor communities, women will have the greatest impact in the choices they will make regarding their own fertility, everyday practices of hygiene and provision of a healthy environment, the allocation of scarce proteins within the household, or the priorities given to different children to continue in school. This will probably still be short from a maternalistic welfare state, but it will at least ensure that women are not at a disadvantage regarding their potential role in development.
8.6 The Future of Social Protection in Mexico
What future awaits the millions of poor Mexicans who witnessed the transformation of social programs we studied in this book? The question is not just about whether we can expect sustained improvements in well-being for poor families in the coming years, but more fundamentally, about whether Mexican citizens have become empowered by the democratic process to demand high-quality local public goods and social programs delivered as entitlements emerging from an underlying social pact, which seeks to promote a more equitable distribution of capabilities and life chances. Or will the country revert to a system of political representation with weak accountability, in which voters are captured in a web of dependence, passively waiting to receive transfers and benefits from corrupt governments that provide as little services as they can get away with?
A critical element for the permanent transformation of social policies regards the role of women (and men) that come to expect better performance from state institutions. The conditionality of Oportunidades means that communities throughout the country have learnt to demand that teachers actually attend their classes and that nurses and doctors keep health clinics open during regular business hours. The decentralization of social infrastructure funds to municipalities has empowered mayors to choose projects that resonate more clearly with the preferences of local dwellers, and many communities have learned to create mechanisms for the oversight of municipal expenditures.
Is the transformation of social policies in Mexico breaking the transmission of poverty across generations? We have shown that children were more likely to survive and therefore have greater chances to enjoy a more productive adult age thanks to the programs that the political transformation we have studied brought about. But are the children of Oportunidades, who have enjoyed better public services, likely to have better life chances and well-being than their parents? The prospect for improved livelihoods must be at the core of the final verdict of the success of these programs.
Despite improvements in accountability, the linkages between citizens and politicians in municipal governments in Mexico have been very imperfect. In particular, the institutional anomaly of the rule of nonreelection perverted accountability, because local politicians could not be punished or rewarded for their performance in office. The municipal three-year terms were so short that a typical complaint was that the first year a mayor devoted to learn how to do his or her job, the second year actually doing it, and the third year looking for their next appointment. Without reelection there are few incentives for building up programmatic reputations, and many observers have noted that corruption is more likely when there is complete certainty that one cannot continue in the job, even if performing well. The administrations of municipal government also have a dramatic turnaround every three years, even when mayors are elected from the same party.Footnote 29
The governance of municipal institutions is not particularly conducive to much citizen involvement either. Although in principle citizens may engage in planning exercises and voice their views in town council meetings, in practice there is very little voter information regarding public decision making at the local level and very little oversight of municipal public servants. Hence, although mayors have more money they can autonomously use to provide public services and expand coverage of basic infrastructure, they do not have the right incentives to think about the long-term impacts of investments in public goods on the well-being of their citizens. For example, even though expanding the provision of water is one of the main priorities of almost every mayor in poor Mexican municipalities, there are no incentives for their administrations to be very concerned regarding the long-term impact of clean water in public health. The mayor may be interested in generating a contract for a firm to expand the existing network of pipes around the town, but has little incentives to provide water systems to villages in the periphery or to ensure that existing systems are maintained and the quality of water is strictly enforced through the oversight of chlorination and frequent testing of the water supply.
In fact, our findings regarding the impact of social programs on infant mortality rates (IMR) suggest that there is little that mayor can do to improve health outcomes. They may increase coverage of local public goods, but have no authority on the quality of federal and state health interventions; no budgetary or oversight authority over health clinics; and are explicitly excluded from the functioning of Oportunidades (in order to ensure the protection of the program from political manipulation, it is important to note). Our estimations suggest that the single most powerful intervention to save the lives of children was the incorporation of families into the conditional cash transfer program Progresa/Oportunidades, followed by the democratic quality of governance as reflected in the alternation in office.
Unfortunately, there is little evidence suggesting a significant change in social mobility in Mexico. The evaluation of the long-term effects of the social programs that have been in place over more than a decade is elusive, in part due to the inherent difficulties of scientific inference in which there are many confounding variables that may explain the changes in well-being, but also because the Mexican economy has underperformed, both compared to its historical record before the debt crisis, and in comparison to peer countries in Latin America.
Our hope for a better future comes from the innovation of social programs that strengthen democratic accountability through the empowerment of poor citizens, who are now able to demand the quality of public services and entitlements they deserve. Inequality and poverty will remain a reality in every country. But extreme destitution will be overcome when deprivation from basic human capabilities and functionings is eliminated through investments in high-quality education, timely access to health services, and in general, a social policy that ensures prospects for social mobility. This is the daunting task still ahead.
