Generals in the Cabinet Room is solid proof of the merits and value of multidisciplinary research. Peri skillfully uses his knowledge in sociology, political science, communication studies, conflict resolution, and Israeli politics to offer a sophisticated and nuanced analysis of the complex and dynamic nature of the relationship between politicians and generals in particular, and civil–military relations in general. In that regard, Generals in the Cabinet Room is essential reading for anyone interested in Israeli politics and in the historical and theoretical aspects of political–military relations.
The main thesis Peri seeks to promote is that the best and more accurate way to characterize the relationship between generals and politicians is through the concept of “political–military partnership.” In talking about a “partnership,” Peri has in mind a relational, symbiotic pattern of joint responsibility, not necessarily symmetrical or equal, between generals and politicians in developing Israeli national-security policy. The specific form and content of this “partnership,” the sources and traits of which can be traced in Israeli political culture even during the prestate period, has been taking shape most profoundly since the second half of the 1980s, with the outburst of the Palestinian intifada in December 1987.
Sources of tension between the military and political echelons have always existed in Israeli history given the nature of the Israeli army as a citizen's army (i.e., Israeli society as a nation in arms). However, the weakness of the political echelon in formulating clear directives and policies—a weakness of structural mechanisms of civilian control over the military because of the nature of the conflict with the Palestinians in the occupied territories, a low-intensity conflict—is significant in further heightening this tension. This is because during the counterinsurgency warfare against the Palestinians, Israeli generals became involved not only at the tactical level of decision making (i.e., the actual conduct of the war), but also at the strategic level (i.e., the process of shaping foreign and defense policy).
For Peri, this should come as no surprise and is certainly not a unique feature of Israeli civil–military relations. Low intensity conflicts (LICs) significantly differ from conventional wars in that “they are not being conducted between regular armies but, rather, between civilian societies. Soldiers have been replaced by irregular fighters. . .they are fought in front of cameras, to gain the sympathy of the international community and to shape civilian consciousness” (p. 4). The nature of LIC blurs the boundaries between the political and the military spheres to the point where the military becomes political and acts as a highly influential and well-resourced pressure group (even to the point of playing a critical role in the downfall of Prime Minister Netanyahu in the 1999 national elections and the victory of Barak), a fact that renders extant analyses and prescriptions for preserving the supremacy of the civic-political echelon over the military invalid and simplistic.
The Israeli case, according to Peri, demonstrates most emphatically the oversimplification of current prescriptions. Although LIC inevitably strains civil–military relations, “the problem becomes more acute in the case of a nation in arms. . .in peacetime, a pattern of political–military partnership. . .rather than civilian control can generate positive and harmonious relations between society and the military. But weak political statesmanship in times of a fourth-generation war may cause the military to cross the threshold of legitimate activity in a democracy” (p. 257). Thus, dissatisfied with both the professionalism approach, according to which the military are policy implementers, not policymakers, and the militarization approach, according to which a military mindset threatens to militarize society and politics, Peri shows how the “partnership” approach provides a more valid and nuanced account of the Israeli case.
According to his approach, the military and civilian sectors are intertwined and the operations of civil–military coalitions and associations are based on common values. As a result, varied scenarios are possible. This is why at times we saw the dominance of a “diplomacy culture” when statesmen were supported by generals to promote peace initiatives, as was the case with the Oslo Accords and the Camp David summit of 2000. On other occasions we witnessed the dominance of the “security culture” when generals went beyond the original instructions of the government, as was the case with Chief of General Staff Gur's objection to disperse the Sebastia settlement in 1975 or Chief of General Staff Mofaz's public campaign in support of the buffer-zone plan in 2001, forcing Prime Minister Sharon to respond harshly: “We are a state with a military, and not a military with a state” (p. 119). The crucial point to bear in mind, Peri advises us, is that in both scenarios there were different voices with different approaches within both the military and civilian sectors.
To illustrate his conceptual framework of political–military partnership, Peri takes us on a journey along which he provides an impressive scope of examples and case studies from Israeli history, stretching from the prestate period all the way to the aftermath of the second intifada and the pullout from the Gaza Strip. He also brings revealing evidence in support of his analysis in the form of a rich amount of primary sources and excerpts from interviews he has conducted with key figures, such as the late Yitzhak Rabin and Ehud Barak (see appendix 3).
Praises aside, however, the book has several weak points. To begin with, the book almost literally cries out for a comparative analysis, which is fairly underdeveloped and surely would have further substantiated Peri's analysis and conclusions. In addition, the way the research is structured and developed strikes us as unscientific because little evidence is offered to test the validity of the book's central thesis. Yet, this should be evaluated in light of Peri's original and targeted audience—the general public. Finally, we find the overall flow of the chapters somewhat confusing; as readers we felt that certain chapters (e.g., Chapter 14) could have been located differently, thereby making the flow of argument more coherent and reader friendly. Still, Peri's Generals in the Cabinet Room is an important, eye-opening, and innovative treatment of civil–military relations, which scholars interested in the topic cannot afford to overlook.
